



# Security Council

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## United Nations Support Mission in Libya

### Report of the Secretary-General

#### I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolutions [2510 \(2020\)](#), [2542 \(2020\)](#) and [2796 \(2025\)](#) and covers political, security and economic developments in Libya from 28 November 2025 to 31 March 2026. It also provides an overview of the human rights and humanitarian situation in the country and the activities of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) during the same period.

#### II. Political, security-related and economic developments

2. During the reporting period, UNSMIL continued its efforts to advance the political road map launched by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya and Head, United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) in August 2025, aimed at unifying national institutions, holding national elections and ending the transitional phase.

3. The House of Representatives and High Council of State were unable to make meaningful progress towards completing the two initial milestones under the road map, namely, reconstituting the board of the High National Elections Commission and amending the electoral framework. Following UNSMIL facilitation, on 28 November, members of the respective committees of the House of Representatives and the High Council of State signed an agreement on the selection mechanism for the High National Elections Commission board members, in the presence of UNSMIL. However, the agreed deadline of 11 December to complete the selection was not met.

4. On 29 December, the House of Representatives voted to appoint individuals to the three vacant seats on the board of the Commission. On the same day, the High Council of State issued a statement rejecting the move, arguing that the vote was procedurally and legally flawed and calling for a full restructuring of the board. On 5 and 12 January 2026, respectively, the High Council of State named a new Commission chairperson, Salah al-Kameshi, and three new board members.

5. On 6 January, UNSMIL issued a statement expressing concern over the escalatory measures by the House of Representatives and High Council of State and highlighting the need to preserve the integrity of the High National Elections Commission. The Mission stated that it would continue to engage with the existing



board of the Commission until the two institutions reached a consensual solution. UNSMIL also continued to mediate between the House of Representatives and the High Council of State to find a way forward.

6. Regarding the amendment of the electoral framework, on 17 December 2025, UNSMIL received a communication from the President of the High Council of State, Mohamed Takala, appointing six new individuals to represent the Council on the joint “6+6” committee of the House of Representatives and High Council of State which is tasked, under constitutional amendment no. 13, with finalizing the electoral laws (see [S/2023/248](#), para. 13). Other Council members, however, contested this decision on legal and procedural grounds, expressing support for maintaining the original six Council representatives on the Committee.

7. In view of the protracted impasse, the Special Representative, in her briefing to the Security Council on 18 February 2026, outlined an alternative two-step approach to achieve progress on the road map. As a first step, she would seek to convene a small group of Libyan stakeholders to identify solutions to achieve the two initial milestones. Should the impasse persist, a broader convening would be necessary, drawing on procedures set out in existing Libyan political agreements.

8. On 14 and 15 December 2025, UNSMIL launched the structured dialogue in Tripoli in the presence of members of the International Follow-up Committee on Libya. With 124 participants from across Libya, including 35 per cent women, as well as youth, persons with disabilities and representatives from the country’s non-Arab communities, the dialogue provides an inclusive platform for the participation of Libyan society in the political process. Intended to run for four to six months, the dialogue is organized around four thematic tracks, namely, governance, economy, security and national reconciliation and human rights. Each track is expected to produce recommendations to help unify institutions, improve governance and accountability, create conditions for the holding of national elections and address drivers of conflict.

9. UNSMIL facilitated eight in-person sessions across the four tracks, each lasting approximately five days, as well as various virtual meetings. Participants in the governance track discussed ways to enable the holding of national elections and developed options to achieve the first two milestones of the road map. They also discussed conflict drivers and issues related to the Libyan political system, including local governance.

10. The economic track focused on how to improve management of public finances and State resources, subsidy reform, economic restructuring and diversification, private sector growth and equitable development across all regions of the country. Participants benefited from exchanges with economic experts, including representatives from Libyan anti-corruption authorities, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank.

11. In the security track, participants assessed the feasibility of conducting national elections in a divided political and security landscape. They underscored that coordinated security decision-making, a clear legislative framework for elections and guarantees of acceptance of the election results were requirements for a peaceful, secure and credible electoral process. Although invited, representatives of the Presidential Council, the Chiefs of Staff of the Libyan Army and the Libyan National Army and the 5+5 Joint Military Commission have not participated in the security track.

12. Participants in the national reconciliation and human rights track highlighted the importance of judicial independence, protection of public freedoms and civic

space and addressing the issue of arbitrary detention. They also engaged virtually with Libyan civil society representatives based outside the country.

13. The dispute between the Supreme Constitutional Court in Benghazi and the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court in Tripoli continued. On 22 December 2025, the Supreme Constitutional Court upheld legislative amendments by the House of Representatives affecting the organization of the judiciary and, on 18 January, confirmed that all legislation enacted by the General National Congress after the end of its mandate in April 2014 (see [S/2014/131](#), para. 3) remained invalid. On 28 January 2026, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court issued rulings that contradicted those of the Supreme Constitutional Court. It restored the validity of legislation enacted by the General National Congress and declared the House of Representatives legislative amendments unconstitutional, thereby calling into question the current composition of the Supreme Judicial Council, the highest administrative body of Libya overseeing the judiciary. On 15 February, the Supreme Constitutional Court issued a ruling annulling this decision and also declared a House of Representatives decision of 14 September 2022 appointing the President of the Supreme Court in Tripoli unconstitutional.

14. Against this background, UNSMIL continued to support the efforts of a mediation committee of eight judicial and legal experts from across Libya to address the dispute and preserve a unified judicial authority and constitutional oversight. On 16 February, the mediation committee submitted a set of recommendations to resolve the deadlock to the House of Representatives, the High Council of State and several judicial and political stakeholders. On 18 February, the President of the Supreme Court took control over the Supreme Judicial Council headquarters in Tripoli. In response, on 25 February, the President of the Supreme Judicial Council, citing force majeure, issued decisions relocating the Council's seat and key judicial departments to Benghazi.

15. Internal divisions within the Presidential Council surfaced through judicial proceedings. On 4 January, the Vice-Presidents of the Presidential Council, Abdullah al-Lafi and Musa al-Koni, filed an administrative appeal in the Tripoli Court of Appeal challenging seven decrees on security, human rights and national reconciliation matters issued by the President of the Presidential Council, Mohamed Younis Menfi, as being in violation of the provisions of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum road map and its annexes. On 4 February, the court dismissed the appeal, ruling that the matter fell outside its jurisdiction.

16. On 23 December, an aircraft carrying a high-level military delegation affiliated with the Government of National Unity, including the Chief of the General Staff of the Libyan Army, Mohamed al-Haddad and the Chief of Staff of the Land Forces and member of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission, Al-Fitouri Ghribil, crashed near Ankara, shortly after take-off. All passengers on board lost their lives. The Attorney General of Libya and Turkish authorities launched separate investigations into the circumstances surrounding the incident. The following day, the Presidential Council appointed the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Salaheddin al-Namrush, as acting Chief of Staff.

17. On 3 February, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, the son of the former Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, was killed in Zintan in western Libya by unidentified assailants. Mr. Gaddafi had registered as a presidential candidate for the planned 2021 elections and was subject to an arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court since 2011. The Attorney General opened an investigation. The Presidential Council and the Government of National Unity issued statements expressing condolences, condemning political violence and calling for restraint. UNSMIL also issued a

statement condemning acts of targeted violence and calling for a swift and transparent investigation and accountability.

18. On 3 March, the Government of National Unity initiated ministerial appointments for a number of vacant, encumbered and newly created portfolios. On 11 March, the reconstituted cabinet met in Tripoli. On the same day, in a joint statement, the Prime Minister, the President of the Presidential Council and the President of the High Council of State expressed support for these measures.

## **A. International Follow-up Committee on Libya of the Berlin process**

19. During the reporting period, UNSMIL facilitated meetings between participants in the structured dialogue and the working groups of the International Follow-up Committee on Libya of the Berlin process in order to enhance coordinated international support for the dialogue and the broader UNSMIL-facilitated road map. On 5 February, participants in the governance track of the structured dialogue presented their recommendations for achieving the first two milestones of the road map to the political working group, including options for resolving the outstanding issues between the House of Representatives and the High Council of State, as well as alternative approaches extending beyond the two institutions. On 12 February, participants in the economy track shared with the economic working group their concerns regarding the rapidly deteriorating economic situation in Libya and underscored the urgency of supporting corrective measures to forestall further social and economic decline. Women participants in the economy track presented a set of recommendations based on the Libyan Women's Charter ([S/2025/792](#), para. 65), a framework document outlining Libyan women's shared priorities and recommendations in the four tracks of the structured dialogue.

## **B. International and regional engagement**

20. UNSMIL continued to engage with international partners to generate support for the implementation of the political road map. On 26 January, the Special Representative participated in the tripartite meeting of the foreign ministers of Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia in Tunis. She reported on developments in Libya and efforts to advance the political process through the implementation of the UNSMIL-facilitated road map. In a joint statement, the Ministers reiterated the importance of a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned process and expressed their support for UNSMIL efforts to support unity, territorial integrity, peace and stability in Libya.

21. On 19 February, at a meeting in New York hosted by Italy, the Special Representative briefed current and prospective donor Member States on the work of UNSMIL to implement the road map, including the structured dialogue.

## **C. Security situation**

### **Tripoli and western region**

22. The security situation in Tripoli witnessed a period of relative calm. While the truce reached in May 2025 largely held, no progress was made in the implementation of the measures agreed upon by the Government of National Unity and the Deterrence Agency for Combating Terrorism and Organized Crime in September (see [S/2025/792](#), para. 22). Sporadic security incidents still occurred, including clashes on 13 February 2026 in Janzur between elements of the Fursan Janzur brigade, with reports of heavy weapons used in residential areas. Mediation by the head of the

military and security arrangements committee established by the Presidential Council and the deployment of the 52nd Infantry Brigade to the area facilitated de-escalation.

23. In December 2025 and January 2026, several protests were held in Tripoli, Misratah, Zawiya and other cities in the western region against the Government of National Unity. Frequent demonstrations also took place in front of the UNSMIL compound in Tripoli, where participants primarily called for elections to be held and the transitional period to be brought to an end.

24. On 4 December, armed clashes erupted in Zawiya between local security actors, leading to the temporary closure of the coastal road. Two combatants were reportedly killed and three others wounded, and a civilian later succumbed to injuries sustained during the clashes. On 12 December, Ahmad Oumar Imhamad al-Fitouri, listed under the Security Council sanctions since 2018 for activities related to human trafficking, was killed in Sabratha in clashes with Government of National Unity-affiliated forces. The Attorney General had issued an arrest warrant against al-Fitouri in June 2025.

25. On 15 December, two air strikes targeted an alleged illicit boat-building facility in Sabratha, on the western coast of Libya, suspected of producing vessels used for irregular migration. No casualties were reported. On 1 January 2026, an alleged drone strike in the Talil area (west of Sabratha) reportedly killed two members of the Security Directorate Support Agency and wounded another, as they were reportedly preparing to dispatch a boat carrying undocumented migrants bound for Europe. Two other unidentified individuals were also reportedly injured.

#### **Eastern and southern region**

26. On 31 January, a coalition of cross-border groups and local armed actors from Murzuq and Qatrun, identifying collectively as the “Southern Revolutionaries”, reportedly briefly seized Toummo crossing on the Libya-Niger border before the Libyan National Army reportedly repelled the assault. Twenty-five combatants and one Libyan National Army officer were reported killed and several other Libyan National Army personnel were captured. The House of Representatives committee on defence and national security condemned the attack. On 1 February, Tebu elders in Qatrun issued a statement denying tribal involvement in the clashes. Subsequently, on 25 February, the Libyan National Army launched an operation against the “Southern Revolutionaries” grouping near the border, which reportedly resulted in the release of the captured Libyan National Army personnel.

#### **Violent extremist organizations and organized criminal networks**

27. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) released a report entitled *Drug Trafficking Dynamics in Libya and across North Africa: Trends and Implications* on 12 January. In the report, UNODC describes Libya as a major transit hub for drug trafficking and other forms of transnational organized crime, including the trafficking of weapons and persons. It notes with concern the growing role of transnational criminal networks in Libya, undermining State authority and contributing to instability.

### **D. Economic developments**

28. Libya continued to experience economic fragility due to persistent governance challenges. On 22 December 2025, the House of Representatives authorized the Central Bank of Libya to clear approximately 303 billion Libyan dinars in domestic public debt using State revenue streams. The decision was rejected by the High Council

of State, which raised concerns over a lack of fiscal discipline and accountability on the part of the parallel administrations.

29. The Central Bank published its 2025 fiscal statement on 18 January 2026, reporting a broadly balanced cash position of approximately 137 billion Libyan dinars in revenues and expenditures. However, spending remained heavily skewed towards wages and subsidies, which accounted for nearly 80 per cent of total outlays. Revenue from non-hydrocarbon sources remained negligible. A foreign exchange gap of approximately \$9 billion was recorded, reflecting the difference between foreign currency inflows and uses, and financed through returns on the central bank's external assets. In its annual report for 2024, issued on 31 December 2025, the Libyan Audit Bureau highlighted declining revenues and weaknesses in public financial management on the part of the Government of National Unity. The report does not include data from eastern Libya, making it difficult to have a complete assessment of public financial management across the country.

30. The Board of Directors of the Central Bank of Libya decided to devalue the Libyan dinar for the second time in nine months, by approximately 14.7 per cent effective 18 January. The official exchange rate increased from 5.57 to about 6.37 Libyan dinars to the United States dollar. In a statement, the Central Bank cited the continued absence of a unified budget, the growth of public spending at an unsustainable pace and the persistence of duplicate expenditures as reasons for the decision. The exchange rate in the parallel market rose from 7.2 Libyan dinars in December 2025 to 9.45 Libyan dinars in March 2026.

31. On 31 December 2025, the Office of the Public Prosecutor informed the National Oil Corporation that it had initiated proceedings related to mismanagement of fuel imports, targeting individuals and entities involved in procurement and supply practices that bypassed oversight and led to inflated costs and substandard supplies. It also instructed the National Oil Corporation to implement transparent, time-bound public tenders in 2026, with the aim of significantly reducing inflated import premiums for diesel and gasoline.

32. On 29 December 2025, the House of Representatives adopted a three-year development plan of 69 billion Libyan dinars for the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund. On the same day, the House approved a draft law to increase the salaries of members of the Libyan National Army by up to 150 per cent. The High Council of State rejected the vote, arguing that it would add pressure on the national budget in times of economic strain.

33. Wage management reforms continued. The Central Bank of Libya advanced the roll-out of the digital platform, launched in September 2025, to improve the verification and transparency of salary payments in the public sector. On 15 January 2026, Libyan media reported that the House of Representatives-appointed government had authorized the transmission of employee data to the platform to facilitate expedited salary payments. To date, the Central Bank has registered a total of 1.5 million employees from the Government of National Unity and the House of Representatives-designated government on the platform, out of a total public sector salary base of 2.2 million.

34. During the reporting period, oil production remained stable at approximately 1.4 million barrels per day. From 24 to 26 January, the Libya Energy and Economic Summit was held in Tripoli, with the participation of several multinational energy companies. On 11 February, the National Oil Corporation announced the awarding of 5 of the 20 oil and gas exploration blocks on offer across the country's main hydrocarbon regions to international companies and consortiums, following a public tender launched in March 2025.

35. On 23 February 2026, the board of directors of the National Oil Corporation ordered the suspension of all procurement except for urgent safety or production needs and halted new financial commitments and overseas transfers. The board cited the need for a “rationalization of spending” in view of the approval of “less than 25 per cent” of the Corporation’s budget for 2024 and no approved budget for 2025, noting that these constraints were placing financial pressure on operations and could affect the sustainability of production. The Corporation also began publishing monthly reports on oil and gas production, exports and revenues, as part of efforts to enhance transparency.

### **III. Electoral support**

36. The High National Elections Commission organized municipal council elections on 13 December 2025 and 7 February 2026 in 12 municipalities, with technical assistance from UNSMIL and UNDP. In total, 116 municipal councillors were elected, including 30 women and 12 persons with disabilities.

37. On 13 December 2025, elections for nine municipalities (Abyar, Benghazi, Qaminis, Qasr al-Jady, Sabha, Sirte, Suluq, Tubruq and Tukrah) were held in 311 polling centres to elect 87 municipal council members, with 21 seats reserved for women and 9 for persons with disabilities. Voter turnout was 69 per cent. Allegations of ballot stuffing in a few polling centres in Sirte were publicly refuted by the High National Elections Commission. Later, owing to inconsistencies detected during verification procedures, the Commission annulled the results from the affected polling centres. The Commission published the preliminary results for the nine municipalities on 23 December and the final results for eight of the nine municipalities on 8 January 2026, after the completion of the challenges and appeal period. The results for Tubruq were put on hold pending a court-directed revote at one polling centre.

38. On 7 February, municipal council elections were held in 36 polling centres in Tajura’ and 7 in Sayyed al-Hashan, together with the pending revote in Tubruq. In Tajura’, the High National Elections Commission piloted a project for biometric voter identification to enhance electoral integrity and voter confidence. In Jadidah, the municipal council was elected by acclamation as the three registered candidates matched the number of available seats. The Commission published the final results for Sayyed al-Hashan, Tajura’ and Tubruq on 15 February.

39. In Suluq, the country’s second woman mayor was elected on 8 February. In Tajura’, one woman was directly elected to the municipal council, in addition to three women elected through the reserved list for women.

40. In a statement on 30 November 2025, the High National Elections Commission affirmed its readiness to commence the organization of presidential and parliamentary elections in April 2026, provided that funding and security requirements were met and the institutions concerned reached agreement on a mechanism to oversee the process. On 30 December, the House of Representatives approved the Commission’s budget proposal of 210 million Libyan dinars, which includes estimated costs to conduct national elections in 2026.

## **IV. Security sector support and the implementation of the ceasefire agreement**

### **A. Support for Libyan planning for interim security arrangements and reunification of security institutions**

41. On 3 and 4 December 2025, UNSMIL, in coordination with the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Interior of the Government of National Unity, convened a meeting in Tripoli to advance the implementation of the code of conduct for military, police and security actors (see [S/2024/895](#), para. 42). Senior officials from the Ministries and members of the defence and national security committee of the House of Representatives and of the national security committee of the High Council of State, including five women, reviewed mechanisms to translate the code of conduct into practice, emphasizing the principles of legality, accountability, professionalism and public trust.

42. UNSMIL continued to support the work of the joint technical coordination team on border security, comprising senior military and police officers from eastern, western and southern Libya. From 26 to 31 January 2026, UNSMIL, in collaboration with the Ministries of Defence and Interior of Türkiye, facilitated a visit of the joint technical coordination team to border security operations centres in Ankara.

### **B. Withdrawal of foreign forces, foreign fighters and mercenaries**

43. From 9 to 11 December 2025, UNSMIL, in collaboration with the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, organized a workshop for the 5+5 Joint Military Commission in Tunis to discuss progress, priorities and challenges in the implementation of the 2020 ceasefire agreement. Members of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission reaffirmed that upholding the agreement remained a priority and urged UNSMIL to continue to support its implementation. They underscored that the absence of progress in the political process, notably towards the reunification of military and security institutions and the organization of national elections, remained a key obstacle to advancing the withdrawal of foreign forces, foreign fighters and mercenaries. UNSMIL encouraged the 5+5 Joint Military Commission to engage in the structured dialogue and contribute to the dialogue recommendations on the way forward.

### **C. Mine action and arms and ammunition management**

44. Explosive ordnance continued to pose a serious threat to civilians across Libya. During the reporting period, two incidents in Misratah, one in Tripoli and one in Musa'id resulted in 10 injured (9 adults and 1 boy) and 2 fatalities (1 adult man and 1 boy). In response, on 17 December, clearance operations at the ammunition storage area in Misratah affected by an explosion on 31 August (see [S/2025/792](#), para. 43) were completed as part of the UNSMIL-led project in partnership with the Libyan Mine Action Centre, the Libyan Peace Organization and the HALO Trust. A total of 3,635 explosive ordnance items and 7,483 rounds of small arms ammunition were safely removed and destroyed by 27 January 2026.

45. From 10 December 2025 to 19 January 2026, UNSMIL and partners conducted 81 explosive ordnance risk education sessions in three schools in Salah al-Din, southern Tripoli. The sessions reached 1,789 students aged 5 to 18 (1,501 girls and 278 boys) and 91 teachers (84 women, 7 men). On 6 January, UNSMIL delivered a

technical awareness session for 21 Libyan Red Crescent responders (7 women and 14 men) on the role of civil society in mitigating risks related to weapons and ammunition.

46. On 27 January, UNSMIL and the Libyan Mine Action Centre co-chaired a meeting of mine action implementing partners in Libya, with the participation of Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain, Türkiye and the European Union, alongside seven national and international non-governmental organizations. The meeting focused on progress in implementation, operational priorities for mine action, the safe and secure management of ammunition storage sites and strengthening the victim assistance system.

## **V. Human rights, transitional justice and the rule of law**

47. Khaled Mohamed Ali el-Hishri, a member of the Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism, arrested in Germany on 16 July 2025, was surrendered to the International Criminal Court on 1 December to face charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder, torture, imprisonment, rape, sexual violence, persecution, cruel treatment and outrages upon personal dignity, allegedly committed at Mitiga prison from 2015 to 2020. This marks the first time that a suspect in the Libya situation has been transferred to the custody of the Court since it began investigations pursuant to the Security Council's referral of the situation in Libya to the Court in 2011.

48. On 11 January 2026, the President of the Benghazi-based Supreme Judicial Council and the Attorney General inaugurated the Sirte Court of Appeal, increasing the number of courts of appeal in the country to 12.

### **A. Transitional justice and national reconciliation**

49. The African Union-sponsored Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation in Libya was officially endorsed by the President of the Presidential Council, Mohammed Menfi in a signature ceremony on 7 January in Tripoli. The Charter sets out principles for future transitional justice processes and provides for the establishment of a national reconciliation commission to oversee implementation. This comes in parallel to efforts in the House of Representatives to adopt a draft national reconciliation law that also provides for the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission. UNSMIL continued to advocate for a unified transitional justice framework grounded in victims' needs, including those of the families of missing persons.

50. On 27 and 28 November 2025, UNSMIL and UNDP convened members of the House of Representatives and the High Council of State and academics to finalize a draft law on missing persons. Participants underscored the need to clarify institutional mandates, align methodologies for the documentation and analysis of evidence in missing persons cases and align domestic legislation with international standards.

51. In December, the General Authority for the Search and Identification of Missing Persons announced dozens of DNA matches among bodies recovered following Storm Daniel in September 2023, in Darnah and other eastern cities. Families of the missing lamented the prolonged delay in identification efforts. From 9 to 12 February 2026 in Tunis, UNSMIL and UNDP facilitated consultations between the General Authority for the Search and Identification of Missing Persons and families of missing persons from Benghazi and Darnah, including those missing from the September 2023 floods,

to raise awareness about the Authority's mandate and the needs of victims and families.

## **B. Unlawful deprivation of liberty, detention and torture**

52. Arbitrary arrests and detentions, violations of due process guarantees and enforced disappearances of human rights activists and individuals associated with the former regime continued to be documented, undermining conditions for an inclusive political process. UNSMIL also monitored allegations of ill-treatment and torture by security actors, including the Internal Security Agency. Lack of sustained access by the Mission to detention facilities across the country remained a major concern.

53. In November 2025, several dozen individuals arbitrarily detained at the Gernada detention facility were reportedly released following sustained engagement by the National Council for Civil Liberties and Human Rights and UNSMIL. On 23 December, the House of Representatives-appointed government issued a decree to establish a committee in Benghazi to review the legality of detentions, monitor prison conditions and compliance with judicial orders and identify violations. In a statement on 28 December, UNSMIL welcomed the establishment of the Committee, together with a similarly mandated committee created in Tripoli on 4 June 2025 and ongoing efforts by the Attorney General to address arbitrary detentions and improve conditions in detention facilities.

## **C. Migrants and refugees**

54. As at December 2025, the International Organization for Migration estimated that more than 939,638 migrants and refugees were present in Libya. By 24 March, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had registered 111,359 refugees in Tripoli, including 91,568 Sudanese, while the total Sudanese refugee population in the country was estimated at 554,937. Women and children accounted for 62 per cent of the Sudanese refugees in Libya, including 24 per cent school-aged children.

55. Heightened military tensions and border closures between Egypt, Libya and the Sudan significantly reduced movements through traditional crossings in the Uwaynat triangle, forcing refugees and migrants to use longer and more dangerous routes through Qatron and Umm al-Aranib in southern Libya. Approximately 70 arrivals were recorded daily along these routes, with onward movements to Sabha averaging 40 per day. Movements towards the country's coastal areas continued, alongside entries at a smaller scale from Egypt into eastern Libya.

56. From late November 2025 to mid-March 2026, 4,525 migrants and refugees were intercepted at sea, including 550 deaths recorded during the first three months of 2026. Tubruq remained a major departure hub, contributing to increased arrivals to Greece and Italy, given its proximity.

57. Many migrants and refugees in detention facilities remained without protection or medical care, amid continued reports of severe overcrowding, abuse and life-threatening conditions. In January 2026, Libyan authorities dismantled informal detention centres in Ajdabiya, Kufrah and Tubruq, releasing more than 400 migrants and refugees, and reported uncovering "evidence of torture". Authorities confirmed that 21 migrants and refugees had died at an informal detention site on a private farm in Ajdabiya; the main suspect was arrested. On 18 January, an underground detention site was uncovered in Kufrah, leading to the release of 221 migrants and refugees,

including women, children and a one-month-old infant. Investigations into both cases were ongoing at the time of reporting.

58. On 17 February, UNSMIL and OHCHR jointly published a report entitled “Business as usual: human rights violations and abuses against migrants, asylum seekers and refugees” which documented widespread and systematic violations against migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees in Libya, committed by State and non-State actors, armed groups and trafficking and organized criminal networks. The report concluded that these violations and abuses have become so entrenched and normalized that they are perpetrated daily as part of an exploitative business model. The report included key recommendations to the Libyan authorities and the international community.

#### **D. Groups in vulnerable situations**

59. On 8 December 2025, the United Nations in Libya convened consultations with 28 activists (15 women and 13 men) and organizations representing persons with disabilities, with a focus on systemic barriers to the political participation of persons with special needs. The inclusion of six persons with disabilities in the UNSMIL-facilitated structured dialogue marks a shift from symbolic to active participation of persons with disabilities in shaping the country’s political transition.

60. On 14 December, 13 persons associated with Sufi religious orders were abducted in Misratah; several religious sites were destroyed and graves were desecrated. The outcome of investigations by local authorities into the incident were not publicly disclosed.

### **VI. Empowerment of women**

61. To support the effective participation of women in the structured dialogue, UNSMIL, UN-Women and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) established a Libyan Women’s Caucus on 13 December. The Caucus enabled the 44 women participants in the structured dialogue to coordinate with one another, engage with broader women’s constituencies, receive tailored technical support and advocate for shared priorities and recommendations. Co-managed by a steering committee of four young Libyan women, the Caucus convened 13 times during the reporting period, bringing together more than 130 women, including activists and human rights defenders, young women, women with disabilities and women from marginalized regions and from the diaspora. The meetings strengthened the collective voice of Libyan women in the structured dialogue. In addition, the Libyan Women’s Charter was disseminated to all dialogue participants to help ensure that women’s priorities are reflected in substantive discussions.

62. On 10 and 11 December, UNSMIL and UN-Women convened 25 members of the House of Representatives, the National Council for Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Libyan legal experts and international gender experts in Tunis to discuss the draft law on the protection of women against violence. Participants assessed obstacles delaying its adoption, notably resistance within the House of Representatives, and discussed ways to strengthen coordinated advocacy and outreach, including with religious scholars, to promote broader societal acceptance of the proposed legislation.

63. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), with support from the Women’s Peace and Humanitarian Fund, promoted civic participation and leadership among young women in Benghazi and Darnah through the Nahda-Women Thrive project. Six leadership workshops reached 104 young women aged 19 to 36, strengthening

advocacy, communication and leadership skills to support community engagement and dialogue. Young women engaged directly with local stakeholders on peacebuilding, emergency response and inclusive governance, reinforcing the role of women as agents of change in post-crisis recovery.

## **VII. Youth and peace and security**

64. To strengthen youth participation in the structured dialogue, UNSMIL launched a dedicated digital youth platform and outreach plan, engaging more than 3,000 young Libyans from across the country. Youth networks and communities contributed to the selection of 16 youth representatives to guide content development and community outreach. UNSMIL also continued the implementation of the third cycle of the “Ra’idat” programme, training 35 young women on communications, media literacy, women’s rights, mental health and electoral knowledge.

65. On 23 December, the United Nations Libya Youth Working Group convened its first coordination meeting with the Sustainable Development Goals committee of the House of Representatives, with the participation of the Ministry of Youth and youth-led civil society and private sector actors. The meeting strengthened alignment between national youth priorities and the Sustainable Development Goals and promoted evidence-based and youth-responsive legislation, policies and programmes.

66. To advance youth-led initiatives in support of broader stabilization efforts, the United Nations Youth Working Group launched the “EcoVision” youth climate challenge on 8 January 2026, a month-long programme to empower young people to develop practical solutions to climate and environmental challenges. Ten teams in Benghazi, Sabha and Tripoli participated in intensive capacity-building sessions on climate-focused business development, financial planning and impact measurement. Ten project proposals received seed funding and mentorship, supporting their transition from concept to business launch and scale-up.

## **VIII. Humanitarian situation and development**

67. The conflict in the Sudan continued to drive significant humanitarian and protection needs in Libya, placing increasing pressure on national capacities and host communities. Humanitarian partners projected that the population of Sudanese refugees and third-country nationals in Libya could reach up to 597,000 by the end of 2026, alongside an estimated 70,000 host community members requiring targeted assistance.

68. On 18 February, UNHCR launched the 2026 Sudan Regional Refugee Response Plan, covering Libya and seven other countries hosting Sudanese refugees. The Plan provides a framework for coordinated, multisectoral assistance across protection, food security, health, education and water and sanitation. It also seeks to reinforce linkages with development and resilience initiatives that benefit both refugees and host communities. UNHCR-led consultations with the Libyan authorities were ongoing regarding the implementation of the Libya chapter of the Plan, developed in partnership with 14 humanitarian organizations, with an estimated financial requirement of \$115.5 million.

69. As at 5 March, the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for Libya (2023–2026) has been formally extended up to the end of 2027, following endorsement by the Ministry of Planning. The extension ensures continuity of coordinated United Nations support to the country’s development priorities.

## **IX. Implementation of the recommendations of the strategic review**

70. Pursuant to Security Council resolution [2796 \(2025\)](#), UNSMIL continued the implementation of the recommendations contained in the strategic review ([S/2025/611](#)). The Mission has recalibrated its strategic orientation, placing the pursuit of a political solution to the Libyan conflict through an inclusive Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process at the forefront of its activities. In addition, UNSMIL has combined its security institutions and ceasefire monitoring components into a ceasefire and security institutions service to streamline engagement on the security track. The Benghazi office has been reinforced through the appointment of a Head of Office and the transfer of four additional staff members. The Mission also streamlined the management of extrabudgetary resources by establishing a dedicated working group to coordinate fundraising and programme management in support of the political process.

### **A. Mission presence**

71. UNSMIL maintained an average presence of 302 civilian staff members, comprising 100 national staff, 198 international staff and 4 United Nations Volunteers. Of those, 274 were stationed in Tripoli, 22 in Tunis, 5 in Benghazi and 1 in Sabha. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution [80/243](#), UNSMIL initiated the relocation of 33 staff members performing support, security and substantive functions to Tunis. In addition, UNSMIL maintained three United Nations military experts on mission in Tunis.

### **B. Security arrangements**

72. As the situation remained volatile, the United Nations maintained a robust security presence in Tripoli and Benghazi and continued its engagement with Libyan security actors to ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel in Libya. UNSMIL international staff in Tripoli continued to be accommodated at the Oea compound, protected by the United Nations Guard Unit, with a troop strength of 231. UNSMIL international staff in Benghazi continued to be accommodated at the United Nations hub in Benghazi.

## **X. Observations**

73. Despite sustained UNSMIL efforts to mediate a consensual way forward, the House of Representatives and the High Council of State have not made meaningful progress towards completing the two initial milestones of the UNSMIL-facilitated road map. Instead, unilateral measures by the two institutions have deepened public mistrust in their willingness to act in the national interest and have threatened the unity of the High National Elections Commission. These developments continue to delay the establishment of a credible legislative framework for national elections, undermining confidence in the political process at a critical juncture.

74. Against this backdrop, the alternative two-step approach outlined by my Special Representative on 18 February offers the most viable path for achieving progress. I urge Libyan stakeholders to lose no more time and engage constructively with the Special Representative to overcome the obstacles preventing national elections and unification of institutions. I count on the support of the Security Council, the

International Follow-up Committee on Libya and the wider international community for these efforts.

75. I am encouraged by the dynamism and sincerity displayed by participants in the structured dialogue, representing diverse segments of Libyan society, as they work on concrete and actionable recommendations to create favourable conditions for the holding of elections and help shape the future direction of their country. Their work constitutes a key component of an inclusive Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process to achieve credible national elections and unified institutions.

76. The active participation of women in the structured dialogue, comprising 35 per cent of participants, marks a significant step towards advancing their full, equal and safe participation in political and decision-making processes. The efforts made to ensure the meaningful participation of persons with disabilities and youth are also commendable.

77. The continued peaceful conduct of municipal council elections is an important step towards fulfilling the aspirations of the Libyan people, building democratic legitimacy from the bottom up through a credible electoral process and laying the groundwork for preparations for national elections. As the only representative public entities with a renewed mandate from the electorate in Libya, newly elected municipal councils have a vital role in local governance and addressing the needs of the Libyan people.

78. The Libyan economy continues to face significant vulnerabilities due to institutional fragmentation, uncoordinated spending resulting in rising deficits and overreliance on hydrocarbons. Greater efforts are needed to address worsening economic conditions impacting Libyan households. It is essential that Libyan authorities accelerate the adoption of a unified budget for the country, strengthen transparency and independent oversight over public spending and pursue critical economic reforms.

79. The politicization and growing fragmentation of the judiciary is undermining a key pillar of the Libyan State. It is crucial that Libyan leaders and institutions engage in good faith with the mediation committee of Libyan legal experts to reach a resolution to the dispute. Upholding the independence, integrity and unity of the judiciary is critical to maintaining the unity of the country.

80. The first transfer of a suspect to the custody of the International Criminal Court pursuant to the Security Council's referral of the situation in Libya is a positive step towards justice and accountability for serious crimes committed in Libya. I call upon Libya and all Member States to continue cooperation with the Court, including by executing outstanding arrest warrants and facilitating the surrender of individuals sought by the Court.

81. I am deeply concerned by the situation of migrants and refugees in Libya and reports of informal detention centres, mass graves and fatalities linked to trafficking and smuggling networks. Increasing trafficking in drugs, weapons and persons in Libya reflect a deeply problematic trajectory that warrants urgent attention. I urge Libyan security institutions and other competent authorities to take immediate and decisive action to dismantle trafficking networks, close informal detention centres and hold perpetrators accountable.

82. Enhanced cooperation between Libyan authorities and international partners will improve institutional mechanisms for the protection of migrants and refugees and expand pathways for safe and dignified return. Protection and respect for human rights must remain at the centre of migration management efforts. I call upon the international community to scale up funding for the 2026 Sudan Refugee Response

Plan to enable the delivery of urgent humanitarian aid to refugees and assistance to host communities.

83. I would like to express my appreciation to my Special Representative for Libya and Head of UNSMIL, Hanna Tetteh, and the staff of UNSMIL and the United Nations country team for their continued dedication and commitment to supporting the people of Libya. I also thank the Government of Nepal for its continued contribution through the provision of the United Nations Guard Unit in Libya.

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