



CARANA Country Study

UNMO STM

Pre-reading Package

for United Nations Military Observers Specialised
Training Materials



General Instructions

1. General

The purpose of the “Pre-reading Package” is to provide you with the initial information about the hypothetical CARANA country and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC), which will be used during the Learning Activities (LA) and the Table-Top Exercise (TTX) of the United Nations Military Observers (UNMO) course.

CARANA is a fictitious country that depicts the nature of contemporary Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO). It was tailored to facilitate Table-Top Exercises (TTX), Command-Post Exercises (CPX), and Scenario Based Exercises (SBE), alongside other peacekeeping training LA, such as Field Training Exercises (FTX).

Upon commencement of the UNMO STM course, you will receive the “CARANA Tactical Version Package”, which provides a short summary of the current situation and the UNAC Military Operational Order (OPORD).

The information in these two reading packages supports you to effectively participate in the LA and the TTX, so that you are more confident and well-equipped to tackle day-to-day situations in UNMO Team Sites once deployed in a UNPKO.

2. Method

Self-paced (reading).

3. Duration

5 (five) working days (approximately 30 minutes per day). It is suggested that participants read this package before attending the UNMO course.

4. Content

CARANA country study and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC).

5. Aim

The overall aim of the “pre-reading Package” is to equip participants with the basic knowledge of the fictitious country CARANA and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC) before attending the UNMO course.

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20.	UNAC Military OPORD	To be distributed during the UNMO course	x

CARANA – COUNTRY STUDY

The Country Study provides a short overview of the essential aspects of the country and the conflict.

The information reflected in the Country study has been collected through:

- Public sources (internet, publications)
- Information provided by International Organizations represented in Carana
- Information provided by UN Member States




Figure 1 – 8th Continent

1. Carana Country fact sheet

Republic of Carana	
Country name:	Republic of Carana (conventional long form); Carana (short form)
Government type:	Republic
Capital:	Galasi (1.28 million legal inhabitants)
Districts / Provinces:	Fellari, Guthar, Leppko, Barin, Hanno, Mahbek, Tereni, Koloni
Independence:	22 October 1968
Executive branch:	Chief of state: President Jackson Ogavo,
Head of government:	Prime Minister William Degusa
Legal system:	Based on the national constitution and a legal code from 2013. Customary law is also observed based on unwritten traditional practices for the indigenous sector.
Political parties:	Parti Démocratique de Carana (PDC)
Flag description:	Green, blue and white. An armillary sphere in the middle represents the Portuguese heritage (found on their flag as well). The writing in the Wheel Says: Notre (French = our), Patria (Italian = Country), Carana, as well as the Year of Self-Governance (not independence). Within the wheel are three diamonds, which not only symbolize one of the country's natural resources, but which also represent each ethnic group. The cross is also indicative of Carana's colonial history and Christian roots.
Population	
Population:	17,024,561 (last census conducted 2015)
Population growth:	3.6 % (annual growth rate)
Age Distribution	<15 : 44 % 15 to 18 : 13 % 18 to 60 : 39 % >60 : 4 %
Fertility Rate	5.1 children per woman
Sex Ratio	1.06 females/male
Infant Mortality	9.1 deaths per 100 live births
Life Expectancy	Total population: 45.3 years Male: 42.1 years Female: 47.9 years
Disability	An estimated 14% of the population have physical and mental disabilities, including due to conflict- and mine/UXO-related injuries.
Languages:	In Carana there are more than 20 original languages or tribal dialects spoken. The official and administrative language is French.
Ethnic groups:	Falin 60 %, Kori 20 %, Tatsi 15 %.
Religions:	Roman Catholic (40%), Protestant Lutherans or Baptists (35%), Muslims (20%), all with mixed in indigenous beliefs (45%)
Literacy:	40% of adult population can read and write (77.5% males, 62% females); 20% of youth can read and write (under 18)

Economy	As of 2015
GDP:	14,05 billion
GDP per Capita:	\$ 825 US dollars
GDP composition by sector	Agriculture: 27% Manufacturing: 16% Mining: 32% Services: 25%
GDP growth	1919 to 2000: average 3% per year 2015: -4% 2016: -2.5% 2017: -2.8% 2018: -2.9%
Labour force:	10.2 million
Labour force by occupation:	Agriculture: 50% Industries: 10% Mining: 10% Services: 30%
Country Comparison to the World	174 rd
Inflation rate	12,35%
Unemployment rate:	Total: N/A. In urban areas more than 29%
Population below poverty line:	45%
Agriculture products:	fruits, vegetables, grains, fish
Export commodities:	fruits, vegetables, textiles, mineral goods, frozen fish
Export partners:	US, France, Italy, Germany, Portugal, China, Sumora, Rimosa
Imports:	machinery equipment, transportation equipment, communication and electronics equipment, manufactured goods, foodstuffs
Import partners:	France, Italy, Portugal, China
Currency code:	Carana Franc (CF) 100 CF = 1.5 \$ US
Infrastructure	
Communication:	Supported by telegraphy, telephone and weak (unreliable) radio connections.
Railways:	Two railway tracks operated by Carana Rail (CR), from Galasi to Akkabar and the other from Maldosa to Mia. There are also 'land-trains' hauled by enormous tractors.
Highways:	A number of paved roads and highways remain intact, though there are a number of unpaved roads and tracks that are fairly robust. Car and coach are the most predominant forms of transportation.
Airports:	International airports (Galasi, Corma), 4 local (Alur, Folsa, Amsan, Mia). Additionally there are basic 25 airfields around the country. None of these airfields has paved runways. The length and quality of facilities at each airfield varies considerably.
Ports and Harbours:	3 (Galasi, Cereni, Maldosa)

2. Introduction

In November 2020, negotiations for a ceasefire and peace agreement, the Kalari Peace Treaty, give hope to end almost 10 years of civil war and a legacy of ethnic discrimination and conflict. Negotiations facilitated by the Fasia Union, the ceasefire agreement foresees that a United Nations mandated mission would take over from the Fasia Union Advisory Mission in Carana (FUAMC) to assist in overseeing and verifying the ceasefire as well as in the stabilisation of the country.

Despite the cessation of violence, Carana remains a politically unstable country and a transitional government under the leadership of President Ogavo has had limited success in re-establishing order and the rule of law in the country. Small uprisings and violent clashes still occur in the rebel-controlled regions of West and South Carana.

The United Nations Security Council recently considers the creation of a UN Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to assist the parties in implementing the Peace Agreement, to support in the country's transition into a secure and peaceful democracy and to make recommendations for the establishment of a UNAC. UNHQ is planning the mission to date using its internal capacities.

The document and its annexes are provided as pre-reading to allow course participants to become familiar with the scenario that will be used throughout the complete course. They reflect the first information/material based on which UNHQ prepares strategical and technical assessments. At later stages, they may also serve as an introduction to the new Mission Leadership Team (MLT) by UNHQ.

3. Geography of Carana

Location

Carana is located on the East coast of the Fasia continent. The total area of Carana is 119,480 km² with 300 km coastline. Carana has land boundaries of 1500 km with its neighbouring countries, Rimosa (southern border), Katasi (western border) and Sumora (northern border).

Hydrography

The three main rivers in Carana, the Kalesi, Mogave and Torongo, flow from the western highlands in an easterly direction and discharge in the ocean. The huge Kalesi River is very salty, like the Dead Sea, and almost divides the country into equal halves. It discharges in a large delta with surrounding swamplands. Though all major rivers are in principle navigable, only the Torongo mouth is the site of a major port (Maldosa) and thus the only waterway used for larger cargo transportation. Two dams along the Kalesi and Mogave are used to produce electricity. Carana has no large natural lakes.

Vegetation

Carana was originally completely covered by jungle and dense bush land. Over the last century, the central and eastern areas have been cleared and cultivated, being used for agricultural

purposes. Even though the soil in Carana is fertile, the intensive use of the land as pasture has left large areas barren and useless for agricultural purposes.

Approximately 20 % of the total area is currently in use for growing grain, millet, vegetables and fruit. The West and South of the country is still covered by jungle and dense bush land. Small areas in the jungle are used for agricultural purposes.

Topography

Carana is topographically divided into two major areas: the plains in the eastern and central parts of the country and the highlands in the West and Southwest areas. The terrain in Carana generally increases in elevation from East to West from sea level to a height of 1200 m.

The composition of the ground is mostly flat and sandy with insignificant areas of rocky, steep terrain. The terrain along the coastline is flat with no cliffs or rocks. The water is calm but with only a few areas suitable for deep-water ships.




Figure 2 – Carana basic map

Climate and Weather

The west of Carana experiences heavy rainfalls (monsoons) from August to October with an average precipitation rate of 250 mm a month and mild temperatures throughout the year. During winter season, especially at higher elevations, temperatures might fall towards the freezing point. In summertime, one sees colourful vegetation and karst mountains.

The north of Carana has a milder climate. There are pine forests and many trees, though it is also possible to find rough deserts and mountains. The northern coast of central Carana has a lot of inlets especially around the Kalesi River Delta. Most time of the year the weather is mild, expect for

the mountain areas in the North-West of Carana.

In the East and South of Carana the weather is mainly hot and dry with an average daily temperature during the dry season is 36°C. Palm trees and desert plants are the typical vegetation in the southern part of Carana. However, there are also very green highlands and the presence of the Torongo River enriches the region with minerals like diamond and copper.

Natural Resources

Carana is rich in natural resources, which are not equally dispersed throughout the country. In the jungle-covered mountains of the West, rare wood and timber are the main natural resources. Diamonds are found along the Kalesi River in the provinces of Mahbek and Barin. Copper is mined in the highlands West of Mia. Coal is mined in the province of Hanno. Further alkali metals (lithium, sodium, potassium, etc.) are found in Central Carana as well as oil off the southern coastline of Carana. The soil in Carana is naturally fertile. The rivers and coastal waters are rich in fish.

4. People and Culture

Human Geography

Human development in Carana has been shaped by differences in climate zones, creating a divided society featuring disparate social structures organized around different modes of subsistence. The most salient cleavage is between the semi-nomadic pastoralists inhabiting the pasturelands in the southwest, and the largely sedentary farmers and miners in the east.

Population

Major cities: Galasi, Maroni, Amsan, Cereni, Turen, Maldosa, Corma, Folsa, Sureen, Alur, Faron (100,000 to 1 million).

Ethnic Distribution

The population of Carana consists of more than 15 ethnic groups. Most of these groups are small in number and socially and politically marginalised. The three major ethnic groups, the Falin, Kori and Tatsi represent 95% of the population. The Kori (20%) live in the West and are the dominant ethnic group in the provinces of Tereni and Koloni. The Falin (60%) are the ethnic majority in the country and mainly live in the East and centre of Carana. The Tatsi (15%) live in the South and are the majority in Leppko Province.

The national boundaries result from the colonial time and do not represent the ethnic distribution of the region. The Falin make up 54% of the population of neighbouring Sumora, the Kori make up 65% of the population of Katasi and the Tatsi make 95% of the population of Rimosa.

Religion

According to the last census conducted in 2015 app. 75% of the population of Carana are Christian. About 35% of the population are Protestant Lutherans and Baptists, while 40% are Roman Catholic. Islam is practised by over 20% of the population, mainly in the South/West. The vast majority of Muslims are Sunni, who overwhelmingly live in the West of Carana. However, there are

small but active Shia communities in the South of Carana and along the coastal plains. Several Sunni groups are extremist in nature and have instituted Sharia Law in the southwestern areas of Leppko. On the other hand, syncretism and indigenous beliefs form a vital part of many Caranians' religious experience.

In terms of ethnic distribution, the majority of the Falin are predominantly Christians, while most of the Kori and Tatsi are Sunni Muslim. Indigenous beliefs, which have been embedded in the main religious, are practised by parts of the population.

The 2013 Constitution (suspended) provides for freedom of religion while prohibiting certain forms of religious fundamentalism. Christian holidays are celebrated as national holidays. Missionary groups within Carana are tolerated and include Lutherans, Baptist, Grace Brethren and Jehovah's witnesses. They tend to operate only in the West and South. The Catholic Church is influential in Falin occupied territories.

5. Current developments

Starting in 2014 some small rebel movements in the Tereni province joined the larger and better-organised rebel groups known as Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) and formed a well-structured and efficient military opposition. The MPC defeated the Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC) in some local battles and gained increasing support from the local population in the West. In February 2016 the FDC lost control of some areas in the western highlands. Though the MPC's military engagements were well coordinated and successfully executed, the rebels failed to formulate a comprehensive political program and failed to capitalise on their success. Their only clearly stated aim was to remove Ogavo from power. Early 2018 the MPC gained control of the three provinces in the West (Koloni, Tereni and Mahbek).

Low level but frequent MPC operations in the West increasingly tied down the FDC, leaving it with weak capability in the south of the country in Leppko province, and creating an opportunity for elements of the predominantly Muslim Tatsi minority to attack government institutions. Initially this amounted to little more than a few localised incidents, but it quickly escalated into more radicalised activities including particularly brutal reprisals against ethnic Falin civilians. Realising that the government could do little against them, a number of these small rebel groups united and called themselves Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC). Both the MPC and the CISC took as their initial aim the removal of President Ogavo from power, though cooperation between the two groups has been minimal.

All parties have suffered numerous defeats, though the civilian population of Carana has been particularly targeted by all parties, leading to an estimated 150,000 killed from violence, famine or disease. The CISC's exploitation of resources in the south has helped fuel their efforts, while the MPC has exploited diamonds and has been receiving external support from the neighbouring country of Katasi. A combination of war-weariness and strategic manoeuvring led the leaders of both the MPC and CISC, as well as President Ogavo, to start negotiating a cease-fire and peace treaty in November 2020. The "Kalari Peace Treaty" will most likely mandate all parties to disarm

and establish a power-sharing arrangement in a new transitional government, including integration in a new Forces de la Défense et Sécurité du Carana (FDSC) and take over from the Fasias Union Advisory Mission in Carana (FUAMC) to assist in overseeing and verifying the ceasefire.

6. International relations

Neighbouring Countries

Sumora is the main trading partner of Carana in the region. The relations between Carana and Sumora are traditionally good, with ethnic Falin making up approx. 54 % of the population. In the recent past, the government of Sumora has tended to support the position of President Ogavo.

The relations between Carana and **Katasi** are strained. Carana repeatedly accused Katasi of supporting the MPC rebels with money, weapons and fighters; these allegations were not without foundation and have been corroborated by reports from a number of international organisations, although the scale of support remains unclear. The government of Carana does therefore lay the blame for its inability to deal with the MPC at Katasi's door. By supporting the MPC, Katasi hoped the fall of the Ogavo regime would lead to better trade relations with Carana. These hopes have been stalled, both by the continued regime and the El Hasar insurgency further straining the relationship. Following a request by the Government of Katasi, French Forces are conducting Counter Insurgency Operations (COIN) operations against El Hasar. El Hasar fighters have now been evading into West Carana, causing instability and insecurity as they conduct attacks against the local population to obtain logistics supplies.

The relations between Carana and **Rimosa** are also tense. Rimosa has been in the grips of a civil war between two rival ethnic groups, the majority Tatsi, who hold nearly all positions of power in the Rimosan government, and the Muslim minority of the Elassi, pastoralists who claim that they suffer ethnic discrimination and persecution. Most of the interethnic fighting in Rimosa has taken place in northern Rimosa, near the border of Carana. The rebel group Elassi Liberation Front (ELF) has waged a guerrilla-style campaign against government forces and pro-government Tatsi militias and has established links to the CISC for financial and logistics support. All aforementioned groups at times cross the border into Carana and conduct raids for obtaining food and supplies, posing a threat to the local population.

In addition, there is a political dispute between Rimosa and Carana over the ownership of some of the islands along the southern coastline of Carana, as well as over related fishing rights in the respective national territory. Oil was also discovered in the Labta Sea in the southeast of Carana, offshore of Maldosa. However, due to the ongoing border dispute and the high start-up-costs required for the exploiting of the oil resources, no company or consortium is currently willing to invest.

Caranese refugees (particularly the Falin) in Sumora and Rimosa have been consistently discriminated and are often under attack by local police and armed forces. Rimosan (Tatsi) refugees in Carana and Katasi face similar treatment, as do Katasi refugees to a lesser extent.

Membership in International Organisations

Carana is a member of the Fasia Union (FU). Its main goal is to have a common political and diplomatic representation / voice for the six Fasia member states as well as to improve the continent's economic development. Carana has also been a member of the United Nations since 09 October 1987 and Member of the Fasia Union since 23 October 2005.

On occasion, however, the FU has brought political and diplomatic pressure to bear when tensions arise between some of the Member States of the Union. Since Mid-2013 the FU has attempted to mediate between the warring factions in Carana. In February of that year, it did succeed in bringing the main groups to the negotiating table, only to see the opportunity for peace slip away when a member of the Sumoran government, who held the FU presidency, was accused of arranging arms shipments to President Ogavo. The allegations were subsequently proven unfounded but too late to save the talks.

The state of Mosana assumes the rotating FU presidency at the end of 2019. Being more distant from Carana, Mosana has the advantage of not being seen to have any stake in the Carana conflict and has pledged to renew the FU efforts to resume negotiations.

7. Economic System

The economy in Carana is based on a free market system with free enterprise but with strong government participation and influence. The government controls the mining sector and all foreign trade activity; however, rebels groups control some major diamond mining areas.

8. Political System

Government

Carana is a Presidential Republic in line with the first Carana constitution adopted by a referendum in 1987. The President is serving as head of state, elected for a five-year term. The head of the government is the Prime Minister, who is appointed by the President. The Prime Minister appoints the ministers and heads of the government departments.

A Parliament with 256 elected members has broad authority and was intended to be representative of the ethnic balance of the country. Under the Ogavo regime, the oversight functions of the parliament as foreseen in the Constitution were merely ornamental and there was no actual institutional counterweight to the personal rule of Ogavo. The Commission on Defence and Security of the Parliament is weak and has limited power in the effective democratic control of the security sector.

Although the constitution supports a democratic political system, President Ogavo has gradually suppressed any effective opposition and since 2013 Carana has effectively been a one-party state. Today the only legal political party is the Falin-dominated PDC (Parti Démocratique de Carana). All members of parliament are members of the PDC or have close ties to the PDC.

Administration

The state of Carana is divided, following the French model, into eight provinces (Tereni, Koloni, Mahbek, Hanno, Barin, Fellari, Guthar, and Leppko) and a special capital zone of Galasi. The President appoints the governors who are the administrative heads of the provinces, and report directly to the President. The administrative system of Carana is a centre-orientated administration. The central government controls most governmental issues.

The central government has intervened particularly in Hanno, Barin, and Leppko provinces to assure the selection of local District Heads predominantly from among the Falin group, who are often outsiders. Appointments to Head arrondissements in Galasi have been at the demand of the President, and usually awarded to cronies (close associates and friends of the government).

9. Judicial System and Police

Police and Civil Security

Prior to the conflict, the Carana police was organized under the Ministry of Interior, based on Western principles. In general, especially in the urban areas the police were sufficiently trained and equipped and functioned according to those principles. Due to the conflict and the domination of the military confrontation, all parties to the conflict neglected the police force in Carana.

The Carana law enforcement agencies are divided into the Carana National Police (CNP) and the Gendarmerie. CNP are located in population centres and are controlled by the Ministry of Interior via the provincial administration. The Gendarmerie is part of the Ministry of Defence and maintains the police presence in rural areas and is responsible for border security. However, in recent years the Gendarmerie has been used more often to suppress opposition political groups than for rural security or border control. In addition, FDC army units often undertake policing tasks in the internal security role, often on an ad hoc basis.

In recent years, CNP and Gendarmerie have suffered a critical shortage of qualified personnel, aging staff, low morale because of unpaid salaries, lack of logistical and financial resources, and training. Police corruption is a severe problem in most government-controlled areas. Police stations have little or no equipment, while the police-training centre is basically a building shell. Within government-controlled areas, a national police presence is visible but not able to deal efficiently with the high level of crime. Police detention facilities are overcrowded and in a dilapidated state. In addition, they have been plagued by heavy politicisation, corruption and mismanagement.

Police presence in Carana is very low. The estimated number for CNP and Gendarmerie officers' amounts to 10,000 officers, or one officer for every 1,700 citizens. Out of this number, only 5 % are female officers and they are in largely administrative roles. The majority of police are ethnic Falin, including in areas populated mainly by minorities.

In the rebel-controlled areas, there is no governmental police presence. In the West, the MPC took over basic police functions to maintain civil order, while in the CISC area there is no policing at all.

Land and marine border policing, immigration, customs, port authority and other related sectors of internal security have ceased to function. In recent months, evidence of organised criminal activities, especially drug and human trafficking as well as diamond smuggling have come to light, in some cases involving collusion or active participation by law enforcement officials.

Crime rates particularly in population centres are high and there are numerous reports of human rights abuses and looting perpetrated by the law enforcement agencies. A small group of officers has been involved in reported human rights abuses. This inefficiency and erosion of professional standards has led to a widespread loss of their credibility and trust within the population.

10. Public Services

Carana Medical System

The Carana Medical system before the conflict was sufficiently developed and structured. Hospitals were available in the major cities (Galasi, Maroni, Suren, Alur, Faron, Folsa, Cereni, Corma, Turen and Maldosa) and mid-level cities had decent health facilities (clinics and/ or health stations). Because of the civil war and economic policy abortive developments, the medical situation of the population has deteriorated dramatically. Even in the regions that are not affected by the civil war, the range and quality of medical services deteriorated, and medical support / supply are insufficient. In addition, the supply with drinkable or potable water represents a problem in some regions.

Telecommunications

The landline telephone system covers less than 20% of the country and is unreliable. Cellular telephone coverage is expanding and generally covers the main towns and routes throughout the country. Some of the more remote border areas can access nodes in neighbouring countries. Governmental institutions and major companies also use satellite communications, particularly in the more remote areas.

Media

There are approximately 20 daily newspapers, two radio stations and two television channels in the country. The radio stations are operated by state cooperatives while most newspapers are privately owned. The two largest newspapers are government owned and the Catholic Church publishes another. Additionally, there are some low power, community radio stations and locally printed media with local and very limited distribution. A few months ago, MPC started producing a regional newspaper and operating one radio station. International newspapers are only available in Galasi. National newspapers are available in the provincial capitals and in some other towns.

In principle, the Ministry of Information controls all media. The censorship is very limited in the case of the small, local media but nearly absolute in the case of the official radio stations and main newspapers. A significant part of the population is very active on social media, which they can access through mobile phones. Social media is used as a tool for awareness raising and democratic mobilisation, but also to spread hate speech and incite to ethnic violence.

11. Infrastructure

Roads

Carana has a system of capable paved roads, which connect most parts of the country and key urban centres. In the West and the North, these roads also ensure cross border travel with neighbouring countries. Most paved roads can withstand the effects of the monsoon season.

Carana also has a dense network of partially robust unpaved roads and tracks. Unpaved roads and tracks are mostly very vulnerable against significant rains and floods and deteriorate quickly if not maintained. The years of civil war, harsh weather, minimal investment and maintenance have degraded it significantly with the result that the road network is often impassable in the rainy season.

Bridges along the paved roads are normally steel and concrete constructions, which can carry trucks and heavy vehicles. Bridges along the unpaved roads are normally of wooden construction and must be assessed individually.

Airports

The international airports in Galasi and Corma are both operational and meet international standards for air traffic. Both airports are suitable for heavy and extremely heavy transport aircraft and used by international airlines. However, their cargo handling capacity is currently limited.

The airports in Alur and Folsa are suitable for medium transport aircraft, but they do not have equipment to handle heavy air cargo. All other airfields, without additional construction work are only suitable for light fixed wing aircraft. They can be used for communication and small size personnel transport. Consistent fuel supplies are only available in Galasi and Corma.

Electricity

Carana could be relatively self-sufficient in the production of electricity; this is generated by three power plants (the Kilu Dam, the Salobo Dam and the coal power plant in Galasi) and two hydro-electric power stations. In previous years, the country was a net exporter of electricity during and after the rainy season.

During the conflict, most of the power supply equipment around the Salobo Dam was destroyed or damaged. This, together with a weak distribution network, leads to a consistent power supply only to Galasi, the provincial capitals, and some other cities. The majority of the country is currently without regular power supply. Some small local waterpower plants and generators provide electrical power for small numbers of the rural population.

Water and sanitation

Only the capital and some larger cities have a water supply system for the central area of the city. All other towns and villages rely on wells and water trading. Potable water is available in most parts of the country, but the quality of water varies. In dry areas southwest of Maldosa and west of Galasi drinking water during the dry season is mostly taken from small ponds and slow flowing brooks.

The quality of this water is low and causes several diseases. The wells in this region are not deep

enough to reach clean water. The quality of water provided by the few supply systems does not meet international hygiene standards but causes no direct health threats for the population. The water quality in the rural areas is mostly satisfactory. Even the water quality of the crowded Galasi suburbs and the IDP camps is problematic.

There is no system of sanitation and garbage removal in Carana, leading to permanent disease and health problems, particularly in the heavily populated areas.

12. Security and Defence Sector

Security Overview

There have been several disputes with neighbouring countries in the past few decades; however, there were no external military threats to Carana. The main internal security problems continue to be the high level of crime in urban areas (resulting from the poor economic situation), the activities of uncontrolled armed groups and the conflicts between government forces and rebels.

An estimated 12,000 people have been killed in recent months and anything up to 700,000 were forced to flee their homes because of the fighting between government forces and rebels in the North and the South. The large numbers of combat-related IDPs further affects the security situation.

With the formation of the El Hasar Terrorist Group in Katasi, new external threats evolved, as well as with the fundamentalist groups in Rimosa that challenge the progress and stability of the ongoing peace process within Carana. While relations with Katasi and Rimosa remain tense, currently the likelihood of intra-state conflict is considered low. This might however change if the situation further escalates and the territorial integrity of Carana is being challenged through these groups.

Security in Carana is negatively impacted / may be impacted:

- If the ongoing peace process based on the Kalari Peace Agreement is delayed in time and conducted without full participation of all parties to the conflict, especially the impact of the CISC splinter groups on the implementation.
- If spoilers to the peace process (CISC splinter groups) pose a threat to the local population of Carana
- through increasing evidence of criminal usurpation of the diamond mining in the North and West, probably with government connivance and controlled by cartels based in Sumora.
- If the El Hasar terrorist group infiltrate the West of Carana to avoid the French COIN operations in Katasi and exploit local communities for logistics and supply.
- If the militia groups (warlords) conducting illegal exploitation and trade of diamonds in central Leppko pose threats to the local population and impede the peace process.

The poor economic situation has resulted in increased and more radicalised level of criminal activity, some of it organized in urban areas. In the North and West there is increasing evidence of

criminal usurpation of the diamond mining, probably with government connivance and controlled by cartels based in Sumora. Rimosa and Carana still dispute the ownership of some of the islands along the southern coastline of Carana, as well related fishing rights in the respective national territory. Armed groups abducted many civilians, mainly by extremist rebel and militia elements. There are, however, also reports of violations conducted by the parties to the PA.

Presidential Guard

The Presidential Guard has a strength equivalent to two infantry battalions and it is not part of the regular defence force. The commanders and most officers are from the tribe of President Ogavo.

Members of the Presidential Guard received intensive training and are entitled to several privileges. This unit is a loyal elite force with the task to protect the President. It is also used for special purpose tasks. In the recent past, the Presidential Guard was used several times, together with Gendarmerie units, to fight against rebel groups, and has a reputation for being particularly brutal.

Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC) or Carana Defence Force (CDF)

The FDC/CDF has a total strength of approximately 20,000 men (17,500 Army, 1600 Air Force, 900 Navy). The chiefs of the services report direct to the president. With a small number of coastal and river patrol boats the Navy plays a specialised but insignificant role in the Defence Force.

The Air Force is equipped with a squadron of armed helicopters, transport helicopters and a few light bombers, which have a limited strike capacity. Although a limited capacity, it allows the government to project its' power over the entire country. However, this limited capacity is not sufficient to deliver decisive strikes against the various rebel groups.

The main service in the FDC/CDF is the Army, primarily but not solely recruited from the Falin people. Its senior leadership is almost wholly Falin. Structured in four area commands it represents the power of the central government all over the country. The areas of responsibility of these commands do not necessarily match the administrative and provincial boundaries. Instead, they reflect the location of the headquarters and troops rather than the real responsibility for a certain precise, defined area. Troops, especially those employed in rural areas, face recurrent problems of non-payment of wages. A number of units are composed of integrated armed group members, lack operational capacity and commitment to human rights, conduct, and discipline standards.

Women's participation in the armed forces is low, with female soldiers and higher-ranking officers making up some 6% of the FDC/CDF in total. During the Uroma regime and on Uroma's specific request, women were recruited and received substantial training abroad, which eventually led to positions as senior officers. A small but steady recruitment of female soldiers continued over the following decades, although their status has been continuously deteriorating due to lack of political support for women's participation.

The French and Russian Governments provided most of the existing military equipment during the 1980s and early 1990s. Since this time, equipment maintenance has often suffered from a lack of spare parts and well-trained mechanics. The level of equipment availability is estimated as low.

All Services have the same set of SALW, app. 3.000 modern assault rifles (M-16), all in good quality and app. 15.000 older types, nonetheless functional (a mix of Belgian and British made FN FAL and some German G3).

Mouvement Patriotique du Carana (MPC)

The MPC is an avowed secular organization with broad appeal that has a total strength of 10,000 fighters and 10,000 to 20,000 supporters. The level of public support is high in the West and cuts across the different religions. The MPC is structured into groups of 700 men. Each of these groups is led by a field commander and has a local network of supporters. The groups have no internally defined military structure, but a system of sub-commanders with different numbers of fighters. The loyalty to the commanders is high and discipline is very good.

The official HQ of MPC is in Alur but this is more a symbolic HQ than an operational one. In some areas the MPC have taken over government and basic administrative functions. Because of the broad public support for the rebels, and the dissatisfaction with the government, the new role of the MPC is well accepted by the largely Kori population in the West.

No detailed information on the equipment and training standards of the MPC is currently available.

Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC)

The CISC is an unstructured formation of rebels with diverging backgrounds. Some members are Tati deserters from the FDC, while others have fled the civil war in Rimoso and joined CISC for lack of alternatives. The total strength is estimated to be around 3,000 to 5,000 fighters. They are organised in company-strength formations (nominal battalion formations), many of which are under-strength. The public support for CISC is based mainly in the Tati dominated Leppko Province because of many acts of FDC violence against the population.

The movement has been successful in recruiting young men to its cause through a combination of government anti-Muslim excesses, religious zeal and the poor economic situation, as well as due to recent rebel successes. The discipline and internal cohesion of this rebel group is low, as is the standard of training, although lately there is increasing evidence of the presence of experienced foreign extremists who have upped the tempo and quality of CISC operations.

No detailed information on the equipment and training standards of the CISC is currently available.

Militias, gangs and warlords

During the years of fighting, several smaller armed groups have formed in Leppko. Some of these groups are fragmentations of the CISC or deserters from the government forces. Other groups have arisen from local vigilant groups built to protect their villages from attacks from soldiers and rebels.

These groups operate mainly in the northern Leppko province, chiefly for economic reasons (theft, illegal exploitation of resources, ransom) and are perceived as loyal to their leaders (warlords). Initial information indicates that these groups consist of 300 up to 1,000 fighters with light weapons.

The aims and loyalties of these groups are very uncertain and the boundary from local militias to armed bandits is affluent. None of these groups is part of the ongoing peace process.

13. Foreign Military Groups/Military Forces

El Hasar Group

The El Hasar group was formed in 2018 in the neighbouring country of Katasi and turned into a “terror organisation” requesting their own state and engaging in guerrilla type terror operations against the Katasi government. Recently, following anti-terror operations conducted by the Government of Katasi supported by the French Forces, El Hasar fighters/elements crossed the border into Carana in the western parts of the Koloni and Tereni Region. Local communities report armed attacks and raids on villages by these elements, the latter stealing money, food, supply items like spare parts, gas and ammunition. Reports also indicate violence against civilians such as rape, torture and other casualties.

Unconfirmed reports claim the fundamentalist elements from both the Tatsi and Kori communities are supporting / sympathising with the El Hasar fighters/elements.

The FDC and MPC do not have the capability to engage the El Hasar elements. Both, however, agreed to allow the French Forces to pursue the fighters into the territory of Carana.

Elassi Liberation Front (ELF)

The ELF was formed in 2018 in the neighbouring country of Rimosa and is conducting insurgency operations against the Rimosa government. They mainly operate south of the Carana border in Rimosa, but have begun to challenge CISC in southern Carana and collaborate with some CISC splinter groups. Recruitment for ELF has surged both in Carana and Rimosa during the past year. Carana communities along the border report armed attacks and raids on villages by ELF elements. ELF plans the establishment of an independent State in Rimosa, possibly to be extended to Carana, as non-negotiable and is not part of the peace negotiations.

Carana communities along the border report armed attacks and raids on villages by ELF elements, who are held to be stealing money, food, supply items like spare parts, gas and ammunition. Reports also indicate violence against civilians like rape, torture and other casualties.

Banditry / Piracy

With the discovery of oil and its initial exploration offshore of the southern coast of Carana, and the shipping of copper ore from Maldosa, incidents of piracy and hijacking of transport vessels are growing more frequent. The bandits/pirates operate mainly by using the island as base/cover and attacking the vessel to demand ransom for further passage.

There is little information about these pirates, who seem to have the support of the local population, based on economic gains and local investment from these illegal operations. Due to the ongoing border dispute between Carana and Rimosa, both Naval Forces are preoccupied and are not engaging the emerging threat of piracy.

14. Humanitarian Situation

As result of the fighting, many people in Carana fled their homelands, but most remained in the country. An estimated 100,000 have taken refuge in the neighbouring countries of Sumora (app. 40,000 refugees), Katasi (appr. 40,000 refugees) and Rimoso (appr. 20,000 refugees). Another 700,000 settled in IDP camps around the harbour cities where they are now clustered in makeshift camps and shantytowns in or near urban areas. The largest part of these IDPs currently live in the camps around Galasi, the majority arrived within the last 12 months.

News of the possible arrival of a UN mission has buoyed the hopes of the nearly 900,000 refugees and IDPs to return home. UNHCR, however, has expressed concerns about whether the environment is sufficiently safe and secure for their return. All parties to the conflict are reported to have used mines. In many areas from which people are displaced there is little prospect of employment or other livelihoods.

Finally, the country of Rimoso, sharing a border of approximately 200 km with Carana, has suffered from civil conflict between the two rival ethnic groups, the majority Tatsi and the minority Elasi. As a result, approximately 30,000 Elasi have taken refuge in southern Carana. Most of these Elasi refugees are sheltered in Camp Lora near the village of Lora, approximately 50 km from the Rimosan border, and are a source of potential instability within the Tatsi dominated Leppko Province. UNHCR and two NGO implementing partners, Refugees International and Care for the Children, maintain Camp Lora.

Conditions of health, sanitation and hygiene in these areas are dangerously inadequate and increasingly provide a breeding ground for extremist discontent. The situation in the IDP camps is poor and has significantly deteriorated during the last months.

Nutrition

Although all basic food is available at the market, large numbers of the population cannot afford the necessary food for sufficient nutrition. In rural areas most people can compensate for inflation and unemployment through self-sufficient agriculture. However, severe nutritional problems exist in the urban areas and the IDP camps. The child mortality rate has dramatically increased during the last several years. The most affected areas of malnutrition are the Barin Region, the area between Faron and Folsa and the coastal area south of Cereni. These areas are already experiencing humanitarian emergencies.

A humanitarian emergency is forecasted to affect approximately 2 million people next year. Projects recently started by the UN World Food Programme (WFP) and other NGOs are not sufficiently funded and cannot to prevent a widespread humanitarian crisis.

Health

Almost no medical infrastructure exists in the rural areas. The rudimentary health system that exists in the cities is unable to provide basic medical support. One of the main humanitarian concerns in Carana is the acute lack of functioning medical facilities in the rebel held South and West. Here there is a critical lack of emergency supplies required for displaced and vulnerable populations, particularly in the IDP camps.

If the situation in the large cities continues to worsen, the threat of epidemics will increase. The WHO (World Health Organisation) has already reported 70 cases of cholera in Carana to date.

15. Explosives

During the conflict, landmines were used extensively by both sides. Similar to other cases, mine warfare was not conducted with documented mine obstacles. Landmines were used by all sides as a means of terror and deterrent and to prevent access to certain areas. As a result, the precise location of mines and explosive devices is not documented and mostly unknown. Further analysis is necessary to identify high mine threat areas.

Carana first pledged its support for a ban on antipersonnel mines in November 2009 and it was a supporter of the Ottawa process that led to the signing of the Mine Ban Treaty on 02 December 2011. Carana was one of the signatories of the treaty, never ratified the treaty, however, due to the outbreak of civil war. Carana also did not attend any Treaty-related meetings and abstained from voting in favour of every pro-ban United Nations General Assembly resolution since 2011.

Carana is not an identified producer or exporter of antipersonnel mines. At the same time, Carana has not enacted any internal measures to prohibit its production or export of antipersonnel mines. The size and origin of Carana's mine stockpile is not known. Antipersonnel mines have been used extensively in the recent civil war by all sides to the conflict. The PA prohibits further use, however, uncorroborated reports of continuing mine use appear.

Annexes:

- A - Carana thematic maps
- B – Carana Security and Defence Forces
- C - Carana Law Enforcement
- D - United Nations and related agencies

Annex A
Carana thematic maps




Figure 1 - Carana Natural Recourses




Figure 2 – Vegetation




Figure 3 – Ethnic distribution in Carana




Figure 4 – Ethnic percentage distribution in Carana




Figure 5 - Overview on the rebel-controlled areas




Figure 6 - Disputed borders and resources




Figure 7 - Carana Administrative borders




Figure 8 – Humanitarian Overview

Annex B

Carana Security and Defence Forces

Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC) or Carana Defence Force (CDF)

The military expenditures currently are estimated at 2.7% of the Carana GDP.

It is further estimated that the potential personnel pool for a military mobilisation is about 5,250,000 (males age 18-49). Family members accompany many of the personnel. Numbers have not yet been determined.

According to the Draft Law, 18 years is the minimum age for conscription and voluntary service, but in spite of this, it is estimated that 15-20 % of the CDF soldiers are younger than 18 years old. Age composition of FDC:

- 18-29 yrs: 63%
- 30-39 yrs: 27%
- 40-49 yrs: 10%
- Officially 5% female soldiers (above 18)

There is evidence that in the last phases of war, there has been increasing recruitment of under 16, so the estimated number of under 18-year-olds is 10% (boys only).

Command Structure

Area Command	Location	Assigned Troops
North	Maroni	2 Inf Bn, 1 Airborne Bn, 1 Arty Bn, 1 Engr Bn, 1 AAA Btry, MP, Mil Band
West	Alur	2 Inf Bn, 1 Arty Btry
Central	Folsa	1 Inf Bn, 1 Engr Coy, 1 Recce Coy
South	Corma	2 Inf Bn, 1 Recce Coy

Major Equipment

Army

Type	Quantity	Role
AMX 13	12	Light Tank
Mamba	17	Reconnaissance Vehicle
AML 60/90	11	Reconnaissance Vehicle
M 3	21	APC
M 2	11	105 mm Artillery Gun
120 mm Brandt	14	Mortar
81 mm Brandt	27	Mortar
RCL M 40	8	106 mm Recoilless Launcher
Panhard M 3 VDA	9	Self-propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun
L 60	17	20 mm Anti-Aircraft Gun

Air Force

Type	Quantity	Role
Alpha Jet C	6	Ground Attack
Fokker 100	3	Communication
Cessna 421	2	Communication
F 33 C Bonanza	4	Training
Aérospatiale SA 330 H Puma	6	Utility
Aérospatiale SA 316 Alouette	5	Utility/Communication

Navy

Type	Quantity	Role
Suscal A	3	Coastguard Boat
LC-84	2	River Patrol Boat

Carana Presidential Guard

The Carana Presidential Guard has a strength of almost 1 500 personnel. The guard mainly consists of two infantry battalions, but also features additional units (see organisational chart).

The presidential guard was created to carry out representative tasks. It is also responsible for the close protection details for the president and close relatives, support of military and of public order operations as well as special assignments from the president.

It is not part of the regular defence force. The presidential guard reports directly to the president of Carana. The guard possesses ties to the gendarmerie of Carana which were created through the frequent joint deployment in operations.




Figure 9 – Structure Carana Presidential Guard

Annex C

Carana Law Enforcement

The Carana law enforcement agencies are divided into the Carana National Police (CNP) and the Gendarmerie. The estimated number for CNP and Gendarmerie officers' amounts to 10,000 officers.

Carana National Police

The Carana National Police (CNP) has an estimated strength of approximately 7100 police officers. Precise numbers cannot be aggregated due to the high fluctuation in the regional personnel bodies.

The CNP operates mainly in densely populated areas. The CNP's first operational pillar concerns public order and safety. In fulfilling this task, the CNP is also tasked with traffic safety. Its second main objective is the investigation of criminal acts. In doing so, the CNP is expected to conduct major investigations outside its area of responsibility, i.e. in rural areas.

The CNP find itself within the command structure of the Carana Ministry of the Interior. However, the Ministry of Justice carries out oversight relating to operational matters of criminal investigation cases.

The CNP has a history of being underfinanced, understaffed and being insufficiently organized. Therefore, the organization lacks basic administrative mechanisms and routines. One example is the lack of a functioning education and training pillar. The CNP does currently not command a centralised educational facility such as an academy.




Figure 10 – Structure Carana National Police

Carana Gendarmerie

The Gendarmerie of Carana has a strength of close to 2900 officers. It is tasked with upholding public order in rural areas. The gendarmerie is further authorized to conduct military police duties.

The Gendarmerie is under the control of the Ministry of Defence. Operational control of units, which engage in public order operations, is transferred to the Ministry of the Interior. However, this mechanism has been widely disregarded, as the Gendarmerie was utilized as a governmental strong-arm.

Traditionally the gendarmerie is closely connected to the Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC). Its organisational structure, the operational approach and its self-understanding are strongly influenced by the FDC's customs and culture. The Gendarmerie has benefitted from its strong ties to the FDC and to the presidential guard. Consequently, it is better funded and staffed than its civilian counterpart, the CNP.




Figure 11 – Structure Carana Gendarmerie

Annex D

United Nations and related agencies

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

International Headquarters: New York, USA

Local Headquarters: Galasi, Folsa, Corma, Alur

Local presence: since 2009

UN OCHA's mission in Carana is to represent the role of the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) and coordinating and facilitating humanitarian assistance responding to the needs of affected people in Carana.

United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF)

International Headquarters: New York, USA

Local Headquarters: Galasi, Folsa, Corma

Local presence: since 2008

UNICEF's mission in Carana is to provide care and special protection to the most vulnerable groups and victims of war, namely women and children. UNICEF is also providing safe access to vulnerable populations, and provides them with health care, basic education and protection from harm.

World Food Programme (WFP)

International Headquarters: Rome, Italy

Local Offices: Galasi, Amsan, Corma, Folsa, Alur

Local presence: since 2009

The UN World Food Programme has been providing food assistance in Carana through a regional operation since 2000 to respond to the food aid needs of vulnerable populations and more than 700,000 IDPs. Programme activities have included therapeutic feeding programmes, supplementary feeding, food for agriculture, food for training, and emergency school feeding.

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

International Headquarters: Geneva, Switzerland

Local Offices: Galasi, Alur, Lora

Local presence: since 2011

World Health Organization

International Headquarters: Geneva, Switzerland

Local Offices: Galasi

Local presence: since 2003

UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)

International Headquarters: Geneva, Switzerland

Local Offices: Galasi

Local presence: since 2010

Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)

International Headquarters: Geneva, Switzerland

Local Offices: Galasi, Corma

Local presence: since 2003

United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

International Headquarters: UN HQ New York, USA

Local Offices: Galasi

Local presence: since 2010

United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)

International Headquarters: New York, USA

Local Offices: Galasi

Local presence: since 2015

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

International Headquarters: Vienna, Austria

Local Offices: Galasi, Faron

Local presence: since 2010

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

International Headquarters: UN HQ New York, USA

Local Offices: Galasi, Alur, Maroni

Local presence: since 2009

United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women)

International headquarters: New York, USA

Local Offices: Galasi

Local presence: since 2013

World Bank

International headquarters: Washington DC, USA

Local Offices: Galasi

Local presence: since 1980

IMF

International headquarters: Washington DC, USA

Local Offices: Galasi

Local presence: since 1980




Figure 12: UN Country Team locations

Peace Process in Carana

Summary



New York
25 September 2021

THE PEACE PROCESS IN CARANA

After a longstanding civil war demanding thousands of victims and causing more than 700,000 Caranese citizens to become internally displaced, the warring factions in the Carana Civil War, the Government of Carana, the Mouvement Patriotique de Carana MPC, and the Combatants Independants de Carana CISC, have finally agreed to engage in peace negotiations in Kalari, Namuna. As negotiations take off under UN mediation, the UNSC has therefore decided to weigh its options of assisting a transition to peace.

At the 5342nd meeting of the Security Council, held on 11 December 2020, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation in Carana", the President of the Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council expresses its grave concern to the ongoing deterioration of the political, security and humanitarian environment in Carana, and the serious consequences for the population of this country and the region. It deplores the loss of life that has already occurred, and fears that the failure, thus far, to reach a political settlement may result in further bloodshed, and calls for an immediate end to hostilities.

"The Security Council commends the Fasia Union (FU) for its role in mediating between the parties and urges it to use its influence to promote a peaceful solution, stressing that the crisis in Carana can be resolved only through a negotiated political solution in which all parties, both those involved in the conflict and within the region, work actively to achieve such a solution.

"The Security Council firmly condemns the continued use force to influence the political situation in Carana and calls for a return to the principles of the 2013 Constitution, and urges all parties to agree terms for a lasting peace agreement that addresses the underlying causes of the conflict and reestablishes confidence among the parties.

"The Security Council also expresses its concern at the humanitarian consequences of the crisis in Carana. It calls upon the international community to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to those in need in all the countries of the Fasia Continent that are affected by the Carana crisis. It also calls on all parties to provide unhindered access to the affected populations."

"The Security Council condemns the deaths of innocent civilians and human rights abuses in Carana and calls for such incidents to be fully investigated. The Council calls upon the Government and all other parties to respect human rights and take immediate steps, with support from the international community, to reverse the climate of impunity, particularly in the context of the use of children in armed conflict."

"The Security Council affirms its readiness to consider the active involvement of the United Nations, in coordination with the Fasia Union, including through concrete sustainable and effective measures, to assist in the implementation of an effective ceasefire agreement and in an agreed process for political settlement of the conflict. The objective of the United Nations should be to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in a united Carana, where human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens

assured and in which internally displaced persons and refugees can return home in safety and dignity."

"The Security Council will continue to monitor closely the situation in Carana and remains seized of the matter."

Thus, the Integrated Task Force (ITF) was set up and tasked to develop a strategic assessment and options for the UN in Carana aiming to implement the following political/strategic end state.

"A unified and peaceful Carana in its current boundaries, with a democratically elected government in which all ethnic groups of the country are represented and accountable security forces able to protect all its citizens, on a level of economic wellbeing so that nobody suffers from basic needs, with a functioning civil society and situation in which human rights, gender perspectives and the rights of the vulnerable people are respected."

The ITF tasked by the UN SG and based on the compiled Carana Country Study conducted a strategic assessment with the following recommendation:

- Root causes of the Caranese civil war are to be found in a history of the colonial and post-colonial centralized governments neglecting rural and provincial areas, in the destruction of livelihoods both man-made and through climate change, in violently exploited ethnic tensions, as well as in political authority challenged through corruption and favouritism and a popular demand for the non-existent rule of law and civic participation. International involvement is deeply entangled with the current conflict dynamics.
- In September 2019, the leaders of the three major factions, President Ogavo (FDC), Cdr. Sefu Akinyi (MPC) and Cdr. Abdirahim Muhamed (CISC) agreed to peace negotiations. First, these took place in Kuku, Mosana, under FU brokerage. After their failure due to perceived mediator partiality, the UN assumed renewed negotiations in Kalari, Namuna in 14 November 2020.
- The Peace Agreement (PA) will supposedly get signed by the parties to the conflict within the next 6 months. The parties will invite the UN to support in the implementation of the PA.
- Expected challenges to the implementation process:
 1. In the northern Leppko region in central Carana, several unmonitored armed groups have formed around locally powerful and well-connected warlords. These groups operate mainly according to economic goals (theft, illegal exploitation of diamond, copper and wood, ransom) and are thought to be connected to the organized crime network in northern Carana. The warlords are not part of the peace agreement.
 2. The fundamentalist Elasi Liberation Front (ELF) is collaborating with CISC splinter groups, plans to establish an independent State in Rimosa, frequently raids villages in the border area to Rimosa and is not part of the PA.
 3. CISC hardliner splinter groups refute the ongoing peace process and gather increasing support from CISC armed forces.
 4. The overall humanitarian and development situation is expected to worsen further.

5. The political dispute between Rimosa and Carana regarding their overlapping maritime territory, contested because of unexplored oilfields and because of fishing rights, has recently intensified.

- The El Hasar insurgency in neighbouring Katasi will have an effect on the development of the peace process. The government of Carana and MPC have agreed to coordinate its actions against El Hasar with Operation Aigle (FRAFOR) and the situation is deemed stable. In the medium-term, this joint effort may create an obstacle to the DDR of MPC fighters. Government institutions and FDC troops are currently not present on the ground there.
- The UN will be prepared to deploy a multidimensional Peacekeeping Mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to monitor and observe the compliance of the PA and to address spoilers to the PA in order to support the establishment of a unified and peaceful Carana. Thus, the UN will also support in establishing a safe and secure environment, in preparing and conducting democratic elections, to offer good offices in resolving the disputes with Rimosa and in assisting the coordination with the Government of Katasi and FRAFOR efforts to neutralize El Hasar.

With the UN SG Report of 01 April 2021, the UN SC was informed about the recommended option to assist Carana upon an signed Peace Agreement. In order to support the strategic planning efforts, the UN SC mandated a military-civilian Technical Assessment Mission to conduct a two-week field survey to verify the conditions in Carana as assumed in the Strategic Assessment.

The report the Technical Assessment Mission then provides to UNHQ can be summarized as follows:

- Even after the beginning of the negotiations for the Ceasefire- and Peace Agreement, Carana can be described as politically unstable. The government holds limited power over the Northeast and no control over the West and the South of the country. An increasing level of public resistance can barely be handled by the security forces. The administration displays a dramatic lack of efficiency. Official administration in the rebel-controlled areas is non-existent. Institutional political mechanisms, such as parties or formal civil society gatherings, are currently non-existent.
- The armed conflict in Carana has also resulted in serious violations and abuses of human rights and humanitarian law. All sides have been responsible for violations and abuses. Torture has been widely used by all parties to the conflict.
- The estimated number of CNP and local police officer's amount to app. 10,000 officers, or one officer for every 1,700 citizens. There is no clarity about the exact figure of national police, or even if those in police uniforms are certified police officers. The relationship between civil society and the police force is fraught with crises of credibility and impunity. In MPC-controlled areas, currently about 50 formally trained police officers and up to 300 personnel appointed from the ranks of the MPC are active. No regular police force services the South anymore. The CISC has taken over all police functions.
- In terms of military strength, the FDC currently commands 20;000 personnel (all three services), mainly in three brigades. The Presidential Guard has a strength equivalent to two

infantry battalions and it is not part of the regular defence force. The MPC has an assessed strength of 10,000 fighters. CISC structures are loose and their strength is estimated at app. 3,000- 5,000 fighters. In contrast to the MPC, CISC has not tried to establish administrative functions and exercises control in the region only by the rule of the force.

- During the years of fighting, several smaller armed groups have formed in Leppko. Some of these groups are fragmentations of the CISC or deserters from the government forces. Other groups have arisen from local vigilant groups built to protect their villages from attacks from soldiers and rebels. Two external militias are important to the Caranese context, The El Hasar group requesting their own state in Katasi and the ELF conducting insurgency operations against the Rimosan government. Both frequently penetrate into Caranese territory. The MPC engagement in the deterrence of El Hasar fighters along the Carana-Katasi border is expected to provide an obstacle to the DDR process otherwise embraced by all relevant actors. In the meantime, ELF has begun to challenge CISC in southern Carana, actively to recruit soldiers in Carana, and to collaborate with some CISC splinter groups.
- The majority of the country is currently without regular power supply and is relying on generators. Water is available in most parts of the country, but the quality of water varies. Carana has a network of capable paved roads, mostly unaffected by meteorological effects especially the rainy season. Carana also has a dense network of partially robust unpaved roads and tracks, the availability of which is highly uncertain during and after the rainy season. The two railway tracks running between Galasi and Akkabar, and between Maldosa and Mia are both mostly in bad shape but operational. Carana has three harbours for deep-water ships and some smaller harbours for fishing boats. The international airports in Galasi and Corma are both operational and meet international standards for air traffic. Both airports are suitable for heavy and extremely heavy transport aircraft. A strong mission support capability needs to be established to allow the operation of a PKM as limited capabilities are only available in Carana.
- During the conflict between FDC and rebels, both sides used landmines as a means of terror and deterrent as well as to prevent access to certain areas, and mine obstacles were not documented. Because of this conduct of mine warfare, as well as through flooding and landslides displacing minefields, the precise location of mines and explosive devices is not documented and mostly unknown. As a result, the explosive picture is chaotic and there are no reliable data or estimates of the amounts of explosives available. Anti-personnel mines, 120mm mortar shells and 122mm howitzer shells are confirmed to have been in use.
- Of the roughly 17 million population of Carana, 6.3 million are currently in need of humanitarian assistance. The overarching immediate humanitarian issues that need to be tackled in a comprehensive and coordinated fashion include food insecurity and livelihoods, protection from exposure to conflict and human trafficking, health and education. Communities most at risk are IDP camp populations, returning IDPs, refugee communities, those hosting IDPs and refugees, children and adolescents, as well as women-headed households and survivors of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). In terms of

development, protection of people and livelihoods, infrastructure, access to credit and markets are key concerns.

- During the past 10 years of civil war, approx. 700,000 Caranese people have become internally displaced (IDPs) and settled in IDP camps around the harbour cities, most in the Galasi area. Approx. 20,000 fled to Sumora and 10,000 to Rimosa and periodically attempt to return to their lands for the farming season. With the peace process in reach, this year a substantial number of IDPs has begun to leave Galasi to return to their lands in Koloni, Tereni and Mahbek. Carana itself hosts refugee populations from Katasi (approx. 30,000 mainly in Tereni and western Koloni) and Rimosa (approx. 20,000 mainly in southern Leppko).
- Humanitarian access has overall proven difficult in the MPC- and CISC-controlled areas and in flooded areas during the rainy season. Government participation in assessment missions is a common demand throughout the entire country. Other obstacles include the road conditions during the raining season, fuel shortages, the frequent interruptions of mobile phone coverage and access to cash, because of both the thin banking infrastructure and the high and fast-evolving inflation. Capacities for air transport are low. An initial assessment conducted showed that the medical facilities in the major cities might be sufficient for minor treatment of UN personnel.

The Kalari Peace Agreement has been signed on 1 August 2021 by the parties to the conflict. The Treaty is structured in five sections, an overview, the Ceasefire Agreement and DDR process, a section on governance and the re-building of state functionality, wealth sharing and development measures and finally humanitarian aspects and issues of transitional justice.

The ceasefire agreement includes the complete cessation of armed hostilities, distribution of weaponry, land mining, propaganda and violence against civilians, release of all civilian abductees and demobilization of under-age combatants. It invites the UN Peacekeeping mission, calls for the establishment of a Joint Ceasefire Commission to observe the transitional process and a National Commission for Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration, to have completed its actions after 240 days regarding the signatory factions and after 360 days regarding other armed groups.

A new national army, the Forces de la Défense et Sécurité du Carana (FDSC), shall be created of not more than 22,000 soldiers with up to 4,000 being drawn from former MPC combatants and 1,500 drawn from former CISC combatants. A new police force shall be created of not more than 12,500 officers with up to 3,000 are being drawn from former MPC combatants and up to 1,250 being drawn from former CISC combatants. Prisoner-of-war issues are to be discussed further.

The governance section describes the formation of the NTGC in three branches, the National Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA), the executive; and the judiciary, all of which are to be staffed according to principles of power-sharing. It determines the establishment of a constitutional board, a presidency and two vice-presidents, and calls for elections six months after the adoption of the new constitution. Furthermore, the treaty describes wealth-sharing measures, administered by a Reconstruction and Development Fund, as well as a Multi-Donor Trust Fund. Last part lays the

Kalari Peace Treaty

11 August 2021

PREAMBLE:

WHEREAS the Government of Carana (GOC), Mouvement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) and Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC), (the Parties) having met under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) in Kalari, in respect of the issues related to an Inclusive Peace Agreement and its implementation;

REAFFIRMING their determination to build a State of democratic law and prosperity, guaranteeing the rights of citizens and harmonious and sustainable development in Carana;

REAFFIRMING their commitment to the Constitution of the Republic of Carana of 15 April 2013;

RECOGNIZING that a viable ceasefire and peace process can meaningfully be realized through adherence and commitment to the Kalari Peace Treaty;

AWARE of the overwhelming support shown by the people of Carana to the irreversible peace process and the will in resolving the outstanding issues of conflict in Carana, the peace process and the need for an expeditious conclusion of the peace agreement;

REITERATING their commitment to the final, just and comprehensive peace settlement, the security, welfare and stability of the people of Carana within the framework of a true and sincere national reconciliation;

CONSCIOUS of the need to promote true national reconciliation as the basis of sustainable peace in Carana;

DEEPLY ATTACHED to the values of democracy, good governance, justice and the protection and promotion of human rights in accordance with the relevant international instruments;

AWARE of the fact that Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants are crucial components for a secure and peaceful Carana and commit themselves to credible, transparent and effective DDR processes which will support the ex-combatants' transition to a productive civilian life;

PART ONE

General and Fundamental Provisions

ARTICLE I

1. A Peace Agreement (PA) is hereby established throughout the territory of CARANA, between the belligerents as defined. The PA shall enter into force upon signature and the implementation will be put into effect as soon as possible.
2. The **Ceasefire Agreement** (as part of the agreement) is the first stage of the peace process, which shall serve as a stable platform for further negotiations with the aim to re-establish complete peace and security in CARANA.
3. The final cessation of hostilities shall enter into force within seventy-two hours after the signing of the ceasefire agreement.

ARTICLE II

4. The Parties agree to a permanent ceasefire among all their forces with their broader objective of sustaining the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, promoting peace culture, reconciliation and confidence building;
5. The ceasefire shall uphold the following principles: Permanent cessation of hostilities between CDF, MPC and ICSC within 72 hours after the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
6. The permanent cessation of hostilities shall include the following activities:
 - a) The suspension of supplies of ammunition and weaponry.
 - b) Banning the distribution of lethal logistical supplies to or from any of the forces.
 - c) Upon signing of the Peace Agreement, the parties will discuss the issue of prisoner of war, political prisoners, and camps for displaced persons. The parties agree to release all civilian abductees and to demobilize combatants who are less than eighteen years.
 - d) A complete ban on any mine-laying operations and the hindering of operations to remove mines.
 - e) Cessation of all domestic and external propaganda between the parties and incitation of ethnic hatred.
 - f) Cessation of all acts of violence against the civilian population; acts of revenge; summary executions; torture; harassment; detention and persecution of civilians on the basis of ethnic origin, religious beliefs, or political affiliation; arming of civilians; use of child soldiers; sexual violence; sponsoring or promotion of terrorists or genocidal ideologies.
 - g) Cessation of all attacks by air, land and sea, as well as all acts of sabotage.

- h) Cessation of any actions likely to impede the normal implementation of the process.

ARTICLE III

7. The Parties agree to request the United Nations to constitute an effective, sustainable and affordable UN Peace Support Mission to monitor and verify this agreement and to support the implementation of the Peace Agreement.
8. The size of the UN Peace Support Mission shall be determined by the UN in consolidation with the parties.
9. For the purpose of monitoring activities related to the cease fire, the international monitors shall have unrestricted access in accordance with a Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) and Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).
10. The Parties request the UN to provide cultural orientation to all its members to create conducive atmosphere for respect and better understanding of social values and cultures to ensure effective implementation of this agreement.

ARTICLE IV

11. The Joint Commission for the Ceasefire (JCC) will be composed of one senior representative from each party and one legal adviser of each party signatory of the agreement and the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General or his/her deputy.
12. It shall be established no later than 30 days (D¹+30) upon signing the Peace Agreement.
13. The Commission, which is the decision-making organ for the ceasefire shall be based in Galasi and shall be headed by the UN. The tasks include:
 - a. after signature of the present Agreement, developing the ceasefire measures to be taken, including in particular the security measures, the cantonment and disarmament of armed groups in Carana as well as the active redeployment of defence and security forces in Carana,
 - b. monitoring the security arrangements.
14. The Commission will discuss and decide on all disputes about allegations regarding the agreed Cease Fire reported by the Regional Joint Teams (RJTs).

¹ D = Day of signature of the peace agreement

ARTICLE V

15. The Regional Joint Teams will be composed of representatives of all signatories, and the United Nations. The RJTs shall be led by officers of the UN. The RJTs will be responsible to the Joint Commission for the Ceasefire (JCC).
16. The RJTs shall have a Secretariat made up of senior United Nations officers. It shall be based at Galasi. It may meet anywhere as convened by the JCC or upon request of the RJT leaders.
17. The RJT will share information and facilitate communication between parties in order to reduce the likelihood of violations of the Ceasefire Agreement and to clarify alleged violations of the agreement. They will thereby assist in building confidence amongst signatories and help create trust in the peace process.
18. The duties and tasks of the Regional Joint Teams will be established by an internal rule of order that will define the attributes, way of functioning, rights and general duties of this structure.
19. RJTs shall be established no later than 60 days (D+60) of signing the Peace Agreement in all provincial capitals of Carana.

ARTICLE VI

20. The signatories of the present agreement accept the following principles whose modalities of implementation specified in the Kalari Peace Treaty:
 - a. Re-establishment of the rule of law based on national unity, democracy, pluralism in all its forms and respect for human rights.
 - b. Formation and composition of the new CARANA National Defence and Security Forces shall consist of Government forces and combatants of the Armed Political Parties and Movements.
 - c. Establishment of power sharing within the framework of a broad-based inclusive Transitional Government.

ARTICLE VII

21. The government of CARANA will undertake any effort to conduct Presidential and National elections within six months of the adoption of a new constitution for Carana.

PART TWO

Ceasefire Agreements

1. A ceasefire is hereby established throughout the territory of Carana between the signatories of the Peace Agreement. The ceasefire shall enter into force upon signature and the implementation will be put into effect as soon as possible.
2. The final cessation of hostilities shall enter into force within 72 hours after the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement.
3. The Ceasefire Agreement is the first stage of the peace process and shall serve as a stable platform for further negotiations with the aim to re-establish complete peace and security in Carana.
4. The permanent cessation of hostilities shall include final termination of the following activities:
 - a. Military activities including movement, reconnaissance, reinforcement, recruitment, drafting and military exercises other than those permitted by the JCC.
 - b. Land, air and river operations;
 - c. Laying of mines and other subversive activities;
 - d. Use of force against and abuse of civilians;
 - e. Replenishment of ammunition, weapons and other lethal or military equipment;
 - f. Hostile propaganda from inside or outside the country;
 - g. Occupation of new locations; The cessation of all acts of violence against the civilian population, including acts of revenge, summary executions, torture, harassment, detention and persecution of civilians on the basis of ethnicity, religious beliefs or political affiliation. Parties also agree to cease the use of child soldiers, sexual violence, or the sponsorship and/or promotion of terrorists or genocide ideologies.
 - h. The cessation of all domestic and external propaganda between the parties and the incitation of ethnic hatred.
 - i. The cessation of any actions likely to impede the normal implementation of the Kalari Treaty and the peace process.
 - j. Any other actions that may impede the normal progress of the peace process.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)

5. To establish a National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) based in Galasi that shall be chaired by a representative of the transitional Government of Carana and consist of twelve members: three each from the FDC, MPC, CISC and the UN. The Commission shall be responsible for all elements of the DDR programme.

- a. The commission shall have a military sub-commission chaired by the United Nations Head of Military Component with four members: one each from the FDC, MPC, CISC, and the UN.
 - b. The commission shall also have a reintegration sub-commission chaired by the transitional Government of Carana with representatives of the four organizations.
 - c. The commission shall also have a small arms and light weapons sub-commission chaired by the transitional Government of Carana with representative of the four organizations.
 - d. The commission may establish other sub-commissions as required.
 - e. The NCDDR shall have be constituted by D+30 and have its first meeting on D+60. The sub-commissions shall be established NLT D+90.
 - f. It reports regularly to the National Transitional Government and informs the Joint Commission for the Ceasefire. The Sub-commissions report to the NCDDR at regular intervals to be determined by the NCDDR.
6. To voluntarily commit all MPC and CISC forces to the DDR process. All FDC, MPC and CISC solders shall be registered.
 7. A complete ban on any mine-laying operations and the hindering of operations to remove mines. All parties further agree to declare all force structures, weapons, minefields and locations to the National Commission by D+45, and further agree to remain at their reported locations.
 8. The immediate suspension of supplies of ammunition and weaponry and a ban on the distribution of lethal logistical supplies to and from any of the parties to this agreement.
 9. To discuss, upon signing of the Kalari Treaty, the issue of prisoners of war, political prisoners, and camps for displaced persons. The parties also undertake to release all civilian abductees and to demobilize combatants who are less than 18 years of age.

National Army

10. A new national army, the Forces de la Défense et Sécurité du Carana (FDSC), shall be created of not more than 22,000 soldiers with up to 4,000 being drawn from former MPC combatants and 1,500 drawn from former CISC combatants. The FDSC shall operate under the authority of the new transitional Government of Carana, based on the establishment of a power-sharing arrangement outlined in the Kalari Treaty.
11. All belligerents will exchange detailed documents about the strength, capabilities and locations of their forces. The information is to be shared with the NCDDR and the JCC NLT D+45.
12. All forces of the FDC, MPC and CISC will withdraw from their field locations to respective Battalion HQ locations, by D+150.

13. All belligerents will decide on cantonment sites/locations for disarmament and demobilisation by D+180.
14. MPC and CISC will disarm and demobilise as soon the security situation allows, but NLT D+210.
15. To ensure that all weapons (including ammunition and mines) are surrendered to international authorities for storage or destruction no later than D+240.
16. 4,000 MPC and 1,500 CISC members will be integrated in the new FDSC NLT D+360.
17. All military personnel beyond 22,000 will need to be disarmed, demobilized and integrated into other government sectors or private sectors.

The Ceasefire Zone

18. The scope of the ceasefire shall be the whole territory of Carana.

Violations

19. The following acts shall be constituting violations of this agreement:
 - a. Any acts that may contravene this agreement
 - b. Unauthorized movements of troops
 - c. Unauthorized recruitment, draft and/or mobilization drive
 - d. Unauthorized replenishment of military equipment and supplies
 - e. Hostile acts
 - f. Violation of human rights, humanitarian law and obstruction of freedom of movement
 - g. Hostile propaganda and media warfare
 - h. Espionage, sabotage and acts of subversion to undermine either party and/or agreement
 - i. Recruitment of child soldiers

Other Armed Groups

20. The Parties agree to expedite the process of incorporation and reintegration of armed groups allied to either Party, into their armed forces, other organized forces, the civil service and societal institutions.
21. The Parties agree to guarantee all armed groups the freedom of choice, which forces or other institution they are joining.
22. By D + 360 all fighters of other armed groups shall be reintegrated or disarmed.

Verification, Monitoring, Complaints and Obligations

23. The structure and levels of verification and decision on disputes of the implementation of the Agreement shall be as follows:
 - a. Joint Commission for the Ceasefire (JCC)
 - b. Regional Joint Teams (RJTs).
24. The structure and levels for the implementation and verification of the Disarmament Process shall be as follows:
 - a. National Transitional Government (until new government is being elected)
 - b. National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR)
 - c. NCDDR sub-commissions.

National Police Force

25. A new national police service shall be created of not more than 12,500 officers with up to 3,000 are being drawn from former MPC combatants and up to 1,250 being drawn from former CISC combatants.
26. The United Nations will support the establishment and restructuring of the police service through the provision of training and monitoring.

PART FIVE

POST-CONFLICT REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

ARTICLE I

AMNESTY

The NTGC shall give consideration to a recommendation for general amnesty to all persons and parties engaged or involved in military activities during the Carana civil conflict.

ARTICLE II

HUMAN RIGHTS

1. The rights and duties proclaimed and guaranteed inter alia by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights, the Asian Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child shall form an integral part of the Constitution of the Republic of Carana.

2. All women and men shall be equal. No one may be discriminated against, inter alia, on grounds of origin, race, ethnicity, gender, colour, language, social situation, or religious, philosophical or political convictions, or because of a physical or mental handicap. All citizens shall enjoy equal protection of the law, as well as equal treatment under the law.
3. The Parties agree on the need for the establishment of an Independent National Commission on Human Rights (INCHR) by D+ 180.
4. The INCHR shall monitor compliance with the basic rights guaranteed in the present Peace Agreement as well as promote human rights education throughout the various sectors of Carana society, including schools, the media, the police and the military.
5. The INCHR shall work together with local Carana human rights and civil society organizations, international human rights organisations and other relevant U.N. agencies to monitor and strengthen the observance of human rights in the country.
6. Technical, financial and material assistance may be sought by the INCHR from the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the African Commission on Human and People's Rights and other relevant international organizations.

ARTICLE IV

RECONCILIATION AND JUSTICE

1. The Parties shall create the conditions needed to facilitate the rapid return, repatriation, reintegration and reinsertion of all displaced persons and refugees, and to set up mechanisms to take care of them, in accordance with the relevant international instruments.

ARTICLE V

HUMANITARIAN ACTION

1. The Parties shall promote and respect the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, which guide humanitarian action. They shall also prevent any use of humanitarian aid for political, economic or military ends, and facilitate access for humanitarian agencies and guarantee the security of their personnel.
2. The Parties re-affirm the commitment made in the Ceasefire Agreement, to provide security guarantees for safe and unhindered access by all humanitarian agencies to vulnerable groups throughout the country, in order to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in accordance with international conventions, principles and norms governing humanitarian operations.
3. Accordingly, the Parties agree to guarantee the security and movement of humanitarian personnel, that of their properties, goods transported, stocked or distributed, as well as their projects and beneficiaries.

4. The Transitional Government provided for in this agreement shall ensure the establishment of effective administrative and security infrastructure to monitor and support the implementation of these guarantees.
5. The said Transitional Government shall request the International Community to assist in providing humanitarian assistance for those in need, including internally displaced persons, refugees and returnees.
6. The Parties shall ensure the presence of security guarantees for the safe return and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons and the free movement of persons and goods.

ARTICLE VI

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

1. The Parties call for the urgent establishment of a consolidated United Nations Peace Support Mission in Carana that will have the resources to facilitate the implementation and coordination of the Political, Social, Economic and Security assistance to be extended under this Agreement.
2. The Parties also call on the International Community, to set up a monitoring mechanism in the form of an Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC) in Galasi that will ensure effective and faithful implementation of the Peace Agreement by all the Parties.
3. The Parties agree on the need for regular joint meetings between this Implementation Monitoring Committee and representatives of the NTGC, in order to assess implementation of the provisions of this Agreement and agree on recommendations for enhanced implementation.
4. The Parties also agree on the need to organise periodic donor conferences for resource mobilisation for post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction in Carana.

ARTICLE VII

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

1. The NTGC, with the assistance of the International Community, shall design and implement a plan for the voluntary return and reintegration of Carana refugees and internally displaced persons, including non-combatants, in accordance with international conventions, norms and practices.
2. Refugees or internally displaced persons, desirous of returning to their original Counties or permanent residences, shall be assisted to do so.
3. The Parties commit themselves to peaceful co-existence amongst returnees and non-returnees in all Counties.

ARTICLE VIII
VULNERABLE GROUPS

1. The NTGC shall accord particular attention to the issue of the rehabilitation of vulnerable groups or war victims (children, women, the elderly and the disabled) within Carana, who have been severely affected by the conflict in Carana.
2. With the support of the International Community, the NTGC shall design and implement a program for the rehabilitation of such war victims.
3. The NTGC shall, in addition, accord special attention to the issue of child combatants.
4. It shall, accordingly, mobilize resources with the assistance of the International Community, especially in cooperation with the Office of the U.N. Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict, UNICEF, the Fasian Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and other relevant agencies, to address their special demobilisation and re-integration needs.
5. The NTGC, in formulating and implementing programs for national rehabilitation, reconstruction and development, for the moral, social and physical reconstruction of Carana in the post-conflict period, shall ensure that the needs and potentials of the war victims are taken into account and that gender balance is maintained in apportioning responsibilities for program implementation.

Security Council Resolution 1544

United Nations



Security Council

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10 September 2021
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Resolution 1544 (2021)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5000th meeting, on 03 May 2021

The Security Council,

Recalling its Presidential Statements of 14 December 2020 (S/PRST/2020/24) and statements on Carana,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Carana,

Reaffirming the basic principles of peacekeeping, including consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, and *recognizing* that the mandate of each peacekeeping mission is specific to the need and situation of the country concerned,

Expressing its utmost concern at the dire consequences of the prolonged conflict for the civilian population throughout Carana, in particular the increase in the number of refugees and internally displaced persons,

Remaining seriously concerned over the significant ongoing food and humanitarian crisis in Carana and over the insecurity which hinders humanitarian access, the presence of landmines as well as the continued proliferation of weapons from within and outside the region that threatens the peace, security, and stability,

Emphasizing the need for all parties to uphold and respect the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence in order to ensure the continued provision of humanitarian assistance, the safety of civilians receiving assistance and the security of humanitarian personnel operating in Carana and stressing the importance of humanitarian assistance being delivered on the basis of need,

Stressing the urgent need for substantial humanitarian assistance to the Carana population,

Deploing all violations of human rights, particularly atrocities against civilian populations, including widespread abduction of men, women and children, the use of landmines and sexual violence against women and children and,

Taking note with appreciation of the reports of the United Nations Commission on Human rights Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Carana,

Noting the continued conflict in the western border region, with regard to El Hasar fighters penetrating into Carana and inflicting violence on local communities there,

Observing the increasing tensions between Carana and Rimosa with regard to territorial disputes about Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and oil field exploration in the Indian Ocean,

Emphasizing the need for all parties to safeguard the welfare and security of humanitarian workers and UN personnel in accordance with applicable rules and principles of international law,

Deploing all violations of human rights, particularly against civilian population, and urging the new transitional Government of Carana to take all necessary measures to put an end to impunity and to ensure that the continued promotion and protection of human rights,

Mindful of the need for accountability for violations of international humanitarian law and urging the transitional government once established to ensure that the protection of human rights and the establishment of a state based on the rule of law and of an independent judiciary are among its highest priorities,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General (S/2021/4711), dated 27 July 2021, on the situation in Carana, including recommendations and options for establishing a United Nations Mission in Carana,

Taking note of the Kalari Peace Agreement reached by some of the key parties on 11 August 2021 in Kalari, Sumora and urging all parties to work without delay towards a broad political consensus on the nature and duration of the political transition,

Reaffirming that the primary responsibility for implementing the Kalari Peace Treaty rests with the parties, and urging the parties to move forward with implementation of these agreements immediately in order to ensure the peaceful formation of a new transitional government,

Stressing that lasting stability in Carana will depend on peace in the sub-region, and emphasizing the importance of cooperation among the countries of the sub-region toward this end, as well as the need for coordination of UN efforts to contribute to the consolidation of peace and security in the sub-region,

Noting the co-operation agreement between the Government of France, the Government of Carana and the MPC allowing French Forces (FRAFOR) to cross into Carana to pursue El Hasar elements, as well as noting the need for close coordination between the French Forces "Operation Aigle", Carana and the UN,

Encouraging the international community to provide broad support to resolve the crisis in Carana through coordinated actions for immediate and long-term needs, encompassing security, governance, development and humanitarian issues,

Looking forward to the high-level international donors' conference in Accra on 25 October 2021 to support the development of Carana, commending the contributions already made toward the 2021 Humanitarian Response Plan for Carana and urging all Member States and other donors to contribute generously for humanitarian operations,

Determining that the situation in Carana continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region and to the peace process for Carana,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council

1. *Decides* to establish the Multidimensional United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC) for an initial period of 12 months;
2. *Calls for* tangible achievements in the political process in Carana, which are of critical significance for the successful deployment and activities of UNAC;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to expeditiously appoint a Special Representative for Carana and Head of Mission of UNAC, who shall, from the date of appointment, assume overall authority on the ground for the coordination of all the activities of the United Nations, and its agencies, funds and programmes, in Carana and shall use good offices and coordinate efforts of the international community, and coordinate the overall support of the international community in Carana, including in the field of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR), further emphasizes that the Special Representative shall ensure optimal coordination between UNAC and the United Nations Country Team in Carana, in connection with the aspects of their respective mandates, and optimal coordination between UNAC, the Government of Carana, the Mouvement Patriotique du Carana (MPC) and French Forces Operation Aigle;
4. *Decides* that UNAC will comprise up to 13,315 United Nations military unit personnel, up to 185 military observers, 40 liaison officers and 300 staff officers, and up to 1,885 civilian police officers including formed units to assist in the maintenance of law and order throughout Carana, and the appropriate civilian component; *calls upon* Member States to provide troops and police with adequate capabilities and equipment in order to establish the capacity of UNAC to operate, and discharge its responsibilities, effectively and requests the Secretary-General to recruit qualified

staff, who have the professional experience and skills appropriate to the tasks defined under applicable competency areas;

5. Decides that UNAC shall have the following mandate:

(a) Support for Implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement:

- i.to observe and monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and investigate violations of the ceasefire;
- ii.to establish and maintain continuous liaison with the field headquarters of all parties' military forces;

(b) Support for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration:

- i.to assist in the development and implementation of a voluntary national disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programme for all armed parties, and to collect, store or destroy weapons and ammunition as part of an organized DDR programme as agreed by the Kalari Peace Treaty of 11 August 2021, and in cooperation with relevant international organizations and donor nations;
- ii.to support the reintegration and rehabilitation of former combatants with particular regard to the needs of child soldiers, women, and addressing the inclusion of non-Carana combatants;
- iii.to assist and carry out voluntary disarmament and to collect and destroy weapons and ammunition as part of an organized DDR programme;

(c) Protection of civilians and United Nations Personnel, Facilities and Civilians:

- i.to protect without prejudice to the efforts of the government, civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment,
- ii.to provide specific protection for women and children affected by armed conflict, including through the deployment of Child Protection Advisors and Women Protection Advisors, and address the needs of victims of sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict;
- iii.to protect UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel;

(d) Promotion and protection of human rights

- i.to monitor, help investigate and report to the Council on any abuses or violations of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law committed throughout Carana and to contribute to efforts to prevent such violations and abuses;
- ii.to support, in particular, the full deployment of UNAC human rights observers throughout the country;
- iii.to monitor, help investigate and report to the Council specifically on violations and abuses committed against children as well as violations committed against women including all forms of sexual violence in armed conflict;
- iv.to assist the authorities of Carana in their efforts to promote and protect human rights;
- v.to ensure an adequate human rights presence, capacity and expertise within UNAC to carry out human rights promotion, protection and monitoring activities;

(e) Support for Humanitarian Assistance:

To facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, including by helping to establish the necessary security conditions to protect refugees and internally displaced persons in accordance with humanitarian principles, and the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees in close coordination with humanitarian actors.

(f) Support for Security Sector Reform:

- i.to assist the new Carana transitional Government in monitoring and restructuring of the police force of Carana, consistent with democratic policing and international standards, to develop a police training programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of police in cooperation with interested organizations and interested States;
- ii.to assist the new transitional Government in the formation of a new and restructured Carana military in cooperation with international organizations and interested States;

(g) Support for Implementation of the Peace Process:

- i.to assist the new transitional Government in conjunction with other international partners to re-establish national authority throughout the country, including the establishment of a functioning administrative structure at both the national and local levels;
- ii.to assist the new transitional Government in restoring proper administration of natural resources;
- iii.to assist the new transitional Government in preparing for national elections to be held no later than six months after the adoption of the new constitution of Carana;

iv.to assist the new transitional Government in conjunction with other international partners in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions;

6. *Urges* all parties in Carana to cooperate fully with the deployment and activities of UNAC, in particular by ensuring their safety, security and freedom of movement with unhindered and immediate access throughout the territory of Carana to enable UNAC to carry out fully its mandate;

7. *Calls upon* Member States, especially those in the region, to ensure the free, unhindered and expeditious movement to and from Carana of all personnel, as well as equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, including vehicles and spare parts, which are for the exclusive and official use of UNAC;

8. *Stresses* the importance to provide UNAC with the necessary performance capacities to fulfil its mandate in a complex security environment that includes asymmetric threats while ensuring the best possible level of safety and security for its personnel;

9. *Urges* Member States to provide troops and police that have adequate capabilities, including regarding language skills, pre-deployment and, where appropriate, in situ training, and equipment, including enablers, specific to the operating environment, notes the potential adverse effects on mandate implementation of national caveats which have not been declared and accepted by the Secretary General prior to deployment, and calls on Members State to declare all national caveats, provide troops and police with the minimum of declared caveats, and to fully and effectively implement the provisions of the Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) signed with the United Nations;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure the full, effective and meaningful participation of women in all aspects of operations;

11. *Reiterates* that the training, consolidation and redeployment of the Carana Defence and Security Forces is vital to ensure Carana's long-term security and stability and to protect the people of Carana and stresses the importance of the Carana Defence and Security Forces assuming full responsibility for providing security throughout the Carana territory;

12. *Demands* that the parties cease hostilities throughout Carana and fulfil their obligations under the Kalari Peace Treaty;

13. *Calls upon* all parties to cooperate fully in the deployment and operations of UNAC, including through ensuring the safety, security and freedom of movement of UN and associated personnel throughout Carana;

14. *Calls upon* the parties to engage for the purpose of addressing the question of DDR on an urgent basis and urges the parties, in particular the Government of Carana, the Mouvement

Patriotique du Carana (MPC) and Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC), to work closely with UNAC, relevant assistance organizations and donor nations in the implementation of a DDR programme;

15. *Calls upon* the international donor community to provide assistance for the implementation of a DDR programme and sustained international assistance to the peace process, and to contribute to consolidated humanitarian appeals;

16. *Calls upon* the Government of Carana, the Government of Katasi, the French Government and the French Operation in Katasi to coordinate the efforts to address the terrorist threat posed by El Hasar in order to ensure the implementation of the peace agreement, force protection and the protection of the civilian population in border regions of Carana and Katasi;

17. *Calls upon* the Government of Carana and the Government of Rimosa to settle their disputes with respect to the territorial ownership of the islands, the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), the exploitation of the oilfields as well as fishing rights of the coast of Carana;

18. *Emphasizes* that the protection of civilians, as described in paragraph 5, subparagraph (c), must be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources, over any of the other tasks described in that paragraph,

19. *Stresses* the need for an effective public information capacity, including the establishment as necessary of United Nations radio stations to promote understanding of the peace process and the role of UNAC among local communities and the parties;

20. *Encourages* UNAC within its capabilities and areas of deployment to support the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons;

21. *Requests* the new transitional Government to conclude a Status-of-Mission Agreement (SOMA) and Status-of-Force Agreement (SOFA) with the Secretary-General within 30 days of adoption of this resolution, and notes that pending the conclusion of such an agreement, the model Status-of-Force Agreement dated 9 October 1990 (A/45/594) shall apply provisionally;

22. *Calls upon* all parties to comply with obligations under international humanitarian law to respect and protect all civilians, including humanitarian personnel and civilian objects, as well as all medical personnel and humanitarian personnel exclusively engaged in medical duties, their means of transport and equipment, as well as hospitals and other medical facilities, and take all required steps to allow and facilitate the full, safe, immediate and unimpeded access of humanitarian actors for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all people in need, while respecting the humanitarian principles and applicable international law;

23. *Reiterates* that the transitional authorities of Carana have primary responsibility to protect civilians in Carana, further recalls its resolutions 1265 (1999), 1296 (2000), 1674 (2006), 1738 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, its resolutions 1612 (2005),

1882 (2009), 1998 (2011) and 2068 (2012) on Children And Armed Conflict and its resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), and 1960 (2010) on Women, Peace and Security and calls upon UNAC and all military forces in Carana to take them into account and to abide by international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, and recalls the importance of training in this regard;

24. *Demands* that all parties cease all use of child soldiers, that all parties cease all human rights violations and atrocities against the Carana population, and stresses the need to bring to justice those responsible;

25. *Reaffirms* the importance of a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations and post-conflict peace building in accordance with resolution 1325 (2000), recalls the need to address violence against women and girls as a tool of warfare, and encourages UNAC as well as the Carana parties to actively address these issues;

26. *Reiterates* its demand that all States in the region cease military support for armed groups in neighbouring countries, take action to prevent armed individuals and groups from using their territory to prepare and commit attacks on neighbouring countries and refrain from any actions that might contribute to further destabilization of the situation in the region, and declares its readiness to consider, if necessary, ways of promoting compliance with this demand;

27. *Calls upon* the international community to consider how it might help future economic development in Carana aimed at achieving long-term stability in Carana and improving the welfare of its people;

28. *Recognizes* that the effective implementation of peacekeeping mandates is the responsibility of all stakeholders and is contingent upon several critical factors, including well-defined, realistic, and achievable mandates, political will, leadership, performance and accountability at all levels, adequate resources, policy, planning, and operational guidelines, and training and equipment;

29. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure full compliance of UNAC with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuses and sexual harassment, including by making full use of the existing authority of the SRSG to ensure accountability of the Mission's staff and through effective mission support arrangement and to keep the Council fully informed if such cases of misconduct occur, and urges troop- and police-contributing countries to take appropriate preventative action, including vetting, pre-deployment and in-mission awareness training, and to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel, including through timely investigations of all allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, and repatriate units when there is credible evidence of widespread or systemic sexual exploitation and abuse by those units;

30. *Recalls* its request to standardize a culture of performance in UN peacekeeping, recalls its requests in resolution 2378 (2017) and resolution 2436 (2018) that the Secretary-General

ensures that performance data related to the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations is used to improve mission operations, including decisions such as those regarding deployment, remediation, repatriation and incentives, reaffirms its support for the development of a comprehensive and integrated performance policy framework that identifies clear standards of performance for evaluating all United Nations civilian and uniformed personnel working in and supporting peacekeeping operations that facilitates effective and full implementation of mandates, and includes comprehensive and objective methodologies based on clear and well-defined benchmarks to ensure accountability for underperformance and incentives and recognition for outstanding performance, and calls on him to apply it to UNAC, in particular by investigating and taking action on underperformance, to include the rotation, repatriation, replacement or dismissal of any under-performing UNAC uniformed or civilian personnel, consistent with resolution 2436 (2018), and notes the efforts of the Secretary-General to develop a comprehensive performance assessment system;

31. *Requests* UNAC to consider the environmental impacts of its operations when fulfilling its mandated tasks and, in this context, to manage them as appropriate and in accordance with applicable and relevant General Assembly resolutions and United Nations rules and regulations;

32. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide regular updates, including a formal report every 90 days to the Council on the progress in the implementation of the Kalari Peace Treaty and this resolution, including the implementation of UNAC's mandate;

33. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Military Concept of Operations

MILITARY CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

FOR UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN CARANA

(UNAC)

25 September 2021

1. References.

- A. Kalari Peace Agreement dated 11 August 2021.
- B. Security Council Resolution 1544 dated 10 September 2021 (S/RES/1544 (2021)).
- C. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations on the situation in Carana 4711 (2021). S/2021/4711, dated 27 July 2021.
- D. Strategic Guidance from USG DPO, dated 02 June 2021.
- E. UNAC Mission Concept, dated 25 September 2021.
- F. Strategic Assessment Report, dated 22 February 2021.
- G. UNAC Rules of Engagement, dated 25 September 2021.
- H. Logistics Support Concept / directive, dated 25 September 2021.
- I. Police Concept of Operations (CONOPS) / Directive, dated 25 September 2021.
- J. UN/DPO/DOS Policy - Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping, dated 25 October 2019.
- K. UN/DPO/DPPA/DOS/DSS Policy – Casualty Evacuation in the Field, effective 01 March 2020.

2. **Review.** The CONOPS should be reviewed when there is major change in a mandate or Mission Concept. It is to be drafted after the IOT revision of Mission Concept.

3. Introduction.

This Military Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the United Nations Multidimensional Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC), hereafter called the UNAC CONOPS, provides high-level guidance to military commanders and planning officers for the deployment and employment of the military component of the Mission. This guidance provides direction for subsequent operational-level plans including military operation orders, commander directives, contingency plans and operational coordination mechanisms.

The CONOPS will be reviewed annually or as determined by the Under-Secretary-General (USG) of the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), in close cooperation with the USG of the Department of Operational Support (DOS).

The UNAC Military Component has an authorised strength of up to 13,315 United Nations military unit personnel, up to 185 military observers, 40 Liaison Officers and 300 Military Staff Officers as stipulated in UNSCR 1544 (Reference B) The detailed organisation of the UNAC Military Component is provided at Annex D.

4. **Situation.**

a. **Background.**

After gaining independence from France in 1968, and although being faced with multiple challenges, Carana experienced app. 10 years of decent development and stability. Over time, however, problems resulting from the time of colonialism began to have a negative impact that led to the military taking control of the government by the end of 1991 to re-establish order.

In the period of military rule (1991 – 2003) the economic situation had deteriorated to such a degree that only a massive injection of international aid could prevent the country from falling into a humanitarian crisis. As a result of the economic situation and the discrimination of Kori and Tatsi by the government, political opposition groups and rebel movements evolved in the early 2000s and challenges to the General Tarakoni's regime became more frequent. The government suppressed most of these groups. Military and police used brutal force to suppress any attempt to challenge Tarakoni's regime.

After years of instability, and under international pressure free elections were conducted (observed by UN electoral delegates) in April 2003 and in the country's first democratic elections in many years, Jackson Ogavo, a Falin, from the Parti Démocratique de Carana (PDC) was elected President. Ogavo was re-elected for four consecutive terms (2003, 2008, 2013, 2018), though opposition to his regime began to grow in 2007 due to a lack of economic growth and increasing discrimination against Kori and Tatsi members by the ruling – and predominantly Falin – party.

In 2014 some small rebel movements in the Tereni province joined the larger and better organized rebel groups known as Mouvement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) and formed a well-structured and efficient military opposition. The MPC defeated the Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC) in some local battles and gained increasing support from the local population in the west. In February 2016 the FDC lost control of some areas in the western highlands. Though the MPC's military engagements were well coordinated and successfully executed, the rebels failed to formulate a comprehensive political program. The only clearly stated aim was to remove Ogavo from power Beginning 2018 the MPC gained control of the three provinces in the West (Koloni, Tereni and Mahbek).

Because of the strong commitment of the FDC in the west, small ethnic based rebel movements took their chances and attacked the government institutions in Leppko province. The uprising in the south was characterized by brutal violence against members of the ethnic group of the Falin and looting rebels. Some of these small rebel groups united and called themselves Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CICS).

A combination of war-weariness and strategic manoeuvring led the leaders of both the MPC and CISC, as well as President Ogavo, to start negotiating a cease-fire and peace treaty in September 2019.

b. **Current Situation (Political, Security and Humanitarian).**

After signing the Kalari Peace Agreement on 11 August 2021 all parties complied on a medium level of compliance. To ensure the compliance to the existing Peace Agreement the parties to the conflict invited the United Nation to support their efforts to implement the signed Peace Agreement. Even, the parties seem to be trustworthy, local skirmishes and conflicts still occur on a regular basis.

There is also an increase of armed rebel groups, warlords and fundamentalist / extremist groups as well-armed criminal elements that have the potential to delay/stall the implementation of the peace agreement and might see the UN as a lucrative target, including groups operating cross border.

The Katasi based El Hasar terrorist group infiltrating the west of Carana to avoid the French COIN operations in Katasi and exploiting local communities for logistics and supply. The NTGC signed an MOU with the French Forces requested by the Katasi government to address the threat posed by the terrorist group, allowing the French Forces to pursue El Hasar across the border into Tereni and Koloni regions in West Carana.

Illegal militia groups under the command of warlords are conducting illegal exploitation and trade of diamonds in central Leppko.

In addition, the political dispute between Rimoso and Carana over the ownership of some of the islands along the southern coastline of Carana, as well as over related fishing rights in the respective national territory, is threatening the already very fragile situation in Carana.

in the last six months, an estimated 12,000 people and a total of up to 200,000 people were forced to flee their homes because of the fighting between government forces and rebels in the North and the South. Due to the tensions, access of the humanitarian community is limited.

c. **Threat Assessment.** See Appendix 1 (**omitted**)

d. **Mission Uniformed Component.**

The UNAC Military Component has an authorised strength of up to 13,315 United Nations military unit personnel, up to 185 military observers, 40 Liaison Officer and 300 military staff officers as stipulated in UNSCR 1544 (Reference B) The detailed organisation of the UNAC Military Component is provided at Annex D.

e. **Non-UN Actors / Relevant Stakeholders.**

The main stakeholders outside UN are the FDC, MPC and CISC. It is crucial to establish a strong liaison to these parties. The current amount of civilian personnel of IOs and NGOs has to be determined after the deployment of own forces.

5. Strategic Framework.

a. **Mandate.**

UN will assist the transitional government and the signatories to the peace agreement in all aspects of rebuilding governmental functions, revitalizing the economy, restructuring the security sector and preparing free elections. UNAC will observe that all signing parties keep

the “Kalari Peace Treaty” and will provide security throughout Carana.

UNAC will also assist the national DDR program and the establishment of new national army, the Forces de la Défense et Sécurité du Carana (FDSC), in the strength of not more than 22,000 soldiers with up to 4,000 being drawn from former MPC combatants and 1,500 drawn from former CISC combatants, with assistance of the UN.

b. Mission End State.

A unified and peaceful Carana in its current boundaries, with a democratically elected government in which all ethnic groups of the country are represented and accountable security forces able to protect all its citizens, on a level of economic well-being so that nobody suffers from basic needs, with a functioning civil society and situation in which human rights, gender perspectives and the rights of the vulnerable people are respected.

c. UN Strategic Objectives.

The objective of the United Nations is to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in a united Carana, where human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens is assured and in which internally displaced persons and refugees can return home in safety and dignity.

d. UNAC Mission Objectives in Carana.

- A sustainable and credible peace process supported by regional actors that include processes at the national and sub-national levels, to foster the implementation of the peace agreement.
- Security and stabilization, through integrated efforts, in key areas critical to the peace process are restored and civilians under imminent threat are protected.
- Social well-being and economic prosperity are restored to a level that allows recovery without international support.
- Trustworthy and responsible security institutions and security forces who respect the law and order and human rights are capable and maintain security in Carana.

e. UNAC End State:

A unified and peaceful Carana in its current boundaries, with a democratically elected government in which all ethnic groups of the country are represented and accountable security forces able to protect all its citizens, on a level of economic well-being so that nobody suffers from basic needs, with a functioning civil society and situation in which human rights, gender perspectives and the rights of the vulnerable people are respected.

6. Planning Parameters.

- a. **Areas of Interest.** The Area of Operations (AO) is determined by the territory of the the Republic of Carana.
- b. **Area of Operations.** The Area of Interest (AI) includes the territories of the neighbouring countries.
- c. **Assumptions.**

1. The signatories of the Kalari Peace Agreement will stay committed to the agreement and will provide continued cooperation and support to UNAC, including sufficient access to Carana seaports and airports in Carana.
2. The Transitional authorities, the Security Council, and the FU maintain their support for the peace development process in Carana.
3. Neighbouring states remain supportive of the peace process in Carana.
4. There will be no further escalation in political and economic disputes between Fasian countries.
5. International donors support relief and development activities.
6. ELF activities in the Leppko Region as well as El Hasar activities in western Carana will have no significant impact on the overall Peace Process in Carana.

d. **Constraints and Restraints.** (omitted).

e. **Risks.** (omitted).

7. **Military Component's mission.**

- a) **UNAC Military Component** is to assist in the implementation and compliance of the Kalari Peace Agreement through observing and monitoring the implementation of the military provisions of the ceasefire/peace agreement, establishing liaison with the forces of all parties to the conflict, supporting the DDR process and humanitarian operations, protecting UN personnel and infrastructure, and protecting the civilian population under imminent threat of physical violence, in order to contribute to a safe and secure environment in Carana.
- b) **Military End State.** A safe and secure environment is ensured by well-trained and well-equipped national security forces.

8. **Execution.**

- a. **Statement of Force Requirements (SFR).** See Annex B
- b. **Task Organization of the Military Component.** See Annex D

Force HQ. FHQ staff will deploy to Galasi after completing induction training by M+45 and should be operational by M+60. Main tasks include:

- establish a liaison to key elements of the parties within the area of operation by M+60,
- collect and analyse all information provided by the parties and other sources,
- continue to finalize plans on the basis of detailed reconnaissance, to facilitate TCC reconnaissance and to prepare the reception of contingents,
- co-ordinate UN activities with all other Mission Components.

Reserve / Quick Reaction Force (QRF). An Infantry Battalion will be allocated as a reserve/quick reaction force to be employed/deployed as additional deterrence and to

allow the FC to strengthen the sector troops in case of requirements / predicted threats. The Reserve will deploy to Galasi by M + 90, will be prepared to react on short notice to crisis situations throughout the mission area, will be prepared to reinforce temporarily in all sectors.

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Unit (ISR).

ISR units will be deployed to Sectors II and III linking battlefield functions together to assist a UN military force in employing its sensors and obtaining and managing the information critical information a part of the Peacekeeping-Intelligence cycle on behalf of the commander, improving the commander's decision-making through enhanced situational awareness. It provides early warning of threats as well as enable UN forces to increase effectiveness and coordination.

Sectors I – III. The Sectors HQs will be established by M+90 and will deploy the battalion elements through the respective sectors as laid out in the deployment map in the document. The main tasks are:

- to monitor and verify positions, strength and movement of the forces of all parties (current and planned) within the sector,
- to protect UN facilities and key infrastructure as soon as possible,
- to protect Civilians within means and capabilities in Areas of Deployment
- to monitor and report the overall security situation in the Sectors.

c. Scheme of Manoeuvre.

The forces will operate from Battalion camps and conduct patrols in platoon and company size. If necessary, they will establish temporary presence in hot spots or along the road Galasi-Akkabar and set up checkpoints. By visible presence, public information and proactive action they will deter and if deterrence fails, neutralize spoiler to the KPA, protect civilians under immanent threat, protect the UN operations and installations and maintain the security in the area.

In each of the three Sectors one Team Site will be co-located with the Sector HQ. The location of all other Team Sites will be determined by the location of the potential monitoring objects. Because of still existing limitations for detailed reconnaissance process and the still developing situation, the location of Team Sites will remain subject to adjustments.

It is intended to conduct the majority of patrols, inspections and investigations through day patrols from the team sites. Monitoring in remote locations away from Team Sites will be covered through the establishment of smaller, temporary team sites and airmobile patrols. Each COG must have the capability to detach one temporary Team Site. The COG fulfils its tasks by establishing liaison to the parties, establishing contacts to the population, conducting patrols, inspections and investigations.

The Team Site Commander determines on the basis of his assigned tasks and the assessment of the situation, the tasks of the Observer Teams, the composition of the patrols and the measures of protection. The representatives of the parties will always participate in joint patrols on their request.

Additional objects of monitoring and reporting, also pending on the requirements expressed by the mission and civilian actors, might be: the overall security situation, such as regular crime or the consequences of return of IDPs and refugees, the activities of militias and

uncontrolled armed groups and the DDR process.

Observer Teams and protection forces must be seen as different operational elements, which should be used combined to build an operational entity and to achieve a common operational aim. Thereby the role and task of protection elements can vary in a wide range. If the security situation does not require protection, the UNMO will operate without being accompanied by protection forces. If the security situation requires protection, protection forces in sufficient strength will accompany the UNMO. Elements of the protection force can be also used to deter uncontrolled armed groups by visible presence of protection forces.

The Force Headquarters will be collocated with the Mission Headquarters in Galasi. All military personnel and units are under the command of the UNAC Force Commander (FC). The Mission HQ plan and conduct operations and assign the priorities. Force elements, which will be utilized will be under the direct operational command of the FC.

Enabling assets which will be utilized as mission assets, will remain under the operational command of the FC but will be under tasking authority of the Director Mission Support (DMS) for the conduct of routine tasks. A number of units will be deployed to the three sectors and will be under tactical command of the sector commander (SC), as delegated by the FC.

d. **Phases.**

Phase I – Initial Deployment (M – M+90)

UNAC will see the deployment of its HQ, main logistic Base, Aviation Forces, and 3 Sector HQs with assigned contingents, through sea and airport points of entry at GALASI, CERINI, MALDOSA and CORMA. Other organizations will also deploy and Joint Commission for the Ceasefire (JCC) will establish Joint Liaison Teams (JLT) down to provincial level throughout the Country.

Each UNAC sector will deploy all assigned forces to monitor the cease fire within boundary, establish Humanitarian corridors and establish liaison with all parties and related agencies. Force security will be maintained throughout by securing permanent locations and maintaining Quick Reaction Forces at Mission and Sector levels. An active public information campaign will be implemented down to contingent level during this phase.

Phase II – Full deployment (M+90 – M+180)

Military Component will maintain the established secure and stable environment and conduct operations in direct and indirect support to:

- Return of refugees and deportees,
- Establish cantonments and conduct DDR activities,
- Security operations in support of electoral process,
- Facilitate creation of the Country Legal structure.

Phase III – Consolidation (M+180 – M+330)

Military Component will maintain the established secure and stable environment and conduct operations focusing on:

- the conduct of elections,
- the formation of the National Army and, as required, the National Police Force,

- contingent rotations,
- monitor and report of HR violations.

Phase 4 – Capacity Building (M+330 – TBD)

Phase V – Mission Drawdown (omitted)

- e. **Rules of Engagement (ROE).** see Annex G.

9. **Logistics.**

- a. **Support Concept.** See UNAC Mission Support Concept (**refer to Complete Package**)

- b. Enabling Units.

Aviation

In each sector and at the FHQ an aviation unit is attached. Air operations must be coordinated by UNMIC Air Operations (AirOps) cell. The Aviation Unit needs to operate permanently in each Sector. Each Sector/team site will have military aviation operational 24 hour per day, 7 days per week, providing 40 flying hour per month per air asset.

Transport Coy

The Companies are to provide medium transport for movement of cargo, fuel, water and personnel beyond the self-sufficiency of deployed military units and to provide limited support to other components within a multi-role mission as requested.

Multi-Role Construction Engineers

The Chief Engineer, through the Chief of Staff, will centrally coordinate the construction engineering. Construction engineer companies will give priority of effort to reconstruction of main supply routes, keeping main supply routes open, supporting the establishment of contingent camps and installations.

The locations of specific tasks will generally align with the local sector and can be outside of the sector.

Demining Coy

De-mining will be centrally co-ordinated by UNMAS, through the Office of the DSRSG. De-mining undertaken by military units will be in support of the force; however, the units need to be qualified to undertake humanitarian de-mining tasks if considered as a mission priority.

Military Transport Unit

Military Transport Units, with a limited force protection capability (corresponding to existing threat levels, will be deployed in each Sector to provide medium lift transport support capability for UNAC.

Military Logistics Unit

Military Logistics Units (MLUs) will be deployed in each sector to provide transportation, supply, maintenance and self-sustainment capabilities to UNAC. These may include movement/transportation, receipt, warehousing and distribution of goods and material, managing petroleum, oil and lubricants, fuel management and aviation fuel handling. Once UNAC has set full logistics civilian capabilities the requirement for MLUs might be re-

evaluated.

Signal Unit

The signal units will operate and monitor UN Communications infrastructure (mission backbone network) under guidance and in close cooperation with the Mission Support. Elements of unit will be located throughout the mission area. The unit will deploy without COE and will be catered for by UNAC.

Military Medical hospitals

The military medical hospitals will provide and ensure medical services and treatment for all military personnel. Each Sector will have a Level II capability (the Level III capability in Galasi serves as Level II hospital for Sector Central. The hospitals are open to all UN personnel in case of emergency. Director Mission Support will establish policies and procedures in cooperation with the FC.

10. Administrative Issues.

- a. **Human Rights.** in accordance with UN Policy - Human Rights Due Diligence, dated 2013
- b. **Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA).** Any misconduct will be investigated according to our zero-tolerance policy. Offenders will be repatriated by the respective TCC.
- c. **Conduct and Discipline.** Has to be defined by the TCCs. The general guideline for the mission will be published before the deployment. An awareness training will be part of the in processing.
- d. **Performance of Military Personnel and Units.** TCC are responsible for the physical and mental readiness of their soldiers in order to achieve military tasks.

11. Command, Control and Coordination.

- a. **C2.** The FC reports directly to the SRSG exercises "UN Operational Command and Control (OPCON) over all military personnel in the Mission. The FC maintains a technical reporting and communications link with the DPO Military Advisor (MILAD) in the UN Headquarters (UNHQ). The FC is to establish and maintain a military operational chain of command for all military personnel in the Mission. The FC may delegate authority to act on his or her behalf through the chain of command. The FC will ensure that the military operational chain of command is maintained and that military reporting responsibility to the SRSG continues in the event of the FC's absence from the Mission or during any short-term incapacitation.

Military enablers and military combat helicopters will be under OPCON of the FC. The DMS/CMS exercises tasking authority over all assigned uniformed logistics personnel and enabling units comprising medical, signal, logistics, construction engineering (except combat field engineers), transportation and movement units including military transport helicopters within the peacekeeping Mission).

The Sector Commanders report directly to the FC. The FC may delegate "UN Tactical Command and Control (TACON) to Sector Commanders, limited to the detailed and usually local direction and control of movements and activities necessary to accomplish the assigned tasks.

- b. **Civil-Military Interaction.** All components within UNAC are to support the integrated UN approach to information gathering, monitoring, verification, early warning and dissemination of information to ensure that decisions are based on sound advice and that actions are positive, pro-active and efficient.
 - c. **Reporting Procedures.** Attention is drawn to the SOP Integrated Reporting from DPO-Led Field Missions to UNHQ reference 2019.10 SOP Integrated Reporting from Peacekeeping Operations to UNHQ.
 - d. **Harm Mitigation.** All members of the mission respect IHL and ensure all possible steps to mitigate risks of civilian casualties. Accurate intelligence is critical for the protection of civilians. Intelligence enables situational understanding of the civilian vulnerabilities and threats, and it is important to comprehend how these are viewed from the population's perspective. Intelligence activities and the protection of civilians are mutually reinforcing; civilians will provide information more freely when they can do so safely and if it enhances their security. In turn, accurate intelligence should drive operations that improve the protection of civilians and make the population more secure.
 - e. **Training.** TBD
12. **Acknowledgement.** The Force commander will acknowledge receipt of the CONOPS and the requirement to produce the Force OPORD, which is to be shared with DPO/OMA for approval.

Under-Secretary-General
Department of Peace Operations
United Nations

Military Adviser
Department of Peace Operations
United Nations

Annexes:

- A. Threat Assessment (**omitted**)
- B. Statement of Force Requirements
- C. Statement of Unit Requirements (**omitted**)
- D. Mission Map and Task Organization
- E. UNAC Military Lines of Operation


Annex B
Statement of Force Requirements

Unit Type	Number of Units	Unit Size	Total Troops	Remarks
Force Headquarters	1	195	195	Military Staff Officers
Brigade HQ, Sector HQ	3	35	105	Military Staff Officers
UN Military Experts on Mission	225		225	185 Military Observer 36 Liaison Officer 4 Liaison Officer to FRAFOR
FHQ Company	1	150	150	
Infantry Battalion	10	850	8.500	
Infantry Battalion QRF	1	850	850	
Infantry Company QRF	3	150	450	
Engineer Company	3	275	825	
Aviation Unit	3	160	480	
Level 3 Hospital	1	120	120	
Level 2 Hospital	2	70	140	
Military Police Company	1	70	70	
Military Police Platoon	3	25	75	
Signal Unit	4	120	480	
Demining Unit	1	130	130	Detached to the FHQ
ISR Unit	2	200	400	
Logistic Company	3	80	240	
Transport company	3	125	375	
Total			13.840	


Task Organization

Force HQ		Sector I		Sector II		Sector III	
	Galasi		Galasi		Alur		Corma
	Galasi QRF		Galasi		Alur		Corma
	Galasi Level 3		Galasi		Alur		Corma
	Galasi		Galasi		Alur		Corma
	Galasi		Galasi		Alur		Corma
	Galasi		Galasi		Alur		Corma
			Galasi		Alur		Corma
			Maroni		Alur		Corma
			Folsa		Alur		Corma
					Alur		Corma
					Alur		Corma
					Alur		Lora
					Faron		Muka
					Sereen		Kika

Areas of Deployment – Tasks



Annex E

UNAC Military Lines of Operations

**RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)
FOR
THE MILITARY COMPONENT
OF THE
UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN CARANA
(UNAC)**



**DEPARTMENT OF PEACE OPERATIONS
OFFICE OF MILITARY AFFAIRS
MILITARY PLANNING SERVICE**

25 SEPTEMBER 2021

INTRODUCTION

This document, including all of its Annexes (A–D), constitutes the entire Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC).

This document provides authority for the use of force and explains policy, principles, procedures and responsibilities relating to the use of force.

These ROEs are directions to operational commanders, which delineate the parameters within which military personnel of national contingents assigned to UNAC's military component may use force in the Carana. They are founded on Security Council resolution. Where issued as prohibitions, they are orders not to take specific actions. Where issued as permissions, they are the authority for commanders to take certain specific actions if they are judged necessary to achieve the aim of the Mission.

While remaining predominantly defensive in nature, the ROE also allows for proactive action in order to ensure the implementation of the tasks assigned to UNAC's military component.

In addition to the main document, the key elements are attached as follows:

- a. Annex A Authorised Numbered ROE for UNAC.
- b. Annex B Definitions and Amplifications.
- c. Annex C Supporting Directions and Procedures, including those for challenging, warning shots, search and apprehension.
- d. Annex D Aide-Mémoire.

AUTHORITY

The powers and authority of UNAC derive from Security Council resolution on UNAC S/RES/1544/2021, dated 10 September 2021. They must be exercised in a manner consistent with UNAC's Mandate.

MISSION

Relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions that set out the circumstances in which force may be used by UNAC to implement its mandate are set out in Annex A – “Authorised Numbered ROE for UNAC.”

EXECUTION OF ROE

Principles

- a. General
 - (1) The conduct of military operations is controlled by the provisions of international law.
 - (2) UNAC military personnel must operate within the framework of this document, which has been formulated in accordance with the parameters set out in Security Council resolution.
 - (3) UNAC ROE provide direction to commanders at all levels, governing the use of force within the Mission Area. They define the degree of force that may be used and the manner in which it may be applied. They are designed to ensure that the

application of force is controlled and legal. The ROE informs commanders of the constraints imposed and the degrees of freedom they have in the course of carrying out their mission.

- (4) The ROE are to be translated in a clear and concise way into the language(s) of each participating nationality. Throughout the conduct of military operations, where force is to be used, UNAC military personnel must comply with the international legal principles of proportionality, the minimum use of force and the requirement to avoid, and in any to event minimize, collateral damage.
- (5) While the ROE may restrict the manoeuvre and operation of specific weapons systems, they do not:
 - a. Describe specific doctrine, tactics and procedures.
 - b. Address safety-related restrictions.

b. International Law, including Law of Armed Conflict.

UNAC military personnel are required to comply with International Law, including the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), and to apply the ROE in accordance with those laws, as and when applicable. Fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law applicable to United Nations forces that are actively engaged as combatants in situations of armed conflict are contained in Secretary-General's Bulletin "Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law" (ST/SGB/1999/13).

c. Self-Defence

- (1) Nothing in these ROEs negates a Commander's right and obligation to take all necessary and appropriate action for self-defence. All personnel may exercise the inherent right of self-defence.
- (2) Pre-emptive self-defence against an anticipated attack must be supported by credible evidence or information that justifies a reasonable belief that hostile units or persons are about to attack.
- (3) Self-defence against a hostile force(s) may be exercised by individuals or by individual units that are under attack or about to be attacked, as well as by other UN forces that are able to assist those individuals or individual units.

d. Military Necessity.

The principle of military necessity authorizes the use of only that force which is required to accomplish the authorized objective. Military necessity does not and cannot authorize acts that are otherwise prohibited under international law, including the law of armed conflict.

e. Alternatives to the Use of Force.

Whenever the operational situation permits, every reasonable effort must be made to resolve a potentially hostile confrontation by means other than the use of force (e.g. through negotiations or assistance from the local authorities). This principle does not apply where UNAC armed units are engaged in offensive operations in accordance with these ROEs.

f. Duty to Challenge and Warn.

Before resorting to the use of force, every reasonable step must be taken to deter a party(s) or person from committing a hostile act. The procedure required by the UN to challenge and warn is given in Annex C. This does not apply where UNAC armed units are engaged in offensive operations in accordance with these ROEs.

g. Duty to Identify Target - Observe Fire.

Positive identification of hostile forces prior to engagement is required. Unobserved indirect fire is prohibited. Firing procedures are given in Annex C.

h. Duty to Use Minimum and Proportional Force.

- (1) Any force used must be limited, in its intensity and duration, to that which is necessary to achieve the authorized objective. In some circumstances, the immediate use of deadly force may be necessary for this purpose.
- (2) The use of force must be commensurate with the level of the threat. However, the level of force that is used may have to be higher than the level of the threat in order to avoid or minimise UN or civilian casualties or, in the case of offensive operations, to ensure that the authorised objective is achieved.
- (3) Commanders should, where appropriate, consider the use of alternatives to the use of physical force, such as deception, psychological methods, negotiation and other non-lethal means, including the deployment or manoeuvre of larger forces in order to demonstrate resolve.

i. Avoidance of Collateral Damage.

When force is used, all feasible precautions are to be taken with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, collateral damage. The use of force shall cease if it becomes apparent that further use of force may be expected to cause collateral damage which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

j. Duty to Report.

Each and every confrontation resulting in a detention, or involving the use of deadly force, is to be reported through the chain of command as soon as possible, whether it results in casualties or not. More details are contained in Annex C.

k. Right to Maintain Position.

UNAC military personnel may maintain their position and equipment when confronted with a hostile act or intent. In such circumstances, they may also use necessary force, as authorised in these ROEs.

I. Use of Force beyond Self-Defence.

- (1) The use of force beyond self-defence may be applied in the circumstances set out in Annex A – “Rule 1 Use of Force” of these ROE and is subject to the conditions set out in these ROEs.
- (2) The Force Commander, or the commander to whom the authorisation has been delegated, retains direct control over the use of force in these circumstances.

Applicability

The ROE set out in this document apply to all military personnel of national contingents assigned to the military component of UNAC, as authorised by the Security Council.

Responsibility of Force Commander and Subordinate Commanders

- a. The implementation of these ROE is a command responsibility. These ROEs are addressed to the Force Commander, who is then responsible for issuing them to all subordinate commanders.
- b. The Force Commander and his/her subordinate commanders are not permitted to exceed these ROE, but may, when and as appropriate, authorise more restrictive limits on the actions of assigned forces, subject to United Nations Headquarters (UNHQ) approval. A commander may issue these ROE as received from UNHQ, may add additional guidance or amplification consistent with their terms, or may incorporate them into appropriate orders or instructions.
- c. All commanders have an obligation to seek clarification if these ROEs are considered to be unclear or inappropriate for the military situation.
- d. It is the responsibility of the commanders of all National Contingents to ensure that all those under their command understand these ROE. To assist in this process, they must issue a ROE Aide-Mémoire (Blue Card), translated into the language(s) appropriate for their own contingent, to each individual under their command. This must be done before the contingent can be considered to be effective.
- e. Training in the application of these ROE is the responsibility of commanders at all levels. ROE training sessions should be conducted on a regular basis and, at a minimum, once per month and whenever UNAC military personnel, including individual replacements or reinforcements as authorised by the Security Council, are deployed into the Mission Area.

ROE Contravention.

The following procedures apply in dealing with ROE contravention:

- a. Any ROE contravention is to be reported to DPO at United Nations Headquarters (UNHQ) through the UN chain of command, by the quickest possible means.
- b. Flanking and subordinate commands should be informed, if the consequences are likely to affect them.

- c. Remedial measures, including training, should be taken in order to avoid reoccurrence.
- d. Any contravention must be subject to a formal investigation. The Force Commander is to convene a board of inquiry (BOI), which is to forward its findings to the Under-Secretary-General of Peace Operations as soon as possible.

Security Classification.

These ROEs are an exercise document for training purposes and are classified as **OPEN**.

ROE Changes.

These ROEs can only be amended or changed by or with the authority of the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations.

**Under-Secretary-General
for Peace Operations**

Annexes

- Annex A Authorised Numbered ROE for UNAC - omitted – refer to Complete Package
- Annex B Definitions and Amplifications - omitted – refer to Complete Package
- Annex C Supporting Directions and Procedures - omitted – refer to Complete Package
- Annex D Aide-Mémoire - omitted – refer to Complete Package

End of Document