



CARANA Country Study

UNMO STM

Tactical Version Package

for United Nations Military Observers Specialised
Training Materials

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General Instructions

1. General

The purpose of the "CARANA Tactical Version Package" is to provide you with the essential information about the hypothetical CARANA country and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC), which is necessary for the Learning Activities (LA) and the Table-Top Exercise (TTX) of the United Nations Military Observers course.

CARANA is a fictitious country that depicts the nature of contemporary Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO). It was tailored to facilitate TTX, Command-Post Exercises (CPX), and Scenario Based Exercises (SBE), alongside other peacekeeping training LA, such as Field Training Exercises (FTX).

The information in this reading package is essential for you to effectively participate in the LA, TTX, and FTX. However, if time is limited, the minimum required information to participate in the LA and TTX is contained in the UNMO Tactical Level Scenario available in this document. Therefore, it is crucial that you carefully read this package to successfully complete the activities in the UNMO course.

2. Method

Self-paced (reading).

3. Duration

Approximately 30 minutes.

4. Content

UNAC Military Operational Order (OPORD), Situation at M+210, and UNMO Tactical Level Scenario.

5. Aim

The overall aim of the "CARANA Tactical Version Package" for UNMO STM course is to equip participants with the essential information on the fictitious country CARANA and the UNAC to effectively participate in the LA and the TTX.

UNAC Military OPORD



OPORD 01/2021: UNAC OP ORDER

(UN Confidential)

Copy No 01 of 40

FWD HQ UNAC
GALASI, CARANA

151030C OCT 2021

OPORD 01/2021

References:

- A. Kalari Peace Agreement dated 11 August 2021.
- B. Security Council Resolution 1544 dated 10 September 2021 (S/RES/1544 (2021)).
- C. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations on the situation in Carana 4711 (2021). S/2021/4711, dated 27 July 2021.
- D. Strategic Guidance from USG DPO, dated 02 June 2021.
- E. UNAC Mission Concept, dated 25 September 2021.
- F. UNAC Military Concept of Operations (CONOPS), dated 25 September 2021
- G. Strategic Assessment Report, dated 22 February 2021.
- H. UNAC Rules of Engagement, dated 25 September 2021.

Time Zone: CHARLIE

Task Organization: See Annex A

1. **PURPOSE:**

- a. This Operation Order (OPORD) provides the overarching operational and tactical direction and guidance to UNAC Force headquarters and units for a period of 12 to 16 months, starting on 01 November 2021. OPORD 001/2021 development and release follow the adoption of UNSCR 1544 (2021) for UNAC (Reference B), the UNAC Mission Concept and the development of the overall situation in Carana. It focuses on Phase 1 and 2 (Initial and full deployment) and Phase 3 (Consolidation) of the UNAC mission.
- b. The overarching tasks and objectives outlined in this OPORD will be supplemented regularly by Force Commander's Quarterly Guidance which will continue to guide subordinates towards the Military Objectives of the Force and Mission.
- c. This OPORD will be reviewed and amended if there are any significant changes in the UNAC mandate or priorities, if the UNAC Force mission is modified, if Phase 3 of the mission is achieved, or through the achievement of all objectives. Annexes to this OPORD will be subject to refinement, given the expected changes in Force structure and laydown throughout the lifespan of the Order.

2. **SITUATION**

- a. General. CARANA has experienced internal conflicts for over 10 years. Due to the lack of political and economic development, as well as an increasing discrimination of Kori and Tatsi members. The opposition against the government under President Ogavo grew and led to the formation of rebel groups that engaged the government in armed conflict. The Mouvement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) defeated the Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC) in local battles, which lead to the FDC loss of control in Western Carana. Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC) established itself in Southern Carana and engaged the FDC in the South. The conflict led to the displacement of and violence against the local population, leading to a serious humanitarian crisis. Approximately 700,000 IDPs currently need assistance in the country.
- b. Sustained efforts by the Fasia Union and the United Nations finally resulted in the KALARI Peace Agreement reached between the Government of Carana, MPC and the CISC. This created the conditions to form a Transitional Government, to develop a new constitution for Carana, to hold general election within 12 months of the adoption of the constitution and to establish new CARANA National Defence and Security Forces consisting of Government forces and combatants of the Armed Political Parties and Movements.
- c. The Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC) and the armed components of the MPC and CISC are currently respecting the overall peace agreement. The new transitional government has been formed, and plans are underway for presidential and national elections to be held in 2023. While the cease-fire is generally holding, tensions between the factions remain high and there is a great deal of suspicion from all sides that the election might not be free or fair.

- d. Ongoing operations to neutralize El Hasar in Katasi may push the terrorist group towards Western Carana. The capabilities of FRAFOR are not sufficient to both maintain the security in Katasi and neutralize El Hasar in and across the border areas of Carana.
- e. Relations with Rimosa are strained due to disputes over islands of their shared coast and oil exploitation in these territories. The Elasi Liberation Front (ELF) is reportedly crossing the border into Carana and conducting armed attacks and raids on local villages along the Carana-Rimosa border.
- f. Despite some humanitarian relief attempts by the International Community, the overall situation in CARANA is critical. There are 6.3 million people who currently need humanitarian assistance. About 1.1 million IDPs are now situated in Carana. Out of this number, 700,000 IDPs currently live in provisional camps in central Carana. An estimated 30,000 refugees and 300,000 IDPs are now based along the borders to Katasi and Rimosa. There is an urgent need to act and improve the dire living conditions of these populations.
- g. Political Situation. The international community has asked the United Nations to intervene with a military force. In view of this situation, the UNSC has adopted Resolution 1544 (2021) establishing the United Nations Assistance Mission in CARANA (UNAC) for a period of 6 months and further defined that UNAC will consist of an authorised strength of up to 13,315 United Nations military unit personnel, up to 185 military observers, 40 liaison officers and 300 military staff officers to address the situation.
- h. Belligerent Forces. The belligerent organisations and capabilities are defined in Annex F INTSUM 01/20 200900C Oct 2021 to this OPORD. There are two major belligerent groups, the FDC and the MPC. Neither side has the military strength to dominate the country in any extent. These two belligerent groups remain deployed in defensive positions but are capable of limited local offensive actions. A third armed group, the CISC, is an unstructured formation of rebels. Their capabilities are very limited and generally consist of conducting terrorist-like actions against the FDC in the LEPPKO Province and harassing the local population.
 - (1) FDC. The FDC has a strength of approximately 20,000 soldiers. It consists of four "area commands", all less than brigade strength, and a small air force. The FDC is considered the official armed forces of CARANA. Its equipment has suffered from previous years of fighting and is in a poor state of maintenance.
 - (2) MPC. The MPC comprises approximately 10,000 personnel, about half of whom have returned home and are currently inactive, although they have retained their weapons. The remainder are organized in groups of 750 men and deployed in camps of around 250. They are equipped with assault rifles, light mortars and anti-tank weapons. Most of their vehicles are in a poor state of repair with shortages of spares and fuel restricting operations.
 - (3) CISC. The CISC is a rebel group, consisting of approximately 3,000 to 5,000 fighters with diverging backgrounds. Some members are deserters from the FDC, while others are former fighters from the civil war in Rimosa. The discipline and the internal cohesion of

this rebel group are low, as is the standard of training. They are notably brutal in combat and show no regard for the rights of non-combatants, rule of law, humanitarian or human rights.

i. Friendly Forces.

- (1) UNSC's Intent. The UNSC's intent is to create a secure, stable, democratic and economically sound CARANA thus promoting peace, prosperity and security throughout the region.
- (2) SRSB's Intent. The SRSB wants to:
 - (a) support the transnational government of Carana in the implementation of the peace process and the creation of a DDR and SSR concept quickly and efficiently with the initial deployment,
 - (b) ensure that an early, visible and robust monitoring and observing posture is established especially in areas where the parties to the conflict have not withdrawn,
 - (c) coordinate all UNAC efforts and humanitarian/development activities with the transitional government, the parties to the conflict and other organizations for mandate implementation,
 - (d) conduct an information campaign in close coordination with the transitional government and all parties to the conflict on the objectives of the UN Peacekeeping, and
 - (e) allow the development of the conditions for the rebuilding of the country, including a general election.
- (3) SRSB's Concept of Operations. To implement UNSC Resolution 1544, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, UNAC is to carry out peacekeeping operations within CARANA. It is to ensure that while doing so it remains an impartial force and is perceived as such by all belligerent parties. It is to do all it can to fulfil its mandate through negotiation and mediation, having gained the consent, trust and cooperation of all the belligerent parties at all levels. Where negotiation has failed, UNAC may take all necessary actions, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, as well as to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, considering the responsibilities of the Government of the Republic of CARANA.
- (4) UN Components in Theatre. The UNAC is organized into five components: Political, Development/Humanitarian, Military, Police and Mission Support Components. The UNAC military force is one of the components available to the SRSB/HoM in CARANA to achieve the objectives set in the UNSC Resolution. It is a vital component as it

provides overall security and adequate stability for other UN and UN components to complete their role.

(5) UNHCR will also be present in CARANA. They are the lead agency for the refugee camps outside CARANA.

(6) The UNAC military forces will operate with UN-related organizations, Regional and civilian organizations, International Organizations (IO) and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs). These organizations' efforts are coordinated by the Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In addition, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the World Food Program (WFP), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations International Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF) are present in CARANA.

j. Attachments and Detachments. See UNAC Task Organization Table (Annex A) for all military forces in UNAC.

3. **MISSION.**

UNAC will implement UNSC Resolution 1544 (2021) with a view to creating conditions for a more secure and stable environment in CARANA.

4. **EXECUTION.**

a. UNAC Force Commander's intent. The Force Commander's intent is to capitalise on the continued commitment of the belligerents to adhere to the KALARI peace agreement and to ensure that their military components do not attempt to delay its implementation. He wishes to quickly establish contacts with all parties and factions involved and develop Sector and local-level cooperation based on consensus. The quick UNAC Forces entry and deployment in CARANA and the implementation of control measures will create the conditions for the provision of humanitarian relief and allow all the UN and UN organisations to achieve their mission. At the same time, the success of UNAC Forces in providing benefits to the citizens of CARANA will secure the people's support.

b. UNAC End State. A secure and stable environment throughout CARANA.

c. UNAC Centre of Gravity. The legitimacy of the mission is evidenced by international support and the Mandate authorised by the UN Security Council.

d. UNAC Concept of Operations. UNAC will conduct its operations along five major lines of operations. Decisive points (DP) for each line of operations are detailed in Annex C.

- (1) Stabilize the Country.
- (2) Secure the Country.
- (3) Coordinate with all parties involved.
- (4) Establish viable new CARANA Armed Forces.
- (5) Obtain the support of the citizens of CARANA.

- e. To secure and stabilise the Country, UNAC Forces will be deployed quickly and deal swiftly with any breach of the agreement by the signing parties. During **Phase 1**, UNAC Forces will adopt a very cooperative approach with all military factions and at the same time be ready to revert to a more aggressive posture. Special efforts will be required with those that do not follow the content of the KALARI Peace Agreement. Of particular importance during this phase, all conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance must be established and maintained. This will be followed by direct and indirect military support actions aimed at further securing the environment.

Activities such as SSR and DDR will be initiated in **Phase 2** and fully supported during **Phase 3**. This will create added security and facilitate the safe return of refugees and IDPs. Once the desired levels of security and stability are achieved, UNAC Forces will switch its main efforts to support the democratization process including the conduct of general elections and the rebuilding of the CARANA Armed Forces and Police Force.

Throughout the Mission, UNAC forces will ensure the protection of all UN components, related organisations and CARANA civilians by coordinating their actions, monitoring all factions' activities and maintaining a 24/7 capability to take appropriate actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as necessary. Flexibility will be ensured by a strong and very mobile Quick Reaction Force.

- (1) Phase 1 Initial Deployment. UNAC will see the deployment of its HQ, main logistic Base, Aviation Forces, and 3 Sector HQs with the first assigned contingents, through sea and airport points of entry at GALASI, CERENI, MALDOSA and CORMA. Other organisations will also be deployed, and the Joint Commission for the Ceasefire (JCC) will establish Joint Liaison Teams (JLT) down to the provincial level throughout the Country. Each UNAC sector will deploy all assigned forces to monitor the cease-fire within the boundary, establish humanitarian corridors and establish liaison with all parties and related agencies. Force security will be maintained throughout by securing permanent locations and maintaining Quick Reaction Forces at the Mission and Sector levels. An active public information campaign will be implemented down to the contingent level during this phase.
- (2) Phase 2 Full Deployment. During the second phase, UNAC will finalize the deployment of assigned contingents in order to maintain the established secure and stable environment and conduct operations in direct and indirect support of the:
 - (a) Return of refugees and deportees
 - (b) Establish cantonments and conduct DDR activities
 - (c) Conduct security operations in support of the electoral process
 - (d) Facilitate the creation of the Country's Legal structure
- (3) Phase 3 Consolidation. In Phase3, UNAC will maintain the established secure and stable environment and conduct operations focusing on the:
 - (a) conduct of elections

- (b) formation of the National Army and, as required, the National Police force
- (c) contingent rotations
- (d) monitoring and reporting HR violations

(4) Phase 3 Capacity Building (**omitted**)

f. Grouping and tasks

(1) Grouping as per Annex A

(2) Phase 1 Tasks – SECTOR 1:

- (a) Deploy in the city of **GALASI**
- (b) Ensure the security of all UNAC elements deployed within Boundaries
- (c) Provide quick reaction forces of Coy size (QRF) at 12 hours' notice to move
- (d) Participate in the Mission Information Campaign

(3) Phase 1 Tasks - SECTORS 2 and 3:

- (a) Deploy contingents assigned to Sector once entering AO
- (b) Ensure the security of all UNAC elements deployed within Boundaries
- (c) Protect sea and airport points of entry within boundaries
- (d) Protect all Airport/Airfield within boundaries
- (e) Monitor the withdrawal of FDC, MPC and CISC from confrontation lines in cantonment areas and establish Zones of Separation (ZOS) in areas of tension
- (f) Promote and ensure freedom of movement
- (g) Secure the delivery of humanitarian aid and the relief of suffering
- (h) Contact other non-signing armed factions, if any within AO, and develop local consensus to conform to the intent of the KALARI Agreement.

(4) Phase 2 and 3 Tasks - SECTOR 1:

- (a) Ensure the security of all UNAC elements deployed within Boundaries
- (b) Promote and ensure freedom of movement within boundaries
- (c) Provide protection and support to the Electoral Division personnel
- (d) Provide a quick reaction force of Coy size (QRF) at 12 hours' notice to move
- (e) Assist the Rule of Law division with escort protection as required
- (f) Participate in the Mission Information Campaign

(5) Phase 2 and 3 Tasks - SECTORS 2 and 3:

- (a) Maintain AO secured 24/7

- (b) Maintain freedom of movement throughout AO
 - (c) Protect sea and airport points of entry within boundaries
 - (d) Protect all Airport/Airfield within boundaries
 - (e) Provide escort protection to Electoral Division personnel when needed
 - (f) Support the establish of Assembly Zones (AZ) and Cantonment Area (CA) for former fighters of the MPC, CISC and other armed group, if any within AO, in preparation of demobilisation
 - (g) Monitor the demobilisation and disarmament of members of the MPC, CISC and other factions
 - (h) Be ready at 72 hours' notice to move to conduct cordon and search operations in support of DDR, SSR and Human Rights activities
 - (i) Assist Rule of Law division with escort protection as required
 - (j) Participate in the Mission Information Campaign
- (6) Phase 3 Tasks - SECTOR 1:
- (a) Ensure security of all UNAC elements deployed within Boundaries
 - (b) Promote and ensure freedom of movement within boundaries
 - (c) Provide protection and support to the Electoral Division personnel
 - (d) Protect electoral material delivery, collect and storage throughout the electoral process while in the city of GALASI
 - (e) Monitor and assist in the training of the new CARANA Armed Forces and assist UN CIVPOL in training the new CARANA Police Force
 - (f) Provide a quick reaction force of Coy size (QRF) at 24 hours' notice to move
 - (g) Participate in the Mission Information Campaign
 - (h) Assist Rule of Law division with escort protection as required
 - (i) Monitor and assist as necessary and as per capability the demobilisation and disarmament of members of the FDC, MPC, CISC and other factions
 - (j) Be ready for additional protection tasks in support of electoral process.
- (7) Phase 3 Tasks - SECTORS 2 and 3:
- (a) Maintain AO secured 24/7
 - (b) Maintain freedom of movement throughout
 - (c) Protect sea and airport points of entry within boundaries
 - (d) Protect all Airport/Airfield within boundaries

- (e) Protect electoral material delivery, collect and storage throughout the electoral process
- (f) Monitor and assist in the training of the new CARANA Armed Forces and assist UN CIVPOL in training the new CARANA Police Force
- (g) Be ready at 48 hours' notice to move to conduct cordon and search operations in support Human Rights activities
- (h) Monitor overall Humanitarian situation and report all HR violations
- (i) Participate in the Mission Information Campaign

g. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Timings.

- (a) Phase 1 to be completed as soon as possible
- (b) Phases 2 and 3 will be initiated by this HQ
- (c) DDR process to begin Aug 21 – New CARANA Armed Forces capabilities to be ready at the latest by Dec 23
- (d) Election scheduled for May 2023

(2) Boundaries. Sector AOs are assigned as per Annexes A and B

(3) Movement. All contingents' movement in and out of the Theatre will be this HQ's responsibility. Once within Sector Boundary, Sectors HQ are responsible for all UNAC troop's movement.

(4) CIMIC. All contingents CIMIC initiative will be coordinated through the CIMIC Sub-Committee of the JCC

(5) AVN SP Reg. Request for Aviation Support to be forwarded 72 hours in advance to this HQ.

(6) Liaison. Sectors are to exchange LO with neighbouring formations. All liaisons with neighbouring countries will be initiated by this HQ.

(7) Coordination.

- (a) Daily Bde/Sector Report to be submitted by 16:00 to this HQ
- (b) UNAC morning coord. UNAC morning coord conference will be held at 0930hrs
- (c) DDR. Sector/Bde HQs to coordinate DDR support activities with the CARANA DDR Commission
- (d) Coordination points between Sectors/Bde as per SOP. Info this HQ when coord points are manned.
- (e) All UNAC armed forces support to Police training will be coordinated through UN CIVPOL

- (f) Direct liaison with all other components of UNAC is authorized at the Bde/Sector level

(8) Visits. All visits within Theatre will be coordinated by this HQ

5. **SERVICE SUPPORT**

- a. Administrative Orders. Mission Administrative Order will be published as Annex I (**omitted**) to the OP Order. UNAC DMS will provide effective administrative, engineering, logistic and technical support for the operation of all components of UNAC and act as a financial 'watchdog'. Sector 1 will be supported directly from the Central admin base and Sector Regional Admin Offices will provide support in assigned AO.
- b. Each contingent support will be as per MOUs developed between UN and the contributing countries.
- c. Defensive stores. Def stores are a Mission control item. All requests are to be forwarded to this HQ. Allocation to each sector in addition to the basic load carried in theatre by contributing countries will be authorized by this HQ.
- d. All direct costs for military support to IDP and refugees will be captured and forwarded to this HQ through RAO.
- e. Medical. Formation's Med support facilities will ensure first and second-line care and first-line evacuation. The mission will provide all CASEVAC including emergency evacuation to Field Hospital, second-line care and stabilization before further evacuation. CASEVAC will be requested through the Op channel. Evacuation to the home country remains each contributing nation's responsibility.

6. **COMMAND AND SIGNALS**

- a. Command
 - (1) UNAC HQs:
 - (a) Phase 1: HQ in GALASI
 - (b) Phase 2 and 3: Main HQ and Alternate in GALASI
- b. Communication. Code words, nicknames, passwords and Emergency Control measures as per Annex H (omitted)

7. **Ack Instruction: ACK**

Kinobe M.S.
Major General
Force Commander UNAC

Annexes:

Annex A: UNAC Task Organization Table by Sector

Annex B: Deployment Map

Annex C: Military Lines of Operations and Decisive Conditions

Annex D: Military Observers/Liaison Officers Deployment Map

Annex E: Known deployment locations of Belligerent Groups

Annex F: Belligerent Organizations and Capabilities

Annex G: Foreign Military Groups/Military Forces

Annex H: UNAC Communications and Electronics Emission Measures **(omitted)**

Annex I: Mission Administrative Order **(omitted)**

DISTR:**Copy No.**

UNAC HQ	1-9
SECTOR 1	10-11
SECTOR 2	12-13
SECTOR 3	14-15
NIGERIA HQ UNIT; ING UNIT	16-17
INDIAN SIGNAL UNIT, Level III HOSPITAL; INF BTL, TRANSPORT UNIT	18 - 21
NEPAL INF BTL/QRF	22
CAMBODIA DEMINING UNIT	23
EGYPTIAN MP UNIT, TRANSPORT UNITS	24 -26
NAMIBIA INF BTL/QRF	27
ETHIOPIA INF BTL	28
BANGLADESH INF BTL, AVN UNIT	29 – 30
CHINA ENG UNIT; LOG UNIT	31 – 33
UGANDA INF BTL	34
RWANDA INF BTL, Level II HOSPITAL	35 - 36
KENYA INF BTL	37
SOUTH AFRICAN INF BTL, ENG UNIT	38 – 39
PAKISTAN INF BTL, ENG UNIT, LEVEL II Hospital, SIG UNIT	40 - 43
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Annex A to OPORD 01/2021


HQ UNAC
15 OCT 2021

UNAC Task Organization Table by Sector

Force HQ		Sector I		Sector II		Sector III	
	Galasi		Galasi		Alur		Corma
	Galasi QRF		Galasi		Alur		Corma
	Galasi Level 3		Galasi		Alur		Corma
	Galasi		Galasi		Alur		Corma
	Galasi		Galasi		Alur		Corma
	Galasi		Galasi		Alur		Corma
	Galasi		Galasi		Alur		Corma
			Galasi		Alur		Corma
			Maroni		Alur		Corma
			Folsa		Alur		Corma
					Alur		Corma
					Alur		Corma
					Alur		Lora
					Faron		Muka
					Sereen		Kika

Annex B to OPORD 01/2021


HQ UNAC
15 OCT 2021

Deployment Map

HQ UNAC
15 OCT 2021


Annex C to OPORD 01/2021

Military Lines of Operations and Decisive Conditions




Annex D to OPORD 01/2021

HQ UNAC
15 OCT 2021

Military Observers/Liaison Officers Deployment Map

Annex E to OPORD 01/2021

HQ UNAC
15 OCT 2021

Known deployment locations of Belligerent Groups

Annex F to OPORD 01/2021

HQ UNAC
15 OCT 2021

Belligerent Organizations and Capabilities

1. **Introduction.** Carana is a Presidential Republic in line with the first Carana constitution adopted by a referendum in 1987. Jackson Ogavo, leader of the PDC, became the first elected president of CARANA. Initially, the government was reasonably representative of the ethnic balance of the country, although still dominated by the Falin. It followed democratic principles that were later enshrined in the 1991 constitution. During the early years, some economic and social reforms were realized. Ogavo's focus changed over time, and he became preoccupied with quietly suppressing all opposition groups and enhancing his own power base. Beginning in 2008, he expanded the influence of the central government on all economic and social activities by laws and administrative rules. The 1996 replacement of all key Kori and Tatsi government ministers with members of Ogavo's Falin tribe was followed by an increasingly repressive regime, administrative and economic inefficiency, and corruption. As in the government, the Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC) are dominated by the Falin and have become the de facto military arm of the party.

2. **Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC).**

The FDC consists of approximately 20,000 personnel in 4 'area commands' and an air force, equipped with mostly a mixture of former French and Russian weapons and vehicles and a small Navy. Most of the equipment is in a poor state of repair. The most effective and best-equipped brigade, with some M3 APCs and AMX 13 tanks, is the Northern Area. The least effective and worst equipped is the Central Area. With a small number of coastal and river patrol boats, the Navy plays a specialized but insignificant role in the Defence Force. The Air Force, equipped with a squadron of armed helicopters, transport helicopters and a few light bombers has a limited striking capacity. This limited capacity allowed the government to project its power over the entire country during the conflict. However, this limited capacity was not sufficient to deliver decisive strikes against the various rebel groups. Currently, the six Alpha Jets can be assessed as non-operational. The FDC headquarters is collocated with PDC headquarters in GALASI.

For further information on the FDC, refer to the "Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) report.

3. **Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC).**

With an eye on future elections, the leadership of MPC is currently developing its political platform and preparing for a long-term political role. Given the precedent set during the fighting in terms of its ability to coordinate activities against the government, it has the potential to become an effective political force. It enjoys broad public support in the west, as it is seen to have the ability to address the concerns and needs of the people when the government had failed. In some areas, the MPC have taken over government and basic administrative functions. The MPC operates a harsh public order regime but have repeatedly indicated that they respect human rights, especially the rights of the child. As a result of broad public support, and dissatisfaction with the government, the new administrative role of the MPC is increasingly accepted by the population in the west – other elements remain compliant out of fear of the

MPC.

The original assessment of the MPC strength was somewhat conservative and has been adjusted from a total of 6,000 to approximately 10,000. The MPC is assessed with a total strength of 10,000 fighters and 10,000 to 20,000 supporters. Approximately 5,000 MPC returned home last month but most have kept their weapons and remain ready to return to their formations if necessary.

The MPC is structured into groups of 750 men. Each of these groups is led by a field commander and has a local network of supporters. The groups have no internally defined military structure but have a system of sub-commanders with different numbers of fighters. The loyalty to the commanders is high and discipline is very good. The deployed elements of the MPC have established camps of up to approximately 250 from where they conduct patrols west of the separation line; while this is not in contravention of the Kalari Treaty, it has the potential to act as a trigger for other action whether by mistake or by design.

The MPC is lightly armed but have AK47 assault rifles, RPG7 anti-tank weapons and a variety of medium and heavy machine guns. They do not have any armoured vehicles but are extremely mobile using 'technical' - light trucks mounting machine guns or recoilless rifles.

The official HQ of MPC is in ALUR but this is more a symbolic HQ than an operational one. After the end of the fighting, the official HQ in ALUR increased in importance and became a basic administrative centre of the region. Some leaders of MPC are permanently in ALUR.

For further information on the MPC, refer to the "Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) report".

4. **Combatants Independent du Sud Carana (CISC).**

The CISC is an unstructured formation of rebels with diverging backgrounds. Some members are deserters from the FDC, while others are from the civil war in RIMOSA. The movement has also been successful in recruiting young men from the local population. This is mostly due to recent rebel successes along with the poor economic situation. The discipline and internal cohesion of this rebel group is low, as is the standard of training.

The CISC currently lacks the structure or organisation that would enable it to develop into an effective political body. It owes its following to frustration over poor living conditions, general dissatisfaction with the Ogavo administration, and longstanding ethnic hostilities with the Falin minority in LEPPKO province.

Unlike the MPC, the CISC has not tried to establish administrative functions and exercises control in the region only by the rule of the force. It has never tried to capitalize on its potential and has probably missed the opportunity to do so in that it has never articulated any clear political objectives. It may become increasingly frustrated when it sees itself marginalised.

The public support for CISC is based mainly in the Tatsi dominated Southern region because of many acts of violence against the population. During the fighting, CISC fighters operated primarily from their villages without deploying in camps or permanent positions. After the fighting stopped, it can be assumed that most CISC rebels were living in their home villages and group only occasionally. The loose structure of CISC makes it very difficult to assess their strength and positions precisely. It can be assumed that the number of active fighters has not changed and remains in the region of 3,000 – 5,000. They are equipped with assault rifles, light machine guns and anti-tank weapons. They are notably brutal in combat and show no regard for the rights of non-combatants.

Even though CISC did not until now attack FDC positions, it has relied upon the strong anti-government feelings in the south for most of its support. However there has been a number recent reports of several acts of violence against ethnic minorities in the south of the area adjacent to the border with RIMOSA. It remains to be seen whether these have involved members of the CISC, in which case it would be in violation of the Kalari Peace Agreement, or whether they are the responsibility of other groups who are not signatories. Reports indicate the former, although this has not been corroborated.

5. Militia / warlords

Several smaller armed groups are operating in the Northern Leppko Region mainly for economic reasons (theft, illegal exploitation of resources, ransom). The aims and loyalties of these groups are very uncertain, assumed to be loyal to their leaders (warlords) and the boundary from local militias to armed bandits is fluent.

Current information indicates that these groups consist of 300 up to 1,000 fighters with light weapons. None of these groups is signatory to the KPA.

Annex G to OPORD 01/2021

HQ UNAC
15 OCT 2021

Foreign Military Groups/Military Forces**1. El_Hasar**

The El Hasar group was formed in the neighbouring country of Katasi and turned into a “terrorist organisation” requesting their own state and engaging in guerrilla type terror operations against the Katasi government. Anti-terror operations conducted by the Government of Katasi supported by the French Forces, led to El Hasar fighters/elements frequently crossing the border into Carana in the area North and South along the Kalesi River into the direction of Terpil and Herai villages in the North and towards Pukka and Maki in the South of the River, while avoiding direct engagement / confrontation with the MPC.

Local communities report of armed attacks and raids on villages, including violence against civilians such as rape, torture and other casualties.

2. Elasi Liberation Front (ELF)

The ELF was formed in the neighbouring country of Rimosa and is conducting insurgency operations against the Rimosa government. They mainly operate south of the Carana border in Rimosa but began to challenge CISC in southern Carana and collaborate with some CISC splinter groups.

Carana communities along the border and along the road from Eres to Kika continue report of armed attacks and raids on villages, including violence against civilians like rape, torture and other casualties.

CURRENT SITUATION M+210



UNMO STM – Table-Top Exercise

Overall Situation Update – Situation at M + 210

Political Situation

The transitional government in Galasi has been constituted and started its work.

The Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC) as well as the Secretariat for the Regional Joint Teams (RJTs) were established in Galasi. The JCC conducted its first meetings and the RJT Secretariat commenced its work.

The RJTs at the provincial capitals have been established (although delayed) and have commenced their work. Initial facilities as well as logistics and secretarial work has been provided by UNAC. A more sustainable solution with the contributions of all parties needs still to be established.

The NCDDR Military Sub-Commissions was established in Alur at M+110. Initial facilities as well as logistics and secretarial work has been provided by UNAC.

The integration of representatives of MPC in the government apparatus is not yet completed, but it creates no problems. The integration of CISC personnel into governmental and administrative functions appear to be more difficult. The obstacles stem mainly from the lack of experience and training of CISC fighters in the administrative area. It must be assumed that the establishment of a functioning national government will be challenging and will at require least six more months.

As the transitional government is focussing its efforts on implementing the provisions of the Kalari Peace Agreement, other issues like the outstanding disputes with Rimosa as well as the incursions of the El-Hasar-terrorists into West-Carana currently remain unresolved.

In addition to this uncertainty, the uncontrolled armed groups create a severe security risk in the CISC area, which will make the preparation and conduct of elections especially difficult.

The attitude of the population to the UN mission is overwhelmingly positive but fragile. Often minor occasions are sufficient to make the situation turn. The efforts of the mission to rebuild civil society in Carana so far had little effect. The creation of a broad landscape of political parties is also evident only in rudimentary ways.

Security situation

During the past few weeks, tensions have intensified between the fighters of the CISC and the government of Carana. Various leaders of the CISC have repeatedly stated that they are dissatisfied with the initial discussions on the distribution of government functions between the conflict parties, as well as with the inaction of the transitional government towards the unresolved border dispute and the ongoing attacks by ELF along the southern border. There have been various

armed clashes between fighters of the CISC and government soldiers, especially in the areas around Kika, Mia, and Lora

The UN is thereby seen as an extended arm of the transitional government and has been denied FOM and is being increasingly attacked by armed groups. One UNAC UNMO and one UNAC interpreter have been killed so far. There are clear indications that the formation of splinter groups within the CISC is increasing.

In recent weeks, several raids and attacks on relief organisations have occurred in the LEPPKO Region. Whether these were carried out by bandits or individual fighters of the CISC is unclear. The CISC leadership denies being involved in these activities against humanitarian organisations.

The tense situation in the HANNO Region has deteriorated and turned violent. Several large-scale demonstrations occurred in MARONI and AKKABAR. Carana and the FDC reacted with force, leading to civilian deaths and injuries. Authorities are losing control over the area/developing situation. The situation is negatively impacting the provision of humanitarian assistance in the area and one of the mission's main LOCs.

In the western part of the KOLONI Region, further incursions from the El-Hasar terrorist group have been reported. Attacks and looting were reported in Rimee, Mikef, Kaso, and Molle.

Deployment of the conflict parties (FDC, MPC, CISC)

The deployment of the conflict parties is essentially unchanged.

Humanitarian Situation in Carana

The movement of IDPs from the camps around the coastal cities towards their former communities in the central/west of Carana continued. The first clashes between the returnees and the local population are reported from the KOLONI and MAHBK regions.

The humanitarian organisations have started to shift their efforts from the IDP camps to the West. However, they cannot meet all expectations. Threats and attacks on humanitarian aid workers happen on a regular basis.

Status of UNAC

Deployment of the civilian components of the Mission

The deployment of civilian components of the Mission continues as planned.

Deployment of Military component

Overall, the deployment of military personnel and units is ongoing in line with the deployment plan. The Force and Sector HQs have almost reached Full Operational Capability (FOC). 295 UNSO and 170 UNMO have been deployed to Carana, of which approximately 30 UNSO and 20 UNMO are still undergoing mission induction training in Galasi and/or are scheduled for deployment to the Sector HQ and UNMO Team Sites locations. It is still expected that full HQ staffing will be achieved at M+220.

The Force Commander is concerned about the developing security situation in Sectors II and III, as well as the capability shortfalls of the military, and tasks the Force Headquarters to provide a plan to:

- React to the increasing tension between the CISC and the FDC to ensure a safe and secure environment in the LEPPKO Region.
- Increase visibility on the activities of El-Hasar in the west of Koloni Region.
- Ensure mandate implementation throughout Carana.

Deployment of the Police component

During the last 30 days, an additional 85 police officers have arrived in the mission. The two FPU's arrived at M+210 and are currently being set up for operations in Maldosa and Folsa respectively. It is expected that they will be operational between M+240 and M+260.

Deployment of further IPOs will be adapted to the deployment of further military capabilities, providing the necessary security conditions for the deployment to the police stations in the Leppko and Mahbek regions.

Logistics situation

The set-up of mission support capabilities has been established as planned. No major obstacles or delays have been experienced.

UNMO Tactical Level Scenario



UNMO STM – Learning Activities and Table-Top Exercise

Overall Situation – UNMO TEAM SITE 5- SECTOR II - Situation at M + 210

Situational Update and Tasks for UNMO Team Site 5 in Sector II

Welcome to the UNMO Team Site 5, located in Sector II of the United Nations Mission in Carana (UNAC). Your deployment here plays a vital role in supporting the implementation of the Kalari Peace Agreement and maintaining stability in this challenging operational environment.

General Overview

Carana is a nation emerging from years of conflict, facing significant political, humanitarian, and security challenges:

1. Political Transition:

- A transitional government is in place in GALASI, supported by structures such as the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC) and the Secretariat for the Regional Joint Teams (RJTs).
- Integration of MPC personnel into government structures is progressing, but incorporating CISC personnel remains problematic due to their lack of experience and training.

2. Security Challenges:

- **In Sector II:** Rising tensions between the Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC) and the Combatants Independents du Sud Carana (CISC) have led to several armed clashes, particularly around Kika, Mia, and Lora. Splinter groups from CISC have increased attacks, including violence against humanitarian workers.
- **Overall:** Uncontrolled armed groups, incursions by the El-Hasar terrorist group, and unresolved disputes with Rimosa compound the security risks.

- UNAC personnel face hostility in certain areas, with recent casualties underscoring the heightened danger.

3. Humanitarian Situation:

- IDPs are returning to their home regions in central and western Carana, creating friction with local populations.
- Humanitarian organizations face ongoing threats, complicating aid delivery.

Primary Tasks for UNMO at Team Site 5

Your primary mission as a United Nations Military Observer (UNMO) is to assist in the implementation and compliance of the Kalari Peace Agreement by performing the following tasks:

1. Monitoring and Verification:

- Observe and report on the positions, strength, and movements of all conflict parties (current and planned) within Sector II.
- Monitor and verify the overall security situation, including ceasefire violations and the activities of militias or uncontrolled armed groups.

2. Liaison:

- Establish and maintain effective communication with the forces of all conflicting parties, as well as local leaders of militias and uncontrolled armed groups, to facilitate mutual understanding and support de-escalation efforts.

3. Support for DDR and Humanitarian Operations:

- Monitor and report on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) activities and assist if requested and within capabilities.
- Assist in assessing the humanitarian situation, including the reintegration of IDPs and refugees and their impact on local communities.

Operational Considerations

- **Joint Patrols:** Conduct patrols—by vehicle or on foot—to monitor compliance with the peace agreement. Representatives from various mission components, such as Human

Rights, Child Protection, Civil Affairs, and UNPOL, as well as representatives of the conflicting parties, may participate in these patrols upon request.

- **Force Protection:**


- UNMO operate independently unless the security situation necessitates protection forces.
- Protection elements, when deployed, enhance operational safety and deter threats through their visible presence.

- **Mobility and Logistics:** Due to limited air and force protection assets, most operations will be conducted as day patrols departing from the UNMO Team Site 5.


Key Points of Attention

- Maintain neutrality and uphold the principles of the UN Charter while building trust with all parties.
- Be prepared to adapt to rapidly changing conditions, including security risks and operational constraints.
- Ensure accurate and timely reporting of any incidents or developments affecting the mission's mandate.

Your work as an UNMO is integral to fostering peace and stability in Carana. By carrying out your duties diligently and impartially, you contribute to a safer environment and the long-term success of the Kalari Peace Agreement.



UNAC Sector-II Force Deployment




UNMO TS-5 Area of Operations

UNMO TEAM SITE-5 - Structure

UNMO Team Site-5 personnel

The Team Site 5, located in Sector II of the United Nations Mission in Carana (UNAC), is composed by 14 military observers. Currently, 8 are male and 6 are female officers. Normally, 4 UNMO from the TS will be on leave/compensatory time off, and 10 UNMO will be at the TS.

UNMO Team Site-5 Staff Duties Organisational Chart



Note that some UNMO may be assigned to two or more roles, or serve as deputies in additional positions. For example, the G9 Officer may also be appointed as the Human Rights Liaison Officer, or the G6 may serve concurrently as the Gender Focal Point.

Team Site-5 counts on one male and one female Language Assistant.

UNMO Team Site-5 Duty Officer

Every day, a UNMO will be appointed as the Team Site Duty Officer. The Duty Officer must be present in the Team Site Office/Operations Room during working hours and at any time a patrol is conducted and maintain radio communication with the Patrol.

UNMO Team Site-5 Patrols

A Patrol Plan is issued weekly to the Team Site. The Patrol Plan includes the Estimated Time of Departure (ETD), Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA), destination, type of patrol, specific tasks, composition, and vehicle.

Commonly, the **UNMO patrols** are conducted by **four UNMO** in **two vehicles**, with a **Language Assistant**. At minimum, a patrol is composed of two UNMO: the **Patrol Leader**, who oversees the patrol, interacts with the population, takes notes and prepares the report; and the **Patrol Driver**, who prepares the vehicle, including radio equipment and first aid kit, drives, and takes pictures of the patrol. UNMO patrols are to be conducted by UNMO from different nationalities, reports from UNMO are not considered as verified information if they are reported by UNMOs from just one nationality.

UNMO Team Site-5 Logistics (Vehicles)

At UNMO Team Site-5, there are five 4x4 vehicles—four operating without restrictions and one currently in maintenance. The TS UNMO G4 is responsible for tracking preventive maintenance and requesting corrective maintenance. All UNMOs are responsible for refuelling and cleaning the vehicles as needed.



UNMO Team Site 5 vehicle

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