ACTION FOR PEACEKEEPING +

8th PROGRESS REPORT March 2026 | Reporting period: 1 May 2025 – 31 October 2025

The following 8th A4P+ Progress Report was produced by the Office of the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations. It is the result of a biannual reporting exercise in which United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping missions and relevant departments based at UN Headquarters contribute. The report speaks to challenges and progress made through the UN's efforts to advance A4P+ and strengthen UN Peacekeeping more broadly. The report covers the period between May 2025 and October 2025, and data collection took place in November and December 2025, unless otherwise noted.

A4P+ reports can be found at https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/action-peacekeeping.

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Executive Summary

Priority 1. Collective Coherence Behind a Political Strategy

- United Nations Peacekeeping missions continue to take forward and uphold peace processes at the international, national, and local levels.

- **MONUSCO** continued to support regional and international peace efforts, including by creating conditions for a future deployment of the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism (COVM).

- **MINUSCA** created an enabling environment for the peace and political process by supporting the peaceful conduct of the December 2025 combined elections and supporting the disarmament of 1,202 combatants since July 2025 and some 6,000 combatants overall since the signing of the 2019 Political Agreement.

- Amidst a sharp escalation of hostilities, **UNMISS** continued to closely coordinate with its regional partners, namely the AU Mission in South Sudan (AUMISS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Special Envoy, and the IGAD-led Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), to support a return to the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) framework.

- **UNIFIL** supported efforts to uphold the 27 November 2024 cessation of hostilities arrangement and assisted the Lebanese Armed Forces to deploy 10,000 Lebanese troops in southern Lebanon.

- From Abyei to South Sudan and the DRC, missions revitalized community-based peace structures and local dialogue, leading to the reopening of markets and the safe return of displaced persons.

Priority 2. Strategic and Operational Integration

- Missions strengthened their efforts to protect civilians and enable humanitarian assistance, including through partnerships with United Nations Agencies, Funds, and Programmes (AFPs).

- **UNMISS** conducted mobile patrols in IDP camps that enabled the delivery of lifesaving aid by partners such as IOM, WFP, and OCHA, while also collaborating with UNICEF to reintegrate children associated with armed groups.

- **MINUSCA** provided good offices, security and logistical support to the 2025 combined elections and facilitated humanitarian assistance, enabling the return of some 11,000 displaced by the Sudan conflict near its base to return to their communities.

- In eastern DRC, **MONUSCO** collaborated with AFPs to promote protection and humanitarian access in areas outside government control.

- Most missions (8) conducted CPAS impact assessments during the reporting period.

Priority 3. Capabilities and Mindsets

- In May 2025, the UN Peacekeeping Ministerial held in Germany demonstrated the continuing political commitment of Member States to peacekeeping and generated the largest number of pledges in the history of the Ministerial process, with 74 Member States committing to critical capabilities in training, technology, and Women, Peace and Security (WPS).

- Training initiatives, such as the Triangular Partnership Programme (TPP) and the Peacekeeping-Intelligence (PKI) Academy, continue to strengthen peacekeeping capabilities, including in engineering, C-IED and peacekeeping-intelligence.

- All categories of personnel met their Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy (UGPS) targets for women's participation, except for military contingents. Peacekeeping also continues to enhance the meaningful participation of women.

Executive Summary

Priority 4. Accountability to Peacekeepers

- Peacekeeping continued working to improve the security of UN peacekeepers, including by taking forward the Action Plan to Improve the Security of UN Peacekeepers. DPO adopted a revised policy on integration of capabilities for defence of bases and launched the Learning to Improve Security (L4S) mechanism.

- The launch of the Action Plan in 2018 helped keep peacekeeper fatalities due to malicious acts lower than in previous years, but one peacekeeper fatality is one too many. In 2025, largely due to the tragic drone strike in Kadugli, at 13, such fatalities were slightly higher than in 2023 and 2024.

- Missions improved casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) readiness, including through simulations and scenario-based drills.

- **UNMAS** and field missions mitigated explosive ordnance (EO) threats by, among others, clearing 8,000 kilometers of routes in Western Sahara and removing over 1,300 explosive items in South Sudan.

- Missions continued to promote the health and well-being of peacekeepers. Telemedicine became a vital security tool, allowing remote specialists to manage trauma care in **MINUSCA**, **UNISFA**, and **UNMISS**.

Priority 5. Accountability of Peacekeepers

- The number of reported SEA allegations decreased in 2025, following a period during which reported allegations generally increased between 2017 and 2024. Overall, the majority of allegations concern incidents that are reported more than two years after the alleged occurrence. It is not uncommon for allegations to be reported with some delay from the date of the alleged incident, which could be up to several years. By contrast, the number of more recent allegations—those alleged to have occurred in the year of reporting or the preceding year—declined in 2025.

- Military, police, and civilian performance evaluation scores remain high. The Office of Military Affairs (OMA) introduced a holistic evaluation methodology for infantry battalions and a new standard operating procedure (SOP) to recognize outstanding performance, and during the reporting period recognized four units. Missions identified and addressed critical performance shortfalls through disciplinary actions and remedial measures.

- Environmental management practices accelerated. For example, the share of electricity produced through renewable energy sources rising from 10% to 12% and the proportion of solid waste treated through preferred methods increasing from 53% to 60%.

Priority 6. Strategic Communications

- Missions are adapting their communication strategies, with proactive approaches to support mandate implementation and local communities. This includes the use of digital platforms and radio, which is critical for reaching broader audiences.

- Radio Miraya and Radio Okapi reach millions of listeners across South Sudan and the DRC respectively, promoting public understanding of peacekeeping efforts.

- Missions partnered with local journalists and media organizations to deliver workshops on fact-checking and to improve editorial policies, strengthening information integrity and social cohesion at the community level.

Priority 7. Cooperation with Host Countries

- Missions strengthened bilateral channels, such as technical secretariats and joint working groups, to maintain continuous dialogue on sensitive security arrangements and humanitarian efforts. For example, a joint technical working group with the government has helped **UNMISS** address emerging challenges and enable, among others, the coordination with national authorities of several last-minute troop repatriation flights.

- Violations of SOFA/SOMA persist and can impede mandate implementation and the safety and security of UN Peacekeepers. Violations include the blockage of medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) flights in **UNISFA** and challenges related to compliance with tax exemption privileges in **UNMISS**.

## Overview — CONTEXT OF UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

Geographic location of peacekeeping missions

MINURSO Western Sahara
UNMIK Kosovo
UNFICYP Cyprus
UNIFIL Lebanon
UNMOGIP India and Pakistan

MINUSCA Central African Republic
MONUSCO Dem. Rep. of the Congo
UNMISS South Sudan
UNISFA Abyei
UNTSO Middle East
UNDOF Syrian Arab Rep.

Source: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Based on UN Peacekeeping operations map No. 4259 Rev. 28.2 (E). In this report, references to Kosovo shall be understood to be in the context of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

Peacekeeping missions' approved budget and revised target budget (after contingency planning)

■ Approved budget FY 2025/26 (1 July 2025 – 30 June 2026) ■ Reduced spending ceiling after contingency measures

Mission	Approved budget	Reduced spending ceiling
MINUSCA	1174.13	997.8
MONUSCO	869.13	738.6
UNDOF	69.58	59.1
UNFICYP	57.32	52.7
UNIFIL	552.84	467.2
UNMIK	45.98	39.1
UNMISS	1186.36	1,008.4
UNISFA	309.12	263.5
MINURSO	70.69	60.1

*Source: DMSPC | A4P+ reporting. **UNMOGIP** and **UNTSO** (financed from the UN regular budget) are not included.*

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**Priority 1** | COLLECTIVE COHERENCE BEHIND A POLITICAL STRATEGY

MISSIONS' EFFORTS TO SUPPORT POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE CONFLICTS

Peacekeeping missions continue working to take forward and uphold peace processes at the international, national and local levels. **MONUSCO** continued to support regional and international peace efforts, including by creating conditions for a future deployment of the COVM. **MINUSCA** continued creating an enabling environment for the peace and political process by supporting the peaceful conduct of the December 2025 combined elections and supporting the disarmament of 1,202 combatants since July 2025 and some 6,000 combatants overall since the signing of the 2019 Political Agreement. Amidst a sharp escalation of hostilities, **UNMISS** continued to closely coordinate with its regional partners, namely AUMISS, the IGAD Special Envoy, and the IGAD-led RJMEC, to support a return to the Revitalized Agreement framework. From **Abyei** to **South Sudan** and the **DRC**, missions revitalized community-based peace structures and local dialogue, leading to the reopening of markets and the safe return of displaced persons. **UNIFIL** supported efforts to uphold the 27 November 2024 cessation of hostilities arrangement and assisted the Lebanese Armed Forces to deploy 10,000 Lebanese troops in southern Lebanon.

Examples of efforts to support for political solutions to the conflict

*Source: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. *Non-Self-Governing territory | Source: Peacekeeping Mission | UN Geospatial | A4P+ reporting.*

UNIFIL hosted 6 meetings of the enhanced US-chaired mechanism to monitor and verify the implementation of the parties' commitments under the 27 November 2024 cessation of hostilities arrangement. The mission created more conducive conditions for stability by supporting the extension of state authority in southern Lebanon. **UNIFIL** directly assisted the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in their deployment following the cessation of hostilities and supported their efforts to clear unauthorized weapons and assets from the area south of the Litani river. As a result, the LAF deployed almost 10,000 troops and cleared over 400 abandoned arms caches.

UNMISS countered persistent subnational violence by facilitating dialogues and supporting local oversight committees, effectively bridging gaps left by national political stagnation. However, a sharp escalation of hostilities in Jonglei has recently displaced over 225,000 people. Amidst this escalation of hostilities and political stalemate, **UNMISS** continued to closely coordinate with its regional partners on the ground, namely the AUMISS, the IGAD Special Envoy, as well as the IGAD-led RJMEC. This collaboration ensured joint messaging to the South Sudanese government and promoted coherent high-level diplomatic engagement by the AU, UN, and IGAD leadership. These efforts were designed to de-escalate, cease hostilities, and encourage South Sudan to implement the R-ARCSS.

MINUSCA supported the preparation of the combined presidential, legislative, regional and municipal elections that occurred peacefully in December 2025. The successful holding of municipal elections, the first since 1988, completed an important outstanding provision of the 2019 Political Agreement. The mission also successfully supported DDR processes across multiple locations, sustained dialogue with armed groups, and enabled the identification and release of children within their ranks. At the local level, **MINUSCA** strengthened social cohesion through CVR programmes.

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Priority 1   COLLECTIVE COHERENCE BEHIND A POLITICAL STRATEGY

MISSIONS' EFFORTS TO SUPPORT POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE CONFLICTS

Examples of efforts to support for political solutions to the conflict

UNMIK sustained community-level progress through the completion of 23 trust-building projects. **UNMIK**'s Mitrovica Regional Office deepened interethnic dialogue in a sensitive security environment, while the Office of Community Support engaged with local actors over 1,000 times. These efforts effectively filled gaps in municipal cooperation and fostered public trust during a period of institutional deadlocks at the central government level.

UNFICYP continued to manage tensions on the ground, creating space for dialogue following the momentum generated by the election of the new Turkish Cypriot leader. At the community level, **UNFICYP** organized 25 peacebuilding events involving 1,164 participants, fostering cooperation between Greek and Turkish Cypriot civil society. These efforts maintained critical bridges between communities and strengthened the role of women in political dialogue.

UNISFA prioritized community-based peace structures in Abyei and Bahr el Arab, revitalizing joint community peace committees that successfully mediated seasonal cattle migration disputes and prevented significant displacement. The Mission also engaged Sudanese and South Sudanese authorities to strengthen security cooperation and cross-border communication.

Source: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. *Non-Self-Governing territory | Source: Peacekeeping Mission | UN Geospatial | A4P+ reporting.

HIGHLIGHT FROM THE FIELD

MONUSCO continued to support regional and international peace efforts for eastern DRC, including the Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity and the Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Following months of political engagement, in early 2026, a **MONUSCO** helicopter landed at the Goma airport for the first time since January 2025, an initial step towards reopening the airspace. The mission also deployed an exploratory assessment mission to Uvira, South Kivu, an important preparatory step for the future deployment of the COVM. Further, **MONUSCO** continued to support local peace dialogue in Ituri, including the Aru II dialogue, which yielded immediate stability dividends. In Djugu territory, engagement with 44 stakeholders reopened markets and roads, reviving trade for Hema and Lendu communities. Similarly, an intercommunal dialogue in Fataki led to a peace statement that facilitated the return of displaced persons, reducing IDP numbers near Mission bases from 8,000 to 500. In coordination with the ICRC, **MONUSCO** secured the safe transfer of 1,359 unarmed Congolese security forces to Kinshasa, alleviating pressure on Goma.

Priority 2	STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION

PLANNING, ASSESSMENT, AND COLLABORATION WITHIN MISSIONS AND WITH AFPs

Missions strengthened their efforts to protect civilians and enable humanitarian assistance, including through partnerships with AFPs. **UNMISS** conducted mobile patrols in IDP camps that enabled the delivery of lifesaving aid by partners such as IOM, WFP, and OCHA, while also collaborating with UNICEF to reintegrate children associated with armed groups. **MINUSCA** played a decisive role in the 2025 successful combined elections, providing good offices, security and logistical in close collaboration with UNDP. The mission also facilitated humanitarian assistance, enabling the return of some 11,000 displaced by the Sudan conflict near its base to return to their communities. In eastern DRC, **MONUSCO** collaborated with AFPs to promote protection and humanitarian access in areas outside government control.

Missions conducting CPAS impact assessments during reporting period

All missions use **CPAS** to monitor progress towards mandate implementation. **8 missions conducted CPAS impact assessments** in the past 6 months

Cycle	6	7	8
MINURSO	✓	✓	✓
MINUSCA	✓	✓	✓
MONUSCO	✓	✓	✓
UNDOF			✓
UNFICYP	✓	✓	✓
UNIFIL	✓	✓	
UNISFA	✓	✓	✓
UNMIK		✓	
UNMISS	✓	✓	✓
UNMOGIP	✓	✓	
UNTSO		✓	✓

Source: A4P+ reporting. Some missions have annual CPAS assessments.

Operational Collaboration Across Organizational Units

- **UNIFIL:** The Mission Peacekeeping-Intelligence Coordination Mechanism gathered representatives of all components to coordinate threat assessments and peacekeeping-intelligence to directly inform mission leadership.

- **UNMISS:** Close collaboration across organizational units strengthened situational awareness, which directly informed strategies to address conflict-related violence, in particular CRSV. It also facilitated coordinated engagement with government officials.

- **UNMOGIP:** To enhance its monitoring capabilities amidst the 2025 escalation of cross-border tensions between India and Pakistan, the mission, with the support of the Global Service Center, developed a geospatial tool to allow centralized data visualization and real-time operational monitoring.

Protecting civilians and enabling humanitarian assistance, including with AFPs

- **UNMISS** conducted mobile patrols to protect civilians inside IDP camps as needed, including in Bentiu, Juba, and Jonglei. This enabled the delivery of critical humanitarian assistance by partners such as IOM, WFP, and OCHA. **UNMISS** also collaborated with UNDP to roll out mobile courts and with UNICEF to reintegrate children associated with armed groups. The mission partnered with UNFPA and ITC to support the provision of medical care and essential items for survivors and children born of CRSV.

- **MINUSCA** partnered with UNDP in support of 2025 combined elections. This effective collaboration contributed to the successful conduct of voting in 6,679 out of 6,700 polling centers across all 20 prefectures, with **MINUSCA** providing good offices, security, and logistical support. The mission also partnered with UN Women to bolster women's participation and protection. Beyond the electoral process, the mission continued to provide security to refugees and the displaced, including by facilitating the return of 11,000 displaced by the Sudan conflict near its base to return to their communities. By rehabilitating essential infrastructure, including airstrips, bridges, and roads, **MINUSCA** continued to facilitate essential access throughout the country, enabling the extension of State authority, protection of civilians in remote areas, and delivery of lifesaving assistance by humanitarian partners.

- As reported in the previous cycle, missions continue to implement joint interventions with AFPs through the use of programmatic funding. Amidst deteriorating conditions in eastern DRC, **MONUSCO** collaborated with AFPs to facilitate protection and humanitarian access in areas outside government control. Through a dedicated $4.2 million transition portfolio, the mission partnered with JHRO, UNICEF, UNHCR, UN Women, and UNFPA to deliver interventions in South Kivu. These resources supported the reprogramming of transition activities toward community-based protection mechanisms and support for vulnerable populations.

- **UNIFIL** continues its US$ 500,000 program (Jan–Dec 2025) with UNICEF and UNESCO to build the capacity of young peacebuilders in South Lebanon.

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Priority 3 | **CAPABILITIES AND MINDSETS**

UN PEACEKEEPING MINISTERIAL 2025

Germany hosted the UN Peacekeeping Ministerial on 13–14 May 2025, convening over 1,000 participants from 135 Member States. The event generated the largest number of pledges in the history of the Ministerial process, with 74 Member States committing to critical capabilities in training, technology, and WPS. These concrete contributions will directly strengthen missions and enhance their efficiency.

Number of pledges per theme

Peacekeeping Training, Capacity Building, and Partnerships	245
Uniformed capabilities	145
Women, Peace and Security	81
Funding	42
Safety and Security of Peacekeepers, including medical	41
Environment	22
Technology	21
Conduct	16
Other	15
Strategic Communications and Information integrity	14
Total	**642**

Source: Ministerial Pledge Tracker/Strategic Force Generation; A4P+ reporting

Status of pledge implementation as of 18 Nov 2025

Not yet implemented, 10%
On hold or withdrawn, 2%
Completed, 27%
No update available, 14%
Implementation ongoing, 47%

TRAINING

Training initiatives continue to strengthen peacekeeping capabilities, with the TPP, for example, expanding its footprint to train 597 uniformed personnel during the reporting period. In July 2025, TPP, in collaboration with the Environment Section and CDOTS, also launched an Environmental Management E-Learning Course. The PKI Academy is enabling the roll out of specialized courses on peacekeeping-intelligence. **UNTSO** is actively mitigating the risks of a volatile regional environment by routing Military Observers through specialized PKI courses to enhance situational awareness. The pivot toward peacekeeping-intelligence-led training is critical as missions like **MONUSCO** and **UNIFIL** grapple with the loss of traditional surveillance assets and the rapid proliferation of micro-drones, requiring a mindset shift toward decentralized threat assessment and independent risk analysis. Finally, an updated integrated training package on the prevention and response to CRSV for in-mission training was rolled-out through regional courses for **MONUSCO**, **MINUSCA**, and **UNMISS**.

Triangular Partnership Programme

	# trainings	# trainees	% female trainees
Engineering	6 (↑ from 5)	175 (↑ from 96)	7% (↓ from 13%)
Medical	3 (↓ from 7)	65 (↓ from 129)	32% (↑ from 19%)
C4ISR	8 (↑ from 7)	101 (↑ from 72)	58% (↑ from 25%)
C-IED	12 (↑ from 6)	256 (↑ from 161)	10% (↔ from 10%)
Total	29 (↑ from 25)	597 (↑ from 458)	19% (↔ from 19%)

Source: Triangular Partnership Programme – DOS | A4P+ reporting.

Peacekeeping-Intelligence Academy

Number of personnel trained, uniformed and civilian, existing course, and women participation (compared to the previous cycle)

Uniformed	25 (↓ from 70)
Civilian	41 (↓ from 57)
Total	66 (↓ from 127)
Women %	61% (↑ from 43%)
Trainings Offered	8 (↔ from 8)

Source: Peacekeeping-Intelligence Coordination Team; A4P+ reporting

| Priority 3	CAPABILITIES AND MINDSETS

WOMEN IN PEACEKEEPING

All categories of personnel deployed in the field met their UGPS targets for women's participation, except for military contingents. Women's representation across all senior leadership posts in peacekeeping missions currently stands at 32%. UN Peacekeeping continues its efforts to increase not only the number, but also the meaningful participation of women, including in leadership and across uniformed roles, for example through tailored strategies and trainings as detailed below.

Efforts to promote women's meaningful participation in peacekeeping operations

To support women's meaningful participation in all military roles, OMA launched a five-year WPS Strategy and a Leadership Framework. DPO is also developing a database of military women eligible for junior, mid-level, and senior leadership positions.

Targeted training expanded the pool of senior uniformed women eligible for deployment. The Women in Military Peace Operations Course trained 138 women military officers from 43 countries over the past two years, while the Police Division completed its 7th Women Command Development Course for 16 senior women police officers from 16 Member States. In addition, a Gender-Responsive Leadership programme equipped 20 mission leaders with strategies to leverage gender expertise effectively and navigate pushback to gender equality initiatives.

Deployment of uniformed women over time (as % of deployed personnel) compared to UGPS targets


Source: *UGPS – OCSS; A4P+ reporting. Data shows annual averages. SPMs are included.*

Gender representation in senior mission leadership

As of 31 October 2025, women's representation across all senior leadership posts in peacekeeping missions stood at 32%, down from 37% in the previous cycle. Six women are currently serving in leadership positions in peacekeeping operations – two civilian Heads of Mission (HoMs), three Deputy HoMs, and one uniformed HoM (**UNDOF**). Five of the 11 peacekeeping missions are led by uniformed HoMs (**UNDOF**, **UNIFIL**, **UNTSO**, **UNISFA** (acting), and **UNMOGIP**). The nomination of uniformed women leadership remains a challenge with Member States continuing to nominate men almost exclusively for these roles. Progress toward parity remains fragile as the limited number of senior posts (19) means that high turnover or a single departure significantly alters representation statistics.

% of senior leadership positions occupied by women

Priority 4 — ACCOUNTABILITY TO PEACEKEEPERS

SAFETY AND SECURITY OF PEACEKEEPERS

The end of 2025 was marked by tragedy in Kadugli, Sudan, where a fatal drone attack on 13 December killed six Bangladeshi peacekeepers serving with **UNISFA** and seriously injured nine others. The attack further underscores the serious risks faced by peacekeepers as well as the growing threat posed by UAS. The number of deaths caused by malicious acts was higher in 2025 than in the two previous years. One peacekeeper fatality due to a malicious act is one too many.

UN Peacekeeping continued to take forward the Action Plan for the Security of UN Peacekeepers and made progress in improving CASEVAC. UNMAS and missions conducted significant clearing operations to protect peacekeepers and civilians from EO threats.

Fatalities in 2025

In 2025, a total of 62 serving civilians (21) and uniformed (41) peacekeepers died, with illness as the leading cause (28).

The total number of deaths caused by malicious acts was 13, representing 21% of all fatalities. This is higher than the percentage for 2023 and 2024. The tragic event in Kadugli, where a drone strike hit **UNISFA**'s logistic base on 13 December, led to almost half of the total deaths from malicious acts (6).

### Action Plan for Improving Security

The Action Plan for Improving Security has advanced in critical areas, continuing to promote the safety and security of peacekeepers. DPO approved a revised policy on the integration of capabilities for defence of bases. The Learning to Improve Security (L4S) mechanism, designed to ensure that lessons learned from security incidents are captured, analyzed, and applied to future operations, launched a pilot to analyze incidents in **MINUSCA**. Missions also significantly increased lessons-learned reporting.

Total number and causes of all fatalities of peacekeepers, 2025

To be determined, Unknown 13%
Accident 21%
Total # 62
Malicious act 21%
Illness 45%

Source: NOTICAS/UNOCC. Data for 2025, reported as of 16 February 2026. The civilian deaths include all non-uniformed personnel, including UN Volunteers and consultants.

Fatalities of peacekeepers per year and % of those resulting from malicious acts

Year	Total	% malicious
2017	134	45%
2018	96	28%
2019	88	30%
2020	121	11%
2021	125	21%
2022	96	34%
2023	59	12%
2024	60	7%
2025	62	21%

Fatalities of peacekeepers caused by malicious acts per year and mission

Legend: MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, UNAMID, UNIFIL, UNISFA, UNMISS

Year	Total
2017	60
2018	27
2019	26
2020	13
2021	26
2022	33
2023	7
2024	4
2025	13

Source: NOTICAS/UNOCC; A4P+ Reporting. Data as of 16 February 2026. Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number. The data includes uniformed and civilian personnel (both local and international), as well as fatalities from missions that are no longer active but were still operational during the reporting year.

Priority 4	ACCOUNTABILITY TO PEACEKEEPERS

Explosive Ordnance

In close coordination with UNMAS, missions mitigated EO risks to peacekeepers and local populations, including through training activities in EORE, WAM, and EHAT. This strengthened the capacities of missions, national counterparts, and local populations to address threats posed by EOs. UNMAS also strengthened national C-IED capacities in TCCs by training peacekeepers and national instructors from 13 Member States, enabling them to deliver in-country pre-deployment training and reducing the need for extensive in mission training. Examples of operational impact include:

- **MINURSO:** UNMAS teams verified as safe from explosive threats all routes used by Military Observers (8,000km in total).

- **MINUSCA:** UNMAS destroyed 228 EO and 5,838 small arms ammunition, provided technical assistance to the establishment of a central demolition site, and supported the design and operationalization of the Compact Ammunition Disposal Incinerator.

- **MONUSCO:** UNMAS delivered 157 explosive ordnance risk education sessions to over 6,000 community members.

- **UNMISS:** UNMAS protected peacekeepers and the local population by finding and destroying 1,357 explosive items and through the delivery of explosive ordnance risk education to more than 100,000 beneficiaries.

- **UNISFA:** UNMAS provided safety induction training to 505 newly arrived personnel to enhance EO threat awareness related to landmine and explosive remnants of war.

Mission	Training sessions and number of participants in training activities targeting local populations		Training sessions and number of participants in training activities targeting UN peacekeepers	
	# of sessions	# of participants	# of sessions	# of participants
MINURSO	--	--	22 (↑ from 21)	141 (↑ from 88)
MINUSCA	330 (↑ from 313)	13,379 (↑ from 12,482)	89 (↑ from 38)	800 (↑ from 773)
MONUSCO	245 (↑ from 10)	7,646 (↑ from 608)	14 (↓ from 25)	276 (↓ from 540)
UNIFIL	11 (↑ from 4)	1,300 (↑ from 200)	9 (↓ from 13)	243 (↑ from 137)
UNMOGIP	--	--	1 (↑ from 0)	12 (↑ from 0)
UNFICYP	--	--	1 (↑ from 0)	20 (↑ from 0)
UNISFA	104 (↓ from 290)	1,537 (↓ from 2,947)	24 (↑ from 19)	505 (↓ from 532)
UNMISS	3,738 (↑ from 38)	113,867 (↑ from 6,286)	45 (↔ from 45)	2,179 (↑ from 1,209)

Source: UNMAS, A4P+ Reporting

-- No Report

HIGHLIGHT FROM THE FIELD

UNIFIL resumed humanitarian demining operations in August 2025 after an almost two-year suspension. This resumption is critical for safety and the restoration of state authority in southern Lebanon. To enhance operational safety, **UNIFIL** deployed an additional combat engineer platoon and a horizontal engineering platoon to support explosive ordnance reconnaissance (EOR) and force protection. These teams conducted visual inspections of UN position perimeters and executed over 300 EOD/EOR operations, including the clearance of 230 roadblocks, to mitigate hazards and facilitate safe freedom of movement for mission personnel.

ACTION FOR PEACEKEEPING +

8th PROGRESS REPORT March 2026 | Reporting period: 1 May 2025 – 31 October 2025

Priority 4	ACCOUNTABILITY TO PEACEKEEPERS

Overview of CASEVAC-related data

Mission	Updated CASEVAC SOP (change from Cycle 6)	# of stress-testing exercises	# of stress-testing exercises compared to Cycle 6	Coordination cell that integrates aviation, operations and medical expertise
MINURSO	✓	1	↔	✓
MINUSCA	↻ → ✓	4	+ 1	✓
MONUSCO	✓	- *	↔	✓
UNDOF	✓	71	+59	-
UNFICYP	✓	2	+2	✓
UNIFIL	✓	5	+4	✓
UNISFA	✓	1	↔	✓
UNMIK	✓	1	+1	✓
UNMISS	↻ → ✓	1	+1	-
UNMOGIP	✓	-	-2	-
UNTSO	✓	2	-23	✓

Sources: Focal Point for Security, A4P+ Reporting.

↻ *Update in process*

CASEVAC-related developments include:

- **UNTSO** conducted scenario-based drills that have proven essential for maintaining readiness and enhancing coordination between security, military, and medical focal points.

- **UNISFA** conducted a joint CASEVAC simulation and aviation safety exercise in August 2025 involving Force Medical, Aviation Unit, Joint Operations Center (JOC), and the Civil-Military Coordination Cell. The simulation exposed radio communication gaps between the JOC and aircraft. In response, the Mission installed a dedicated CASEVAC radiofrequency to prevent future issues.

- **MONUSCO** postponed a planned CASEVAC exercise due to the security situation in Goma.

- A UNHQ team will visit **UNDOF** in March 2026 to provide support and training for a future mission coordination cell that integrates aviation, operations, and medical expertise.

- In the case of **UNMISS**, the mission is revisiting where the coordination center is best placed following the implementation of cost reduction measures.

- Stress tests are followed by after-action reviews (AAR) and the development of action plans to address identified gaps. The plan is developed by the stress test team with the mission and agreed to by mission leadership. UNHQ continues to work with the missions on implementing their specific action plans.

| Priority 4 | **ACCOUNTABILITY TO PEACEKEEPERS** |

HEALTH AND WELL-BEING

Missions continued to promote the health and well-being of peacekeepers. Efforts included the deployment of a new Level 2 hospital to **MINUSCA** and adaptive procurement to resolve medical supply disruptions. Telemedicine became a vital security tool, allowing remote specialists to manage trauma care in **MINUSCA**, **UNISFA**, and **UNMISS** when evacuations are unsafe. Additionally, missions strengthened physical and mental resilience through new fitness infrastructure and mental health strategies, including the operationalization of digital tele-mental health frameworks in **UNMISS** to reach personnel in remote locations.

Hospitals in missions

	Level 1+	Level 2	Level 2+	Level 3	# of hospitals submitting reports	# of hospitals reporting service interruptions
MINURSO	1				0	0
MINUSCA		1	3		4	0
MONUSCO	1	1	1		3	1
UNDOF	1				1	1
UNIFIL	2				2	0
UNISFA			1		0	0

*Sources: DHMOSH. Hospitals only submit reports at the 5th and 10th month after rotation. **MINURSO** and **UNISFA**'s reports are due in April 2026. Hospitals are defined as Level 1+ and above. **UNFICYP**, **UNMIK**, **UNMOGIP**, and **UNTSO** were excluded as the missions do not have hospitals due to their size or proximity to health facilities.*

Developments in the reporting period include:

- **UNDOF** is experiencing ongoing challenges with the procurement of consumables and medicines under a systems contract. Patients have been referred to an external referral hospital when needed.

- For surgical consumables, **UNIFIL** went through the low value acquisition process to address a shortfall.

- Bunia Level 2 Hospital (**MONUSCO**) had challenges due to a disruption of the quarterly resupply cycle from the T/PCC. All logistic issues have now been resolved.

- A Level 2 Hospital, generated from the PCRS/RDL, was deployed to **MINUSCA** to replace another at the conclusion of its service. This ensured continuity of medical support and prevented any gaps in the provision of essential health services for UN personnel and other beneficiaries in Bangui.

Telemedicine

Telemedicine has become a frontline security tool, reducing the need for dangerous physical transfers. For example:

- **UNISFA**: In October 2025, telemedicine consultation and expert guidance from a remote specialist supported the local management of a complex fracture case until evacuation became possible once flight safety conditions were met.

- **UNMISS** and **MINUSCA**: A total of seven Level 1 sites in high-risk areas, including some temporary bases, were equipped with portable real-time telemedicine kits capable of transmitting live patient monitoring data and enabling remote teleconsultations. These sites conducted more than 100 simulation exercises, following established protocols, to ensure operational readiness for point-of-incident telemedicine support.

% of telemedicine consultation by specialty between May 2025 – October 2025 in MINUSCA, UNMISS and UNISFA

General practice 6%

Gynecology 6%

Total # 17

Orthopaedics 18%

Internal medicine 70%

Priority 4	ACCOUNTABILITY TO PEACEKEEPERS

HEALTH AND WELL-BEING

Examples of physical and mental health improvement efforts

- **UNIFIL** capitalized on improved security conditions to restore access to outdoor recreational facilities and team sports for peacekeepers. This return to regular physical activity has been instrumental in mitigating the long-term health risks and cumulative stress associated with prolonged bunker confinement and sedentary operational postures. These efforts complement the implementation of Mental Health Strategies for military personnel, including initiatives to reduce stigma and enhance access to mental health resources.

- **UNISFA** addressed the growing well-being needs of its downsizing workforce by completing the construction of a high-standard gymnasium and fitness club. These new facilities provide both uniformed and civilian personnel with a critical, accessible space for stress relief and physical maintenance within the camp.

- **UNTSO** reinforced its support architecture by combining professional counselling with robust peer support networks. This dual approach ensures that Military Observers operating in dynamic conflict environments have timely access to peer support for mental health and wellbeing, alongside referral pathways for specialized care when needed.

HIGHLIGHT FROM THE FIELD

To overcome geographical constrains and bridge the gap between limited resources and the needs of personnel, **UNMISS** successfully operationalized a tele-mental health framework. By leveraging digital platforms, the Staff Counselling Unit was able to maintain regular communication with staff, provide psychological support, and ensure continuity of care for personnel stationed in remote duty locations

Priority 4	ACCOUNTABILITY TO PEACEKEEPERS

PREVENTION, INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMES AGAINST PEACEKEEPERS

Below is an overview of the investigation and prosecution of crimes against peacekeepers. Data is available from 2013 and is reported cumulatively. In **MINUSCA**, on 20 June 2025, an attack in Am-Sissia, in the Vakaga prefecture of CAR, resulted in the death of a Zambian peacekeeper and the injury of another. A preliminary investigation, conducted at the request of national judicial authorities, indicates the attack was perpetrated by elements affiliated with the Sudanese Rapid Support Force. Regarding the 2022 killing of an Irish peacekeeper serving with **UNIFIL**, the Permanent Military Court sentenced six individuals and acquitted one on 28 July 2025. The Military Prosecution subsequently appealed the verdict, challenging the acquittal and the leniency of the sentences; proceedings are now pending before the Military Court of Cassation.

Evolution of key metrics over the last ten years

Metric	2015	2025
Cases Investigated (% of reported)	20%	49%
Suspects Charged	7	142
Convictions	0	103

### 143 (49%) of the reported cases have been investigated by host state authorities

■ # of reported crimes against peacekeepers
■ # of reported crimes investigated

### 248 (73%) of alleged perpetrators of crimes against peacekeepers that had been identified were detained

■ # of alleged perpetrators identified
■ # of alleged perpetrators detained

142 (60%) of alleged perpetrators of crimes against peacekeepers that had been detained were brought to trial

■ # of alleged perpetrators detained
■ # of individuals brought to trial

103 (70%) of the alleged perpetrators of crimes against peacekeepers that were brought to trial were convicted

■ # of individuals brought to trial
■ # of convictions

*Sources: OROLSI – Justice and Corrections; A4P+ Reporting. In the case of **MONUSCO**, statistics include investigations, detentions, and convictions relating to the high-profile assassination of two UN experts in 2017, noting that they were not peacekeepers. For **UNIFIL**, one alleged perpetrator was detained but subsequently released, while six were arrested and indicted in absentia (and thus not detained). Data from **MINUSMA** is included and pertains to information available as of October 2023. After the mission closure, following up on the cases became more challenging. In comparison to the last A4P+ cycle, **MINUSCA** has one more case reported, and one more investigated. **UNIFIL** has two more cases reported and investigated, with two more alleged perpetrators identified and detained, and two more brought to trial and convicted.*

Priority 5	ACCOUNTABILITY OF PEACEKEEPERS

CONDUCT OF PEACEKEEPERS

The UN standards of conduct are the foundation for service in UN peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping personnel must uphold the highest standards of conduct, which reflect the values of the organization. Personnel and leadership are accountable for proper conduct, including a victim-centered approach to prevention from all forms of SEA, and, where needed, accountability and support to victims.

Allegations of SEA in missions by year reported (as of January 27th 2026)

The number of reported SEA allegations decreased in 2025, following a period during which reported allegations generally increased between 2017 and 2024. Overall, the majority of allegations concern incidents that are reported more than two years after the alleged occurrence, as illustrated in the chart below (shown in grey as "other"). It is not uncommon for allegations to be reported with some delay from the date of the alleged incident, which could be up to several years. By contrast, the number of more recent allegations—those alleged to have occurred in the year of reporting or the preceding year—declined in 2025.

Date of Incident ■ Current year ■ Other ■ Previous year ■ Unknown

Year	Current year	Other	Previous year	Unknown
2017	32	9	17	2
2018	28	16	9	2
2019	33	22	16	3
2020	25	24	13	3
2021	24	36	12	2
2022	23	47	7	1
2023	14	68	10	6
2024	18	57	19	3
2025	20	20	9	1

Date of incident: Date / period during which the alleged SEA occurred. If acts of SEA took place over a period of time, the allegation will be marked for the year in which the acts ended.

Current year (e.g.): An Incident that occurred in 2025 and was reported to the UN in 2025 will be marked as the current year; **Previous year (e.g.)**: An incident that occurred in 2024 and was reported in 2025 will be marked as previous year in the 2025 column; **Other (e.g.)**: Other refers to incidents that occurred more than one year before they were reported.

Actions taken against substantiated SEA cases since 1st January 2010

■ From 2010 to end of Cycle 6   ■ In Cycle 7   ■ In Cycle 8

	From 2010 to end of Cycle 6	In Cycle 7	In Cycle 8
Uniformed Personnel repatriated on disciplinary grounds	317	17	16
Substantiated allegations for which a T/PCC reported to the Secretariat that sanctions were taken	186	10	9
Civilian personnel dismissed, terminated or separated from service	61	5	5

Allegations of serious misconduct (non-SEA) in missions by year reported (as of January 27th 2026)

Year	Value
2017	272
2018	291
2019	369
2020	349
2021	350
2022	291
2023	415
2024	350
2025	281

| Priority 5 | ACCOUNTABILITY OF PEACEKEEPERS |

PERFORMANCE

OMA introduced a new holistic evaluation methodology for infantry battalions. Following incidents highlighting operational deficiencies, five military units underwent reviews that resulted in disciplinary actions and subsequent performance improvements. Responsible environmental management practices, reported on an annual basis, accelerated in 2024/2025, increasing the share of renewable electricity from 10 to 12 percent and preferred solid waste treatment from 53 to 60 percent. However, liquidity constraints caused a slight decrease in mission sites meeting wastewater best practices, dropping from 77 to 72 percent.

Military performance

As previously reported, OMA introduced a new methodology to evaluate infantry battalions in November 2025. It enables a more holistic assessment of battalion performance by streamlining the quantitative indicators used to assess battalions and adding qualitative indicators. In November 2025, OMA held a virtual workshop to familiarize missions' evaluators with the new methodology and its practical application. Going forward, OMA is revising the methodology for evaluating quick reaction forces (including Special Forces) and enabler units. The results presented in this cycle still reflect the previous methodology.

Outcomes of submitted evaluations of military units per cycle

■ Standard not met [0-49.9%] ■ Standard partially met [50-64.9%] ■ Standard met [65-89.9%] ■ Standard exceeded [90-100%]

UN Peacekeeping continues working to identify performance shortfalls where they exist so that remedial measures can be put into place to improve performance and ensure effective mandate implementation. Such shortfalls can be identified through various means, including the abovementioned evaluations or lessons learned and/or investigation reports following incidents. These can trigger the mission to take remedial measures or where necessary to raise to Headquarters for consideration and decision. During this reporting period, five military units were reviewed following incidents that highlighted deficiencies in operational skills, training, and logistics.

The following is an example that shows the full cycle from shortfalls being identified to how they are being addressed. There was a case of a unit's inadequate adherence to established military tactics, techniques, and procedures under a hostile situation, which impacted the safety and security of peacekeepers and damaged critical equipment. It exposed significant maintenance shortcomings in the unit's armored personnel carriers. The mission level remedial actions were taken swiftly, and the unit's performance improved accordingly, evidenced by the unit's successful actions under the same type of hostile situation. In parallel, UNHQ engaged with the TCC to ensure that national-level corrective measures were also adopted, with the TCC committing to its own internal review to address the identified gaps. The case was discussed at UNHQ and it was decided as a follow-up to conduct a field visit to confirm full implementation of corrective measures and the preparedness of the incoming rotation.

UN Peacekeeping is rolling out the SoP on Recognizing Outstanding Performance, and during the reporting period recognized four units. Examples of achievements faced by the military include **UNIFIL** improving freedom of movement across its Area of Operations (AO), with record monitor patrol levels. It supported the increased deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces within the AO, including through the establishment of new observation positions, strengthening security and monitoring capabilities along sensitive areas.

Sources: OMA; A4P+ Reporting.

| Priority 5	ACCOUNTABILITY OF PEACEKEEPERS

PERFORMANCE

Police performance

Evaluations of Formed Police Units (FPUs) indicate generally positive performance, with high numbers of "Good" and "Satisfactory" ratings recorded as backlog cases were processed.

The Police Division conducted PAET visits to **MINUSCA**, **MONUSCO**, and **UNMISS** to assess, validate and improve the operational capability of FPUs.

*Outcomes of submitted evaluations of FPUs per cycle*

Sources: OROLSI – Police Division; A4P+ Reporting. In a given reporting period, a unit may be evaluated more than once; therefore, the data is presented as the number of evaluations, not the number of evaluated units.

Civilian performance

6861 DPO and mission staff members were evaluated. Almost all either exceeded expectations (39.69%) or successfully met expectations (60.03%), which is similar to the results from the same period last year.

Performance evaluations of civilians

Sources: DMSPC; A4P+ Reporting. Civilian performance is monitored annually. The data reported this cycle is from July 2025, and the evaluation period is April 2024 – March 2025.

ACTION FOR PEACEKEEPING +

8th PROGRESS REPORT March 2026 | Reporting period: 1 May 2025 – 31 October 2025

| Priority 5 | ACCOUNTABILITY OF PEACEKEEPERS |

PERFORMANCE

Environmental performance

Missions made measurable progress in advancing _The Way Forward: Environment Strategy for Peace Operations 2030_. Implementation of responsible environmental management practices accelerated, with the proportion of renewable electricity in the field rising to 12%, up from 10% in 2023-2024, and the share of solid waste treated through preferred methods like composting and recycling reaching 60%, up from 19% in 2017-2018. 72% of sites currently meet "best practice" standards for wastewater management practices, up from 32% in 2017/28. A slight decrease in this percentage (from 77% in 2023/2024) is due to the current liquidity constraints. DOS continues to support missions in these efforts through a risk-based approach enabled by appropriate technology, guidance, capacity building, monitoring, and technical assistance. The second edition of the standard operating procedure on Wastewater Risk Assessment and Reporting is close to finalization, just like the first revision of the Water and Wastewater Manual.

Environmental scorecard of missions for the fiscal year 2024-2025(*), with evolution against the previous results

Mission	Score
MINURSO	78 (+2)
MINUSCA	79 (+2)
MONUSCO	82 (-3)
UNDOF	83 (+1)
UNFICYP	95 (+3)
UNIFIL	85 (<->)
UNISFA	84 (+1)
UNMIK	93 (<->)
UNMISS	82 (+3)
UNMOGIP	72 (-2)
UNTSO	90 (+4)

Percentage of mission sites where wastewater is assessed to pose a minimum risk, out of total number of sites

Mission	%	Sites
MINURSO	100%	13
MINUSCA	61%	113
MONUSCO	23%	44
UNDOF	100%	19
UNFICYP	100%	28
UNIFIL	100%	47
UNISFA	78%	18
UNMIK	25 %	4
UNMISS	100%	22
UNMOGIP	38%	13
UNTSO	64%	14

Generator fuel consumption for electricity generation (liter per capita per day)

Mission	Value
MINURSO	1.3
MINUSCA	2.8
MONUSCO	1.5
UNDOF	3.9
UNFICYP	0.0
UNIFIL	3.4
UNISFA	5.6
UNMIK	0.2
UNMISS	4.1
UNMOGIP	0.5
UNTSO	1.1

(*) This report covers the fiscal year 1 July 2024 – 30 June 2025. **UNMOGIP** and **UNTSO** report on a calendar-year basis (1 January – 31 December 2024).

Sources: Environment Section – DOS; A4P+ Reporting

ACTION FOR PEACEKEEPING +

8th PROGRESS REPORT March 2026 | Reporting period: 1 May 2025 – 31 October 2025

ACTION FOR PEACEKEEPING

Priority 6	STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY OVERVIEW

Missions are adapting their communication strategies as an operational necessity, with proactive approaches to support mandate implementation and strengthen engagement with local communities. This includes the use of digital platforms and radio, critical tools for reaching wider audiences. Broader efforts to promote information integrity and address misinformation, disinformation and hate speech (MDH) have continued through outreach, engagement and capacity-building to strengthen resilience, including collaboration with local journalists.

Missions continued to adopt a whole-of-mission approach to ensure effective strategic communications in support of mandate implementation. **UNFICYP** and **UNIFIL** reported a "very high level of integration" with communications fully embedded across mission activities. **MINUSCA** further strengthened coordination mechanisms to ensure messaging coherence between components. **UNMIK** and **UNISFA** likewise reported high levels of integration, with strategic communications regularly leveraged across sections to advance mission objectives.

In line with the Policy on Information Integrity, peacekeeping missions have been taking comprehensive action, by basing anticipatory and responsive measures on monitoring and analysis of the information environment, stepping up proactive engagement with host populations, and building the capacity of host authorities, journalists and media workers. New digital tools such as Unite Wave and the Monitoring and Analysis of the Information Environment (MAIE) help monitor, analyze, and respond to mis- and disinformation and have been supporting **MINUSCA**, **MONUSCO**, and **UNIFIL**, with plans to continue to roll out across other missions and UN entities.

Examples of successful communications and information integrity efforts from this reporting period include:

- **Proactive communications**: In support of the electoral process, **MINUSCA** aligned its communications closely with operational planning, ensuring timely information on logistical support activities and security arrangements. This reinforced understanding of the Mission's role and confidence in a peaceful and inclusive electoral environment.

- **Crisis response**: In south Lebanon, as the operational environment continued to pose risks to the safety and security of peacekeepers, **UNIFIL** adopted a high-visibility digital posture to underscore its commitment to Security Council resolution 1701 (2006).

- **Digital engagement**: **UNFICYP** recorded a 29% increase in Facebook followers, as the SRSG's sector visits served as a catalyst for expanded digital engagement, enhancing the mission's ability to communicate mandate implementation to broader audiences.

- **Awareness raising**: Radio Miraya, operated by **UNMISS**, continued broadcasting programmes aimed at strengthening public understanding of how misinformation and disinformation undermine the protection of civilians and broader peacebuilding efforts.

- **Capacity building**: **MONUSCO** delivered seven workshops focused on countering MDH, strengthening fact-checking practices and promoting social cohesion. In **UNTSO**, training on strategic communications and MDH has been integrated into the monthly induction programme for newly arrived personnel.

- **Countering hate speech**: To address systemic media bias, **UNMIK** partnered with the *Association of Journalists of Kosovo* to improve editorial policies, resulting in the launch of the *Hate Speech in Kosovo's Media Landscape Monitoring Report*. **UNISFA** focused on preventive engagement by training local journalists and traditional leaders to recognize and counter hate speech at the community level.

HIGHLIGHT FROM THE FIELD

Despite the rise of digital media, radio remains key for reaching mass audiences in complex environments. In **MONUSCO**, *Radio Okapi* continues to serve as a stabilization tool, reaching an estimated 25 million listeners and 2 million online users. By broadcasting in French and four national languages (Swahili, Tshiluba, Kikongo, and Lingala) through a network of 200 partner community stations, it maintains a 24-hour presence that defends human values and counters hate speech across the DRC.

Priority 6	STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY OVERVIEW

Secretary-General António Guterres and Executive Director of UN Women Sima Sami Iskandar Bahous at the "Through her Lens" exhibition at UNHQ in New York. UN Photo/October 2025.

To mark the 25th anniversary of the WPS agenda, DPO partnered with DPPA, UN Women, and the Elsie Initiative Fund for Uniformed Women in Peace Operations to organize an exhibition of photos captured in 11 post-conflict contexts. Entitled "Through her lens: women rising for peace," the exhibit travelled across four continents. In June 2025, over 250,000 visitors attended the New York exhibit.

A new partnership with Maryam Bukar Hassan, the first ever DPO-DPPA United Nations Global Advocate for Peace, enabled UN Peacekeeping channels to engage new audiences. Her address at UNGA80, where she performed "Peace is a Verb", garnered over 500,000 views across our platforms.

*DPO-DPPA UN Global Advocate for Peace, Maryam Bukar Hassan, addressing the high-level meeting of the General Assembly*

ACTION FOR PEACEKEEPING +

8th PROGRESS REPORT March 2026 | Reporting period: 1 May 2025 – 31 October 2025

ACTION FOR PEACEKEEPING

| Priority 7	**COOPERATION WITH HOST COUNTRIES**

SOFA, SOMA, AND COORDINATION MECHANISMS

SOFA and SOMA remain an essential legal backbone of peacekeeping, but continue to be violated by host countries. The violations continued to impede missions' implementation of their respective mandates and often impact the safety and security of peacekeepers. The number of SOFA violations reported this cycle is lower than in the previous one, particularly due to a decrease in incidents in **UNMISS**, which continued to report the highest number of such violations. As reported in previous A4P+ cycles, formal cooperation mechanisms remain key to increasing cooperation with host authorities. Missions do not rely solely on meetings between leadership of the mission and host country. They are also strengthening alternative bilateral channels such as technical secretariats and joint working groups to enable continuous dialogue on sensitive transition, security arrangements, and activities such as humanitarian efforts. Member State support and engagement is needed to reduce or halt violations of SOFA/SOMA and to enable missions to fully implement their mandates.

How useful is the SOFA/SOMA in supporting cooperation between host authorities and the mission?

- Not at All Useful
- Rarely Useful
- Occasionally Useful
- Useful
- Very Useful

Reported SOFA violations per cycle

Violations of SOFA and SOMA include:

- The denial of freedom of movement to collect water and the demand for import levies on goods entering through the South Corridor (Nimule) forced **UNISFA** to procure fuel locally at increased prices, straining an already reduced budget.

- The South Sudan Revenue Authority (SSRA) continues to cause challenges for **UNMISS.** However, there are ongoing engagements with the Ministry of Finance and Planning and SSRA to ensure compliance with tax exemption privileges. Further, an *ad hoc* joint technical working group with the government has helped address emerging challenges and enable, for example, the coordination with national authorities of several last-minute troop repatriation flights.

Reported impact of SOFA incidents on missions

Mission	Movement of civilian personal	Movement of uniformed personnel	Implementation of mandated tasks
UNIFIL	⚠️⚠️	⚠️⚠️	⚠️⚠️
UNISFA	⚠️⚠️	⚠️⚠️	⚠️⚠️
UNMISS	⚠️⚠️	⚠️⚠️	⚠️⚠️

⚠️ ⚠️ **No/Low impact**   ⚠️ ⚠️ **Medium impact**   ⚠️ ⚠️ **High impact**

*Sources: Peacekeeping missions, SAGE Dashboard (as of End of Nov 2025), and A4P+ Reporting. Six missions have SOFA agreements in place: **MONUSCO**, **MINUSCA**, **UNISFA**, **UNMISS**, **UNFICYP**, and **UNIFIL**. **MINURSO** operates under SOMA. Alternate arrangements outline the terms under which the remaining four operate.*