



CARANA Country Study

Complete Package

for training packages developed by the Integrated
Training Service

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* Partially Developed (To be completed by participants during Learning Activities and Exercises)

Disclaimer:

The CARANA Country Study has been developed as a fictitious scenario for learning and peacekeeping training purposes. Reference to any country, group or organization does not reflect the position of the UN or the foreign policy stance of such country, group or organization.



General Instructions

1. General

The purpose of the “CARANA Complete Package” is to provide you with all the information available about the hypothetical CARANA country and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC), which may be necessary for the Learning Activities (LA) and the Exercises (SBE, TTX, ...) of the training packages developed by the Integrated Training Service.

This package offers more detailed information than the “Pre-reading Package” and other packages, which could be necessary to proceed with the LA and/or Exercises. Therefore, it is recommended to have this package available to all participants for “consultation purposes” in case the information needed is not available in the other packages.

2. Method

Consultation document.

3. Content

Complete set of information for the CARANA country study and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC).

4. Aim

The “CARANA Complete Package” aims to equip participants with all the information currently available about CARANA and UNAC, enabling them to participate effectively in the Learning Activities and Exercises of the training packages developed by the Integrated Training Service.

CARANA – COUNTRY STUDY

The Country Study provides a short overview of the essential aspects of the country and the conflict.

The information reflected in the Country study has been collected through:

- Public sources (internet, publications)
- Information provided by International Organizations represented in Carana
- Information provided by UN Member States




Figure 1 – 8th Continent

1. Carana Country fact sheet

Republic of Carana	
Country name:	Republic of Carana (conventional long form); Carana (short form)
Government type:	Republic
Capital:	Galasi (1.28 million legal inhabitants)
Districts / Provinces:	Fellari, Guthar, Leppko, Barin, Hanno, Mahbek, Tereni, Koloni
Independence:	22 October 1986
Executive branch:	Chief of state: President Jackson Ogavo,
Head of government:	Prime Minister William Degusa
Legal system:	Based on the national constitution and a legal code from 2013. Customary law is also observed based on unwritten traditional practices for the indigenous sector.
Political parties:	Parti Démocratique de Carana (PDC)
Flag description:	Green, blue and white. An armillary sphere in the middle represents the Portuguese heritage (found on their flag as well). The writing in the Wheel Says: Notre (French = our), Patria (Italian = Country), Carana, as well as the Year of Self-Governance (not independence). Within the wheel are three diamonds, which not only symbolize one of the country's natural resources, but which also represent each ethnic group. The cross is also indicative of Carana's colonial history and Christian roots.
Population	
Population:	17,024,561 (last census conducted 2015)
Population growth:	3.6 % (annual growth rate)
Age Distribution	<15 : 44 % 15 to 18 : 13 % 18 to 60 : 39 % >60 : 4 %
Fertility Rate	5.1 children per woman
Sex Ratio	1.06 females/male
Infant Mortality	9.1 deaths per 100 live births
Life Expectancy	Total population: 45.3 years Male: 42.1 years Female: 47.9 years
Disability	An estimated 14% of the population have physical and mental disabilities, including due to conflict- and mine/UXO-related injuries.
Languages:	In Carana there are more than 20 original languages or tribal dialects spoken. The official and administrative language is French.
Ethnic groups:	Falin 60 %, Kori 20 %, Tatsi 15 %.
Religions:	Roman Catholic (40%), Protestant Lutherans or Baptists (35%), Muslims (20%), all with mixed in indigenous beliefs (45%)
Literacy:	40% of adult population can read and write (77.5% males, 62% females); 20% of youth can read and write (under 18)

Economy	As of 2015
GDP:	14,05 billion
GDP per Capita:	\$ 825 US dollars
GDP composition by sector	Agriculture: 27% Manufacturing: 16% Mining: 32% Services: 25%
GDP growth	1919 to 2000: average 3% per year 2015: -4% 2016: -2.5% 2017: -2.8% 2018: -2.9%
Labour force:	10.2 million
Labour force by occupation:	Agriculture: 50% Industries: 10% Mining: 10% Services: 30%
Country Comparison to the World	174 rd
Inflation rate	12,35%
Unemployment rate:	Total: N/A. In urban areas more than 29%
Population below poverty line:	45%
Agriculture products:	fruits, vegetables, grains, fish
Export commodities:	fruits, vegetables, textiles, mineral goods, frozen fish
Export partners:	US, France, Italy, Germany, Portugal, China, Sumora, Rimosa
Imports:	machinery equipment, transportation equipment, communication and electronics equipment, manufactured goods, foodstuffs
Import partners:	France, Italy, Portugal, China
Currency code:	Carana Franc (CF) 100 CF = 1.5 \$ US
Infrastructure	
Communication:	Supported by telegraphy, telephone and weak (unreliable) radio connections.
Railways:	Two railway tracks operated by Carana Rail (CR), from Galasi to Akkabar and the other from Maldosa to Mia. There are also 'land-trains' hauled by enormous tractors.
Highways:	A number of paved roads and highways remain intact, though there are a number of unpaved roads and tracks that are fairly robust. Car and coach are the most predominant forms of transportation.
Airports:	International airports (Galasi, Corma), 4 local (Alur, Folsa, Amsan, Mia). Additionally there are basic 25 airfields around the country. None of these airfields has paved runways. The length and quality of facilities at each airfield varies considerably.
Ports and Harbours:	3 (Galasi, Cereni, Maldosa)

2. Introduction

In November 2020, negotiations for a ceasefire and peace agreement, the Kalari Peace Treaty, give hope to end almost 10 years of civil war and a legacy of ethnic discrimination and conflict. Negotiations facilitated by the Fasia Union, the ceasefire agreement foresees that a United Nations mandated mission would take over from the Fasia Union Advisory Mission in Carana (FUAMC) to assist in overseeing and verifying the ceasefire as well as in the stabilisation of the country.

Despite the cessation of violence, Carana remains a politically unstable country and a transitional government under the leadership of President Ogavo has had limited success in re-establishing order and the rule of law in the country. Small uprisings and violent clashes still occur in the rebel-controlled regions of West and South Carana.

The United Nations Security Council recently considers the creation of a UN Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to assist the parties in implementing the Peace Agreement, to support in the country's transition into a secure and peaceful democracy and to make recommendations for the establishment of a UNAC. UNHQ is planning the mission to date using its internal capacities.

The document and its annexes are provided as pre-reading to allow course participants to become familiar with the scenario that will be used throughout the complete course. They reflect the first information/material based on which UNHQ prepares strategical and technical assessments. At later stages, they may also serve as an introduction to the new Mission Leadership Team (MLT) by UNHQ.

3. Geography of Carana

Location

Carana is located on the East coast of the Fasia continent. The total area of Carana is 119,480 km² with 300 km coastline. Carana has land boundaries of 1500 km with its neighbouring countries, Rimosa (southern border), Katasi (western border) and Sumora (northern border).

Hydrography

The three main rivers in Carana, the Kalesi, Mogave and Torongo, flow from the western highlands in an easterly direction and discharge in the ocean. The huge Kalesi River is very salty, like the Dead Sea, and almost divides the country into equal halves. It discharges in a large delta with surrounding swamplands. Though all major rivers are in principle navigable, only the Torongo mouth is the site of a major port (Maldosa) and thus the only waterway used for larger cargo transportation. Two dams along the Kalesi and Mogave are used to produce electricity. Carana has no large natural lakes.

Vegetation

Carana was originally completely covered by jungle and dense bush land. Over the last century, the central and eastern areas have been cleared and cultivated, being used for agricultural purposes. Even though the soil in Carana is fertile, the intensive use of the land as pasture has left large areas barren and useless for agricultural purposes.

Approximately 20 % of the total area is currently in use for growing grain, millet, vegetables and fruit. The West and South of the country is still covered by jungle and dense bush land. Small areas in the jungle are used for agricultural purposes.

Topography

Carana is topographically divided into two major areas: the plains in the eastern and central parts of the country and the highlands in the West and Southwest areas. The terrain in Carana generally increases in elevation from East to West from sea level to a height of 1200 m.

The composition of the ground is mostly flat and sandy with insignificant areas of rocky, steep terrain. The terrain along the coastline is flat with no cliffs or rocks. The water is calm but with only a few areas suitable for deep-water ships.




Figure 2 – Carana basic map

Climate and Weather

The west of Carana experiences heavy rainfalls (monsoons) from August to October with an average precipitation rate of 250 mm a month and mild temperatures throughout the year. During winter season, especially at higher elevations, temperatures might fall towards the freezing point. In summertime, one sees colourful vegetation and karst mountains.

The north of Carana has a milder climate. There are pine forests and many trees, though it is also possible to find rough deserts and mountains. The northern coast of central Carana has a lot of inlets especially around the Kalesi River Delta. Most time of the year the weather is mild, except for the mountain areas in the North-West of Carana.

In the East and South of Carana the weather is mainly hot and dry with an average daily temperature during the dry season is 36°C. Palm trees and desert plants are the typical vegetation in the southern part of Carana. However, there are also very green highlands and the presence of the Torongo River enriches the region with minerals like diamond and copper.

Natural Resources

Carana is rich in natural resources, which are not equally dispersed throughout the country. In the jungle-covered mountains of the West, rare wood and timber are the main natural resources. Diamonds are found along the Kalesi River in the provinces of Mahbek and Barin. Copper is mined in the highlands West of Mia. Coal is mined in the province of Hanno. Further alkali metals (lithium, sodium, potassium, etc.) are found in Central Carana as well as oil off the southern coastline of Carana.

The soil in Carana is naturally fertile. The rivers and coastal waters are rich in fish.

4. People and Culture

Human Geography

Human development in Carana has been shaped by differences in climate zones, creating a divided society featuring disparate social structures organized around different modes of subsistence. The most salient cleavage is between the semi-nomadic pastoralists inhabiting the pasturelands in the southwest, and the largely sedentary farmers and miners in the east.

Population

Major cities: Galasi, Maroni, Amsan, Cereni, Turen, Maldosa, Corma, Folsa, Sureen, Alur, Faron (100,000 to 1 million).

Ethnic Distribution

The population of Carana consists of more than 15 ethnic groups. Most of these groups are small in number and socially and politically marginalised. The three major ethnic groups, the Falin, Kori and Tatsi represent 95% of the population. The Kori (20%) live in the West and are the dominant ethnic group in the provinces of Tereni and Koloni. The Falin (60%) are the ethnic majority in the country and mainly live in the East and centre of Carana. The Tatsi (15%) live in the South and are the majority in Leppko Province.

The national boundaries result from the colonial time and do not represent the ethnic distribution of the region. The Falin make up 54% of the population of neighbouring Sumora, the Kori make up 65% of the population of Katasi and the Tatsi make 95% of the population of Rimosa.

Religion

According to the last census conducted in 2015 about 75% of the population of Carana are Christian. About 35% of the population are Protestant Lutherans and Baptists, while 40% are Roman Catholic. Islam is practised by over 20% of the population, mainly in the South/West. The vast majority of Muslims are Sunni, who overwhelmingly live in the West of Carana. However, there are small but active Shia communities in the South of Carana and along the coastal plains. Several Sunni groups are extremist in nature and have instituted Sharia Law in the southwestern areas of Leppko. On the other hand, syncretism and indigenous beliefs form a vital part of many Caranians' religious experience.

In terms of ethnic distribution, the majority of the Falin are predominantly Christians, while most of the Kori and Tatsi are Sunni Muslim. Indigenous beliefs, which have been embedded in the main religious, are practised by parts of the population.

The 2013 Constitution (suspended) provides for freedom of religion while prohibiting certain forms of religious fundamentalism. Christian holidays are celebrated as national holidays. Missionary groups within Carana are tolerated and include Lutherans, Baptist, Grace Brethren and Jehovah's witnesses. They tend to operate only in the West and South. The Catholic Church is influential in Falin occupied territories.

5. History

Carana historically formed a vital part of the ancient and early modern trading hub Fasia, as described in Briefing 01–Fasia.

Colonial Period

The invading powers faced significant resistance by local kingdoms, the most bloody of which the kingdom of Galasi upheld. The Italian army finally conquered the kingdom in 1898 and established formal colonial rule. After the Italian defeat in World War I, the French government took over the territory as French protectorate and developed the country according to their policy of “assimilation” with Galasi to remain the capital city. Since the French administration focused on the exploitation of the natural resources and accepted the tribal structure in the country, as well as the role of local authority, the period between 1919 and 1979 was relatively calm and peaceful.

The following period was characterised by rapidly evolving civil unrest based on the increasingly popular movement for national liberation. From 1979 unrest and riots were frequent and developed into more organised actions and violence against the colonial power. In the beginning of 1982, the French lost control of most of the country outside the capital and the main coastal cities. To retain a minimum level of control, the French were forced to agree to certain forms of cooperation and to an autonomous State of Carana. In 1984 the legal status of Carana changed from a French protectorate to a Republic of the French Community. Carana was finally granted full independence from France on 22 October 1986.

Because of a long period of colonial rule, a strong influence on nearly all-cultural, social and economic aspects of the country is still visible, and in some areas still dominates. Important parts of the infrastructure, particularly the railway and road systems were built during the colonial period and have not been improved until now. The architecture of the political/administrative system in Carana also reflects the strong French influence imposed over recent decades.

Post-Colonial Period

After gaining independence, and although being faced with multiple challenges, Carana experienced about 10 years of decent development and stability, first under a communist/socialist system lead by Falin-backed President Joseph Uroma, then after a military coup in 1991 by the former Chief of the Falin dominated Army Christian Hakutu, who re-established links with France and other Western countries. The successor regime under the Falin General Tarakoni, in power until 2003, facilitated humanitarian, human rights and economic crises as well as strong civil political opposition. The death of General Tarakoni in February 2003, however, created an opening for the country's first democratic elections in many years, where Jackson Ogavo, a Falin, from the Parti Democratique de Carana (PDC) was elected President in April 2003.

During the early years, some economic and social reforms were realised but over time, Ogavo's focus changed and he became preoccupied with suppressing all opposition groups and enhancing his own power base. Since 2008 he expanded the influence of the central government

on all economic and social activities by laws and administrative rules. Ogavo was re-elected for four consecutive terms (2003, 2008, 2013, 2018), though opposition to his regime began to grow early 2010 due to a lack of economic growth and increasing discrimination against Kori and Tatsi members by the ruling – and predominantly Falin – party. All opposition to the government was met with either the threat or use of armed force, and eventually escalated into civil conflict in January 2014.

Current developments

Starting in 2014 some small rebel movements in the Tereni province joined the larger and better-organised rebel groups known as Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) and formed a well-structured and efficient military opposition. The MPC defeated the Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC) in some local battles and gained increasing support from the local population in the West. In February 2016 the FDC lost control of some areas in the western highlands. Though the MPC's military engagements were well coordinated and successfully executed, the rebels failed to formulate a comprehensive political program and failed to capitalise on their success. Their only clearly stated aim was to remove Ogavo from power. Early 2018 the MPC gained control of the three provinces in the West (Koloni, Tereni and Mahbek).

Low level but frequent MPC operations in the West increasingly tied down the FDC, leaving it with weak capability in the south of the country in Leppko province, and creating an opportunity for elements of the predominantly Muslim Tatsi minority to attack government institutions. Initially this amounted to little more than a few localised incidents, but it quickly escalated into more radicalised activities including particularly brutal reprisals against ethnic Falin civilians. Realising that the government could do little against them, a number of these small rebel groups united and called themselves Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC). Both the MPC and the CISC took as their initial aim the removal of President Ogavo from power, though cooperation between the two groups has been minimal.

All parties have suffered numerous defeats, though the civilian population of Carana has been particularly targeted by all parties, leading to an estimated 150,000 killed from violence, famine or disease. The CISC's exploitation of resources in the south has helped fuel their efforts, while the MPC has exploited diamonds and has been receiving external support from the neighbouring country of Katasi. A combination of war-weariness and strategic manoeuvring led the leaders of both the MPC and CISC, as well as President Ogavo, to start negotiating a cease-fire and peace treaty in November 2020. The "Kalari Peace Treaty" will most likely mandate all parties to disarm and establish a power-sharing arrangement in a new transitional government, including integration in a new Forces de la Défense et Sécurité du Carana (FDSC) and take over from the Fasias Union Advisory Mission in Carana (FUAMC) to assist in overseeing and verifying the ceasefire.

6. International relations

Neighbouring Countries

Sumora is the main trading partner of Carana in the region. The relations between Carana and Sumora are traditionally good, with ethnic Falin making up approx. 54 % of the population. In the recent past, the government of Sumora has tended to support the position of President Ogavo.

The relations between Carana and **Katasi** are strained. Carana repeatedly accused Katasi of supporting the MPC rebels with money, weapons and fighters; these allegations were not without foundation and have been corroborated by reports from a number of international organisations, although the scale of support remains unclear. The government of Carana does therefore lay the blame for its inability to deal with the MPC at Katasi's door. By supporting the MPC, Katasi hoped the fall of the Ogavo regime would lead to better trade relations with Carana. These hopes have been stalled, both by the continued regime and the El Hasar insurgency further straining the relationship. Following a request by the Government of Katasi, French Forces are conducting Counter Insurgency Operations (COIN) operations against El Hasar. El Hasar fighters have now been evading into West Carana, causing instability and insecurity as they conduct attacks against the local population to obtain logistics supplies.

The relations between Carana and **Rimosa** are also tense. Rimosa has been in the grips of a civil war between two rival ethnic groups, the majority Tatsi, who hold nearly all positions of power in the Rimosan government, and the Muslim minority of the Elassi, pastoralists who claim that they suffer ethnic discrimination and persecution. Most of the interethnic fighting in Rimosa has taken place in northern Rimosa, near the border of Carana. The rebel group Elassi Liberation Front (ELF) has waged a guerrilla-style campaign against government forces and pro-government Tatsi militias and has established links to the CISC for financial and logistics support. All aforementioned groups at times cross the border into Carana and conduct raids for obtaining food and supplies, posing a threat to the local population.

In addition, there is a political dispute between Rimosa and Carana over the ownership of some of the islands along the southern coastline of Carana, as well as over related fishing rights in the respective national territory. Oil was also discovered in the Labta Sea in the southeast of Carana, offshore of Maldosa. However, due to the ongoing border dispute and the high start-up-costs required for the exploiting of the oil resources, no company or consortium is currently willing to invest.

Caranese refugees (particularly the Falin) in Sumora and Rimosa have been consistently discriminated and are often under attack by local police and armed forces. Rimosan (Tatsi) refugees in Carana and Katasi face similar treatment, as do Katasi refugees to a lesser extent.

Membership in International Organisations

Carana is a member of the Fasia Union (FU). Its main goal is to have a common political and diplomatic representation / voice for the six Fasia member states as well as to improve the

continent's economic development. Carana has also been a member of the United Nations since 09 October 1987 and Member of the Fasia Union since 23 October 2005.

On occasion, however, the FU has brought political and diplomatic pressure to bear when tensions arise between some of the Member States of the Union. Since Mid-2013 the FU has attempted to mediate between the warring factions in Carana. In February of that year, it did succeed in bringing the main groups to the negotiating table, only to see the opportunity for peace slip away when a member of the Sumoran government, who held the FU presidency, was accused of arranging arms shipments to President Ogavo. The allegations were subsequently proven unfounded but too late to save the talks.

The state of Mosana assumes the rotating FU presidency at the end of 2019. Being more distant from Carana, Mosana has the advantage of not being seen to have any stake in the Carana conflict and has pledged to renew the FU efforts to resume negotiations.

International Trade

45 foreign companies (from Anglo and Western Europe and more recently from Asia) rival the quest for mineral and other natural resources of Carana. France is one of the main trading partners in military goods with Rimosa, which is providing support to the CISC in Carana. In general, Carana's trade balance reflects its colonial legacy: with industry capacities limited to the food sector, exports comprise mainly raw goods (timber, diamonds, copper, cotton and to a lesser extent fish, fruit and woodcrafts) and processed food to other emerging markets. In contrast, manufactured goods (industrial products, vehicles, food, and petroleum products), services, official development assistance (7.3% of GNI) and remittances (3.6% of GNI) comprise the spectrum of imported goods and capital, mainly from France, the US and other Western nations.

7. Economic System

The economy in Carana is based on a free market system with free enterprise but with strong government participation and influence. The government controls the mining sector and all foreign trade activity; however, rebels groups control some major diamond mining areas.

Mining

The mining of coal, diamonds and copper is an important contributor to the GDP. Hanno district has several coal mines in Akkabar and Maroni; Kika produces diamonds from the Gachal and Herla swamps. Copper is also mined in Lora and being exported via Maldosa. Due to the conflict and weak infrastructure, exports, however, are only at about 15% of possible capacity.

Before 1997, the mining industry was controlled by private enterprises but since then the government has progressively taken control of the industry. Illegal exploitation of natural resources and exportation by private businesses to neighbouring countries is rife and armed groups and rogue security force elements are heavily involved.

Along with rare wood, timber and cotton, diamonds and copper are the main export of Carana. Coal is mostly used in the country for production of electricity.

Oil Exploration

Oil is also found in the Labta Sea in the southeast of Carana, offshore of Maldosa. Initial exploration and export have commenced, however, due to the unresolved border conflict and ownership of the oil resources between Carana and Rimosa, international investors / corporations are reluctant to invest. Neither Carana nor Rimosa have the financial capacity to further develop infrastructure for exploration or refining the oil resources.

Manufacturing

The main activities in this sector are the food and fish industries, production of goods for local markets, and the processing of timber and textiles. The manufacturing sector suffers from a lack of infrastructure, skilled workers, an inefficient administration and widespread corruption. Manufacturing contributes 16% to the GDP.

- Metallurgic industry (creating useful objects from metals): both heavy and light (e.g. machine building, shipyards)
- Textile industry - All major cities have a clothing factory.
- Food industry - Food-preparing factories are built across the country to bottle and can many things. Food storage facilities (silos) are mostly located in the northwest region of Carana.

Agriculture

Providing 27% of the GDP and roughly 50% of the labour force employed, agriculture is a relatively large sector in the economy of Carana. The Northeast and Central Region of Carana produce large quantities of agricultural produce that not only feed the people of Carana but are also used

for export. The soil is fertilized by using the "slash-and-burn" technique on a large scale. Products are fruits, corn, grain sesame seed, cocoa, coffee, ginger, groundnut, coconut, rice and maize.

Most of the agricultural land exists as small farm lots owned by the local population. Cotton is the only commodity produced on large farms using employed labour.

Approximately 31% of the total land area of Carana is used for agricultural purposes.

8. Political System

Government

Carana is a Presidential Republic in line with the first Carana constitution adopted by a referendum in 1987. The President is serving as head of state, elected for a five-year term. The head of the government is the Prime Minister, who is appointed by the President. The Prime Minister appoints the ministers and heads of the government departments.

A Parliament with 256 elected members has broad authority and was intended to be representative of the ethnic balance of the country. Under the Ogavo regime, the oversight functions of the parliament as foreseen in the Constitution were merely ornamental and there was no actual institutional counterweight to the personal rule of Ogavo. The Commission on Defence and Security of the Parliament is weak and has limited power in the effective democratic control of the security sector.

Although the constitution supports a democratic political system, President Ogavo has gradually suppressed any effective opposition and since 2013 Carana has effectively been a one-party state. Today the only legal political party is the Falin-dominated PDC (Parti Démocratique de Carana). All members of parliament are members of the PDC or have close ties to the PDC.

Administration

The state of Carana is divided, following the French model, into eight provinces (Tereni, Koloni, Mahbek, Hanno, Barin, Fellari, Guthar, and Leppko) and a special capital zone of Galasi. The President appoints the governors who are the administrative heads of the provinces, and report directly to the President. The administrative system of Carana is a centre-orientated administration. The central government controls most governmental issues.

The central government has intervened particularly in Hanno, Barin, and Leppko provinces to assure the selection of local District Heads predominantly from among the Falin group, who are often outsiders. Appointments to Head arrondissements in Galasi have been at the demand of the President, and usually awarded to cronies (close associates and friends of the government).

9. Judicial System and Police

Legal System

In theory, the Constitution and judicial (legal) system in Carana is based on modern democratic principles comprising three levels of courts: Supreme Court, provincial and district courts.

De facto, the judiciary sector has lacked institutional capacity and resources for years and has suffered from limited territorial coverage, with no actual presence in some districts, and endemic corruption. Basic administrative tools are missing, and, as a result, the case management flow does not work properly and response times for cases are extremely long. This has also exacerbated the overcrowding of prisons, from which convicts regularly manage to escape. Salaries of judicial staff often are unpaid for months, leading to absenteeism and corruption. Meanwhile, legislation remains outdated and often discriminatory against women, ethnic minorities and other vulnerable groups. In some regions, local traditional authorities hold considerable influence over the district courts or act as de facto legal authorities in parallel to or in the absence of the state system.

Under the State of Emergency imposed in March 2018 a system of mixed civilian/military courts with very limited rights of appeal has been put in place to try all treason, terrorist and other similar cases. Carana courts regularly impose the death penalty for serious crimes.

In 2017, the Interior Ministry also ran 10 jails, with room for 20,000 inmates, though among these, only three are still in operation with a nominal capacity of some 2,000 inmates.

Police and Civil Security

Prior to the conflict, the Carana police was organized under the Ministry of Interior, based on Western principles. In general, especially in the urban areas the police were sufficiently trained and equipped and functioned according to those principles. Due to the conflict and the domination of the military confrontation, all parties to the conflict neglected the police force in Carana.

The Carana law enforcement agencies are divided into the Carana National Police (CNP) and the Gendarmerie. CNP are located in population centres and are controlled by the Ministry of Interior via the provincial administration. The Gendarmerie is part of the Ministry of Defence and maintains the police presence in rural areas and is responsible for border security. However, in recent years the Gendarmerie has been used more often to suppress opposition political groups than for rural security or border control. In addition, FDC army units often undertake policing tasks in the internal security role, often on an ad hoc basis.

In recent years, CNP and Gendarmerie have suffered a critical shortage of qualified personnel, aging staff, low morale because of unpaid salaries, lack of logistical and financial resources, and training. Police corruption is a severe problem in most government-controlled areas. Police stations have little or no equipment, while the police-training centre is basically a building shell. Within government-controlled areas, a national police presence is visible but not able to deal efficiently with the high level of crime. Police detention facilities are overcrowded and in a dilapidated state. In addition, they have been plagued by heavy politicisation, corruption and mismanagement.

Police presence in Carana is very low. The estimated number for CNP and Gendarmerie officers' amounts to 10,000 officers, or one officer for every 1,700 citizens. Out of this number, only 5 % are female officers and they are in largely administrative roles. The majority of police are ethnic Falin, including in areas populated mainly by minorities.

In the rebel-controlled areas, there is no governmental police presence. In the West, the MPC took over basic police functions to maintain civil order, while in the CISC area there is no policing at all.

Land and marine border policing, immigration, customs, port authority and other related sectors of internal security have ceased to function. In recent months, evidence of organised criminal activities, especially drug and human trafficking as well as diamond smuggling have come to light, in some cases involving collusion or active participation by law enforcement officials.

Crime rates particularly in population centres are high and there are numerous reports of human rights abuses and looting perpetrated by the law enforcement agencies. A small group of officers has been involved in reported human rights abuses. This inefficiency and erosion of professional standards has led to a widespread loss of their credibility and trust within the population.

10. Public Services

Carana School System

In comparison to other countries within the region, Carana originally had a well-developed educational system, which includes first, second and third level education. Prior to the outbreak of war, Carana had one of the best-developed educational systems in the region.

The formal school system in Carana follows a 7-3-2-2 pattern. This pattern represents primary, lower secondary, upper secondary and pre-tertiary levels respectively. The Université de Carana, Institut de Technologie Carana (the Carana Institute of Technology), provides education and training at the post-secondary level, in both academic and professional fields. The Carana Nursing College and various technical and vocational education institutions and training centres provide further opportunities.

Carana Medical System

The Carana Medical system before the conflict was sufficiently developed and structured. Hospitals were available in the major cities (Galasi, Maroni, Sureen, Alur, Faron, Folsa, Cereni, Corma, Turen and Maldosa) and mid-level cities had decent health facilities (clinics and/ or health stations). Because of the civil war and economic policy abortive developments, the medical situation of the population has deteriorated dramatically. Even in the regions that are not affected by the civil war, the range and quality of medical services deteriorated, and medical support / supply are insufficient. In addition, the supply with drinkable or potable water represents a problem in some regions.

Postal Services

The Carana Post Office provides postal and money-transfer services, as well as postal savings accounts. Its 1,580 post offices and other facilities handled more than 7 million items each workday in 2000, delivering mail to some 5 million addresses. In its first year in power, the PDC opened at least 70 new post offices and upgraded many others in previously ill served areas. It also installed an estimated 700,000 new mailboxes at private addresses and in post-office box locations. Carana was admitted to the Universal Postal Union in 1992, enabling it to participate in international technical assistance programs and accounting facilities within the Union.

Telecommunications

The landline telephone system covers less than 20% of the country and is unreliable. Cellular telephone coverage is expanding and generally covers the main towns and routes throughout the country. Some of the more remote border areas can access nodes in neighbouring countries. Governmental institutions and major companies also use satellite communications, particularly in the more remote areas.

Media

There are approximately 20 daily newspapers, two radio stations and two television channels in the country. The radio stations are operated by state cooperatives while most newspapers are

privately owned. The two largest newspapers are government owned and the Catholic Church publishes another. Additionally, there are some low power, community radio stations and locally printed media with local and very limited distribution. A few months ago, MPC started producing a regional newspaper and operating one radio station. International newspapers are only available in Galasi. National newspapers are available in the provincial capitals and in some other towns.

In principle, the Ministry of Information controls all media. The censorship is very limited in the case of the small, local media but nearly absolute in the case of the official radio stations and main newspapers. A significant part of the population is very active on social media, which they can access through mobile phones. Social media is used as a tool for awareness raising and democratic mobilisation, but also to spread hate speech and incite to ethnic violence.

11. Infrastructure

Roads

Carana has a system of capable paved roads, which connect most parts of the country and key urban centres. In the West and the North, these roads also ensure cross border travel with neighbouring countries. Most paved roads can withstand the effects of the monsoon season.

Carana also has a dense network of partially robust unpaved roads and tracks. Unpaved roads and tracks are mostly very vulnerable against significant rains and floods and deteriorate quickly if not maintained. The years of civil war, harsh weather, minimal investment and maintenance have degraded it significantly with the result that the road network is often impassable in the rainy season.

Bridges along the paved roads are normally steel and concrete constructions, which can carry trucks and heavy vehicles. Bridges along the unpaved roads are normally of wooden construction and must be assessed individually.

Railways

The two railway tracks running with a total length of 280 km between Galasi - Akkabar and Maldosa - Mia are both operational but not dependable. The entire track system and loading facilities were built during the French colonial period. Even though the track from Maroni to Akkabar is operational, the northern line ends in Maroni because the railway bridge west of Maroni was damaged by flooding in March 2020. The stations in Galasi, Maroni, Akkabar and Maldosa are sufficiently equipped for loading and unloading of containers, vehicles and all types of goods. The station in Mia is specialized for the transport of copper and has no container facilities. A lack of maintenance has resulted in the rail system being in bad shape.

Airports

The international airports in Galasi and Corma are both operational and meet international standards for air traffic. Both airports are suitable for heavy and extremely heavy transport aircraft and used by international airlines. However, their cargo handling capacity is currently limited.

The airports in Alur and Folsa are suitable for medium transport aircraft, but they do not have equipment to handle heavy air cargo. All other airfields, without additional construction work are only suitable for light fixed wing aircraft. They can be used for communication and small size personnel transport. Consistent fuel supplies are only available in Galasi and Corma.

Harbours

In Carana there are three harbours for deep-water ships and some smaller harbours for fishing boats. The smaller harbours have no capacity to support the loading and unloading of ships, but they are suitable for coastal vessels. The main harbour in Galasi is well equipped with sufficient capacity for large ships and with Roll on/Roll off (RoRo) capability.

The harbour in Cereni has no RoRo capability but does have capable cranes and sufficient transport equipment to handle heavy loads and containers. The harbour in Maldosa, which has

railroad access, is mostly specialized for the transport of copper but it is also capable to handle regular transport ships. The fact that just two wharves are equipped with cranes for vehicles and containers can cause limitations for deployment and support. The location of the harbour in the town results in a lack of free space to store containers or to assemble vehicles. There is plenty of space for this purpose available outside the city.

Electricity

Carana could be relatively self-sufficient in the production of electricity; this is generated by three power plants (the Kilu Dam, the Salobo Dam and the coal power plant in Galasi) and two hydro-electric power stations. In previous years, the country was a net exporter of electricity during and after the rainy season.

During the conflict, most of the power supply equipment around the Salobo Dam was destroyed or damaged. This, together with a weak distribution network, leads to a consistent power supply only to Galasi, the provincial capitals, and some other cities. The majority of the country is currently without regular power supply. Some small local waterpower plants and generators provide electrical power for small numbers of the rural population.

Water and sanitation

Only the capital and some larger cities have a water supply system for the central area of the city. All other towns and villages rely on wells and water trading. Potable water is available in most parts of the country, but the quality of water varies. In dry areas southwest of Maldosa and west of Galasi drinking water during the dry season is mostly taken from small ponds and slow flowing brooks.

The quality of this water is low and causes several diseases. The wells in this region are not deep enough to reach clean water. The quality of water provided by the few supply systems does not meet international hygiene standards but causes no direct health threats for the population. The water quality in the rural areas is mostly satisfactory. Even the water quality of the crowded Galasi suburbs and the IDP camps is problematic.

There is no system of sanitation and garbage removal in Carana, leading to permanent disease and health problems, particularly in the heavily populated areas.

12. Security and Defence Sector

Security Overview

There have been several disputes with neighbouring countries in the past few decades; however, there were no external military threats to Carana. The main internal security problems continue to be the high level of crime in urban areas (resulting from the poor economic situation), the activities of uncontrolled armed groups and the conflicts between government forces and rebels.

An estimated 12,000 people have been killed in recent months and anything up to 700,000 were forced to flee their homes because of the fighting between government forces and rebels in the North and the South. The large numbers of combat-related IDPs further affects the security situation.

With the formation of the El Hasar Terrorist Group in Katasi, new external threats evolved, as well as with the fundamentalist groups in Rimosa that challenge the progress and stability of the ongoing peace process within Carana. While relations with Katasi and Rimosa remain tense, currently the likelihood of intra-state conflict is considered low. This might however change if the situation further escalates and the territorial integrity of Carana is being challenged through these groups.

Security in Carana is negatively impacted / may be impacted:

- If the ongoing peace process based on the Kalari Peace Agreement is delayed in time and conducted without full participation of all parties to the conflict, especially the impact of the CISC splinter groups on the implementation.
- If spoilers to the peace process (CISC splinter groups) pose a threat to the local population of Carana
- through increasing evidence of criminal usurpation of the diamond mining in the North and West, probably with government connivance and controlled by cartels based in Sumora.
- If the El Hasar terrorist group infiltrate the West of Carana to avoid the French COIN operations in Katasi and exploit local communities for logistics and supply.
- If the militia groups (warlords) conducting illegal exploitation and trade of diamonds in central Leppko pose threats to the local population and impede the peace process.

The poor economic situation has resulted in increased and more radicalised level of criminal activity, some of it organized in urban areas. In the North and West there is increasing evidence of criminal usurpation of the diamond mining, probably with government connivance and controlled by cartels based in Sumora. Rimosa and Carana still dispute the ownership of some of the islands along the southern coastline of Carana, as well related fishing rights in the respective national territory. Armed groups abducted many civilians, mainly by extremist rebel and militia elements. There are, however, also reports of violations conducted by the parties to the PA.

Presidential Guard

The Presidential Guard has a strength equivalent to two infantry battalions and it is not part of the regular defence force. The commanders and most officers are from the tribe of President Ogavo.

Members of the Presidential Guard received intensive training and are entitled to several privileges. This unit is a loyal elite force with the task to protect the President. It is also used for special purpose tasks. In the recent past, the Presidential Guard was used several times, together with Gendarmerie units, to fight against rebel groups, and has a reputation for being particularly brutal.

Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC) or Carana Defence Force (CDF)

The FDC/CDF has a total strength of approximately 20,000 men (17,500 Army, 1,600 Air Force, 900 Navy). The chiefs of the services report direct to the president. With a small number of coastal and river patrol boats the Navy plays a specialised but insignificant role in the Defence Force.

The Air Force is equipped with a squadron of armed helicopters, transport helicopters and a few light bombers, which have a limited strike capacity. Although a limited capacity, it allows the government to project its' power over the entire country. However, this limited capacity is not sufficient to deliver decisive strikes against the various rebel groups.

The main service in the FDC/CDF is the Army, primarily but not solely recruited from the Falin people. Its senior leadership is almost wholly Falin. Structured in four area commands it represents the power of the central government all over the country. The areas of responsibility of these commands do not necessarily match the administrative and provincial boundaries. Instead, they reflect the location of the headquarters and troops rather than the real responsibility for a certain precise, defined area. Troops, especially those employed in rural areas, face recurrent problems of non-payment of wages. A number of units are composed of integrated armed group members, lack operational capacity and commitment to human rights, conduct, and discipline standards.

Women's participation in the armed forces is low, with female soldiers and higher-ranking officers making up some 6% of the FDC/CDF in total. During the Uroma regime and on Uroma's specific request, women were recruited and received substantial training abroad, which eventually led to positions as senior officers. A small but steady recruitment of female soldiers continued over the following decades, although their status has been continuously deteriorating due to lack of political support for women's participation.

The French and Russian Governments provided most of the existing military equipment during the 1980s and early 1990s. Since this time, equipment maintenance has often suffered from a lack of spare parts and well-trained mechanics. The level of equipment availability is estimated as low.

All Services have the same set of SALW, about 3.000 modern assault rifles (M-16), all in good quality and about 15.000 older types, nonetheless functional (a mix of Belgian and British made FN FAL and some German G3).

Mouvement Patriotique du Carana (MPC)

The MPC is an avowed secular organization with broad appeal that has a total strength of 10,000 fighters and 10,000 to 20,000 supporters. The level of public support is high in the West and cuts across the different religions. The MPC is structured into groups of 700 men. Each of these groups is led by a field commander and has a local network of supporters. The groups have no internally defined military structure, but a system of sub-commanders with different numbers of fighters. The loyalty to the commanders is high and discipline is very good.

The official HQ of MPC is in Alur but this is more a symbolic HQ than an operational one. In some areas the MPC have taken over government and basic administrative functions. Because of the broad public support for the rebels, and the dissatisfaction with the government, the new role of the MPC is well accepted by the largely Kori population in the West.

No detailed information on the equipment and training standards of the MPC is currently available.

Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC)

The CISC is an unstructured formation of rebels with diverging backgrounds. Some members are Tatsi deserters from the FDC, while others have fled the civil war in Rimosa and joined CISC for lack of alternatives. The total strength is estimated to be around 3,000 to 5,000 fighters. They are organised in company-strength formations (nominal battalion formations), many of which are under-strength. The public support for CISC is based mainly in the Tatsi dominated Leppko Province because of many acts of FDC violence against the population.

The movement has been successful in recruiting young men to its cause through a combination of government anti-Muslim excesses, religious zeal and the poor economic situation, as well as due to recent rebel successes. The discipline and internal cohesion of this rebel group is low, as is the standard of training, although lately there is increasing evidence of the presence of experienced foreign extremists who have upped the tempo and quality of CISC operations.

No detailed information on the equipment and training standards of the CISC is currently available.

Militias, gangs and warlords

During the years of fighting, several smaller armed groups have formed in Leppko. Some of these groups are fragmentations of the CISC or deserters from the government forces. Other groups have arisen from local vigilant groups built to protect their villages from attacks from soldiers and rebels.

These groups operate mainly in the northern Leppko province, chiefly for economic reasons (theft, illegal exploitation of resources, ransom) and are perceived as loyal to their leaders (warlords). Initial information indicates that these groups consist of 300 up to 1,000 fighters with light weapons.

The aims and loyalties of these groups are very uncertain and the boundary from local militias to armed bandits is affluent. None of these groups is part of the ongoing peace process.

13. Foreign Military Groups/Military Forces

El Hasar Group

The El Hasar group was formed in 2018 in the neighbouring country of Katasi and turned into a “terror organisation” requesting their own state and engaging in guerrilla type terror operations against the Katasi government. Recently, following anti-terror operations conducted by the Government of Katasi supported by the French Forces, El Hasar fighters/elements crossed the border into Carana in the western parts of the Koloni and Tereni Region. Local communities report armed attacks and raids on villages by these elements, the latter stealing money, food, supply items like spare parts, gas and ammunition. Reports also indicate violence against civilians such as rape, torture and other casualties.

Unconfirmed reports claim the fundamentalist elements from both the Tatsi and Kori communities are supporting / sympathising with the El Hasar fighters/elements.

The FDC and MPC do not have the capability to engage the El Hasar elements. Both, however, agreed to allow the French Forces to pursue the fighters into the territory of Carana.

Elassi Liberation Front (ELF)

The ELF was formed in 2018 in the neighbouring country of Rimosa and is conducting insurgency operations against the Rimosa government. They mainly operate south of the Carana border in Rimosa, but have begun to challenge CISC in southern Carana and collaborate with some CISC splinter groups. Recruitment for ELF has surged both in Carana and Rimosa during the past year. Carana communities along the border report armed attacks and raids on villages by ELF elements. ELF plans the establishment of an independent state in Rimosa, possibly to be extended to Carana, as non-negotiable and is not part of the peace negotiations.

Carana communities along the border report armed attacks and raids on villages by ELF elements, who are held to be stealing money, food, supply items like spare parts, gas and ammunition. Reports also indicate violence against civilians like rape, torture and other casualties.

Banditry / Piracy

With the discovery of oil and its initial exploration offshore of the southern coast of Carana, and the shipping of copper ore from Maldosa, incidents of piracy and hijacking of transport vessels are growing more frequent. The bandits/pirates operate mainly by using the island as base/cover and attacking the vessel to demand ransom for further passage.

There is little information about these pirates, who seem to have the support of the local population, based on economic gains and local investment from these illegal operations. Due to the ongoing border dispute between Carana and Rimosa, both Naval Forces are preoccupied and are not engaging the emerging threat of piracy.

14. Humanitarian Situation

As result of the fighting, many people in Carana fled their homelands, but most remained in the country. An estimated 100,000 have taken refuge in the neighbouring countries of Sumora (about 40,000 refugees), Katasi (appr. 40,000 refugees) and Rimosa (appr. 20,000 refugees). Another 700,000 settled in IDP camps around the harbour cities where they are now clustered in makeshift camps and shantytowns in or near urban areas. The largest part of these IDPs currently live in the camps around Galasi, the majority arrived within the last 12 months.

News of the possible arrival of a UN mission has buoyed the hopes of the nearly 900,000 refugees and IDPs to return home. UNHCR, however, has expressed concerns about whether the environment is sufficiently safe and secure for their return. All parties to the conflict are reported to have used mines. In many areas from which people are displaced there is little prospect of employment or other livelihoods.

Finally, the country of Rimosa, sharing a border of approximately 200 km with Carana, has suffered from civil conflict between the two rival ethnic groups, the majority Tatsi and the minority Elasi. As a result, approximately 30,000 Elasi have taken refuge in southern Carana. Most of these Elasi refugees are sheltered in Camp Lora near the village of Lora, approximately 50 km from the Rimosan border, and are a source of potential instability within the Tatsi dominated Leppko Province. UNHCR and two NGO implementing partners, Refugees International and Care for the Children, maintain Camp Lora.

Conditions of health, sanitation and hygiene in these areas are dangerously inadequate and increasingly provide a breeding ground for extremist discontent. The situation in the IDP camps is poor and has significantly deteriorated during the last months.

Nutrition

Although all basic food is available at the market, large numbers of the population cannot afford the necessary food for sufficient nutrition. In rural areas most people can compensate for inflation and unemployment through self-sufficient agriculture. However, severe nutritional problems exist in the urban areas and the IDP camps. The child mortality rate has dramatically increased during the last several years. The most affected areas of malnutrition are the Barin Region, the area between Faron and Folsa and the coastal area south of Cereni. These areas are already experiencing humanitarian emergencies.

A humanitarian emergency is forecasted to affect approximately 2 million people next year. Projects recently started by the UN World Food Programme (WFP) and other NGOs are not sufficiently funded and cannot to prevent a widespread humanitarian crisis.

Health

Almost no medical infrastructure exists in the rural areas. The rudimentary health system that exists in the cities is unable to provide basic medical support. One of the main humanitarian concerns in Carana is the acute lack of functioning medical facilities in the rebel held South and West. Here

there is a critical lack of emergency supplies required for displaced and vulnerable populations, particularly in the IDP camps.

If the situation in the large cities continues to worsen, the threat of epidemics will increase. The WHO (World Health Organisation) has already reported 70 cases of cholera in Carana to date.

15. Explosives

During the conflict, landmines were used extensively by both sides. Similar to other cases, mine warfare was not conducted with documented mine obstacles. Landmines were used by all sides as a means of terror and deterrent and to prevent access to certain areas. As a result, the precise location of mines and explosive devices is not documented and mostly unknown. Further analysis is necessary to identify high mine threat areas.

Carana first pledged its support for a ban on antipersonnel mines in November 2009 and it was a supporter of the Ottawa process that led to the signing of the Mine Ban Treaty on 02 December 2011. Carana was one of the signatories of the treaty, never ratified the treaty, however, due to the outbreak of civil war. Carana also did not attend any Treaty-related meetings and abstained from voting in favour of every pro-ban United Nations General Assembly resolution since 2011.

Carana is not an identified producer or exporter of antipersonnel mines. At the same time, Carana has not enacted any internal measures to prohibit its production or export of antipersonnel mines. The size and origin of Carana's mine stockpile is not known. Antipersonnel mines have been used extensively in the recent civil war by all sides to the conflict. The PA prohibits further use, however, uncorroborated reports of continuing mine use appear.

16. Civil society organizations

Civil society in Carana is weak and there are no groups with substantial influence outside of the PDC party structure. The PDC did have an affiliated social movement organising activities in sports and culture, but the organisation is elitist (oriented exclusively towards ethnic Falin party cadres) and not viable without party support. Non-affiliated organisations have been harassed and persecuted under the Ogavo regime. Remaining elements of former parties have lost their internal structure and are represented by a few motivated individuals only. Some smaller political movements were nevertheless identified, including small communist groups in the capital of Galasi and in Maldosa, as well as ethnically motivated minority groups of Kori along the coastline. These groups are not very well organized and suffer from a lack of followers.

The well-established civil society organizations pre-dating Ogavo's crackdown on opposition outside of parliament, the National Bar Association and the Carana Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, are staffed by known members of the opposition as well as by close allies of the PDC. Their internal struggles have rendered them de facto unimportant in the process. Some members of the NBA have acted as advisers to the Peace Process; however, their agenda is unclear.

The coal and copper miner's trade unions have limited political influence, but are active only as single-interest organisations that have not challenged the political leadership. The teachers' union may currently also be considered a single-interest organisation, demanding their salaries be paid, and face violent backlash.

Women's organisations are starting to form at grassroots level but so far are poorly organised. Some local human rights organisations are becoming more active. Currently, social activity and organisation connected to the religious institutions is increasing. Traditional structures in the form of chiefdoms with some de facto authority exist, particularly in the rural areas.

Annexes:

- A - Carana thematic maps
- B - Carana Security and Defence Forces
- C - Carana Law Enforcement
- D - Carana Civil Society Organisations
- E - International Organisations in Carana
- F - United Nations and related agencies
- G - Carana Background History & Institutions
- H - Fasía - The 8th Continent
- I - Frequently used Acronyms

Annex A: Carana thematic maps




Figure 1 - Carana Natural Recourses




Figure 2 - Vegetation




Figure 3 – Ethnic distribution in Carana




Figure 4 – Ethnic percentage distribution in Carana




Figure 5 - Overview on the rebel-controlled areas.




Figure 6 - Disputed borders and resources




Figure 7 - Carana Administrative borders




Figure 8 – Humanitarian Overview

Annex B: Carana Security and Defence Forces

Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC) or Carana Defence Force (CDF)

The military expenditures currently are estimated at 2.7% of the Carana GDP.

It is further estimated that the potential personnel pool for a military mobilisation is about 5,250,000 (males age 18-49). Family members accompany many of the personnel. Numbers have not yet been determined.

According to the Draft Law, 18 years is the minimum age for conscription and voluntary service, but in spite of this, it is estimated that 15-20 % of the CDF soldiers are younger than 18 years old. Age composition of FDC:

- 18-29 yrs: 63%
- 30-39 yrs: 27%
- 40-49 yrs: 10%
- Officially 5% female soldiers (above 18)

There is evidence that in the last phases of war, there has been increasing recruitment of under 16, so the estimated number of under 18-year-olds is 10% (boys only).

Command Structure

Area Command	Location	Assigned Troops
North	Maroni	2 Inf Bn, 1 Airborne Bn, 1 Arty Bn, 1 Engr Bn, 1 AAA Btry, MP, Mil Band
West	Alur	2 Inf Bn, 1 Arty Btry
Central	Folsa	1 Inf Bn, 1 Engr Coy, 1 Recce Coy
South	Corma	2 Inf Bn, 1 Recce Coy

Major Equipment

Army

Type	Quantity	Role
AMX 13	12	Light Tank
Mamba	17	Reconnaissance Vehicle
AML 60/90	11	Reconnaissance Vehicle
M 3	21	APC
M 2	11	105 mm Artillery Gun
120 mm Brandt	14	Mortar
81 mm Brandt	27	Mortar
RCL M 40	8	106 mm Recoilless Launcher
Panhard M 3 VDA	9	Self-propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun
L 60	17	20 mm Anti-Aircraft Gun

Air Force

Type	Quantity	Role
Alpha Jet C	6	Ground Attack
Fokker 100	3	Communication
Cessna 421	2	Communication
F 33 C Bonanza	4	Training
Aérospatiale SA 330 H Puma	6	Utility
Aérospatiale SA 316 Alouette	5	Utility/Communication

Navy

Type	Quantity	Role
Suscal A	3	Coastguard Boat
LC-84	2	River Patrol Boat

Carana Presidential Guard

The Carana Presidential Guard has a strength of almost 1,500 personnel. The guard mainly consists of two infantry battalions, but also features additional units (see organisational chart).

The presidential guard was created to carry out representative tasks. It is also responsible for the close protection details for the president and close relatives, support of military and of public order operations as well as special assignments from the president.

It is not part of the regular defence force. The presidential guard reports directly to the president of Carana. The guard possesses ties to the gendarmerie of Carana which were created through the frequent joint deployment in operations.




Figure 9 – Structure Carana Presidential Guard

Annex C: Carana Law Enforcement

The Carana law enforcement agencies are divided into the Carana National Police (CNP) and the Gendarmerie. The estimated number for CNP and Gendarmerie officers' amounts to 10,000 officers.

Carana National Police

The Carana National Police (CNP) has an estimated strength of approximately 7,100 police officers. Precise numbers cannot be aggregated due to the high fluctuation in the regional personnel bodies.

The CNP operates mainly in densely populated areas. The CNP's first operational pillar concerns public order and safety. In fulfilling this task, the CNP is also tasked with traffic safety. Its second main objective is the investigation of criminal acts. In doing so, the CNP is expected to conduct major investigations outside its area of responsibility, i.e. in rural areas.

The CNP find itself within the command structure of the Carana Ministry of the Interior. However, the Ministry of Justice carries out oversight relating to operational matters of criminal investigation cases.

The CNP has a history of being underfinanced, understaffed and being insufficiently organized. Therefore, the organization lacks basic administrative mechanisms and routines. One example is the lack of a functioning education and training pillar. The CNP does currently not command a centralised educational facility such as an academy.




Figure 10 – Structure Carana National Police

Carana Gendarmerie

The Gendarmerie of Carana has a strength of close to 2,900 officers. It is tasked with upholding public order in rural areas. The gendarmerie is further authorized to conduct military police duties.

The Gendarmerie is under the control of the Ministry of Defence. Operational control of units, which engage in public order operations, is transferred to the Ministry of the Interior. However, this mechanism has been widely disregarded, as the Gendarmerie was utilized as a governmental strong-arm.

Traditionally the gendarmerie is closely connected to the Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC). Its organisational structure, the operational approach and its self-understanding are strongly influenced by the FDC's customs and culture. The Gendarmerie has benefitted from its strong ties to the FDC and to the presidential guard. Consequently, it is better funded and staffed than its civilian counterpart, the CNP.




Figure 11 – Structure Carana Gendarmerie

Annex D: Carana Civil Society Organisations

Carana Trade Union (CTU)

Headquarters: Amsan

Established: 2014

The CTU is fighting for more labour rights of particularly the diamond workers in the Southern region of Leppko. They are further strongly campaigning for the legitimization of the diamond industry in Leppko, so that these mines would provide a new job market for the ex-combatants.

National Bar Association (NBA)

Headquarters: Galasi

Established: 1974

The National Bar Association is the oldest post-colonial civil society organization in Carana and acts as the largest network of legal professionals in Carana. Traditionally leaning towards constitutionalism and democratic opposition, it was sanctioned harshly already during President Ogavo's second legislature. Nowadays, the group is divided between open opponents of the current regime and beneficiaries of the judicial re-staffing process. Members of the NBA have acted as advisers to the Kalari Peace process.

Carana Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture (CCCIA)

Headquarters: Galasi

Established: 1920

The Carana Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture was established in the French Protectorate of Carana to facilitate the establishment of French businesses in Carana. After independence, it developed into the main political organ representing Caranese business elites and considers itself the umbrella body for the private sector. It counts many mine owners, logistics operators in central Carana and harbour companies among its members.

Teachers' Union

Headquarters: unknown

Established: 1976/ unknown

The formerly rather active original Carana Teachers' Union fell victim to the increased pressure on civil society organisations from 2008 – 2013. Recalling the times of nation-wide influence, the current Teachers' Union is a loose body of teachers regularly calling for large-scale strikes when salaries go unpaid for several months. To the dismay of its members, their political weight remains limited at best, and teachers on strike have been jailed repeatedly.

Veterans for Peace

Headquarters: Sureen

Established: unknown

Veterans for Peace have established themselves in Carana over the last decade. Until the peace negotiations commenced, they had to operate “undercover”, as they weren’t allowed to express and expand the political activism of the veteran and to use political power. Now, with the peace agreement and a DDR program in sight veteran groups have indicated their potential role in this process, as advisers to any actors engaged in the reintegration process, as they, as veterans know exactly what it is an ex-combatant wants and how to permanently integrate him/her back into civil society.

Caranese United

Local Headquarters: Cereni

Established: 1991

In the last five years Caranese United has become an organization that is committed to continual re-formation. The Bible and historic evangelical understanding of its central truths remain as their foundations, but their experience of serving the poor in partnership with others continually forces us to go back to their foundations and think again. This means that statements of purpose, values or principles are not final but in some respects snapshots of where they have got to in their pilgrimage. Caranese United remain open to continuing discussion and learning. The organization works through local churches and Christian agencies – their partners – to open up brighter futures for the world’s poorest communities. Together they’re helping people become all that God wants them to be.

Front for Civil Order

Headquarters: Folsa

Established: 2001

Front for Civil Order is a local NGO. Its objectives are to create goodwill and peaceful coexistence among all ethnicities in Carana. Front for Civil Order engages in development activities and promotes small loans for development incentives. It consists of 20 local staff. The organizations program manager is a former official of the Ministry of Justice and the Police, and was allegedly a member of the MPC before he changed sides.

Carana Center for Dialogue and Democracy

Headquarters: Galasi, Cereni

Established: 2014

The Carana Center for Dialogue and Democracy was established after rumours were spread that a “Weapons for Cash” initiative would be established. The organizations’ objectives are to rebuild a peaceful society in Carana, but the methods used to achieve this are not clear.

Union des Femmes pour la Paix

Headquarters: Maldosa

Established: 2013

The objective of the Network is to create a reflection framework for women and then to mobilize them so that they can assume their vital role in the evolution of our society towards a world of peace. The organization's activities include communication, domestic violence, women's health, non-sexist education and gender studies, cultural matters (cinema, literature, art, and music).

Carana International Peace Institute

Headquarters: Galasi

Established: 2014

This organization was established as an initiative of returnee expatriates, many of them intellectuals who fled Carana during the worst excesses of the war. Objectives are to institute peaceful coexistence in Carana society. Funded by donations from European peace groups, though the administrative ability and control over finances seem dubious at best, it has produced three reports, two on ethnic coexistence in Carana and one on problems of proper governance.

Egalité

Headquarters: Galasi

Established: 2003

Egalité is a local Caranese organization that advocates for the equal rights, opportunities and treatment of all ethnic groups in Carana. Since 2003, Egalité has been collecting information, investigating and writing reports on abuses against Kori, Tatsi and Falin civilians, as well as mobilizing the public to take action against ethnic injustice and discrimination. Egalité produces annual updates on the status of all ethnic communities in Carana, largely to inform the international community of ongoing violations. Domestic activities have largely been stifled due to the civil conflict, although community counselling, monitoring and letter campaigns are some of the main activities undertaken by the organization.

Carana Catholic Church

The Catholic Church of Carana (CCC) is a diocese of the Catholic Church with a resident bishop in Galasi. The Church is strongly identified with the Falin majority. In recent years the Church has become highly involved in civil issues ranging from fair elections to minority rights. The influence of the CCC is considerable, with the ability of higher-ups in the Church to appeal through discreet channels both to the President, and to international fora. Consequently, the CCC has often been the (unacknowledged) source of reports on human-rights abuses by both armed groups and Government forces.

National Church of Carana

The National Church of Carana (NCC) was founded in the middle of the Twentieth Century. Two charismatic US-trained Caranese's founded the NCC in parallel in the Northwest and South of the country (particular inroads in Leppko and in Koloni). They became members of a Baptist-related church while studying in the US. The NCC has become a major religious player due to the original factors that brought the Church into being, and to the financial support of the mother Church, which has since attained a markedly revivalist flavour. It is also the result of good organization and localization.

The NCC is organized into independent churches scattered about the country. It is heavily involved in charity and is strongly active in the areas of local confidence building. With a Protestant self-help ethic, the NCC has great appeal to the middle classes and to the peasants in the hinterlands. It has recently announced that it will support the national disarmament campaign by becoming engaged in weapons collection. The NCC, which has members among all ethnic groups, is considered a neutral.

Forest Cult

At almost the same time as the NCC was founded, a French-trained chemist, Antoine leBoot, reinvigorated and re-established along modern lines a number of traditional cultic activities under the umbrella of the "Forest cult". The original paganism of Carana's various ethnic groups was suppressed and effectively went into hiding during the years of colonial rule.

The Forest cult has great appeal to the urban poor, on the one hand, and to rural marginal people on the other. In many rural communities, followers participate in Forest cult rituals along with their membership in the CCC (the NCC is more strongly opposed to this dual membership).

During the war, the Forest cult assumed a more political slant as many of its members from the rural areas joined the MPC and the CISC. Some efforts were made by the Government to ban or outlaw the Forest cult. However, in view of the fact that it is pervasive in the cities as well, and that some high-ranking Government officials are reputedly members, this was not put into practice.

Muslim congregations

The (Sunni) Sufi brotherhoods in southern Carana have historically been closely affiliated with local elites, and engaged in local charity, worship and patronage work. CISC and ELF mobilizations, however, have been fuelled more by Salafist tendencies arriving with Gulf state imams and donations to mosques in south-western Carana and Rimosa in recent years. The affluent Shia communities along the East Coast have not engaged as such in national politics.

Annex E: International Organisations in Carana

German Red Cross

International Headquarters: Berlin, Germany

Local Headquarters: Galasi, Corma, Folsa, and Faron.

Local presence: since 2012

The German Red Cross is a leading member of the largest independent humanitarian organization in the world – the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The German Red Cross responds immediately to conflicts and disasters around the world, providing essentials such as food, clean water, shelter and medicines.

In Carana the German Red Cross is distributing food in cooperation with the WFP to the most vulnerable groups. An Emergency Response Unit (ERU), which recently arrived at the hunger-stricken country, has been working around the clock to set up the essential infrastructure to ensure the food is distributed safely and to those most in need. About 25 per cent of the population are short of food. The German Red Cross is also closely monitoring the prevalence of HIV/AIDs in the country, as well as other conflict-related diseases to assist in the design of prevention programmes.

Save the Children

Headquarters: London, United Kingdom

Local Headquarters: Galasi, Cereni

Local presence: since October 2013

Save the Children (SC) advocates for the rights of children around the world who suffer from poverty, disease, injustice and violence. In particular, SC fights to protect children from becoming not only a victim of war, but also a perpetrator of violence. Around 300,000 youth – both boys and girls – are currently fighting wars around the world. SC's core mandate is to ensure that all children around the world have a right to a childhood.

In Carana, SC is working closely with UNICEF to provide programming for youth education and recreation to create an alternative to fighting in the war. Following the signing of the Kalasi Treaty, SC is also concerned with the reintegration of child soldiers who have either escaped, or voluntarily left armed groups, particularly those who have experienced physical and/or psychological trauma. SC is committed to helping the children of Carana learn new skills and regain their lost childhood, all the while preventing their recruitment or return to battle.

CARE International

Headquarters: London, United Kingdom

Local Headquarters: Galasi

Local presence: since June 2014

CARE International works with communities in need to improve living conditions once the immediate crisis or conflict is over. In specific, CARE INT works with communities to re-establish stability, order and create the means for sustainable development to take root.

In Carana, CARE is working with women to promote their safety, security and status in the aftermath of conflict. This project involves working with a wide group of women affected by the conflict – from widows, former female combatants, HIV/AIDS patients, to the disabled and landmine victims – in order to promote reconciliation, rehabilitation and reintegration into the local community. CARE works closely with the ICRC in providing both health and sanitation needs, as well as Save the Children in dealing with female youth affected by conflict.

Doctors without Limits

International Headquarters: Amsterdam, Netherlands

Local Headquarters: Galasi, Maldosa, Faron, and Corma

Local presence: on and off since 2012

Doctors without Limits are an international humanitarian aid organization that provides emergency medical assistance to populations in danger. In Carana, Doctors without Limits works in rehabilitation of hospitals and dispensaries, vaccination programs and water and sanitation projects. They further work in remote health care centres, slum areas and provide training of local personnel with the objective of rebuilding health structures to acceptable levels.

While carrying out humanitarian assistance, Doctors without Limits seeks also to raise awareness of crises; it acts as a witness and will speak out, either in private or in public about the plight of populations in danger for whom the organization works. In doing so, Doctors without Limits sets out to alleviate human suffering, to protect life and health and to restore and ensure respect for the human beings and their fundamental human rights.

Further organisations

Acronym	Organisation
AECID	Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation
AFD Int.	Alliance for Freedom and Dignity
AGICO	Agrico cooperative
Amnesty Int.	Amnesty International
CARE CA	CARE, Canada
CGSC	Center for Global Communication Studies
DFID	Department for International Development, UK
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
MOFCOM	Ministry of Commerce, People's Republic of China
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NRC	Norwegian refugee council
Open AID	Open government data of Swedish Aid
OXFAM Int.	OXFAM International
SDA	Seventh-day Adventist Church
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WRC	World Refugee Council

Annex F: United Nations and related agencies

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

International Headquarters: New York, USA

Local Headquarters: Galasi, Folsa, Corma, Alur

Local presence: since 2009

UN OCHA's mission in Carana is to represent the role of the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) and coordinating and facilitating humanitarian assistance responding to the needs of affected people in Carana.

United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF)

International Headquarters: New York, USA

Local Headquarters: Galasi, Folsa, Corma

Local presence: since 2008

UNICEF's mission in Carana is to provide care and special protection to the most vulnerable groups and victims of war, namely women and children. UNICEF is also providing safe access to vulnerable populations, and provides them with health care, basic education and protection from harm.

World Food Programme (WFP)

International Headquarters: Rome, Italy

Local Offices: Galasi, Amsan, Corma, Folsa, Alur

Local presence: since 2009

The UN World Food Programme has been providing food assistance in Carana through a regional operation since 2000 to respond to the food aid needs of vulnerable populations and more than 700,000 IDPs. Programme activities have included therapeutic feeding programmes, supplementary feeding, food for agriculture, food for training, and emergency school feeding.

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

International Headquarters: Geneva, Switzerland

Local Offices: Galasi, Alur, Lora

Local presence: since 2011

World Health Organization

International Headquarters: Geneva, Switzerland

Local Offices: Galasi

Local presence: since 2003

UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)

International Headquarters: Geneva, Switzerland

Local Offices: Galasi

Local presence: since 2010

Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)

International Headquarters: Geneva, Switzerland

Local Offices: Galasi, Corma

Local presence: since 2003

United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

International Headquarters: UN HQ New York, USA

Local Offices: Galasi

Local presence: since 2010

United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)

International Headquarters: New York, USA

Local Offices: Galasi

Local presence: since 2015

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

International Headquarters: Vienna, Austria

Local Offices: Galasi, Faron

Local presence: since 2010

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

International Headquarters: UN HQ New York, USA

Local Offices: Galasi, Alur, Maroni

Local presence: since 2009

United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women)

International headquarters: New York, USA

Local Offices: Galasi

Local presence: since 2013

World Bank

International headquarters: Washington DC, USA

Local Offices: Galasi

Local presence: since 1980

IMF

International headquarters: Washington DC, USA

Local Offices: Galasi

Local presence: since 1980




Figure 12: UN Country Team locations

Annex G: Background Information

History, Economy & Institutions

Historical Background

In the century preceding Portuguese occupation, the area of modern-day Carana saw two major kingdoms, among other smaller local chiefdoms. The Allada kingdom, remnants of the Mototo empire, ruled over parts of what is now southern Carana and the Horn of Rimoso. The Kingdom of Galasi expanded from Carana to Morna in modern-day Katasi and Dasso in modern-day Sumora, harboured an internationally valued library, was well known for its oral and visual culture and had accumulated significant wealth due to maritime trade.

During the 17th Century, the Portuguese landed on the coast of Galasi. This was the period of slave trade and invasion by the Portuguese, which was made even more lucrative given the presence of diamonds and copper in the country. Accompanied by more or less belligerent disputes with the Kingdom of Galasi, the Portuguese settlement lasted over a hundred years, during which time the port of Galasi prospered and grew into a large city. The Portuguese area of influence was mainly concentrated in the Northeast, while the western region was generally left undiscovered and undeveloped. Financial difficulties back home forced the Portuguese to give up a large number of their foreign business holdings.

Italian missionaries came into Carana in 1850. The Italian missionaries moved quickly to establish schools and hospitals all over the western region and even spread the gospel to the east by setting up some of the best schools and hospitals in the region. With the discovery of diamonds and copper. The Italian government began to take an active interest in the country and a more concrete role in the general administration of the West as well as the eastern regions. During the period 1898 – 1918, Carana experienced a great deal of economic and educational growth and development. With the end of the First World War, the Italians pulled out and left Carana to the French.

After the independence of Carana in 1986, Joseph Uroma (the leader of the largest of the liberation movements and with a power base derived from the backing of the Falin majority in the east of the country) came to power and immediately tried to cut all ties with France. He attempted to establish a communist system with the assistance of USSR and Cuba. With significant economic and military support, he successfully established his regime and suppressed all other liberation movement parties and opposition groups.

During the first years of his government, Uroma received broad public support and enhanced powers. As a result of the deteriorating economic situation and the inability of the Uroma regime to establish effective governmental functions, public support declined and opposition to his leadership increased. In 1991, Uroma was expelled from power and killed. Christian Hakutu, the former Chief of the Falin dominated Army, replaced him.

Hakutu re-established the links with France and promised massive social and economic reform. Even though he received intensive support from western countries, Hakutu was unable to solve the

economic problems and stabilise the country. In 1994, Hakutu was removed from power by a coup and replaced by a military junta under Colonel Tarakoni, also a Falin. The military government of Tarakoni was also unable to address the economic and humanitarian issues but was relatively successful in maintaining public order in the country, albeit at the expense of human rights.

In 1995, the economic situation had deteriorated to such a degree that only a massive injection of international aid could prevent the country from falling into a humanitarian crisis. During the crisis, opposition groups evolved and challenges to the Tarakoni regime became more frequent.

Instead of returning the government to civilian control, the military continued to rule Carana until 2003. Under Tarakoni's military regime, the country's economic, political and social development was stifled – civil and political rights in particular were not observed and resources were directed toward the military sector.

The PDC (Parti Démocratique de Carana) won the elections and Jackson Ogavo (PDC leader) became the first elected president of Carana. Initially the government was representative of the ethnic balance of the country, although still dominated by the Falin, and it followed democratic principles that were later enshrined in the 1996 Constitution.

Initially, Ogavo based his government on a liberal constitution and realised some economic and social reforms. During the first years of the Ogavo's regime, Carana showed liberal development and economic prosperity. Nevertheless, over time Ogavo's focus changed and he became preoccupied with suppressing all opposition groups and enhancing his own power base. Since 2008 he has expanded the influence of the central government on all economic and social activities by laws and administrative rules. The replacement of all key Kori and Tatsi government ministers with members of Ogavo's Falin tribe led to an increasingly repressive approach, administrative and economic inefficiency and corruption.

Key government positions have been generally open only to those of Falin descent, as well as French-speaking Carananians. Small uprisings occurred from 2012 to 2014 against the Ogavo regime, and rebel groups were mobilized to challenge the government's hold on power. All opposition to the government was met with either the threat or use of armed force and eventually escalated into civil conflict at the beginning of 2014.

Government




Figure 13 - Carana Government Structure

Political Administration

Provinces are divided into districts, usually from 4 to 6 counties, depending on population density. The Capital district is divided into arrondissements, of which there are seven. The political and administrative role of these districts is not defined in the constitution. Most district boundaries were established by the colonial administration. Side by side with the formal administrative structure, there exists a traditional system built around chiefdoms. Chiefdom chiefs exercise considerable de-facto authority, particularly in rural areas, and preside over traditional courts applying unwritten customary legal codes, which vary across ethnic and religious groups. Sharia law is prominent in Leppko province amongst the Tatsi people.

District heads are appointed by the district Governor, though the methods of selection vary. In Fellari province, heads have been appointed from among the honcho, the chiefs of traditional clans. In Tereni, following local custom, District Heads have been appointed through consultation with local land-owning groups. In all other provinces, the awards of the position of District Head have been seen as a prerogative of the Governor.

Judicial Administration

All politically sensitive cases are tried in the Supreme Court or the provincial courts. The government appoints judges in these courts. Province Governors appoint judges to the District Courts. Government control over the district courts varies, depending on the region.

The Supreme Court, mainly with appointed members of the Falin ethnic group (with a few minor exceptions) has been the cause of contention, since members of both the Kori and Tatsi have argued, with much justification, that its decisions favour the Falin.

Before the military rule, the Province courts, with one bench in each district, dealt with civil and criminal matters. The judges and personnel of the Provincial courts were all dismissed, and many of the more independent-minded judiciary were arrested, disappeared or were exiled during the period of military rule. Military and security officers with little to no legal training replaced them and the work of the Provincial courts became inefficient and biased along the government lines.

District courts dealt with civil matters and minor criminal offences. Courts were located in most of the larger towns. Judges were rotated between counties, and there was a reluctance to allow judges to work in their birthplaces, thus ensuring a modicum of impartiality. This has fallen into disuse since the military takeover, and the number of courts was reduced and military courts have mostly replaced the District Courts to allow for military trials.

Under the constitution, the judicial system is designed to counter the political weight of the government. However, because of the judiciary's politicisation under the one party system, its independence is highly questionable. There is no functioning juvenile justice system, and no public defence counsel service. The legal education system, centred on the University of Galasi Law School, has come to a standstill through a lack of government funding. Judges need not be members of the bar association before their appointment. The legal system has been supported by a corps of lawyers (advocates) mostly trained in Europe and North America.

Banking System

The heart of the banking system in Carana is the Bank of Carana, which is responsible for the national currency reserve, the international currency exchange and all government monetary transactions, has the primary monetary authority and is custodian of the country's gold and foreign exchange reserves. The Bank of Carana's primary functions are to protect the value of the Carana Franc and to control inflation. The Bank of Carana regulates the money supply by influencing its cost – e.g., interest charged on loans to other institutions. It is technically independent of government control, but in practice works closely with the Treasury and helps to formulate and to implement macroeconomic policy. Constitutionally the Central Bank is responsible for the currency value and economic growth. In reality, the Central Bank is more a government institution than an independent instrument for economic growth and stability. Corruption is widespread.

The Bank of Carana issues banknotes and is responsible for the sale and purchase of foreign exchange for the government, as well as for the administration of the treasury-bill tender system. Its major customers are government agencies, private banks, and discount houses, although it also performs clearinghouse functions for private banks and assists banks that experience liquidity

problems. Finally, the Bank of Carana is the authorized buyer of gold bullion, thereby acting as an agent for the gold-mining industry in effecting sales on their behalf in the private market.

The government owned BEC (Banque Economique de Carana) is the only monetary institution operating on a countrywide basis. The BEC is represented in all provincial capitals and some of the larger towns. Some private international banks have branches in the capital.

The private banking sector was controlled by commercial banks until the 1980s when banking services began to diversify. Until then, commercial banks had avoided services such as personal loans, property leasing, and credit-card facilities. New institutions - including discount houses, merchant banks, and general banks - emerged to meet this demand, and in reaction to these changes in the banking sector, commercial banks increasingly entered into medium-term credit arrangements with commerce and industry and acquired interests in hire-purchase firms and leasing activities. In addition, they expanded their operations into insurance and even invested in manufacturing and commercial enterprises. Some private international banks have branches in the capital.

Annex H: Fasia – The 8th Continent

Introduction

The following document outlines the primary characteristics of the six countries of the 8th Continent of FASIA, about geography, history, society, religion, governance, law, economy, security and geopolitics.

The countries of Fasia are described through a General Description document, which contains pertinent information on each of the nations, while in addition the country of Carana is described in a Country Profile, which provides more information with respect to the conflict history, the current situation and the ongoing peace efforts by the United Nations.

The Continent of Fasia

The small continent of Fasia lies in the Indian Ocean, approximately 100 km from the Horn of Africa across the Gulf of Fasia to the northwest, and about 100 km from the Seychelles archipelago to the southeast. The countries of the southern part of the continent are located on the equator (0° longitude) and the continent is centred at approximately 55° E longitude.

It measures approximately 1,600 km from east to west, and 1,300 km from north to south. It has a land area of approximately 1,413,000 km². It features a diversity of terrain, from desert to rainforest, and from rugged mountains to level coastal plains. The highest feature on the continent is Mount Katasi (1,917m).

Geologically, Fasia sits on the north-eastern edge of the Horn of Africa sub plate, southwest of the Carlsberg Ridge in the Indian Ocean. It forms one of the 12 distinct physiographic provinces of the South African Platform physiographic division. Fasia originated as part of the Gondwana supercontinent. Its western coast was formed when Africa broke off from Gondwana approx. 165 million years ago.

Due to the overall small size and its proximity to Africa, Fasia's status as continent or island belonging to the continent of Africa was heavily disputed. In 1936 the League of Nations decided Fasia has the status of a continent.

Countries on Fasia

Fasia consists of six independent states. These are (capitals in brackets):

- Republic of Mosana (Kuku)
- Republic of Sumora (Babani)
- Republic of Namuna (Doba)
- Republic of Rimosa (Yudifa)
- Republic of Carana (Galasi)
- Republic of Katasi (Namon)

All six countries are members of the United Nations and founded the Fasian Union (FU) in 2005.

Fasia's average population is one of the youngest amongst all the continents; the median age in 2017 was 19.9 years, when the worldwide median age was 30.3 years. Despite a wide range of natural resources, the continent is one of the least wealthy per capita, in large part due to the legacies of European colonization in Fasia. Even given this low concentration of wealth, the rich reservoir of natural resources, recent economic expansion and the large and young population make Fasia an important economic market in the broader global context.



Figure 14 – The Fasia Continent

History


First settlements of humans in Fasia are assumed to have occurred apprx. 30,000 BC. At that time, different tribes from East Africa crossed the Indian Ocean through today's "Strait of Fasia" and settled on the Continent. By apprx. 1,000 BC the Mototo Kingdom emerged in the West of Fasia. Due to its strategic position in the Incense and Spice trade routes, Fasia became a regional economic and immigration hub. Several kingdoms and city states on both the western and the eastern coast accumulated substantial wealth. Most famous of them, the Kingdom of Galasi harboured an internationally valued library and was renowned for its oral and visual culture. Namuna in north-western Fasia was target to several invasions by Horn of Africa sultanates and later the Seljuk empire, which in turn took to dominate most of western Fasia. Qarmatian merchants established exclusive albeit thriving Shi'a communities on the south-eastern coastal plains, now in Carana and Rimosa. These outlived the arrival of Portuguese merchants, missionaries and colonial

settlers who established Catholic Christianity on the eastern coast. The mountain ridges in northern and central Fasia, however, impeded further Christian conversion efforts throughout the rest of the continent.

With the arrival of the first European colonial powers in Fasia in 1612, these powers began to divide the continent in colonial zones, which later became the geographic basis for the current boundaries and shape of the countries. While initially Italy, Portugal, France and England established representation on the continent, only France and England were able to form colonies. Mosana and Namuna in the East became British colonies, while Sumora, Katasi, Carana and Rimosa became French colonies. Internal conflict in Katasi in the late 19th century forced tens of thousands of Muslim Falin to flee to Carana, who then established the first major structures of Muslim community worship in Eastern Fasia.

All countries of Fasia gained independence between 1982 and 1986. In most of the countries, the former colonial powers still play a more or less important role in the internal politics and economy of the country. After the achievement of independence, all Fasian countries ran through different phases of instability, unrest and civil wars. The situation in most countries of Fasia is still fragile.

Geography of Fasia



Fasia is rugged and mountainous, with principal ranges separated by major rivers. The northern and southern halves of Fasia are distinguished by the lower regions stretching along the axis from the Bay of Mertl in the west to the Bay of Sumora, from Babani to the Indian Ocean, in the East. In the northern half, the Sumora and Namuna highlands rise gradually to an elevation of about 1,100m. In Namuna the Namu River flows southwest through Lake Namuna into the Bay of Mertl, and the Lonari River flows northeast into the Indian Ocean.

Figure 15 - Topography of Fasia

In the southern half, a long ridge covers central Mosana, reaching elevations of almost 1,500 m there, and extending through Katasi, where it reaches elevations of almost 2,000 m in central Katasi, into the West of Carana. A range of low hills covers most of Rimosa.

Almost all the major river systems empty into the ocean along the southern and eastern coasts. Most of these rivers meander across broad flood plains, terminating in estuarine deltas. The Kalesi River delta in Carana forms a large swamp area towards the Indian Ocean. Most of the major rivers permit navigation part-way into the continent interior by riverine and small coastal craft. Lake Namuna is a large freshwater lake of 287 km².

Climate

The climate of Fasia ranges from tropical to arid. Along the coastline, it is primarily desert, or savannah, while its central and mountain areas contain rainforest and dense jungle. In between, there is a convergence, where vegetation patterns like open forests and humid savannah dominate. Fasia covers, with exception of the subarctic area and the extreme desert, nearly all climate and vegetation zones on the neighbouring African Continent.

Ethnic Groups and Religion

Fasia has a population of appr. 89 million people. The aggregated fertility rate in 2014 was 5.5 children per woman. The population of Fasia consists of five major ethnic groups. These are the Tatsi with about 26 %, the Falin with about 21%, the Kori with about 26 %, the Dubi with about 12 % and the Wari with about 8 %. Several smaller ethnic groups are of local importance, notably the Elasi in along the borders between Rimosa and Carana.

The continent of Fasia is home to a wide variety of beliefs and religious denominations, and statistics on religious affiliation are difficult to come by since they are often a sensitive topic for governments with mixed religious populations. Islam and Christianity are the two largest religions in Fasia. Appr. 30% of the population are Christians, about 60% are Muslims (50%Sunni, 10% Shi'a in the coastal regions) and about 10% follow traditional religions/beliefs. A small number of Fasians are Hindu, Buddhist, Confucians, Baha'i, or Jewish. The Christians live mostly in the East and north-eastern part of the continent while the Muslim communities live in the centre and the western half of Fasia.



Figure 16 - Major Ethnic Groups




Figure 17 - Major Religions on Fasia

Infrastructure

In total, Fasia has 11 capable harbours and 6 international airports. Each national capital has an international airport. Of these, Nanom in Katasi can only be reached via Kuku, Yudifa or Galasi. National carriers fly regularly between the various capitals and the African continent, with the Mosana capital Kuku being the island's principal hub. Kuku has regularly scheduled flights to Europe, North and South America, Asia and various African destinations.

Each country in Fasia has at least one commercial air carrier, either wholly or partially state-owned, and operating fleets of varying size, age and reliability. (Some are on the list of airlines banned by the United Nations.) There are also a few charter services (both fixed and rotary wing), primarily serving the natural resources industries. Many major airports are dual-use facilities, sharing runways and other services with their national Air Forces. All countries have several austere airstrips and other minor facilities suitable for light aircraft and military tactical airlift (e.g. C-130).

As the geography tends towards shallow coastal waters, shoaling, sedimentation and marshy river deltas, Fasia has relatively few natural harbours located mostly along the southern coast. There are numerous small ports along the coasts of Fasia visited by coastal vessels plying both internal and international trade. Coastal trade provides an alternative to the often poorly maintained road systems, and inadequate rail networks. The majority of coastal traffic consists of break-bulk cargo, loaded and unloaded by cranes, or occasionally by human muscle.

Water access to the interior is provided by a number of river systems, in particular the Torongo and northern Torongo rivers, emptying into the Gulf of Carana, the Namu River, emptying into Mosana Bay through Lake Namura, and the Lonari River, flowing northeast into the Indian Ocean. All inland waterways are limited by overhead obstructions and elevation features such as rapids and waterfalls, which affects the size and draught of vessels they can carry.

Road transport in Fasia is based on a series of national road networks of differing standards and with varying levels of connectivity. The best road on the continent is known as the "Coastal Highway" connecting Kuku in Mosana with Yudifa in Rimosa; for most of its distance, it is a modern paved two-lane highway, maintained and engineered for speeds of 100 km/h. Both countries have other paved roads connecting some of their major communities. Sumora, Carana, and Namuna have fewer paved roads, and Katasi has fewer still.

There is no other highway to connect the North and South coast or the West and East coast. This lack of long-range connections hampers the economic development of the continent. The rugged northern coast of Sumora still lacks a single paved road connecting the small communities along its length.

There is a limited rail network available in Fasia, however, there is no single rail network connecting all states or their major communities and ports. In addition, the difference between the southern (1,067 mm) gauge used by Rimosa and Mosana, and the central (1,000 mm) gauge used by Carana, Namuna, Katasi and Sumora imposes further problems: Katasi's rail system is effectively obsolete.

Ultimately, Fasia depends on air traffic for the rapid movement of people and products.

Political Situation

Since the end of colonialism, the political and economic development of the six Fasian states has frequently been hampered by instability, corruption, violence, and authoritarianism. Currently all Fasian states are republics that operate under some form of presidential system of government. However, few of them have been able to sustain democratic governments on a permanent basis,

and many have instead cycled through a series of coups, producing military leadership/dictatorships and transition to elected governments.

Great instability was mainly the result of marginalization of ethnic groups and graft under these leaders. For political gain many leaders fanned ethnic conflicts, some of which had been exacerbated, or even created, by colonial rule. From the early 1980s to the late 1990s, Fasia experienced several coups and three presidential assassinations. In many countries, the military is perceived as being the only group that could effectively maintain order, as it ruled many nations in Fasia during that time.

Border and territorial disputes are also common, with the European-imposed borders of many nations being widely contested through armed conflicts and political disputes. The border dispute between Namuna and Mosana over the control of the Strait of Fasia and the borders in the Bay of Mertl, as well as over respective fishing rights, may serve as an example.

Geopolitical Considerations

Three major intrastate conflicts determine the current security situation in Fasia. The effects of climate change intensify the conflict dynamics.

A decade long civil war in Carana has given way to peace negotiations between the Government and the two major rebel groups, the Mouvement Patriotique du Carana (MPC) and the Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC). A Fasian Union Advisory Mission in Carana (FUAMC) has been mandated to support the peace process in Carana.

The population of Katasi suffers from the conflict between the Katasi government and the El-Hasar militia, threatening to destabilise both Katasi and the bordering eastern Carana.

The Elasi Liberation Front (ELF) active in northern Rimosia and southern Carana poses another security concern. While both militias are reportedly in contact, transfer of knowledge and goods between El-Hasar and Al-Shabaab in Eastern Africa is not yet documented.

Currently the French Military, invited by the Katasi Government, conducts a stabilisation operation to counter El-Hasar (Operation Aigle). Furthermore, the Fasia Union Political Monitoring and Advisory Mission to Sumora (FUPAMS) assists the Government of Sumora to mitigate the threats posed by El-Hasar.

For more details refer to **Annex A-F and Annex H**.

Economic Situation

Although relatively rich with natural resources, the states of Fasia reflect a level of economic development not significantly different from most states on the neighbouring African continent and Fasia remains the world's poorest and least-developed continent. All six Fasian states have lacked the capital necessary to develop modern infrastructure for transport and delivery of services. This lack results from a variety of causes, which may include corrupt governments that have often committed serious human rights violations, failed central and consistent planning, high

levels of illiteracy, lack of access to foreign capital, and frequent tribal and military conflicts (ranging from guerrilla warfare to military conflict).

Its total nominal GDP of 78.06 bn US\$ remains behind that of the United States, China, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, India and France. According to the United Nations' Human Development Report in 2006, the six Fasia states were among the bottom 24 ranked nations (171st to 195th).

Poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition and inadequate water supply and sanitation, as well as poor health, affect a large proportion of the people who reside in the Fasia continent. It is also one of the least successful regions of the world in reducing poverty. Some 50% of the population were living in poverty in 1984, a figure that rose to 58% in 1999 before dropping to 50% in 2008 (44 million people).

From 1998 to 2008, Fasia's rate of economic growth increased, averaging 2,2 % in 2008. Some countries experienced still higher growth rates, notably Rimosa and Mosana, all of which had recently begun extracting their mineral reserves or had expanded their oil extraction capacity. In all countries but Mosana, GDP growth has contracted from 2018 onwards. Katasi, Rimosa and Carana debt-to-GDP ratios have doubled since the 2008 debt relief provided under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Scheme (HIPC). This renewed looming debt crisis is in part attributed to the fall in copper prices in 2011 and the plunge of oil prices in 2019, in part to mismanagement and corruption by political elites.

Looming conflict in Carana and the insurgency in Katasi have affected Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which decreased from 1.6 bn US\$ in 2019 to 1.2 bn US\$ in 2020. The Fasian countries have received official development assistance (ODA) funds of approx. 1.1 bn US\$, or 3.2 % of GNI, of which 800 mil. US\$ annually stem from US departments, 260 mil US\$ from German foreign assistance and 15 mil. US\$ each from Japan and Norway.

Basic economic data Fasia 2018

GDP	US\$ 78.06 bn
Average GDP per capita	905 US\$
GDP composition by sector	Agriculture and Livestock: 28% Services: 18.7% Mining: 17.17% Fishery: 12.17% Manufacturing: 11.16% Oil: 7.17% (Namuna only) Logging: 2.7% Remittances: 2.6% Tourism: 1.3% (Mosana only)
GDP growth	-2.31%
Inflation rate	12.81%
Unemployment rate	approx. 27%

Fasia international relations

Key partner states

As the FU's main trading partner (26.3 % of overall Fasia exports (goods), 35% of imports (goods and services), 1.7% of French imports, 0.9% exports), as well as main cooperation partner on security efforts in central and eastern Fasia, France is the key stakeholder in Fasian economic and political matters. Additionally, France cultivates its influence on the continent through foreign direct investment (FDI), the local currencies Carana Franc (CF), Rimosa Franc (RF), Katasi Franc (KF), Sumora (SF) tied to the French Treasury, military bases in Katasi and Rimosa and via French language, exchange and migration.

Due to competing infrastructure projects on land and in the Indian Ocean, India and China have become emerging partners on economic affairs throughout Fasia. Indian diaspora communities are present in Mosana and Namura, augmented through British colonialism, as well as in the port towns of Sumora. Whereas India engages mostly in capacity building in Fasia, the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative generates a much more tangible presence in Fasian infrastructure development. After China as second-largest trading partner, South Africa and the US are further key economic stakeholders.

International Organizations

The Fasian states have a long involvement with international organizations dating back to their respective independence periods. While various international organizations (IOs) have tried to influence the respective governments, the experience demonstrates mixed or poor results that can come from misguided and misinformed policies. Yet, it would not be fair to characterise the records as entirely negative. Some large development projects had a positive impact. In addition, it is fair to note that all Fasia governments (and their citizens) have benefited greatly from community-level development projects and humanitarian assistance.

Following the developments on the African Continent with the establishment of the African Union (AU) and its subsidiary organs, the Fasian countries agreed to establish a Mechanism for Prevention, Management and Resolution to find solutions to conflicts, promote peace, security and stability on the continent. So far, Good Offices to the Bay of Mertl dispute and supporting the Carana Peace process are two ongoing projects.

UN Country Teams are present in Carana, Rimosa, Katasi and Sumora. The UNCTs comprise all UN agencies, funds, programmes and departments operating in the countries with participation by representatives from major non-governmental organisation (NGO) community in a liaison role. Through these agencies, the UN system has already had a presence in some of the Fasia states for many years. The size and operations of each agency varies according to the needs of each host state.

In 2018, the Fasia Union joined the AU and the UN co-signed Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security in order to increase coordination and information exchange.

All Fasia countries are members of the Group of 77 at the United Nations. Additionally, Mosana holds an observer seat at the International Monetary Fund (IMF)-hosted Group of 24. Negotiations for Mosana to join Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have recently commenced. Mosana also is a signatory to the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor.

The Joint Fasia–EU-strategy co-signed between the FU and the EU in 2019 envisions enhanced cooperation in the fields of peace and security, democracy and human rights, and human and ecological development.

Members of the FU and the Arab League hold a Fasian-Arab summit twice a year, and their Joint Council of Ministers is currently negotiating a free trade agreement. Negotiations between the FU and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) have stalled.

In 2007, the FU and the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC) signed a cooperation agreement to promote implementation of humanitarian law in Fasia. An ICRC delegation has observer status in the FU.

International Financial Institutions (IFIs)

All Fasia countries rely on IFIs - some more than others. Mosana and Katasi depend to a lesser extent on these institutions, but for very distinct reasons. Mosana because its own economy has fared comparatively well, and as such has had less of a need to borrow; Katasi because it has primarily looked to the European West, and more recently to Asian countries for support.

Rimosa, Sumora, Namuna and Carana all depend heavily on IFIs.

Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)

The OIC has traditionally played a small role in the political life of Fasia, but since 2003 it has taken a greater interest in policies implemented by external players in the context of growing fundamentalism and the “war on terror” and how these policies affect the lives of Muslims around the world. Given the membership of Namuna, Katasi and Rimosa in the OIC and the external and internal pressure they face to combat extremism, the OIC pays attention to developments in Fasia, especially on Katasi and Carana.

Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF)

As members of the OIF Carana and Rimosa enjoy a level of support from this group's members in diplomatic circles. In spite of the diverse membership in the OIF, Carana has been able to use this forum to influence other francophone states, who have gone on to provide support in other settings such as the AU, the EU and the UN.

International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)

As the smuggling and organized crime problem has grown more serious, Carana, Rimosa and Mosana have reached out to Interpol for intelligence and technical support. While the resulting cooperative programme is only two years old, some successes can be claimed. Most of the interceptions of smuggling operations have occurred in Mosana, whose airport is the principal air gateway to Fasia, but the navies of these three countries, acting with the ships of other navies and

on intelligence provided by Interpol, have also made a few arrests in coastal waters and chased off two separate pirate attacks.

These initial results have been sufficiently promising that the three states have begun talks with Mosana to expand the programme. However, given the human rights records of the countries involved, some Interpol members are insisting on limits to the programme, so that a fuller range of cooperation should be used as an incentive to implement domestic reforms in the Human Rights and rule of law areas.

Appendices of Annex H:

- 1 –Mosana
- 2 - Sumora
- 3 – Namuna
- 4 – Rimoso
- 5 – Carana
- 6 – Katasi
- 7 – Fasian Union
- 8 – Climate Security
- 9 – UN Representation in Fasia
- 10 – Fasia Map

Appendix 1 to Annex H: Mosana

Republic of Mosana - General Description

1. General

Capital:	Kuku
Size:	403,322 km ²
Population:	17,453,271
Ethnics:	Dubi 64%, Kori 10%, Tatsi 18%, Others 8%
Religion:	73% Muslims, 20% Christians, 6% others
Language:	Main language: Arabic, second language: English
Government:	Presidential Republic
Independence:	05 August 1985

2. Geography

With an area of 403,322 km², Mosana is the largest country of the continent. It shares its borders with Namuna in the North, with Katasi in the north-eastern corner, with Rimosa in the east and in the West and South by its long coastline with the Indian Ocean.

Situated along the south-western coast of Fasias, Mosana has a rugged mountainous jungle interior, with fertile land along the southern shores of the Bay of Mertl. The Namu River in the north, the Hudi River in the east and the Dila River and Kasapi River, all originating in the mountain ranges, create coastal wetlands in the north and south of Mosana.

3. History

During the 17th Century, the Portuguese landed on the southern coast in the area of Kuku, which was then mainly inhabited by Arab settlers and indigenous tribes. The Portuguese area of influence was concentrated at the Northern and Southern shorelines of Mosana and shaped by slave trade and large-scale exploitation of minerals and gold. Around 1873 Great Britain, already present in Namuna, extended their area of influence to the South by establishing schools and hospitals all over the northern region of Mosana and began to take a more formal role in the country, which finally led to the departure of the Portuguese.

In 1957 the legal status of Mosana changed from a colony of Great Britain to a Republic of the Commonwealth and Mosana was finally granted full independence on 05 August 1985. In the wake of independence, the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with Mosana, and Mosana became its most important Fasian trading partner during the Cold War. The Soviet Union invested heavily into resource extraction infrastructure and industry, much of which is still in use today. After the end of the Cold War, Mosana has established diplomatic relations with all major Western powers, and preserved, albeit under current president James Lasoso cooled, relations with the Russian confederation.

4. Ethnic groups and religion

Three major ethnic groups settled in Mosana. The largest ethnic group are the Dubis with about 64 % of the population. The Tatsi are the second most populous with 18 % and the Kori are the third most populous with about 10 % of the population.

According to the 2018 Inter-censal Demography Report by the Mosana National Statistics Agency, about 72.9 % of the Mosanians are Sunni Muslims, 14.6 % belong to Protestant Christianity, and 6.4 % are Roman Catholic. 6.1 % of the population does not belong to any religion.

5. Governance

Mosana is a republic with a presidential system of government. The semi-presidential system was abolished with the adoption of a new constitution after a referendum in May 2009. Under the constitutional changes in 2003, an upper chamber, the Senate, was reinstated. The House of Assembly is the lower chamber of parliament. The Mosana National Party has been the dominant of 3 political parties in Mosana since its independence. President James Lasoso is currently serving his second 5-year term, elected in 2019 in elections considered free and fair with minor irregularities.

6. Judicial System / Law

The Constitution and judicial system in Mosana is based on democratic principles, consisting of three levels of courts, the Supreme Court, the provincial courts and the district courts. The government appoints judges for the Supreme and provincial courts. Governors appoint judges to the District Courts. Government control over the district courts varies, depending on the region. In some regions, local traditional authorities have considerable influence over the district courts.

7. Economy

Minerals, gold and seafood are the main foreign exports of Mosana. Tourism also plays an important role in its economy. The mining sector remains very lucrative, with some of the world's largest platinum reserves in the area north of Tango.

The Riverdal diamond fields, discovered in 2007, are considered the biggest diamond find in over a century, and are estimated to produce 12 million carats in 2020 worth over \$350 million. They have the potential to improve the fiscal situation of the country considerably, but so far much of the revenue from the field has disappeared into tax-exempt contracts with international mining conglomerates and the pockets of local officials and politicians.

Tourism was an important industry for the country but has been failing in recent years. The Mosana Conservation Task Force released a report in June 2018, estimating 60% of wildlife has died since 2000 due to poaching and deforestation. The report warns that the loss of wildlife combined with widespread deforestation is potentially disastrous for the tourist industry.

Main trading partners in the region are Sumora and Namuna, in terms of intercontinental trade the Commonwealth nations, notably Canada and South Africa, the US and Russia. Canada and Russia are both active bidders over extended mining rights in the Riverdal fields. Remittances provide 0.8% of GDP.

Taxes and tariffs are high for private enterprises, while state enterprises are strongly subsidised. State regulation is costly to companies; starting or closing a business is slow and costly. Government spending was predicted to reach 67% of GDP in 2019.

Basic Economic Data (as of 2017)

GDP	17.45 billion US dollars
GDP per capita	\$ 1,254 US dollars
GDP composition by sector	Mining: 31 % Fishing: 22 % Agriculture: 14 % Manufacturing: 11 % Services: 10 % Tourism: 8 %
GDP growth	2015: 1.15 % 2016: 1.75 %
Country Comparison to the World	162 nd
Inflation rate	11.5 %
Unemployment rate	Total: N/A In urban areas more than 26 %
Currency	MP (Mosana Pound) 1 MP = 1.22 \$

8. Infrastructure

Roads: Mosana has a paved road network of appr. 3,000 km. The most important road is the “Coastal Highway” connecting Kuku in Mosana with Yudifa in Rimosa; for most of its distance, it is a modern paved two-lane highway. It connects mainly the major population centres Kuku via Harp, Riverdal and crosses the border by Orata in Rimosa. Another road runs from Kuku up to Tataburg connecting the tourist locations along the coastline to the airport in Kuku. Most of the remaining road network are unpaved or gravel roads.

Railroads: There is currently only one railroad track of about 300 km total length connecting Kuku with diamond fields in Riverdal. It is limited capacity and frequency, but operational. Mosana is interested to expand the track and approached the European Union and the Chinese government, which indicated interest to extend the tracks providing a continuous connection to Yudifa in Rimosa, running in parallel to the “Coastal Highway”.

Harbours: The Mosana port of Kuku is the largest and busiest seaport on the continent, followed by the Rimosa port of Yudifa. Kuku has a capacity to handle approximately 4.8 million tonnes of cargo. The other important harbours are in Tataburg in the West and Baldwell in the North of Mosana, both with loading systems for containers and bulk cargo. Most of the other ports along the long coastline are fishing ports.

Airports: Kuku International Airport (Mosana) is also the largest airport on the continent, and together with Yudifa (Rimosa) is capable of handling most large commercial aircraft. It also connects to all capital cities of Fasias. Additionally, there are 26 airfields/airstrips around the country. Not all have paved runways. The length and quality of facilities at each airstrip varies considerably.

Electricity: Mosana has five coal power plants with a stable distribution network. The network, however, is mainly providing power to the southern coastline of Mosana to support Kuku, the provincial capitals, the harbour cities and the tourist centres towards Tataburg. The rural areas, particularly the central mountain regions, have no access to the power network. Some small local waterpower plants and generators provide electrical power for small numbers of the rural population.

Water and Sanitation: Only the capital, the main cities and the tourist centres in the South have a stable water supply system, meeting international standards. All other towns and villages rely on wells and water trading. The quality of water provided by the well systems does not meet international hygiene standards but causes no direct health threats for the population.

There is no system of sanitation and garbage removal in Mosana, except for the capital and localized provisions in the tourist centres, causing health concerns particularly in the heavy populated areas.

Telecommunications: The landline telephone system covers about 49 % of the major cities, mainly used for business and trade. Cellular telephone coverage is expanding; it generally covers the main towns and routes throughout the country. Governmental institutions and major companies also use satellite communications.

9. Security

The police is a professional organisation of about 10,000 personnel. The police is mainly responsible for the security of the city and customs. On the countryside, the gendarmerie provides security.

The military is a professional force of about 25,000 personnel, divided into Army (15,000), Navy (3,000), Air Force (2,000) and gendarmerie (5,000). The Mosanian forces are oriented towards the defence of the country and have not been trained for an offensive role. A presidential guard regiment (1,000 soldiers) provides security for the president.

Currently there are no known internal conflicts. The rule of law is implemented throughout the country; very few human rights issues are reported.

However, disputes with Namuna about the borders and fishing rights in Bay of Merti have been smouldering for nearly two decades. Both Navies are operating in the area. Confrontations taking place on a frequent basis result in exchanges of diplomatic notes by both countries.

10. Geopolitics

Mosana is a Member of the United Nations since 01 June 1986 and of some of its specialized and related agencies, as well as of the World Bank and the IMF. It is member of the Fasian Union since

its inauguration on 23 October 2005. The seat of the Fasia Union is located in Mosana's capital Kuku.

In addition, it is member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

Mosana maintains good relationships with Sumora, Rimosa, Katasi, as well as with countries from Africa and Europe, mainly Great Britain.

Mosana is currently also contributing to the Fasian Union Mission with 5 Police officers and 10 Military Observers to contain the El-Hasar raids/operations into South-West of Sumora and to assist Sumora in protection of the civilian population suffering from the El-Hasar insurgency.

11. UN Representation

Organisation	since	Local Offices	Main focus
UNDP	1995	Kuku	climate change adaptation and risk management
WHO	2001	Kuku	vaccination, HIV, medical infrastructure in rural areas

Appendix 2 to Annex H: Sumora

Republic of Sumora - General Description

1. General

Capital:	Babani
Size:	315,939 km ²
Population:	15,899,563
Ethnics:	Falin 54 %, Kori 38 %, Others 8 %
Religion:	70% Christians, 20% Muslims, 10% others
Language:	Main language: French, Second language: Arabic
Government:	Unitary Presidential Constitutional Republic
Independence:	11 June 1986

2. Geography

At 315,939 km² Sumora is the second largest country on the continent behind Mosana. Located on the northeast side of the continent, it is bordered by Carana on the southeast, southwest by Katasi, west by Namuna, and by the Indian Ocean in the north and east of the country.

Situated along the north-eastern coast of Fasia, Sumora has a barren, rugged and hilly northern coastline. Coastal highlands rise steeply from the northern littoral, dropping gradually to the Lonari River valley in the south. The hills of the Gasi peninsula rise steeply between the Lonari River and the Kalesi River, which forms the southern border.

3. History

Previously home to the Kingdom of Galasi, the Bokongo empire stretching into Namuna, several Shi'a city states and small local chiefdoms, Sumora was colonised by France in the mid-17th century and remained under French influence and colonial power until 1986 when Sumora gained its independence.

In the period prior to independence, the French enabled a small, but influential elite to participate in administration and to run for political offices, hoping they refrain from anti-French sentiment after independence. One of these protégées was Mr Francois Laurantois, who reached a position equivalent to ministerial level in the colonial administration. Following independence, he founded the National Democratic Party (NDP) and became the first elected President of Sumora in 1987. His government maintained a strong relationship with France, seeking support in developing the country and establishing an economic foundation.

In the late 1990s, a combination of economic difficulties and accusations of rampant corruption and mismanagement of food supplies resulted in a coup d'état by a small military group named the "Military Council", led by Col. Abou Sisso, overthrew President Laurantois in 1989. Strict military rule addressed the problems of mismanagement and corruption. The economic situation in

Sumora stabilized and in 1998 the Military Council initiated a process for political reform. This process led to the establishment of political parties, the drafting of a new constitution and democratic elections in 1999, in which Mr Debois Diallo was elected as President. He remained in office until 2004 when Dr Michael Sorré was elected President.

In 2014, President Sorré requested a constitutional referendum seeking to extend his presidency. Other political parties opposed this request and the Constitutional Court ruled such a referendum to be unconstitutional. By declaring the constitutional court as illegal, modifying the constitution, and conducting the referendum, President Sorré remained in office. However, these events generated severe political and social unrest throughout the country, leading to a coup d'état in February 2015 by Gen Aziz Diop. Under his leadership, the "Assembly for the Restoration of Democracy" established a transitional government, drafted a new constitution, and held elections in June 2018. These elections were considered internationally as free and fair, and Dr William Goodnight was elected as President.

4. Ethic groups and religion

About 70% of the population have Christian roots such as Protestant Lutherans, Baptists, Roman Catholics, about 20% are Muslims, and another 10% have other religious backgrounds. The Falin, predominantly Christians, live in the major population centres along the coastline of Sumora, east of the "North-South axis" going through the capital of Babani. The predominantly Muslim Tatsi, the second major ethnic group, mainly live in communities in the more rural and mountainous areas to the West of the "North-South Axis".

5. Governance

The unicameral National Assembly consists of 210 representatives, may propose laws, and is required to approve all legislation. To support the work of the representatives 120 "deputies" are elected for a five-year term. Political parties must obtain at least 5 percent of the votes in order to gain a seat in the legislature.

Sumora is divided into 8 regions including the capital district, subdivided into 36 departments. The chief administrator (Governor) in each department is appointed by the government and functions primarily as the local agent of the central authorities. The 36 departments are further broken down into communes of varying types. There are 280 communes, including *communes urbaines* (Urban Communes: as subdivisions of major cities) and *communes rurales* (Rural Communes) in sparsely populated areas. Rural communes may contain official villages and settlements, while Urban Communes are divided into quarters.

6. Judicial System / Law

The current Judiciary of Sumora was amended with the new constitution of 2015. It is based on the Code Napoleon "Inquisitorial system", established during the colonial rule and the first Constitution of Sumora established in 1987. The Court of Appeals reviews questions of fact and law, while the Supreme Court reviews application of the law and constitutional questions. The High Court of Justice (HCJ) deals with cases involving senior government officials. The justice system also includes civil criminal courts, customary courts, traditional mediation, and a military court. The military court

provides the same rights as civil criminal courts; however, customary courts do not. The military court cannot try civilians.

Law enforcement in Sumora is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence through the National Gendarmerie and the Ministry of the Interior through the National Police and the National Guard. The National Police is primarily responsible for law enforcement in urban areas. Outside big cities and in rural areas, this responsibility falls on the National Gendarmerie and the National Guard.

7. Economy

Since Sumora's independence, its economic planning and policy have been influenced by foreign powers. Diversification of agricultural exports and encouragement of foreign investment have been factors in the economic growth of Sumora in the 20 years following independence. Sumora's natural resources include a variety of agricultural products such as rice, coffee, cattle, cotton, raffia and palm oil, fishery and forestry, as well as and mineral products.

Due to internal political disagreement on economic development and mismanagement in the early 1990s the economy started to decline. Increased competition on the global marketplace, combined with the unfavorable conditions provided by the Sumora Franc (SFr) monetary policy regime, worsened the situation. In December 2000, Sumora qualified for debt relief under the International Monetary Fund program for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and concluded an agreement with the Fund for Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). Debt relief reduced Sumora's annual debt service obligations, freeing funds for expenditures on basic health care, primary education, HIV/AIDS prevention, rural infrastructure, and other programs geared at poverty reduction. This led to a moderate growth rate and slow recovery of Sumora's economy.

In recent years further exploration indicated that Sumora has important reserves of chromite, coal, iron, cobalt, copper and nickel. Several major projects are underway in the mining sector and it anticipated that explorations and processing in-country could give a significant boost to the Sumora economy by 2024. So far, the contract negotiations do not include elements of Sumora capacity-building, nor include citizen concerns regarding environmental issues.

France is still Sumora's main trading partner, although the United States, Japan, India and Germany in recent years have established strong economic ties to the country. Given the global demand for minerals, Russia and China have also taken an interest in Sumora's economy. China currently is involved in infrastructure projects (port enlargement and adjacent railway construction) in El Mulmou and Alot.

Basic Economic Data (as of 2017)

GDP	14.47 billion
GDP per capita	\$ 910 US dollars
GDP composition by sector	Agriculture: 30 % Manufacturing: 16 % Fishing: 18 % Mining: 15 % Services: 21 %
GDP growth	2015: 0.5 % 2016: 0.35 %
Country Comparison to the World	167 th
Inflation rate	11.5 %
Unemployment rate	Total: N/A In urban areas more than 26 %
Currency	SFr (Sumora Franc) 100 CFr = 1.28 \$

8. Infrastructure

Roads: Sumora has a paved road network of appr. 3,000 km. It mainly connects the major population centres on the West-to East Axis from Gayo in the West to El Mulmou in the East; another main road is connecting the cities in the North crossing the mountains via Dasso going to Arlot. Most of the remaining road network are unpaved or gravel roads.

Railroads: There is currently only one railroad track of appr. 400 km total length connecting the capital Babani with the coastal cities Yolado and El Mulmou. It has a limited capacity and frequency but is operational and mainly used for transportation of agricultural products and fish. The European Union as well as China indicated interest to extend the tracks to the West into Namuna to establish a “northern transport axis” on the Fasia continent (running parallel to the “Coastal Highway” in the South).

Harbours: Sumora has three deep-water harbours with varying capacities. The harbour at Babani is the most developed and best-equipped harbour in the country, with a Roll-on Roll-off (RoRo) and container capabilities and working cranes. It has a handling capacity is approximately 4.5 million tonnes. The other harbours are in El Mulmou in the East and Alot in the North of Sumora, both with loading systems for containers and bulk cargo. Most of the other ports along the long coastline are fishing ports.

Airports: The only international airport is in Babani, capable of taking wide-bodied aircraft, and used by international airlines. It also connects to all capital cities of Fasia. Additionally, there are 28 airfields/airstrips around the country. Not all have paved runways. The length and quality of facilities at each airstrip varies considerably.

Electricity: Sumora has five coal power plants with a stable distribution network. However, the network is currently structured following the coastline of Sumora to support Babani, the provincial capitals, the harbour cities and other cities along the coast. The rural areas, particularly the central mountain regions, have no access to the power network. Some small local waterpower plants and generators provide electrical power for small numbers of the rural population.

Water and Sanitation: Only the capital and the main cities have a stable water supply system. All other towns and villages rely on wells and water trading. The quality of water provided by the well systems does not meet international hygiene standards but causes no direct health threats for the population.

There is no system of sanitation and garbage removal in Sumora, except for the capital, causing health concerns particularly in the heavy populated areas.

Telecommunications: The landline telephone system covers about 48 % of the major cities and is mainly used for business and trade. Cellular telephone coverage is expanding. It generally covers the main towns and routes throughout the country. Governmental institutions and major companies also use satellite communications.

9. Security

The security situation in Sumora is pre-dominantly calm and stable, with the exception of the areas bordering Carana and Katasi.

The situation at the border to Carana is tense following the conflict in Carana, which has led to about 20,000 people fleeing Carana into Sumora, seeking refuge along the border. Smaller disputes and disagreements have been reported between the local population and the refugees from Carana.

Developments along the border with Katasi are of concern. The fighters/elements of the El-Hasar terrorist group opposing the Government of Katasi regularly cross the south-western border of Sumora to conduct raids for logistical re-supply, thereby attacking the local population and/or to evade the French anti-terrorist operating *Operation Aigle* in Katasi.

The Fasia Union Political Monitoring and Advisory Mission to Sumora (FUPAMS) has been authorised and been established to assist the Government of Sumora to mitigate the threats posed by the El-Hasar terrorist group.

10. Geopolitics

Sumora has been a member of the United Nations since 26 April 1987 and inaugural member of the Fasia Union from 23 October 2005 onwards. Sumora maintains cordial relationships with African and European countries, the United States and India. France continues to be Sumora's most important geopolitical point of reference.

Fasia Union Political Monitoring and Advisory Mission to Sumora (FUPAMS)

Upon request of the Government of Sumora, the FU Peace and Security Council with its mandate FA/RES/1598/2019, dated 01 May 2019, authorised the deployment of "Fasia Union Political

Monitoring and Advisory Mission to Sumora" (FUPAMS). Under the leadership of a Special Representative, Dr Timothy Wintock, from Mosana, the mandate of FUPAMS is to:

- o monitor the impact of the El-Hasar terrorist group on the security and stability in Sumora
- o provide advisory services and mediation to the government and security institutions, mainly the Sumora police and military,
- o mitigate the threat posed by the terrorist activities, especially with respect to protect the civilian population, through an inclusive political dialogue,
- o promote and protect human rights, particularly for those belonging to vulnerable groups,
- o as appropriate, coordinate support that may be requested from other multilateral and bilateral humanitarian or development actors.

FUPAMS is authorized with a strength of 250 personnel, including 25 police advisers and 50 military observers as well as a mission support element of up to 100 support personnel. The Mission HQ is located in Babani and Field Offices are located in Goya, Baroka and Baeren, as small town across the border from Forsa.

French Forces "Operation Aigle" in Katasi

To prevent collateral damages and to inform and where possible coordinate the operations, the French Operation Aigle also has established a small liaison element with the Governments of Sumora.

11. UN Representation

Organisation	In country since	Local Offices	Main focus
IOM	2009	Babani	Monitoring migration
UN OCHA	2015	Babani, Annabo	An estimated 20,000 people were forced to flee their homes because of conflict in Carana.
UNICEF	2015	Babani, Annabo	• provide care and special protection to vulnerable group, women and children • provide health care, basic education, and protection from harm
UNHCR	2015	Babani	Assistance to approx. 20,000 Carana refugees
OHCHR	2014	Babani, Annabo	Assistance to approx. 20,000 Carana refugees
UNDP	2010	Babani	Improve utilities, infrastructure in rural areas, support climate adaptation and risk management strategies
WFP	2015	Babani	support smallholder agricultural market support, livelihood support
WHO	2007	Babani	Vaccination campaign, public health education (HIV, tobacco, water hygiene)

Appendix 3 to Annex H: Namuna

Republic of Namuna - General Description

1. General

Capital:	Doba
Size:	267,770 km ²
Population:	14.572.341
Ethnics:	Wari 50 %, Kori 42 %, Others 8 %
Religion:	75 % Muslims, 15 % Christians, 10 % others
Language:	Main language: Arabic, Second language: English
Government:	Presidential Republic
Independence:	24 July 1984

2. Geography

Namuna is the third largest country on Fasia with an area of approximately 267,770 km². It is mostly surrounded by the Indian Ocean and is bordered to its East by Sumora, and by Katasi and Mosana in the South. Situated in the northwest of Fasia, it has a rugged and hilly coastline; fertile land along the northern shores of Lake Namuna which extends to the East of Agoba.

3. History

Before colonization by Western powers, the territory of present-day Namuna displayed perhaps the most eventful history of foreign invasion on the continent of Fasia. Throughout the early modern period, Namuna was target to several invasions by Horn of Africa sultanates and later the Seljuk Empire, which in turn took to dominating most of western Fasia. In the century preceding the British arrival, the Muslim kingdom of Nkiesa frequently challenged the Bokongo Empire (expanding from Sumora to the eastern city of Tsebo). Small local chiefdoms aligned mostly with the Bokongo army, and in 1754 with the death of Emperor Umar Sér   the Nkiesa kingdom fell apart.

In the 18th Century, British sailors landed in the Bay of Mertl in the area of Doba interested in the country's natural resources. The British presence, which lasted until the independence of Namuna, was the period of slave trade and the initial discovery and exploitation of minerals and gold in the country. The British area of influence was mainly concentrated in the South along the Bay of Mertl. During that time, the city of Doba prospered and grew into a large city.

In 1962 the legal status of Namuna changed from a colony of Great Britain to a Republic of the Commonwealth and it was finally granted full independence on 24 July 1984. A National Transitional Council under the leadership of Dr Emmanuel Borro formed an interim government, drafted the constitution and prepared the first democratic election in 1985.

Dr William Borro became the first elected President of Namuna. He stayed in office until 1995 finishing his second and last term as President. Mr Daniel Patrick from the Democratic National Party became President. Due to a lack in leadership, mismanagement and corruption the economy declined, despite the oil revenues, leading to nationwide demonstrations and public unrest in 1998 triggering early elections in May 1999.

Dr John Matobo became President and initiated a reform process against corruption and stronger government budgetary control. Initial progress was made, and the economy slowly recovered, public spending on infrastructure development, however, remained low. Follow-on governments faced similar problems affected by economic instabilities and slow development but kept a stable political and governmental environment. The current President, Dr Abbu Kabale, was elected in 2016.

4. Ethnic Groups and Religion

The majority of people in Namuna are Muslims with about 75% of its population. In addition, about 8% of the population belong to Protestant Christianity and another 7% are Roman Catholic. About 10% of the population are of other beliefs and religions.

The Wari, who mainly settled in the western regions of Namuna, are the largest ethnic group with about 51%. The Kori, who settled in the East of the country, are second with about 41%. Some 45 other, smaller ethnic groups settled mainly along the coastlines.

5. Governance

Namuna is a republic with a presidential government based on the 1985 constitution (revised in 1991, rewritten in 1996, the current version was revised in 2009). The president initially was elected by universal electoral rights for a seven-year term. The 2009 constitutional amendment removed the presidential term limits and facilitated a presidency for life.

The president can appoint and dismiss the prime minister, the cabinet, and judges of the independent Supreme Court. The president also has other strong powers, such as authority to dissolve the National Assembly, declare a state of siege, delay legislation, and conduct referenda. The current president Mr Robert Eastright was elected in May 2015, following the tragic death of his predecessor in an airplane crash.

Namuna has a bicameral legislature with a National Assembly and Senate. The National Assembly has 120 deputies who are elected for a 5-year term. The Senate is composed of 102 members who are elected by municipal councils and regional assemblies and serve for 6 years. The Senate was created in the 1990–1991 constitutional revision, although it was not implemented until after the 1997 local elections. The President of the Senate is next in succession to the President.

Despite the democratic system of government, the World Freedom Report of 2015 lists Namuna and the elections in 2015 as "not free", and the latter were initially challenged by the opposition in street protests and through litigation. After a crackdown on protesters and media outlets and reported incidents of coercion of Supreme Court judges, President Eastright remained in office.

6. Judicial System / Law

The constitution and judicial (legal) system in Namuna are based on democratic principles, consisting of three levels of courts, the Supreme Court, provincial courts and district courts. All politically sensitive cases are the responsibility of the Supreme Court or the provincial courts. The president appoints the judges to the Supreme Court, the government appoints judges to the provincial courts and the governors appoint judges to the district courts. Government control over the provincial courts varies, depending on the region. In some regions, local traditional authorities have considerable influence over the district courts.

7. Economy

Namuna's economy is still dominated by oil export, with most of the oil fields located in the north of the country around Belem. Oil revenues constitute roughly 46% of the government's budget, 43% of the gross domestic product (GDP), and 81% of exports. Oil production is currently declining rapidly from its high point of 370,000 barrels per day in 1997. Some estimates suggest that Namuna's oil will be exhausted by 2025. In spite of the decreasing oil revenues, planning is only now beginning for an after-oil economy scenario.

Namuna's public expenditures from the years of significant oil revenues were not spent efficiently into development of public infrastructure or for future economic capacities. Namuna earned a poor reputation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) over the management of its debt and revenues. Successive IMF missions have criticized the government for overspending on off-budget items (in good years and bad), over-borrowing from the Central Bank, and slipping on the schedule for privatization and administrative reform.

Namuna's oil revenues have given it a per capita GDP of US\$ 895 in 2017. However, a skewed income distribution and poor social indicators are evident. The richest 8 % of the population earn over 90% of the income while more than a third of the Namunans population lives in poverty. While official development assistance (0.7% of GNI) and remittances (0.1 % of GDP) are considered negligible, the decrease of FDI (9.8% of GDP in 2020) is perceived as worrisome in Namunan political circles.

The economy is highly dependent on extraction of natural resources, but primary materials are abundant. Before the discovery of oil, fishing and logging was the main pillar of the Namuna economy. Today, fishing, logging and manganese mining are the next-most-important income generators. Recent explorations suggest the presence of large unexploited iron ore deposits in the mountain range around Tsebo. Explorations and transportation will be challenging and will require a substantial investment.

Basic Economic Data (as of 2017)

GDP	13.04 billion US dollars
GDP per capita	\$ 895 US dollars
GDP composition by sector	Oil: 43% Fishery: 18% Logging: 16% Services: 14% Mining: 8%
GDP growth	2015: 1.7% 2016: 1.2%
Country Comparison to the World	169 th
Inflation rate	11.9%
Unemployment rate	Total: N/A In urban areas more than 35%
Currency	MS (Namuna Shilling) 100 MS = 1.2 \$

8. Infrastructure

Roads: Namuna has a paved road network of about 2,700 km. The most important road is connecting Doba with the city's centres along the Bay of Merti running from Domna in the East to Bigi Giti in the West. For most of its distance; it is a modern one-lane highway, except for the last 80 km to Bigi Giti. Another road runs from Doba via Agoba and Tsebo to Belem, forming the main route to the North of the country. Most of the remaining road network are unpaved or gravel roads.

Railroads: Currently only one railroad track of about 250 km total length connects Doba with Agoba, which is the agricultural centre in the fertile lands north of Lake Namuna. It is mainly used for transportation of agricultural goods and products. With the recent discovery of iron ore deposits near Tsebo, the government is looking for investors to expand the track to Tsebo and Belem to transport the ore to the harbours for export.

Harbours: The port of Doba is the main seaport of Namuna with a capacity of about 2.8 million tonnes of cargo. Other important harbours are Teshibu in the west and Belem in the north of Namuna, all with loading systems for containers and bulk cargo. Most of the other ports along the long coastline are fishing ports.

Airports: The main airport in Namuna, Doba International, is capable of handling most large commercial aircraft. It also connects to all capital cities of Fasias. Due to the oil business, Belem has a regional airport able to land medium sized aircraft offering connections to the Fasian countries, to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and Nairobi, Kenya. Additionally, there are 23 airfields/airstrips around the country. Not all have paved runways, the length and quality of facilities at each airstrip varies considerably.

Electricity: Namuna has five coal power plants with a stable distribution network. The network, however, is mainly providing power to the cities along the Bay of Mertl, Agoba (the agricultural centre), Tsebo and Belem (oil industries). The rural areas, particularly the central mountain regions, have no access to the electricity network. Some small local waterpower plants and generators provide electrical power for small numbers of the rural population.

Water and Sanitation: Only the capital and the main cities have a stable water supply system meeting international standards. All other towns and villages rely on wells and water trading. The quality of water provided by the well systems does not meet international hygiene standards but causes no direct health threats for the population. There is no system of sanitation and garbage removal in Namuna, except for the capital and limited localized provisions in the cities along the Bay of Mertl and in Belem, causing health concerns particularly in heavily populated areas.

Telecommunications: The landline telephone system covers about 47% of the major cities, mainly used for business and trade. Cellular telephone coverage is expanding. It generally covers the main towns and routes throughout the country. Governmental institutions and major companies also use satellite communications.

9. Security

Namuna has a small, professional military of about 15,000 personnel, divided into army (5,000), navy (2,000), air force (1,000), gendarmerie (5,000), and police force (3,000). Namuna's forces are oriented to defend the country and have no training for an offensive role.

Currently, demonstrations against the current government criticise the lack of economic development, resulting in smaller clashes with the local police. In principle, the situation is stable; rule of law is established throughout the country. However, recently a number of human rights issues were reported in connection with the demonstrations, and international watchdogs report declining freedom of press and expression.

For nearly 2 decades, disputes with Mosana about the borders and fishing rights in Bay of Mertl have been smouldering. Both countries' navies are operating in that area. Confrontations take place on a frequent basis, resulting in exchanges of diplomatic notes by both countries.

10. Geopolitics

Namuna is a member of the United Nations since 20 May 1985 and inaugural member of the Fasian Union. In addition, it is member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Namuna maintains good relationships with Sumora, Rimosa, Katasi, the Gulf states, Africa, especially Kenya, and Europe, mainly with Great Britain and Spain. Namuna is currently also contributing to FUPAMS mission in Sumora with 5 Police officers and 10 Military Observers.

11. UN Representation

Organisation	since	Local Office	Main focus
UNDP	1997	Doba	smallholder agriculture, micro-financing
WHO	2001	Doba	sanitation and hygiene, HIV, vaccination, medical infrastructure

Appendix 4 to Annex H: Rimosa

Republic of Rimosa - General Description

1. General

Capital:	Yudifa
Size:	225,288 km ²
Population:	14,145,771
Ethnics:	Tatsi 95 %, 5 % Others
Religion:	95% Muslims, 4% Catholics, 1% others
Language:	Main language: Arabic, Second language: French
Government:	Presidential Republic
Independence:	09 October 1985

2. Geography

Rimosa is the fourth largest country on the continent with a size of 225,288 square kilometres and is bordered to the west by Mosana, to the north by Katasi and Carana and with the Indian Ocean along its coastline in the South.

Situated along the south-eastern coast of Fasia features primarily consist of gentle hills, raising up to more than 1.300 m altitude in the North-West of Rimosa, with a mixture of grassland savannah and rainforest.

3. History

Rimosa was colonised by France in the 17th century and remained under French influence until its independence in 1985.

After a short period of a transitional government, the first democratic elections were held in 1986 and the Rimosa People Congress (RPC) and Rimosa Movement for Freedom (RMF) parties emerged as winners. They formed the first independent government with Mr Sore Batu as executive prime minister and with Mr Sauro Karare as president of the republic. Under changing prime ministers and presidents, the coalition of RPC and RMF ruled the country for 25 years. Through a military coup on 27 July 1991, General Ali Someto seized control of the country. He ruled Rimosa as dictator with the support of the military for the next ten years.

While RMF disappeared from the political scene, the RPC became the leading opposition power and established an armed rebel movement. During the dictatorship of Gen Someto the economy declined dramatically, and the population became more and more unsatisfied with the situation in Rimosa. Demonstrations and civil unrest became more frequent starting in 1996, finally leading the RPC to remove Gen Someto from power in 1998. The non-violent coup was widely supported by the public due to overall dissatisfaction with the regime.

Following the coup, democratic national and presidential elections were held in June 2002. Mr Anorph Gittens was elected as President, succeeded by Dr Mohamed Hassain in 2012. He was re-elected in 2017 and announced his candidacy for the next elections in 2022, which - based on the constitutional limit - would be his last term, if elected.

4. Ethnic groups and religion

Rimosa is a secular state with Islam as the predominant religion in the country, practiced by approximately 95 % of the country's population (90% Sunni, 10% Shi'a). The Christian community at 4 % of the population are mostly Catholics, some from diverse Protestant denominations. One percent has animist beliefs, particularly in the south-eastern region of the country.

5. Governance

The National Assembly controls legislation. It consists of 165 members elected for four-year terms and holds regular sessions twice a year, starting in March and October. It may hold special sessions when called by the prime minister. Assembly members elect a National Assembly President every two years.

The National Assembly must approve the prime minister's plan of government and may force the prime minister to resign through a majority vote of no confidence. However, if the National Assembly rejects the executive branch's programme twice in one year, the president may disband the Assembly and call for new legislative elections. In practice, the president exercises considerable influence over the National Assembly through his party, which holds a large majority. The president must sign or reject newly passed laws within 30 days.

6. Judicial System / Law

Rimosa's legal system is based on French civil law and Rimosan customary law; the latter does not interfere with public order or constitutional guarantees of equality. Despite the constitution's guarantee of judicial independence, the president names most key judicial officials. The highest jurisdictions, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Council, became operational in 2000.

The Supreme Court consists of a Chief Justice, named by the president and 15 councillors, appointed for life by the president and confirmed by the National Assembly. Nine judges elected to nine-year terms head the Constitutional Court. It has the power to review legislation, treaties, and international agreements prior to their adoption. The National Judicial Service Commission provides overall management for the judiciary.

The Rimosa Police Service and the Criminal Investigation Department are the main law enforcement agencies of the Republic of Rimosa, and are responsible for the detection of crime, maintenance of law and order and the maintenance of internal peace and security. The Rimosa Police Service has eleven specialised police units including a Militarized Police Rapid Deployment Force and Marine Police Unit. The Rimosa Police Service operates in 12 divisions: ten covering the ten regions of Rimosa, one assigned specifically to the seaport and industrial hub of Yudifa, and the twelfth being the Railway, Ports and Harbours Division.

7. Economy

Predominantly rural, and with limited natural resources, the economy of Rimosa gains most of its foreign exchange from fish, phosphates, copper, and oil. As one of the dominant parts of the economy, the agricultural sector of Rimosa is highly vulnerable to environmental conditions, such as variations in rainfall and climate change, and changes in world commodity prices.

The main industries include food processing, mining, cement, artificial fertilizer, chemicals, textiles, and refining oil. Exports include fish, chemicals, cotton, fabrics, meat, and calcium phosphate. The principal foreign market is India with 26.7% of exports. Other foreign markets include the United States, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom.

Agriculture is one of the dominant parts of Rimosa's economy. Agriculture occupies about 75% of the workforce. Despite a relatively wide variety of agricultural production, most farmers produce for subsistence needs. Millet, sorghum and meat from camels and goats are the primary products of the agricultural sector Rimosa.

Rimosa has a 12-nautical-mile (22km; 14mi) exclusive fishing zone that has been regularly breached in recent years (as of 2017). It has been estimated that the country's fishermen lose 300,000 tonnes of fish every year to illegal fishing. The Rimosa government tried to control the illegal fishing, which is conducted by fishing trawlers, some of which are thought to be registered in Russia, Mauritania, Belize, and Ukraine.

Rimosa depends heavily on foreign assistance of the World Trade Organisation and receives 5.6% of its GNI from Official Development Assistance, mainly from France, Germany and the US.

Basic Economic Data (as of 2017)

GDP	12.87 billion
GDP per capita	\$915 US dollars
GDP composition by sector	Agriculture: 38% Services: 25% Manufacturing: 16% Fishing: 15% Mining: 12%
GDP growth	2015: -2.8 % 2016: -7.2 %
Country Comparison to the World	170 th
Inflation rate	11.8 %
Unemployment rate	Total: N/A In urban areas more than 30%
Currency	RFr (Rimosa Franc) 100 RFr = 1.45 \$

8. Infrastructure

Roads: Rimosa has a paved road network of appr. 1,550 km. which connects the major population centres. The most important road is the “Coastal Highway” connecting Kuku in Mosana with Yudifa in Rimosa; for most of its distance, it is a modern paved two-lane highway. Due to the budget shortfalls maintenance of the road in Rimosa is falling behind. Besides this network, roads and paths are mainly unpaved or gravel roads.

Railroads: There is currently only one railroad track of appr. 300km total length connecting Yudifa with Quato and Moissa. It is limited in capacity and frequency, but operational. Due to budget constraints, maintenance is becoming a problem. The European Union as well as China indicated interest to extend the tracks to the West (in parallel to the “Coastal Highway” through Ngamau and Orata to establish a central transport axis in Rimosa.

Harbours: Rimosa has two deep-water harbours with varying capacities. The harbour at Yudifa is the most developed and best-equipped harbour in the country, with container and Roll-on Roll-off (RoRo) capabilities and working cranes. Yudifa's handling capacity is approximately 3.45 million tonnes. In 2015, 1.65 million tonnes of cargo were handled. The other harbour is Tingro equipped with loading systems for containers and bulk cargo. Most of the other ports are fishing ports.

Airports: The only international airport is in Yudifa, capable of taking wide-bodied aircraft, and used by international airlines. It also connects to all capital cities of Fasias. Additionally, there are 22 airfields/airstrips around the country. Not all have paved runways. The length and quality of facilities at each airstrip varies considerably. Rimosa plans to develop the airfield in Sintra as a second international airport however funding is lacking.

Electricity: Rimosa has three coal power plants and a weak distribution network, which is only able to support Yudifa, the provincial capitals, the harbour cities and some other cities. The rural areas, particularly the central mountain regions, have no access to the electricity network. Some small local waterpower plants and generators provide electrical power for small numbers of the rural population.

Water and Sanitation: Only the capital, Sintra and Quato have a stable water supply system. All other towns and villages rely on wells and water trading. The quality of water provided by the few supply systems does not meet international hygiene standards but causes no direct health threats for the population.

There is no system of sanitation and garbage removal in Rimosa, except for the capital Yudifa, leading to permanent disease and health problems particularly in the heavy populated areas.

Telecommunications: The landline telephone system covers about 35% of the major cities, mainly used for business and trade. Cellular telephone coverage is expanding. It generally covers the main towns and routes throughout the country. Governmental institutions and major companies also use satellite communications.

9. Security

The security situation in southern Rimosan is pre-dominantly calm and stable. The northern region bordering Carana is troublesome for two reasons. First, the situation at the border to Carana is tense due to the ongoing conflict in Carana resulting from attacks of CISC splinter groups leading Carana population to seek refuge in Rimosan. About 10,000 refugees are in Rimosan, mainly in the proximity of Moas and Dabalou. Second, the civil war between two rival ethnic groups, the majority Tatsi, who hold nearly all positions of power in the Rimosan government, and the minority and also Muslim Elasi pastoralists who claim to suffer ethnic discrimination and persecution, has produced approx. 5,000 Rimosan refugees in Carana, an undocumented number of which have joined the CISC. The rebel group Elasi Liberation Front (ELF) has waged a guerrilla-style campaign against government forces and pro-government Tatsi militias and has established links to the CISC for financial and logistics support.

In addition, in 2018 local Tatsi community groups, disappointed with the government and the economic situation, became more radical and established Fundamentalist Tatsi militia groups. These threaten the local population and are dissatisfied with the refugees being supported by the international community, while they receive only limited assistance. There are reports of cooperation between the Tatsi militia groups in Rimosan and CISC splinter groups in Carana aiming to destabilise the area to gain more political influence and exploit the economic capabilities (copper trade and oil).

10. Geopolitics

Rimosan is Member of the United Nations since 04 August 1986 and inaugural member of the Fasian Union. Rimosan has been devoted to ideals of nonalignment and is a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement. It favours international and regional political and economic co-operation.

Rimosan has friendly relationships with Mosana, Namuna, Katasi and Sumora. A conflict between Rimosan and Carana over the ownership of some of the islands along the southern coastline of Carana has been ongoing since 1995, as well over related fishing rights in the respective national territory. With the discovery of oil in the Labta Sea offshore of Maldosa (Carana), the dispute expanded to include the question of the offshore oil exploration in the disputed area.

Rimosan is currently also contributing to the Fasian Union Mission in Sumora with 5 police officers and 10 Military Observers.

11. UN Representation

Organisation	In country since	Local Offices	Main focus
IOM	2011	Yudifa, Dabalou	Monitor and support refugees and IDPs in northern Rimosá
UN OCHA	2015	Yudifa, Moas, Dabalou	An estimated 10,000 people were forced to flee their homes because the conflict in the South of Carana (Leppko Region).
UNICEF	2014	Yudifa, Moas, Dabalou	• provide care and special protection to vulnerable group, women and children • provide health care, basic education, and protection from harm
UNHCR	2015	Yudifa, Moas	refugee support in northern Rimosá
OHCHR	2013	Yudifa	refugee support & human rights monitoring in northern Rimosá
UNDP	2010	Yudifa	Resident coordinator Liv Mamquist from Sweden.
WFP	2015	Yudifa, Dabalou	refugee support in northern Rimosá
WHO	2007	Yudifa	polio eradication campaigns, HIV

The UN Secretary-General further is conducting Good Offices to help Carana and Rimosá solve their border conflict.

Appendix 5 to Annex H: Carana

Republic of Carana - General Description

1. General

Capital:	Galasi
Size:	119,480 km ²
Population:	17,024,651
Ethnics:	Falin 60%, Kori 20%, Tatsi 15%
Religion:	75% Christians, 20% Muslims, 5% others
Language:	Main language: Caranese, Second language: French
Government:	Presidential Republic
Independence:	22 October 1986

2. Geography

Carana is the fifth largest country on Fasia with an area of 119,480 km². It is bordered in the North by Sumora, in the West by Katasi, in the South by Rimosia and in the East by the Indian Ocean.

Situated along the east coast of Fasia its diverse terrain includes coastal savannah, montane rainforest, and rocky desert uplands. The west is filled with mountains and volcanoes, while the northeast is mainly wetland. The highest peaks are Molle and Xoxi Mountains. Three main river running west to east through Carana, the Torongo River, Kalesi River and the Mogave River. The huge Kalesi River is as salty as the Dead Sea and is located at the centre of Carana, almost dividing the country into equal halves.

3. History

Three different colonial powers settled in Carana, each with a different interest in the country's natural resources.

During the 17th Century, the Portuguese landed on the coast of Galasi. The Portuguese presence, which lasted over a hundred years, was the period of the initial discovery and exploitation of diamonds and copper in the country. At around 1850 Italian missionaries entered Carana from the neighbouring country of Katasi. The Italian missionaries moved quickly to establish schools and hospitals all over the western region and even spread the gospel to the east by setting up some of the best schools and hospitals in the region.

With the end of the First World War, the Italians pulled out and left Carana to the French who, according to their policy of "assimilation", developed the country to suit the policies of the French government. Galasi remained as the capital city.

In 1984 the legal status of Carana changed from a French protectorate to a Republic of the French Community and was finally granted full independence from France on 22 October 1986.

After gaining independence, and although being faced with multiple challenges, Carana experienced about 10 years of decent development and stability. Over time, however, problems resulting from the time of colonialism began to have a negative impact. The language problem, tribalism, the different ethnicities being favoured by the former colonial masters, as well as the growth of nepotism and corruption in the government, resulted in tensions in Carana. Small uprisings against the Carana government developed into armed protests and organized violence, which finally led to the military taking control of the government by the end of 1991.

The military continued to rule Carana until 2003 the country's first democratic elections were held and Mr Jackson Ogavo, a Falin from the Parti Democratique de Carana (PDC), was elected President in April 2003. During the first years of the Ogavo's regime Carana showed liberal development and economic prosperity. But over time Ogavo's focus changed and he became preoccupied with suppressing all opposition groups and enhancing his own power base leading to administrative and economic inefficiency and corruption.

Small uprisings occurred from 2010-2011 against the Ogavo regime, and rebel groups were mobilized to challenge the government's hold on power; eventually escalating into civil conflict in January 2014. A larger and better-organised rebel group known as Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) established itself a well-structured and efficient military opposition. In February 2016 the FDC lost control of some areas in the western highlands and by early 2018 the MPC gained control of the three provinces in the West of Carana (Koloni, Terreni and Mahbek). Smaller rebel groups in the South united and called themselves Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC). Both the MPC and the CISC aims are the removal of President Ogavo from power.

All parties have suffered numerous defeats, though the civilian population of Carana has been particularly targeted by all parties, leading to an estimated 150,000 killed from violence, famine or disease. A combination of war-weariness and strategic manoeuvring led to start negotiating a cease-fire and peace treaty in November 2020. The "Kalari Peace Treaty" will most likely mandate all parties to disarm and establish a power-sharing arrangement in a new transitional government, including integration in a new Forces de la Défense et Sécurité du Carana (FDSC).

For more background on Carana, see **Document 02–Carana country study**.

4. Ethnic groups and religion

According to the last census conducted in 2017 appr. 75% of the population of Carana are Christians. About 35% of the population are Protestant Lutherans and Baptists, while 40% are Roman Catholics. Islam is practised by over 20%, mainly in the South-West of Carana.

The majority of the Falin are predominantly Christians, while the majority of the Kori and Tatsi are Sunni Muslims. In terms of ethnic distribution, the Falin represent the biggest ethnic group with about 60% of the population, followed by the Tatsi with about 20% and the Kori with app 15 %.

5. Governance

Carana is a Presidential Republic in line with the constitution adopted by a referendum in 1988. The President is serving as head of state, elected for a five-year term. The head of the government is

the Prime Minister who is appointed by the President. The Prime Minister appoints the ministers and heads of the government departments. A Parliament with 256 elected members has broad authority and was intended to be representative of the ethnic balance of the country.

The state of Carana is divided into eight districts (Tereni, Koloni, Mahbek, Hanno, Barin, Fellari, Guthar, and Leppko) and a special capital zone of Galasi, following the French model. A Governor, appointed by the Prime Minister in consultation with local notables and the Minister of the Interior, heads each district.

6. Judicial System / Law

The constitution and judicial (legal) system in Carana is based on modern democratic principles of April 2013, consisting of three levels of courts, Supreme Court, provincial courts and district courts. All politically sensitive cases are the responsibility of the Supreme Court or the provincial court. The government appoints judges in these courts. Governors appoint judges to the District Courts.

All parties due to the ongoing conflict have neglected the police in Carana. The role of the police is more symbolic than any guarantee of the rule of law. Within government-controlled areas, a national police presence is visible but not able to deal efficiently with the high level of crime. Police lacks equipment and training, and police corruption is a severe problem in most government-controlled areas. In the rebel-controlled areas, there is no governmental police presence. In the west, the MPC took over basic police functions to maintain civil order, while in the CISC area there is no policing at all.

7. Economy

The economy in Carana is based on a free market system with free enterprise but with strong government participation and influence. The government controls the mining sector and all foreign trade activity; however, rebels groups control some major diamond mining areas.

Mining of diamonds and copper is an important contributor to the GDP. Along with rare wood, timber and cotton, diamonds and copper are the main exports of Carana. Manufacturing activities include the food and fish industries, production of goods for local markets, and the processing of timber and textiles. The manufacturing sector suffers from a lack of infrastructure, skilled workers, an inefficient administration and widespread corruption.

Agricultural goods produced in Carana include fruits, corn, and grain are sold mostly on the local market. Cotton is the only significant agricultural commodity that is exported.

Carana's main exports are timber, diamonds, copper, cotton and to a lesser extent fish, fruit and woodcrafts. Carana's main imports are industrial products, vehicles, food, and petroleum products. Carana has established trade relations with its neighbours, and the European Union, especially with France, and more recently also with China and India.

The discovery of oil in the Labta Sea, offshore of Maldosa, could boost Carana's economy in the future. However, the ongoing disputes with Rimosa over their shared maritime border and the rights for an offshore oil exploration currently prevents any foreign investment.

Basic Economic Data (as of 2017)

GDP	14.05 billion
GDP per capita	\$825 US dollars
GDP composition by sector	Mining: 32% Agriculture: 27% Services: 25% Manufacturing: 16% Fishing: 15%
GDP growth	2015: -2.8% 2016: -2.9%
Country Comparison to the World	174th
Inflation rate	12.35%
Unemployment rate	Total: N/A In urban areas more than 30%
Currency	CFr (Carana Franc) 100 CFr = 1.5 \$

8. Infrastructure

Roads: Carana had a capable road network, supporting commercial traffic, with all major towns connected. However, the years of civil war, harsh weather, minimal investment and maintenance have degraded it significantly with the result that parts of the road network are often impassable in the rainy season. Besides the paved roads, there is an intricate network of unpaved roads and tracks. The bridges throughout this network are generally of wooden construction and are rarely capable of sustaining heavy vehicle movement.

Railroads: Carana has two railroad tracks with a total length of 280 km. One track connects Galasi with the coal mining area east of Sureen. The second track connects Maldosa and Mia and was built to transport copper to the harbour in Turen. A lack of maintenance has resulted in the rail system being in bad shape, although it is still periodically operational.

Harbours: Carana has three deep-water harbours with varying capacities. The harbour at Galasi is the most developed and best-equipped harbour in the country, with container handling and Roll-on Roll-off (RoRo) capabilities and working cranes. The harbour in Cereni does not have a RoRo capability but is equipped with loading systems for containers for heavy goods. The harbour in Maldosa was originally built for the loading of copper. It has railroad access but limited facilities for loading containers and heavy equipment.

Airports: Carana has two international airports in Galesi and Corma. Both airports are operational, capable of taking wide-bodied aircraft, and used by international airlines. However, their cargo handling capacity is limited. Additionally, there are 25 airstrips around the country. Not all of these airstrips have paved runways. The length and quality of facilities at each airstrip varies considerably.

Electricity. Carana, with three coal power plants could be relatively self-sufficient in the production of electricity. Due to destruction of the Soloba Dam Plant and a weak distribution network, it is only

able to support Galasi, the provincial capitals, and some other cities. The rural areas have no access to the electricity system. Some small local waterpower plants and generators provide electrical power for small numbers of the rural population.

Water and Sanitation: The capital and some larger cities have a water supply system but only to the central area of the city. All other towns and villages rely on wells and water trading. The quality of water provided by the few supply systems does not meet international hygiene standards but causes no direct health threats for the population. The water quality in the rural areas is mostly satisfactory. However, the water quality of the crowded Galasi suburbs and the IDP camps, is problematic.

There is no system of sanitation and garbage removal in Carana, leading to permanent disease and health problems particularly in the heavy populated areas.

Telecommunications: The land-line telephone system covers less than 20% of the country and is unreliable. Cellular telephone coverage is expanding and covers the main towns and routes throughout the country. Some of the remoter border areas can access nodes in neighbouring countries. Governmental institutions and major companies also use satellite communications, particularly in the more remote areas.

9. Security

Although there have been several conflicts with neighbouring countries in the past few decades, and while relations with Katasi and Rimosa remain tense, the likelihood of intra-state conflict is low.

Security in Carana is negatively impacted / may be impacted:

- If the ongoing peace process, based on the Kalari Peace Agreement, is conducted without full participation of all parties to the conflict, delayed in time or fails implementation. Possible negative factors /reasons could be
 - impact of the CISC splinter groups opposing the peace process
 - threats to the local population of Carana posed by the Fundamentalist Tatsi Militia Groups operating south of the Carana border in Rimosa, possibly leading strengthening CISC splinter groups
 - threats to the local population posed by the Militia Groups (Warlords) conducting illegal exploitation and trade of diamonds in central Leppko.
 - threats to the local population posed by the "El-Hasar" Terrorist Group infiltrating the West of Carana to exploit local communities for logistics and supply and to avoid the French COIN operations in Katasi
- If, resulting from the poor economic situation, the level of criminal activity increases, some of it already organized in urban areas. In the North and West there is increasing evidence of criminal, illegal diamond mining, probably with government support and controlled by cartels based in Sumora.

- By the ongoing political border dispute between Rimosa and Carana over the ownership of some of the islands along the southern coastline of Carana, the fishing rights in the respective national territory as well as the exploration of the oil recently discovered in the Labta Sea, offshore of Maldosa
- By the high number of IDPs in Carana as about 700,000 people were forced to flee their homes because of the fighting between government forces and rebels in the north and the south.
- By abductions of civilians, mainly by extremist rebel and militia elements, for ransom. There are also reports of violations conducted by the parties to the PA.

10. Geopolitics

Carana is a Member of the United Nations since 09 October 1987 and member of the Fasias Union with its inauguration on 23 October 2005. Carana maintains good relationships with the countries from Africa and Europe, and more recently also with China.

French Forces “Operation Aigle” in Katasi

Due to the conflict in neighbouring Katasi, the government of Carana signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with France allowing French Forces currently deployed and operating in Katasi to address the El-Hasar terrorist movement and to pursue El-Hasar fighters/elements across the border into Western Carana.

Fasia Union Political Monitoring and Advisory Mission to Sumora (FUPAMS)

Carana is currently also contributing to the Fasian Union Mission in Sumora with 5 police officers and 10 Military Observers.

11. UN Representation in Carana

Organisation	In country since	Local Offices	Main focus
IOM	2009	Galasi, Alur, Corma	Monitor and support IDPs and refugees all across Carana
UN OCHA	2009	Galasi, Folsa, Corma, Alur	OCHA is coordinating and facilitating humanitarian assistance responding to the needs of affected people in Carana.
UNICEF	2008	Galasi, Folsa, Corma	- provide care and special protection to the most vulnerable groups and victims of war, namely women and children - provide safe access to vulnerable populations, and provides them with health care, basic education, and protection from harm
UNHCR	2011	Galasi, Alur, Lora	Monitor and support IDPs and refugees all across Carana
OHCHR	2010	Galasi	Monitor human rights violations
UNDP	2010	Galasi	- Infrastructure capacity building projects - Smallholder agricultural projects for women
WFP	2009	Galasi, Amsan, Corma, Folsa, Alur	- provide food assistance in Carana through a regional operation since 2000 to respond to the food aid needs of Gazebo's vulnerable populations and more than 700,000 IDPs - conduct programme activities including therapeutic feeding programmes, supplementary feeding, food for agriculture, food for training, and emergency school feeding
WHO	2003	Galasi	polio eradication campaigns, HIV

Appendix 6 to Annex H: Katasi

Republic of Katasi - General Description

1. General

Capital:	Nanom
Size:	81,205 km ²
Population:	9,775,630
Ethnics:	Kori 65%, Tatsi 30%
Religion:	95% Muslims, 5% Christians
Language:	Main language: French, second languages English or Italian, and about 20 different local dialects
Government:	Presidential Republic
Independence:	05 October 1982

2. Geography

At 81,205 km², Katasi is the smallest and only landlocked country on the continent. It only has access to harbours through river systems leading from Katasi to the Bay of Mertl and the Indian Ocean on either side of the continent. These rivers, however, are not suitable for large scale transportations of goods.

Katasi is dominated by mountain ranges reaching heights of more than 1,500 m. The ranges are mostly covered with jungle. The lowland areas are fertile land fed by rivers originating in the mountains.

3. History

In the mid-16th century, Italian missionaries arrived on Fasias and established schools and hospitals in the soon-to-be British colony of Namuna and the warrior chiefdoms of present-day Katasi. In the central corridor of Katasi, the missionaries founded the capital of Nanom. Christianity yet never took widespread hold in the only rather shortly Muslim-dominated area. With the discovery of gold, diamonds and copper the Italian Kingdom took a more active role in Katasi, establishing a colony under Italian rule. Due to the logistics challenges, the success and gains from the mining efforts did not pay off and the overall development of Katasi was limited to only the capital and mining areas. Internal conflict in Katasi in the late 19th century forced tens of thousands of Muslim Falin to flee to Carana.

The end of the First World War forced Italy to leave Katasi and the latter became a French colony. Nanom remained the capital city. The French continued the limited mining operations but tried to improve the infrastructure for the movement of goods and agricultural products. Focus was to establish a connection to the port in Babani in the French colony of Sumora. Progress was limited as investment costs were high.

With the global developments in the mid-20th century colonialization on the African and Asian continent came to an end and Katasi was granted independence from France on 05 October 1982. After independence, similar to its neighbours, Katasi experienced a period of about 30 years with minimum but decent development and stability. With the efforts of globalization of economies Katasi, as land-locked country with no access to international shipping routes, fell behind in its overall development.

Post-colonial Katasian governments have shined mainly through cronyism, while large parts of the population have lived in poor and sometimes desperate conditions. Especially the population in rural areas (north of the capital) has frequently voiced its frustration of the lack of political participation and economic development.

Muslim community leaders provided some initial support and became advocates for the suffering communities. Over time, some of the community members became organised in a fundamentalist movement, opposing the government and requesting reforms. As the government did not respond, the movement became more radical and reverted to direct confrontation towards the government. In 2018 they named themselves El-Hasar, requested their own state and engaged in guerrilla-type terror operations targeted at the government. It is assessed that the group has about 7,000 active fighters and a strong support base in the rural areas especially north/northeast of the capital.

4. Ethnic groups and religion

The last census was conducted in 2015 determining that appr. 95% of the population of Katasi are Sunni Muslims. About 5% of the population have Christian roots such as Protestant Lutherans, Baptists and Roman Catholics.

The Kori with about 65% and the Tatsi with about 30% of the population are predominantly Sunni Muslims, which settled all over the country. The small Christian minority settled mainly in the centre of Katasi, around and to the East the capital of Nanom.

5. Governance

Katasi is a constitutional republic with a directly elected president and a unicameral legislature, based on the Katasi Constitution of 1991. Katasi has a dominant unitary central government and weak local governments. The president heads the executive branch of the Government with extensive powers and influences. They are the Head of State, the Head of Government and the Commander-in-Chief of the Katasian Armed Forces and are elected by popular vote to a maximum of two five-year terms. The president appoints and heads a cabinet of ministers, which must be approved by the Parliament.

The Parliament of Katasi is unicameral, with 135 seats. Each of the country's eight districts is represented in parliament. 120 members are elected concurrently with the presidential elections; the paramount chiefs from each of the country's eight administrative districts fill the other 15 seats. The Speaker of Parliament, elected by sitting members of Parliament, leads the Parliament.

The current President Ahmad Ulouro, a Kori and professed Muslim, who was re-elected for his second term in office in 2017, relies strongly on military powers to lead the country and to address the threat towards his government posed by El-Hasar extremists. The next elections are scheduled for November 2022.

6. Judicial System / Law

The official judicial system in Katasi is based on civil law and is vested in the Supreme Court headed by the Chief Justice of Katasi. The Supreme Court is the highest court in Katasi and its ruling cannot be appealed. Other courts include the High Court of Justice, the Court of Appeal, the magistrate courts, and traditional courts in rural villages. The president appoints and parliament approves judges for the three higher courts. The Judiciary has jurisdiction in all civil and criminal matters throughout the country.

However, in practice, customary laws play a large role in the lives of the Katasian population. For most people, traditional forms of justice take precedence over the official judiciary system. The judicial system in Katasi is under-resourced, leaving it fragile and arbitrary. Getting access to law-enforcement officers and legal professionals is often difficult, and legal processes are often delayed and drawn-out. There are unconfirmed reports about cases extra-judiciary punishment, even executions and impunity for powerful people is customary.

7. Economy

The economy in Katasi is based on a free market system with free enterprise, however, the military government firmly controls the economic activities in the country. Katasi is considered one of the world's poorest countries. Economic development was and still is limited through an overall lack of suitable infrastructure (roads and railroads), its difficult terrain and its lack of direct access to international markets.

Agriculture in Katasi is a significant part of the economy, accounting for about 58% of national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2015. Two-thirds of the population of Katasi are involved in subsistence agriculture. The main tree crop, growing in the mountains, is the oil palm. It is used for its perennial fruit and processed into palm oil and sap, then turned into palm wine. The other main perennial crops are citrus, sugarcane, cocoa, coffee, and coconut. In the lower plains in the North and South of Katasi livestock cattle, sheep, goats and poultry, mainly for the home market, contribute to about 15% of the GDP. The current conflict and threat posed by the El-Hasar group is affecting the level of livestock in the country.

Although Karana is rich in minerals (gold, diamonds, copper), the government-controlled mining sector in Katasi has very limited capacity due to lack of infrastructure and instability in Katasi and is a main target for El-Hasar.

Katasi currently receives most of its foreign aid from France and Asian countries. Much of the aid is used to address the severe unemployment rates of the country. Recent hikes in international food prices adversely affected Katasi, as it relies heavily on imported rice. Faced with the difficult market situation, the informal economy in Katasi is flourishing.

Basic Economic Data (as of 2017)

GDP	6.18 billion
GDP per capita	\$ 631 US dollars
GDP composition by sector	Agriculture: 54% Livestock: 5% Manufacturing: 8% Mining: 5% Services: 17%
GDP growth	2015: -3.2% 2016: -7.1%
Country Comparison to the World	182 th
Inflation rate	17.1%
Unemployment rate	Total: N/A, In urban areas more than 35%
Currency	KFr (Katasi Franc) 100 CFr = 1.2 \$

8. Infrastructure

Roads: The Katasian road network consists of roads of differing standards and with varying levels of connectivity. Paved roads are only available around Nanom and to the main mining/agricultural centres (around Floro/in the Morna–Forsa region), but their maintenance is poor. The main road connection runs from Namon to the port city of Babani, Sumora.

Railroads: There is no reliable rail network in Katasi. The French build a connection from Namon to Babani, Sumora through the mountains. Due to a lack of maintenance, lack of financial recourses and the threat through El-Hasar, the line is effectively obsolete.

Airports: Nanom has one international airport, which can only be reached via Kuku, Yudifa or Galasi. Katasi has a state-owned airline, which appears on the EU list of prohibited air carriers with regard to the required certification standards of airlines. There are further 12 airfields in Katasi, limited in capacity due to runway capacity (length and lack of pavement).

Electricity: Katasi has two coal power plants and a weak distribution network, which is only able to support Nanom, the provincial capitals, and some other cities. The rural areas have no access to the electricity system. Some small local waterpower plants and generators provide electrical power for small numbers of the rural population.

Water and Sanitation: Only the capital has a water supply system. All other towns and villages rely on wells and water trading. The quality of water provided by the few supply systems does not meet international hygiene standards but causes no direct health threats for the population.

There is no system of sanitation and garbage removal in Katasi, leading to permanent disease and health problems particularly in the heavily populated areas.

Telecommunications: The landline telephone system covers less than 17% of the city and is unreliable. Cellular telephone coverage is expanding. It generally covers the main towns and routes throughout the country. Governmental institutions and major companies also use satellite communications, particularly in the more remote areas.

9. Security

The security situation in Katasi is very fragile and determined through:

- centralized ruling of the president and his elites preventing political dialogue, economic development and economic participation of the population (corruption and favouritism)
- armed conflict (guerrilla tactics) and terror activities of El-Hasar against the government trying to establish an independent state, influenced and supported by foreign groups
- anti-terror operations conducted by French Forces “Operation Aigle”, requested by the Katasi government, to eliminate the threat of El-Hasar
- attacks and raids against the population by both El-Hasar and government troops, accusing the local population of supporting the group
- recent reports of weapons originating from Katasi to be traced to the Kori in parts of Southern Carana that potentially will significantly fuel insecurity in these areas
- reports of weapons and ammunition smuggling from Namuna and Sumora into Katasi in support of El-Hasar, having led to tense political relations between the three states
- tense relations between Katasi and Carana due to the cross-border activities and accusations of supporting opposition groups against the respective governments.

10. Geopolitics

Katasi is Member of the United Nations since 04 Jan 1983 and an inaugural member of the Fasian Union. It maintains good relationships with the countries from Africa and Europe, mainly with France. Katasi is currently also contributing to the Fasian Union Mission (FUPAMS) targeting El-Hasar in Sumora with 5 police officers and 10 Military Observers.

French Forces “Operation Aigle”

To address the ongoing threat of El-Hasar, the Katasi government asked France for support and a French-led anti-insurgent operation deployed in June 2020. “Operation Aigle” consists of a 1,500-strong French force with its headquarters in Nanom. The declared aim of the operation is to help Katasi regain and maintain control of its territory and to prevent the group from establishing itself in Katasi and from negatively affecting the situation in neighbouring countries Sumora and Carana.

Operation Aigle capabilities include Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, Special Forces and manoeuvre capabilities including helicopters, transports aircraft, armoured vehicles as well as Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). Besides the main base in Nanom, Temporary Forward Bases (FOBs) have been established in Bindi, Morna and Forsa.

To evade French anti-insurgency operations and for reasons of re-grouping, recuperating and logistics El-Hasar frequently crosses the borders into the neighbouring countries of Sumora and Carana. Here they reportedly attack and conduct raids against the local population, mainly for logistical and food supplies. In addition, there are reports of weapons and ammunition smuggling from Namuna, Sumora and Carana into Katasi in support of El-Hasar.

To prevent civilian victims, to inform and where possible coordinate the operations Operation Aigle also has established small liaison elements with the governments of Sumora, Carana and FUPAMS.

In addition, the Government of Carana, in response to the threat posed by El-Hasar in West Carana, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Government of France allowing the French forces to pursue fighters/elements into West Carana.

11. UN Representation

Organisation	In country since	Local Offices	Main focus
IOM	2009	Nanom	IDP and refugee monitoring and support
UN OCHA	2005	Nanom, Forsa, Tulsa	• Coordinating and facilitating humanitarian assistance to population in need. • About 14,000 people were forced to flee their homes because of the fighting between government forces and El-Hasar in the north and the east of Katasi
UNICEF	2014	Nanom, Forsa, Tulsa	• provide care and special protection to vulnerable group, women and children • provide health care, basic education, and protection from harm
UNHCR	2015	Nanom	IDP and refugee support in eastern Katasi
OHCHR	2013	Nanom, Forsa	Human rights monitoring in Nanom and rural regions
UNDP	2010	Nanom	Livelihood assistance in central and eastern Katasi, capacity-building medical infrastructure
WFP	2015	Nanom, Floro	Provide food assistance to vulnerable populations affected by the conflict between El-Hasar and the government
WHO	2007	Nanom	medical infrastructure and assistance in rural areas, IDP support

Appendix 7 to Annex H: The Fasian Union (FU)

Establishment of the FU

Following the developments on the African Continent with the establishment of the African Union (AU) and its subsidiary organs, the Fasian countries agreed to establish a Mechanism for Prevention, Management and Resolution to find solutions to conflicts, promote peace, security and stability in the continent. Similar to the AU, the new organisation should have a capacity to respond proactively to conflicts, to anticipate and prevent conflicts; and deploy missions where intervention failed.

In June 2003 the Heads of States and Governments of the Fasian countries met in Kuka, Mosana to sign the declaration for the establishment of the Fasian Union. It took three years to develop the road map and constitutional documents for the implementation of the Fasian Union. The Fasian Union was launched during the 1st Assembly of the Heads of States of the FA at the Babani Summit on 23 October 2005.

The Headquarters of the Fasian Union have been established in Kuka, the capital of Mosana.

Vision of the FU

Based on the respect of the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of member states, the vision of the FA was defined as: "An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Fasia, driven by its own citizens and representing a common vision for the regional and global arena."

Objectives of the FU

In terms of peace and security, the objectives of the FU include, to:

- defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States;
- promote peace, security, and stability on the continent; and
- promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the Union's Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments,
- coordinate and harmonise the policies between the countries of Fasia for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union; and
- work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent.

The guiding principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act, the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the two most profound principles of the FU are:

- the right of the Union to intervene in a Member States' internal affairs pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in cases of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity; and

- the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore internal peace and security.

Organs of the FU

The key Organs of the FU are the:

- Assembly of Heads of States and Governments or their duly accredited representatives, is the supreme organ of the Union.
- Council of Ministers or Authorities designated by the Governments of Members States, responsible to the Assembly.
- Permanent Representatives' Committee of Permanent Representatives of Member States accredited to the Union, charged with the responsibility of preparing the work of the Council.
- FU Commission (FUC), whose central role is the day-to-day management of the FU. This includes representing the Union and defending its interests; elaborating draft common positions; preparing strategic plans and studies for the consideration of the Council; elaborating, promoting, coordinating and harmonising the programmes and policies of the Union; and ensuring the mainstreaming of gender in all programmes and activities of the Union.
- Chairperson of the Commission, the Deputy Chairman, four Commissioners and Staff members.
- Other organs are:
 - o Fasian Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) – with its focus on Peace and Security (Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, and Combating Terrorism, etc.), among others.
 - o Fasian Union Economic, Social and Cultural Council (FUESCC)
 - o Court of Justice (CoJ), and
 - o the Specialised Technical Committees.

Appendix 8 to Annex H: Climate change-related security risks in Fasias

1. Macro-effects of climate change in Fasias

The effects of climate change on populations already on the verge of armed conflict may create both conflict catalyzers and contribute significantly to already existing conflict dynamics. Negative effects of climate change contain immediate disaster risks (landslides, floods, drought) as well as long-term changes (desertification, land degradation, depletion of fish stocks), which may affect a loss of livelihood and critical infrastructure, as well as be weaponized for political and military goals.

Government intervention in western and southern Carana, in northern Rimosa and in all of Katasi is already partly failing to meet the needs of its citizens. In addition shortages produced by climate change, the missing ability to meet its citizens' demands for basic resources – like food, water, energy and employment can further contribute to state fragility, internal conflict, and even state collapse. The fast-growing population and the increasing scarcity of resources in general exacerbates the existing problem. In the cities, organized political opposition has been demanding more support to deal with the negative effects of climate change and, at times questioning government legitimacy as such, elicited violent responses by security forces.

In oil-exporting Namuna and the coal-reliant other Fasian countries, the transition to economies based on low-carbon goods is pushed not so much by the governments themselves, but by foreign development initiatives. As visible already in northern Carana, these infrastructure projects may channel development aid and further social inequality and elite corruption, which then in turn promote or enhance civil and armed unrest. Similar problems surround the coalmines and coal power plants serviced in all Fasian states.

2. Ecosystem dynamics in Fasias

General water shortages affect all ecosystems in Fasias. In the mountains, less snowfall leads to noticeably less refill of drinking water basins. In the jungle regions, droughts have led to an increase in wildfires and a general degradation of the rainforests. These droughts worsen the already happening degradation through logging for export purposes, or for creating food monocultures and mining areas. Additionally, in the jungle region on the border of Katasi and Carana refugee communities have begun to make their livelihoods through the production and sale of charcoal made from rainforest woods. While understandable from a humanitarian point of view, in ecological terms this adds to the severe problem of rainforest degradation.

The forest regions in Fasias often face problems of erosion. Sudden heavy rainfalls on hill slopes that are subject to uncontrolled logging and exhausted aquifers (pools of ground water) frequently lead to landslides or suddenly sinking ground, thereby destroying shelter, interrupting food and water supplies and are at times accompanied by epidemics. Combined with the non-existent sewage and garbage removal systems, especially in rural regions, at times the landslides have led to a long-term contamination of potable water sources. In the lower highlands, droughts additionally target agricultural plantations, destroying harvests at times several years in a row and

thus contributing to famines and desertification. Heat waves during pollination may decrease yields, and pollution through mining, coal power plants, garbage cremation and to a much lesser degree through wooden cook stoves, kills pollinators. Overuse of pastures and agricultural lands adds to the long-term degradation of soil.

In the coastal regions of Mosana, Namuna and Rimosa, rising sea levels have caused the inundation of critical infrastructure with salt water, a severe reduction of arable land and the long-term contamination of drinking water. Migration and depletion of fish stocks due to the changing ocean chemistry have increased the strain on resources in all fishing economies and provoked conflicts overfishing territory between Mosana and Namuna, as well as between Carana and Rimosa. Over the past 10 years, the coastal highlands in Sumora have been experiencing a surge in climate-sensitive diseases, mainly malaria and tuberculosis, which previously were confined only to the Lonari river valley and the hot areas in southern Fasias.

3. Political and military tensions

The worsening livelihood conditions have motivated people to join existing armed groups. This will certainly continue in the future. The armed groups themselves have developed strategies to cope with and exploit climate change-related changes. Using water as a weapon has become a frequent tool of military and political pressure: cutting off water infrastructure, delivery and trade of water, purposeful flooding through dam openings and at times even purposefully contaminating reservoirs.

In areas already experiencing resource strain, armed groups may exploit farmers to secure both troop nutrition and stronghold in the region. This leads to devastating effects especially on the borderlands Carana-Rimosa and Carana-Katasi, where local population, IDPs and refugees already compete for scarce food and water resources and low-quality arable land. Independent of refugee classifications, the increased competition over land, combined with strictly enforced border regimes, may lead to conflicts between agricultural and pastoral communities.

After disasters such as the major landslide of 2019 in Katasi and Rimosa, local political powers (landlords, politicians, local elites) have been observed to gain control over aid distribution. Moreover, these have hindered refugees from returning to their homes for political motives, and then occupied the lands, disintitled and marginalized the previous owners. National law-making may further exacerbate tensions, limiting freedom of movement, denying legal claims to land, etc.

4. Climate-related migration

The climate-related mass migration from the countryside into cities, while rational decision-making on the part of the migrating, create several security risks. First of all, civilian reporting has unanimously established a higher risk of gender-based violence enroute. In the strongly patriarchal societies of Katasi, Carana and Rimosa, the absence or death of the male head of household increases food and social insecurity, and limits access to agricultural credit, land ownership and also to medical services and aid for women heads of household. The additional refugee influx in neighbouring countries puts additional strain on the neighbouring countries' resources and increases the risk of riots in the host community. Such tensions are visible in southern Carana

between locals and Rimosan refugees, in northern Rimoso with Caranese refugees, in the Carana-Katasi borderlands and throughout Carana in the vicinity of IDP camps. Given the lack of livelihood opportunities for new and old inhabitants in the cities, poverty-related crime such as piracy, illicit weapons trade etc. is constantly increasing.

The increased frequency and higher intensity of potentially disastrous natural phenomena such as flooding, sandstorms, landslides etc. also need to be recognized as having an impact on the peacekeeping mission. Logistics, security and maintenance of personnel and equipment need to be adapted to the variety of harsh conditions.

The PK mission itself has a significant impact on local environments, creating immediate and long-term ecological damage, issues of mission legitimacy, additional tensions and security concerns for the deployed personnel. As visible surrounding Operation Aigle (OA) in Katasi, the extensive use of previous agricultural lands, the demand for food, water and petroleum, as well as the amount of produced garbage and sewage has reinforced the perception of PKMs as unfair competitor for scarce resources. As a reaction to more frequent incidents of violence against PK soldiers, OA has fortified its bases. This has not de-escalated the situation.

Appendix 9 to Annex H: UN Organisations in Fasias

UN Organisation	Mosana	Sumora	Namuna	Rimosa	Carana	Katasi
IOM		X		X	X	X
OHCHR		X		X	X	X
UNDP	X	X	X	X	X	X
UNHCR		X		X	X	X
UNICEF		X		X	X	X
UNOCHA		X		X	X	X
UNOPS					X	
WFP		X		X		X
WHO	X	X	X	X	X	X

Appendix 10 to Annex H: Fasia Map (Major Cities)




Figure 18: Major Cities in Fasia Continent

Appendix 11 to Annex H: Frequently used Acronyms

CCC	Catholic Church of Carana	UNIRED	United Nations Integrated Referendum and Elections Division
CDC	Convention on the Rights of the Child	UNJLC	United Nations Joint Logistics Cell
CISC	Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana	UNMEM	United Nations Expert on Mission
CivPol	Civilian Police	UNMO	United Nations Military Observer
CNP	Carana National Police	UNOCHA	UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
CRDF	Carana Reconstruction and Development Fund	UNOHCR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
CTU	Carana Trade Union	USG	Under-Secretary General
DDR	Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration	WFP	World Food Programme
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War		
FDC	Forces de la Défense du Carana		
FDSC	Forces de la Défense et Sécurité du Carana		
GOC	Government of Carana		
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross		
IDP	Internal Displaced Persons		
IED	Improvised Explosive Device		
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund		
MHQ	Mission Headquarters		
MPC	Movement Patriotique de Carana		
NCC	National Church of Carana		
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations		
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs		
PDC	Parti Démocratique de Carana		
PKM	Peacekeeping Mission		
RoRo	Roll-On Roll-Off		
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons		
SC	Security Council		
SCR	Security Council Resolution		
SG	Secretary General		
SMT	Security Management Team		
UNCT	United Nations Country Team		
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme		
UNGSC	UN Global Service Centre		
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees		
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund		

Peace Process in Carana

Summary



New York

25 September 2021

THE PEACE PROCESS IN CARANA

After a longstanding civil war demanding thousands of victims and causing more than 700,000 Caranese citizens to become internally displaced, the warring factions in the Carana Civil War, the Government of Carana, the Mouvement Patriotique de Carana MPC, and the Combatants Independants de Carana CISC, have finally agreed to engage in peace negotiations in Kalari, Namuna. As negotiations take off under UN mediation, the UNSC has therefore decided to weigh its options of assisting a transition to peace.

At the 5342nd meeting of the Security Council, held on 11 December 2020, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation in Carana", the President of the Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council expresses its grave concern to the ongoing deterioration of the political, security and humanitarian environment in Carana, and the serious consequences for the population of this country and the region. It deplores the loss of life that has already occurred, and fears that the failure, thus far, to reach a political settlement may result in further bloodshed, and calls for an immediate end to hostilities.

"The Security Council commends the Fasia Union (FU) for its role in mediating between the parties and urges it to use its influence to promote a peaceful solution, stressing that the crisis in Carana can be resolved only through a negotiated political solution in which all parties, both those involved in the conflict and within the region, work actively to achieve such a solution.

"The Security Council firmly condemns the continued use force to influence the political situation in Carana and calls for a return to the principles of the 2013 Constitution, and urges all parties to agree terms for a lasting peace agreement that addresses the underlying causes of the conflict and reestablishes confidence among the parties.

"The Security Council also expresses its concern at the humanitarian consequences of the crisis in Carana. It calls upon the international community to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to those in need in all the countries of the Fasia Continent that are affected by the Carana crisis. It also calls on all parties to provide unhindered access to the affected populations."

"The Security Council condemns the deaths of innocent civilians and human rights abuses in Carana and calls for such incidents to be fully investigated. The Council calls upon the Government and all other parties to respect human rights and take immediate steps, with support from the international community, to reverse the climate of impunity, particularly in the context of the use of children in armed conflict."

"The Security Council affirms its readiness to consider the active involvement of the United Nations, in coordination with the Fasia Union, including through concrete sustainable and effective measures, to assist in the implementation of an effective ceasefire agreement and in an agreed process for political settlement of the conflict. The objective of the United Nations should be to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation, lasting peace

and stability in a united Carana, where human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens assured and in which internally displaced persons and refugees can return home in safety and dignity."

"The Security Council will continue to monitor closely the situation in Carana and remains seized of the matter."

Thus, the Integrated Task Force (ITF) was set up and tasked to develop a strategic assessment and options for the UN in Carana aiming to implement the following political/strategic end state.

"A unified and peaceful Carana in its current boundaries, with a democratically elected government in which all ethnic groups of the country are represented and accountable security forces able to protect all its citizens, on a level of economic wellbeing so that nobody suffers from basic needs, with a functioning civil society and situation in which human rights, gender perspectives and the rights of the vulnerable people are respected."

The ITF tasked by the UN SG and based on the compiled Carana Country Study conducted a strategic assessment with the following recommendation:

- Root causes of the Caranese civil war are to be found in a history of the colonial and post-colonial centralized governments neglecting rural and provincial areas, in the destruction of livelihoods both man-made and through climate change, in violently exploited ethnic tensions, as well as in political authority challenged through corruption and favouritism and a popular demand for the non-existent rule of law and civic participation. International involvement is deeply entangled with the current conflict dynamics.
- In September 2019, the leaders of the three major factions, President Ogavo (FDC), Cdr. Sefu Akinyi (MPC) and Cdr. Abdirahim Muhamed (CISC) agreed to peace negotiations. First, these took place in Kuku, Mosana, under FU brokerage. After their failure due to perceived mediator partiality, the UN assumed renewed negotiations in Kalari, Namuna in 14 November 2020.
- The Peace Agreement (PA) will supposedly get signed by the parties to the conflict within the next 6 months. The parties will invite the UN to support in the implementation of the PA.
- Expected challenges to the implementation process:
 1. In the northern Leppko region in central Carana, several unmonitored armed groups have formed around locally powerful and well-connected warlords. These groups operate mainly according to economic goals (theft, illegal exploitation of diamond, copper and wood, ransom) and are thought to be connected to the organized crime network in northern Carana. The warlords are not part of the peace agreement.
 2. The Elassi Liberation Front (ELF) is collaborating with CISC splinter groups, plans to establish an independent state in Rimosa, frequently raids villages in the border area to Rimosa and is not part of the PA.

3. CISC hardliner splinter groups refute the ongoing peace process and gather increasing support from CISC armed forces.
 4. The overall humanitarian and development situation is expected to worsen further.
 5. The political dispute between Rimosa and Carana regarding their overlapping maritime territory, contested because of unexplored oilfields and because of fishing rights, has recently intensified.
- The El Hasar insurgency in neighbouring Katasi will have an effect on the development of the peace process. The government of Carana and MPC have agreed to coordinate its actions against El Hasar with Operation Aigle (FRAFOR) and the situation is deemed stable. In the medium-term, this joint effort may create an obstacle to the DDR of MPC fighters. Government institutions and FDC troops are currently not present on the ground there.
 - The UN will be prepared to deploy a multidimensional Peacekeeping Mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to monitor and observe the compliance of the PA and to address spoilers to the PA in order to support the establishment of a unified and peaceful Carana. Thus, the UN will also support in establishing a safe and secure environment, in preparing and conducting democratic elections, to offer good offices in resolving the disputes with Rimosa and in assisting the coordination with the Government of Katasi and FRAFOR efforts to neutralize El Hasar.

With the UN SG Report of 01 April 2021 the UN SC was informed about the recommended option to assist Carana upon an signed Peace Agreement. In order to support the strategic planning efforts, the UN SC mandated a military-civilian Technical Assessment Mission to conduct a two-week field survey to verify the conditions in Carana as assumed in the Strategic Assessment.

The report the Technical Assessment Mission then provides to UNHQ can be summarized as follows:

- Even after the beginning of the negotiations for the Ceasefire- and Peace Agreement, Carana can be described as politically unstable. The government holds limited power over the Northeast and no control over the West and the South of the country. An increasing level of public resistance can barely be handled by the security forces. The administration displays a dramatic lack of efficiency. Official administration in the rebel-controlled areas is non-existent. Institutional political mechanisms, such as parties or formal civil society gatherings, are currently non-existent.
- The armed conflict in Carana has also resulted in serious violations and abuses of human rights and humanitarian law. All sides have been responsible for violations and abuses. Torture has been widely used by all parties to the conflict.
- The estimated number of CNP and local police officer's amount to about 10,000 officers, or one officer for every 1,700 citizens. There is no clarity about the exact figure of national police, or even if those in police uniforms are certified police officers. The relationship between civil society and the police force is fraught with crises of credibility and impunity. In MPC-controlled areas, currently about 50 formally trained police officers and up to 300

personnel appointed from the ranks of the MPC are active. No regular police force services the South anymore. The CISC has taken over all police functions.

- In terms of military strength, the FDC currently commands 20,000 personnel (all three services), mainly in three brigades. The Presidential Guard has a strength equivalent to two infantry battalions and it is not part of the regular defence force. The MPC has an assessed strength of 10,000 fighters. CISC structures are loose and their strength is estimated at about 3,000- 5,000 fighters. In contrast to the MPC, CISC has not tried to establish administrative functions and exercises control in the region only by the rule of the force.
- During the years of fighting, several smaller armed groups have formed in Leppko. Some of these groups are fragmentations of the CISC or deserters from the government forces. Other groups have arisen from local vigilant groups built to protect their villages from attacks from soldiers and rebels. Two external militias are important to the Caranese context, The El Hasar group requesting their own state in Katasi and the ELF conducting insurgency operations against the Rimosan government. Both frequently penetrate into Caranese territory. The MPC engagement in the deterrence of El Hasar fighters along the Carana-Katasi border is expected to provide an obstacle to the DDR process otherwise embraced by all relevant actors. In the meantime, ELF has begun to challenge CISC in southern Carana, actively to recruit soldiers in Carana, and to collaborate with some CISC splinter groups.
- The majority of the country is currently without regular power supply and is relying on generators. Water is available in most parts of the country, but the quality of water varies. Carana has a network of capable paved roads, mostly unaffected by meteorological effects especially the rainy season. Carana also has a dense network of partially robust unpaved roads and tracks, the availability of which is highly uncertain during and after the rainy season. The two railway tracks running between Galasi and Akkabar, and between Maldosa and Mia are both mostly in bad shape but operational. Carana has three harbours for deep-water ships and some smaller harbours for fishing boats. The international airports in Galasi and Corma are both operational and meet international standards for air traffic. Both airports are suitable for heavy and extremely heavy transport aircraft. A strong mission support capability needs to be established to allow the operation of a PKM as limited capabilities are only available in Carana.
- During the conflict between FDC and rebels, both sides used landmines as a means of terror and deterrent as well as to prevent access to certain areas, and mine obstacles were not documented. Because of this conduct of mine warfare, as well as through flooding and landslides displacing minefields, the precise location of mines and explosive devices is not documented and mostly unknown. As a result, the explosive picture is chaotic and there are no reliable data or estimates of the amounts of explosives available. Anti-personnel mines, 120mm mortar shells and 122mm howitzer shells are confirmed to have been in use.

- Of the roughly 17 million population of Carana, 6.3 million are currently in need of humanitarian assistance. The overarching immediate humanitarian issues that need to be tackled in a comprehensive and coordinated fashion include food insecurity and livelihoods, protection from exposure to conflict and human trafficking, health and education. Communities most at risk are IDP camp populations, returning IDPs, refugee communities, those hosting IDPs and refugees, children and adolescents, as well as women-headed households and survivors of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). In terms of development, protection of people and livelihoods, infrastructure, access to credit and markets are key concerns.
- During the past 10 years of civil war, approx. 700,000 Caranese people have become internally displaced (IDPs) and settled in IDP camps around the harbour cities, most in the Galasi area. Approx. 20,000 fled to Sumora and 10,000 to Rimoso and periodically attempt to return to their lands for the farming season. With the peace process in reach, this year a substantial number of IDPs has begun to leave Galasi to return to their lands in Koloni, Tereni and Mahbek. Carana itself hosts refugee populations from Katasi (approx. 30,000 mainly in Tereni and western Koloni) and Rimoso (approx. 20,000 mainly in southern Leppko).
- Humanitarian access has overall proven difficult in the MPC- and CISC-controlled areas and in flooded areas during the rainy season. Government participation in assessment missions is a common demand throughout the entire country. Other obstacles include the road conditions during the raining season, fuel shortages, the frequent interruptions of mobile phone coverage and access to cash, because of both the thin banking infrastructure and the high and fast-evolving inflation. Capacities for air transport are low. An initial assessment conducted showed that the medical facilities in the major cities might be sufficient for minor treatment of UN personnel.

The Kalari Peace Agreement has been signed on 1 August 2021 by the parties to the conflict. The Treaty is structured in five sections, an overview, the Ceasefire Agreement and DDR process, a section on governance and the re-building of state functionality, wealth sharing and development measures and finally humanitarian aspects and issues of transitional justice.

The ceasefire agreement includes the complete cessation of armed hostilities, distribution of weaponry, land mining, propaganda and violence against civilians, release of all civilian abductees and demobilization of under-age combatants. It invites the UN Peacekeeping mission, calls for the establishment of a Joint Ceasefire Commission to observe the transitional process and a National Commission for Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration, to have completed its actions after 240 days regarding the signatory factions and after 360 days regarding other armed groups.

A new national army, the Forces de la Défense et Sécurité du Carana (FDSC), shall be created of not more than 22,000 soldiers with up to 4,000 being drawn from former MPC combatants and 1,500 drawn from former CISC combatants. A new police force shall be created of not more than 12,500 officers with up to 3,000 are being drawn from former MPC combatants and up to 1,250 being drawn from former CISC combatants. Prisoner-of-war issues are to be discussed further.

The governance section describes the formation of the NTGC in three branches, the National Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA), the executive; and the judiciary, all of which are to be staffed according to principles of power-sharing. It determines the establishment of a constitutional board, a presidency and two vice-presidents, and calls for elections six months after the adoption of the new constitution. Furthermore, the treaty describes wealth-sharing measures, administered by a Reconstruction and Development Fund, as well as a Multi-Donor Trust Fund. Last part lays the foundations for future humanitarian engagement and sketches out mechanisms of transitional justice.

Given the host nation consent for a UN peacekeeping mission on Carana territory, the detailed plan of how to engage in peaceful transition, and the consent of the parties to the conflict to lay aside their arms, the UN SC passed Security Council Resolution 1544 (2021) and authorized an UNPKM.

The UN SC resolution decided to establish the Multidimensional United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC) for an initial period of 12 months, requested the SG to appoint an SRSG to oversee mission planning and coordination between the UN country team, UNAC, the Government of Carana, the Mouvement Patriotique du Carana (MPC) and the French Forces Operation Aigle in Katasi. The mandate set UNAC troop strength at up to 13,315 UN military unit personnel, 185 military observers, 40 liaison officers and 300 staff officers, and up to 1,885 civilian police officers including formed units. The resolution asked TCC to contribute personnel and adequate equipment and to declare caveats and asked for Caranese compliance. It called upon neighbouring states to ensure unhindered movement to and from Carana of all personnel, as well as equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods. Finally, it emphasized the need for coordination between the implementation of the Peace Agreement in Carana and the French-led operation in Katasi.




Figure 19: Deployment of the United Nations Assistance Mission to Carana (UNAC) - Overview



Statement by the President of SC

United Nations

S/PRST/2020/24

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 December 2020
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Statement by the President of the UN Security Council

At the 5342nd meeting of the Security Council, held on 11 December 2020, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The question concerning Carana", the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council expresses its grave concern to the ongoing deterioration of the political, security and humanitarian environment in Carana, and the serious consequences for the population of this country and the region. It deplores the loss of life that has already occurred, and fears that the failure, thus far, to reach a political settlement may result in further bloodshed, and calls for an immediate end to hostilities.

"The Security Council commends the Fasía Union (FU) for its role in mediating between the parties and urges it to use its influence to promote a peaceful solution, stressing that the crisis in Carana can be resolved only through a negotiated political solution in which all parties, both those involved in the conflict and within the region, work actively to achieve such a solution.

"The Security Council firmly condemns the continued use force to influence the political situation in Carana and calls for a return to the principles of the 2013 Constitution, and urges all parties to agree terms for a lasting peace agreement that addresses the underlying causes of the conflict and reestablishes confidence among the parties.

"The Security Council also expresses its concern at the humanitarian consequences of the crisis in Carana. It calls upon the international community to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to those in need in all the countries of the Fasía Continent that are affected by the Carana crisis. It also calls on all parties to provide unhindered access to the affected populations."

"The Security Council condemns the deaths of innocent civilians and human rights abuses in Carana and calls for such incidents to be fully investigated. The Council calls upon the Government and all other parties to respect human rights and take immediate steps, with support from the international community, to reverse the climate of impunity, particularly in the context of the use of children in armed conflict.

Statement by the President of the UN Security Council

"The Security Council affirms its readiness to consider the active involvement of the United Nations, in coordination with the Fasia Union, including through concrete sustainable and effective measures, to assist in the implementation of an effective ceasefire agreement and in an agreed process for political settlement of the conflict. The objective of the United Nations should be to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in a united Carana, where human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens assured and in which internally displaced persons and refugees can return home in safety and dignity."

"The Security Council will continue to monitor closely the situation in Carana and remains seized of the matter."

Strategic Assessment Report

Development of the Peace Process in Carana

Proposed further engagement of the United Nations



**New York,
22 February 2021**

Executive Summary

Root causes of the Caranese civil war are to be found in a history of the colonial and post-colonial centralized governments neglecting rural and provincial areas, in the destruction of livelihoods both man-made and through climate change, in violently exploited ethnic tensions, as well as in political authority challenged through corruption and favouritism and a popular demand for the non-existent rule of law and civic participation. International involvement is deeply entangled with the current conflict dynamics.

In September 2019, the leaders of the three major factions, President Ogavo (FDC), Cdr. Sefu Akinyi (MPC) and Cdr. Abdirahim Muhamed (CISC) agreed to peace negotiations. First, these took place in Kuku, Mosana, under FU brokerage. After their failure due to perceived mediator partiality, the UN assumed renewed negotiations in Kalari, Namuna in November 2020.

The Peace Agreement (PA) will supposedly get signed by the parties to the conflict within the next 6 months. The parties will invite the UN to support in the implementation of the PA.

Expected challenges to the implementation process:

1. In the northern Leppko region in central Carana, several unmonitored armed groups have formed around locally powerful and well-connected warlords. These groups operate mainly according to economic goals (theft, illegal exploitation of diamond, copper and wood, ransom) and are thought to be connected to the organized crime network in northern Carana. The warlords are not part of the peace agreement.
2. The Elasi Liberation Front (ELF) is collaborating with CISC splinter groups, plans to establish an independent state in Rimosa, frequently raids villages in the border area to Rimosa and is not part of the PA.
3. CISC hardliner splinter groups refute the ongoing peace process and gather increasing support from CISC armed forces.
4. The overall humanitarian and development situation is expected to worsen further.
5. The political dispute between Rimosa and Carana regarding their overlapping maritime territory, contested because of unexplored oilfields and because of fishing rights, has recently intensified.

The El Hasar insurgency in neighbouring Katasi will have an effect on the development of the peace process. The government of Carana and MPC have agreed to coordinate its actions against El Hasar with Operation Aigle (FRAFOR) and the situation is deemed stable. In the medium-term, this joint effort may create an obstacle to the DDR of MPC fighters. Government institutions and FDC troops are currently not present on the ground there.

The UN will be prepared to deploy a multidimensional Peacekeeping Mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to monitor and observe the compliance of the PA and to address spoilers to the PA in order to support the establishment of a unified and peaceful Carana. Thus, the UN will also support in establishing a safe and secure environment, in preparing and conducting democratic

elections, to offer good offices in resolving the disputes with Rimosa and in assisting the coordination with the Government of Katasi and FRAFOR efforts to neutralize El Hasar.

1. Background and objective of the Strategic Assessment

At the 5342nd meeting of the Security Council, held on 11 December 2020, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation in Carana", the President of the Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

The Security Council appreciates the development regarding the ongoing negotiations towards a Peace Agreement and the commitment of the Parties to the Conflict.

The Security Council reaffirms its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Carana and to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

The Security Council invites all parties to the conflict to refrain from any action that would lead to a worsening of the situation and also asks all neighbouring countries to support the efforts of the government of Carana to stabilize the situation.

The Security Council condemns the continuation of systematic armed violence by ELF and El Hasar against Caranese civilians and the illegal mining activities in central Carana controlled by local warlords.

The Security Council is particularly concerned with the humanitarian crisis that has developed as a result of civil war, resting on exploited ethnic tensions and longstanding humanitarian deficiencies for marginalized communities, in the country and the subsequent displacement of civilians and demands that all parties allow the unimpeded flow of humanitarian aid and the safe return of IDPs to their place of origin.

The Security Council will continue to closely follow the events in Carana and has tasked the Secretariat to propose further actions as necessary.

Thus, the Integrated Task Force (ITF) was set up and tasked to develop a strategic assessment and options for the UN in Carana aiming to implement the following political/strategic end state.

A unified and peaceful Carana in its current boundaries, with a democratically elected government in which all ethnic groups of the country are represented and accountable security forces able to protect all its citizens, on a level of economic wellbeing so that nobody suffers from basic needs, with a functioning civil society and situation in which human rights, gender perspectives and the rights of the vulnerable people are respected."

2. Key conflict factors and dynamics

a. Root causes

The colonial rule in Carana created a central administration in the capital Galasi after the Parisian model. Mountainous and jungle terrain in the West, as well as the lack of exploitable natural resources in the area south of the Torongo River, discouraged the colonial authorities

from developing infrastructure in these regions. On top, these regions have predominantly been inhabited by ethnic groups not privileged by the French nor the post-independence Falin-backed government (the Tatsi in the southern regions and Kori in the western part). The post-colonial government did not answer calls for better transport infrastructure, did not give sufficient support for medical and educational facilities in the regions, and provided no electricity and water grids to distribute the available resources. The fast-growing population and the local overuse of agricultural and pastoral grounds resulting from growth and lack of import options added to the strain. Climate change has severely affected the Fasian continent, and the loss of livelihoods, lack of employment alternatives other than in agriculture, and increased competition for scarce resources has further incited anger against perceived government shortcomings.

In the much better-serviced urban areas, opposition against President Ogavo increased when in 2010 the sitting president expanded his powers over the previously well-functioning democratic system. Corroborated reports criticize election manipulation in his four subsequent re-elections. Key positions in the administration, in the legal system, police and formal economy have been filled with close allies. Ogavo's regime rather effectively suppressed all opposition groups. In the meantime, the neighbouring states of Namuna and Mosana present vivid examples of functional democracies and civic organisation in Fasias.

The legitimacy of the judicial system was called into question when in 2011 the judicial and police institutions grew ever more biased towards the Falin. Other systems of state authority have evolved locally, often disregard gender and ethnic equality, and are not accepted elsewhere. Corruption is perceived as major problem throughout all levels of political power, both in state and in community-based mechanisms. More and more civilians join armed groups or criminal gangs for hopes of a stable income. All factions, the government forces, the MPC and the CISC, have committed severe human rights violations. This has damaged social cohesion gravely. Recently, evidence of an entrenched network of organized crime (diamond smuggling, human & drug trafficking) in northern Carana has come to light. Its scope is yet unknown to the international community. Competition over smuggling routes and transport nodes may certainly have fuelled the conflict further.

As the taxation system is perceived as dysfunctional and corrupt, and employment opportunities in the formal job market are scarce, Carana hosts a strong, elaborate and well-established informal economy. The inflated bureaucracy and the strongly overvalued Carana Franc pegged to the Euro have resulted in a globally non-competitive Caranese formal economy and little manoeuvrability for national fiscal policy. Debtor demands and debt relief conditioned on terms that are not suited to the Caranese context cemented the vicious cycle of financial mismanagement and economic downturn.

International involvement is deeply entangled with the current conflict dynamics. For one, the dependency on Western markets and donors has a significant impact. In many cases, donor investment, while paying off government elites, does not provide the promised capacity-building or the desired outcome for local communities and instead further harms the

surrounding environment. Aid programmes and nation building initiatives have concentrated on the urban areas and the capital. Little engagement with local and translocal power networks outside the major cities has driven further suspicion of the central government. Whereas the Galasi government has lost control once held over what is now MPC territory, in the southern Leppko presence the CISC instead filled a longstanding power vacuum.

As the present local and provincial power networks are not organized in state-like structures and hard to measure, they have not been perceived as valid authorities by international agencies and thus are not supported. Critics have voiced concerns that the vast quantity of long-running aid programmes has performed service delivery functions the government should perform and thereby further undermined government legitimacy among the Caranese population. The estimated small arms per capita ratio of up to 1:4 (civilian and armed forces combined) made armed conflict an obvious choice of venting the existing grievances.

b. Conflict History

After gaining independence in 1986 and although being faced with multiple challenges, Carana experienced about 25 years of decent development and stability. Over time, however, problems resulting from the time of colonialism began to have a negative impact leading to different regimes by coups or elections. Sustainable democracy could not be established and the economy as well as political and social deteriorated constantly.

In 2003 President Jackson Ogavo was elected President and his government, based on a liberal constitution, realised some economic and social reforms leading to liberal development and economic prosperity. However, following his re-election in 2008 President Ogavo's government focus changed and became preoccupied with suppressing all opposition groups and enhancing its own power base. Since 2008 his government expanded its influence on all economic and social activities by laws and administrative rules. Because of the economic situation and the discrimination of Kori and Tatsi by the Falin-dominated Government of Carana (GOC), political opposition groups and rebel movements evolved around 2010.

Small uprisings against President Ogavo's regime occurred from 2010-2012, and rebel groups mobilized to challenge the government's hold on power. All opposition to the government was met with either the threat or the use of armed force to suppress any attempt to challenge the regime, and eventually escalated into civil conflict in January 2014.

By that time some small rebel movements in the Tereni province joined the larger and better-organised rebel groups known as Mouvement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) and formed a well-structured and efficient military opposition. The MPC defeated the Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC) in local battles and gained increasing support from the local population in the West. In February 2016, the FDC lost control of some areas in the western highlands. Though the MPC's military engagements were well coordinated and successfully executed, the rebels failed to formulate a comprehensive political program. The only clearly stated aim was to remove President Ogavo from power. By early 2018, however, the MPC gained control of the three western provinces (Koloni, Tereni and Mahbek).

The FDC forces being bound in the West, small ethnic-based rebel movements took their chances and attacked government institutions in Leppko province. The uprising in the South was characterised by lootings and brutal violence against members of the Falin ethnic group. Some of these small rebel groups united and called themselves Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC).

Both the MPC and the CISC took the removal of President Ogavo from power as their initial aim, though cooperation between the two groups has been minimal. Throughout the conflict all parties have suffered numerous defeats, though the civilian population of Carana has been particularly targeted by all parties, leading to an estimated 150,000 killed from violence, famine or disease.

c. Political Situation

A combination of war-weariness and strategic manoeuvring led the leaders of both the MPC and CISC, as well as President Ogavo, to start negotiating a ceasefire and peace treaty in end 2019. After more than 9 years of civil war, the major parties at war had exhausted their support systems and soldiers' morale. None of the factions could extend its territorial control further nor secure it without major effort. The MPC has been observing the El Hasar insurgency at its borders and has been unwilling and probably incapable of defending its territorial control both against El Hasar and the FDC. CISC is internally incohesive and has been noting an increase in radical splinter groups who refute the peace negotiations. In the meantime, the Sunni fundamentalist Elasi Liberation Front (ELF) was formed in 2018 in the neighbouring country of Rimosa, where it is conducting insurgency operations against the Rimosan government. They mainly operate south of the Carana border in Rimosa, but have begun to challenge CISC in southern Carana and collaborate with some CISC splinter groups. Recruitment for ELF has surged both in Carana and Rimosa during the past year. Carana communities along the border report armed attacks and raids on villages by ELF elements. ELF has declared the establishment of an independent state in all of Rimosa as non-negotiable, potentially to be extended into Carana, and is not part of the peace negotiations.

The government forces in turn faced growing civilian opposition in the North and has responded with brutal crackdowns executed by military forces. Additionally, the border dispute over fishing rights and the newly discovered oilfields with Rimosa potentially has opened another theater of war. With several months of unpaid soldier salaries, empty fiscal pockets and the looming next debt default, continuing the civil war was perceived as the worst of options. In September 2019, the leaders of the three major factions, President Ogavo (FDC), Cdr. Sefu Akinyi (MPC) and Cdr. Abdirahim Muhamed (CISC) agreed to peace negotiations. First, these took place in Kuku, Mosana, brokered by the FU under then sitting President Oswald Bankole (Sumora).

In September 2019, the negotiations had almost reached common ground, only to see the opportunity for peace slip away when a member of the Sumoran government was accused of arranging arms shipments to President Ogavo. The allegations were subsequently proven unfounded but too late to save the talks. The mutually hurting stalemate between the parties

and the war-weariness lasted, and so in November 2020 the UN took over mediation efforts in co-operation with the Fasian Union under UN chief mediator Susan Billiams in Kalari, Namuna. These negotiations are going well and will most likely mandate all parties to disarm and establish a power-sharing arrangement in a new transitional government and integrated armed forces, the Forces de la Défense et Sécurité du Carana (FDSC).

d. Security Situation

There have been several disputes with neighbouring countries in the past few decades, however, there were no external military threats to Carana. The main internal security problems continue to be the absence of reliable police structures throughout the country, high levels of crime in urban areas resulting from the poor economic situation, the activities of uncontrolled armed groups and the conflicts between government forces and rebels. The poor economic situation has resulted in increased and more radicalised levels of criminal activity, some of it organised in urban areas. In the North and West there is growing evidence of criminal usurpation of the diamond mining, probably with government knowledge, and supposedly controlled by cartels based in Sumora.

Thousands of people have been killed in recent months and thousands more were forced to flee their homes because of the fighting between government forces and rebels in the north and the south. The large numbers of IDPs that fled the fighting, some of which have begun to return, further impact the security situation. Armed groups, mainly extremist rebel and militia elements, have frequently abducted, exploited and trafficked civilians.

New external threats evolved with the formation of the El Hasar terrorist group in Katasi, as well as with rebellion groups (ELF and associated) in Rimosa. While relations with Katasi and Rimosa remain tense, currently the likelihood of intra-state conflict is considered low. Rimosa and Carana still dispute the ownership of some of the islands along the southern coastline of Carana.

Security in Carana is negatively impacted / may be impacted:

- If the ongoing peace process towards the Kalari Peace Agreement is delayed in time and conducted without full participation of all parties to the conflict, especially the impact of the CISC splinter groups on the implementation.
- If the CISC splinter groups and the ELF in the South pose a threat to the local population of Carana and reject the peace process.
- If increasing evidence of criminal seizing of the diamond mining in the North and West appears, probably with knowledge or complicity by at least one party to the conflict and controlled by cartels based in Sumora.
- If El Hasar infiltrates western Carana to avoid the FRAFOR operations in Katasi and recruits local communities or exploits them for logistics and supply.

- If the militia groups and warlords conducting illegal exploitation and trade of diamonds in northern Leppko continue to pose a threat to the local population and impede the peace process.

e. Humanitarian and Development Situation

Carana is a very young country, with 44% of the population younger than 15 years, and an additional 13% between 15 and 18 years. Elderly people make up less than 4% of the overall population. At an average rate of 5.1 children per woman and 9.1 deaths per 100 births, infant mortality is a frequent issue. An estimated 14% of the population has a physical or mental disability. Approx. 45% live below the poverty line, with the poorest regions traditionally in the Leppko province and in the highlands of Tereni.

Carana remains one of the countries hardest hit by global warming. The annual interplay of dry and rainy season has evolved into severe droughts and desertification in the South and East, shorter and more intense rainfalls which reliably lead to flood disasters in the Mahbek and Barin regions. Meanwhile, the increasing number of cyclones and sudden heavy rainfalls on hill slopes in western and northern Carana frequently cause landslides, thereby destroying shelter, interrupting food and water supplies. The overuse of pastures and agricultural lands adds to the long-term degradation of soil.

Of the roughly 17 million population of Carana, 5.3 million are currently in need of humanitarian assistance. The overarching immediate humanitarian issues that need to be tackled in a comprehensive and coordinated fashion include food insecurity and livelihoods, protection from exposure to conflict and human trafficking, health and education. Communities most at risk are IDP camp populations, returning IDPs, refugee communities, those hosting IDPs and refugees, children and adolescents, as well as women-headed households and survivors of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). In terms of development, protection of people and livelihoods, infrastructure, access to credit and markets are key concerns.

As consequence of the economic crisis and the war, the price level for food and basic goods has increased dramatically. Even though all basic goods are available, large parts of the population cannot afford sufficient nutrition.

During the past 10 years of civil war, approx. 700,000 Caranese people have become internally displaced (IDPs) and settled in IDP camps around the harbour cities, most in the Galasi area. Approx. 20,000 fled to Sumora and 10,000 to Rimosa and periodically attempt to return to their lands for the farming season. With the peace process in reach, this year a substantial number of IDPs has begun to leave Galasi to return to their lands in Koloni, Tereni and Mahbek. Carana itself hosts refugee populations from Katasi (approx. 30,000 mainly in Tereni and western Koloni) and Rimosa (appr. 20,000 mainly in southern Leppko).

f. Scenarios

Three likely scenarios were developed based on the root causes, the key conflict factors (see Appendix 1) and their dynamics (see Appendix 2).

All scenarios rely on 4 strategic assumptions about the further proceedings of the peace process:

- The GOC will stick to the peace process and the implementation of the PA.
- The warlords in central Carana will persist to control the area and continue their activities.
- The humanitarian crisis will remain.
- The current status of development will remain or will not significantly change.

Scenario 1: Developed status quo

The peace process will move forward as planned and the Parties to the conflict will sign the Kalari Peace Agreement (KPA) currently in negotiation within the next 6 months. After signing the KPA, all parties will support the implementation on a medium level of compliance.

The parties to the conflict will invite the United Nations to support their efforts in implementing and ensuring compliance to the KPA. Local skirmishes and conflicts will still occur on a regular basis. The ongoing operation to neutralize El Hasar in Katasi will push the terrorist group into the borderlands between Katasi and western Carana. The capabilities of FRAFOR are not sufficient to both maintain the security in Katasi and neutralize El Hasar in and across the border areas to Carana. Thus, MPC must increase their capabilities to secure the region's population towards random assaults of El Hasar and to hinder El Hasar from expanding into western Carana. The MPC forces therefore are likely to not comply with the DDR process as foreseen by the KPA.

It must be expected that the activities of CISC splinter groups, armed rebel groups, warlords, armed criminal elements and fundamentalist extremist groups will remain on the current level until and after the Parties to the Conflict have signed the KPA. These groups have the potential to delay or stall the implementation of the KPA.

In addition, the political dispute between Rimosa and Carana over exclusive economic zones (EEZ) off the East Coast will increase, motivated by the newly discovered oilfields and by fishing rights. Rimosa may potentially support activities to destabilise the fragile situation in Carana in order to gain advantages in the EEZ dispute if the situation in Carana deteriorates again.

The humanitarian situation will improve slightly as soon as the PA is signed and international organisations are granted access to certain areas, mainly in the South and East of the country. The government is not expected to assume responsibility for their citizens' social security in the near future. In the long run, government legitimacy is not expected to improve throughout the country. The ongoing return of IDPs and refugees will lead to further local conflicts in the areas of origin and along the return routes.

The economic situation will slowly improve as soon as the PA is signed. Infrastructure projects are already planned or executed, currently mainly in the eastern part of Carana. Civil unrest and disturbances are most likely in the western and southern part of Carana, as investors have been slow to engage there.

Scenario 2: Increased Resistance by CISC

In general, the peace process will move forward as planned and the Parties to the conflict will sign the negotiated Kalari Peace Agreement within the next 6 months.

However, radical elements of CISC will demonstrate very openly their antipathy towards the negotiated PA. Because of limited progress after signing the Kalari Peace Agreement and the rise of hard liners within the CISC, the support for the implementation will be on a very low level of compliance.

El Hasar will have only a very limited effect on the development of the situation. MPC will mainly handle the situation, but that will may create an obstacle in the further peace process, regarding the overall DDR process. Depending on the situation in the South and with other uncontrolled armed and terrorist groups the overall situation in the border area to Katasi may get worse.

The parties to the conflict will still invite the United Nation to support their efforts to implement the signed Peace Agreement and to ensure the compliance to the existing Peace Agreement. However, CISC/CISC splinter groups will most likely oppose the operations of the United Nations in the Leppko Region.

In addition, it must be expected, that the activities of Armed Rebel Groups, Warlords and Fundamentalist / Extremist groups as well as armed criminal elements will increase until and after the Parties to the Conflict have signed the PA. That will have the potential to prevent /seriously limit activities to implement the peace agreement, especially in the southern part of Carana.

In addition the political dispute between Rimosa and Carana regarding the oilfields, as well a related fishing rights in the respective national territory, will increase. Rimosa will openly and covertly support any activities to destabilize the fragile situation in Carana to gain advantage in the EEZ dispute.

The Humanitarian situation will remain unstable and the access, especially to the Leppko region, might remain restricted/limited.

The economic situation will only improve in the eastern part of Carana, because there are already several projects running. Civil unrest and disturbances are most likely in the western and southern part of Carana because of the slow or no progress.

Scenario 3: Burgeoned Resistance by MPC

In general, the peace process will move forward as planned and the Parties to the conflict will sign the negotiated Kalari Peace Agreement within the next 6 months.

After signing the Kalari Peace Agreement all parties will support the implementation on a medium level of compliance.

To ensure the compliance to the existing Peace Agreement the parties to the conflict will still invite the United Nation to support their efforts to implement the signed Peace Agreement. Even, the parties seem to be trustworthy, local skirmishes and conflicts will still occur on a regular basis.

The ongoing operation to neutralize El Hasar in Katasi will push back the terrorist group. Therefore, El Hasar will increase their activities in western Carana. The capabilities of FRAFOR are not sufficient either to maintain the security in Katasi and neutralize El Hasar in the border areas. Thus, MPC must increase their capabilities to secure the own population towards random assaults of El Hasar. That will create an obstacle in the further peace process, and especially regarding the overall DDR – process.

In addition, it must be expected, that the activities of Armed Rebel Groups, Warlords and Fundamentalist / Extremist groups as well-armed criminal elements will remain on the current level until and after signing the Parties to the Conflict have signed the PA. That may have the potential to further delay/stall the implementation of the peace agreement.

Furthermore, the political dispute between Rimosa and Carana regarding the oilfields, as well as a related fishing rights in the respective national territory, may threaten the very fragile situation in Carana.

The Humanitarian situation will slightly improve as soon as the PA is signed and the access to certain areas is granted. However, the planned return of IDPs and Refugees may have the potential of local conflicts in the areas of origin.

The economic situation will slowly improve as soon as the PA is signed. Certain projects are already planned or executed, currently mainly in the eastern part of Carana. Civil unrest and disturbances are likely in the western and southern part of Carana because of the most likely slow progress.

A combination of Scenarios 2 and 3 cannot be ruled out and is assessed as the worst-case scenario.

g. Assessment

Scenario 1 is assessed as the **most likely development** in Carana over the next year, because:

- The civilian population is tired of war. If any of the current conflict is ongoing (or starts again), the support of the civilian population towards the parties to the conflict will dramatically decrease. That will have a negative impact on the ability of the parties to the conflict to control their respective occupied areas.
- As the economic crisis has worsened, all warring parties have strained their financial resources. Without renewed support from the population and economic development, troop salaries cannot be paid, food, weapons and ammunition cannot legally be bought. Raids are a likely short-term course of action. If conducted in the already controlled territory, these will undermine local support further. If conducted on hostile territory, they will further exhaust resources, motivation and obstruct local economies. As the provision of resources to the troops is so costly for all warring parties, no group will aim for the expansion of their territory.
- Although CISC splinter groups oppose the PA and a significant faction of the mainstream CISC perceives the agreement as biased towards the Carana government, CISC is still granted government participation. In staying, it also retains more influence on the peace process regarding the development of Carana. Given its exhausted resources and the unlikelihood of replacing the Carana government, CISC's only alternative option would be separatism. On its own, CISC separatism is unlikely to gather enough civilian and troop support. Although alignment with ELF is considered by some CISC splinter groups aiming to

separate from Carana and fight against the influence of warlords and the influence of Rimosa.

- The humanitarian and development situation causes growing civilian protest, even less national and international investment and a loss of legitimacy for all current political powers. The parties to the conflict are currently not capable/willing to create sufficient support structures of their own and have already asked for more extensive international aid.

3. Priority objectives

Based on the given desired end-state “a unified and peaceful Carana in its current boundaries, with a democratically elected, legitimate government in which all former warring factions are represented, with transparent and accountable governmental functions, on a level of economic wellbeing so that nobody suffers from basic needs, with a free civil society and situation in which human rights, gender perspectives and the rights of the vulnerable people are respected” and considering the most likely development of the situation, following priority objectives of the UN were determined:

1. **A safe and secure environment is established.**
2. **Basic needs (food, water, medical) are met.**
3. **Respect of human rights is granted.**
4. **Territorial integrity of Carana is ensured.**
5. **An environment conducive to national reconciliation is established.**
6. **Rule of law and security institutions are established.**
7. **A democratic government is elected.**

4. Existing capacities

Currently, a UN country team, 27 international and 11 national NGOs and civil society organizations are active contributors to the peacebuilding, humanitarian and development process in Carana. Four major religious associations also participate in humanitarian and political issues.

5. Strategic options

The following options are based on **Scenario 1**, which builds the foundation for the further engagement of the United Nations. Three options were developed and analysed.

a. Option 1

The UN consents to support the ongoing peace process and the elaboration of a peace agreement.

The UN purposefully supports the parties to the conflict and their efforts to end the conflict.

Furthermore, the UN will be prepared to deploy a Political Mission to monitor and observe the implementation of the PA in order to support the establishment of a unified and peaceful Carana.

Thus, the UN will also support in preparations of democratic elections, in solving the disputes with Rimosa and in assisting the coordination with the Government of Katasi and FRAFOR efforts to neutralize El Hasar.

The UN Political Mission in Carana will consist of Headquarters in Galasi and several offices throughout the country. Liaison will be established to the parties of the conflict and to the FRAFOR HQ in Katasi.

The UN efforts will mainly support in maintaining the territorial integrity and the political process between and within the parties.

b. Option 2

The UN consents to support the ongoing peace process and the elaboration of a peace agreement.

The UN purposefully supports the parties to the conflict and their efforts to end the conflict.

Furthermore, the UN will be prepared to deploy a multi-dimensional Peacekeeping Mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charta to monitor and observe the compliance of the PA and to neutralise spoilers to the PA in order to support establishing a unified and peaceful Carana.

Thus, the UN will also support establishing a safe and secure environment, in preparation of democratic elections, solving the disputes with Rimosa and in assisting the coordination with the Government of Katasi and FRAFOR efforts to neutralize El Hasar.

The UN Peacekeeping Mission in Carana will consist of Headquarters in Galasi, a political component, a humanitarian and development component, a robust military component, a police component and a mission support component. Liaison will be established to the parties of the conflict and to the FRAFOR HQ in Katasi.

The UN efforts will mainly support in establishing an environment conducive for national reconciliation, coordination of humanitarian and development actions, in maintaining the territorial integrity and the political process between and within the parties.

c. Option 3

The UN together with the Fasia Union (FU) will support the ongoing peace process and the elaboration of a peace agreement. Thereby, the UN and the FU purposefully support the parties to the conflict and their efforts to end the conflict.

Furthermore, the UN and FU will be prepared to deploy a hybrid multi-dimensional Peacekeeping Mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charta, jointly set up by the UN and the FU, to monitor and observe the compliance of the PA and to neutralise spoilers to the PA in order to support in establishing a unified and peaceful Carana.

Thus, the UN and the FU will also support in establishing a safe and secure environment, in preparation of democratic elections solving the disputes with Rimosa and in assisting the coordination with the Government of Katasi and FRAFOR efforts to neutralize El Hasar.

The hybrid Peacekeeping Mission in Carana will consist of headquarters in Galasi, a political component, a humanitarian and development component, a military component, a police component and a mission support component. Liaison will be established to the parties of the conflict, to the partner nation headquarters and to the FRAFOR HQ in Katasi.

The UN and FU efforts will mainly support in maintaining the territorial integrity, coordination of humanitarian and development actions, and the political process between and within the parties.

6. Recommended option and recommendations on UN configuration

Option 2 is recommended to the UN Secretary General, because:

- Spoilers to the Kalari Peace Agreement will most likely arrive from factions who have not been included in the KPA. To send a Political Mission (option 1) would leave defending the PA to the factions who should be engaging in a DDR process. Either the factions will not engage in DDR, leaving the original conflict to flare up again, or spoilers will be unhindered and create a new set of conflicts.
- Hence, a Peacekeeping mission under a robust mandate is the only chance to facilitate a peaceful transition to a politically and militarily unified Carana while stabilizing the security situation until the democratic legitimised government, the Rule of Law and security institutions as provisioned by the KPA have been established.
- Option 3 foresees a Hybrid Fasias Union/ United Nations PKM to assist Carana in implementing the KPA, to engage with Armed Groups and to assist in neutralising spoilers to the PA. First, potential FU candidates for such a mission might not have the necessary recourse (capabilities) and might have strong national interests and might be seen as not impartial to the implantation to the KPA and addressing the problems between Carana and especially Katasia and Rimosa. This perception threatens to delegitimize the UN PKM and ultimately the peace process as a whole. Second, coordination between the UN PKM and the Fasias Union mission may prove difficult, as national interests of the FU member states and UN agendas may not necessarily coincide.
- While the threat posed by El Hasar is considered contained for the moment, shifts in the Caranese conflict landscape may encourage El Hasar to broaden their scope into Carana. Option 1 may not provide enough deterrence, or hinder MPC forces from participating in the DDR and power-sharing processes. Option 3 may provide El Hasar with further legitimization against the 'colonial oppressor' and increase its recruitment and support pool. Option 2 provides middle ground between these two risks.

Appendices:

- (1) Overview - Conflict Map
- (2) Key conflict factors and dynamics



Appendix 2: Key conflict factors and dynamics

Key Factor	Assessment	Dynamics
The Government of Carana (GOC): GOC initiated together with MPC the peace talks in Carana in Kalari. All known statements of GOC indicate that the Government pursues the ongoing peace process and intends the signature and implementation of the PA.	All statements of GOC as well as the current behaviour show that GOC is interested to sign the PA and will comply to the treaty. Despite some resistance in the government, the majority of the government wants to continue the peace process and implement the PA.	Some of the current GOC members may disagree with the results of the peace process and the draft PA. However, it can be assumed that GOC will stick to the results, the PA will get signed and the implementation of the PA will be supported.
Movement Patriotic de Carana (MPC): MPC initiated together with GOC the peace talks in Carana in Kalari. All known statements of MPC indicate that MPC supports the ongoing peace process and intends the signature and implementation of the PA.	The movement is inherently stable and reliable. It can be assumed that MPC will remain stable and will comply with the terms of the peace agreement. It is in the interests of the MPC to implement the PA and thus become a political power in Carana and participate in government and wealth.	● MPC is very interested in the peace process and in implementing finally the signed PA. MPC will therefore most likely stick to the peace process and implement the PA. ● However, there is a risk that the EI Hasar activities in the MPC-controlled area have a negative effect on the ongoing negotiations within Carana. In a worst-case scenario, this could lead to MPC not complying from the timeline outlined in the KPA.
CISC: CISC joined the peace negotiation later in Kalari. From the beginning, CISC was incoherent in the participation in the Peace process and in risk to fall apart in several splinter groups. Especially some hardliners are not interested in the implementation of the PA.	CISC is internally unstable and permanently threatened by fragmentation by hard liner splinter groups, who are not supporting the overall Peace process. There are ongoing attacks against the civilian population in the Leppko District for which CISC is most probably responsible. The risk of disintegration remains the major risk throughout the implementation of the PA.	● Despite the internal problems and the possible disintegration, it is likely that CISC will continue to adhere to the peace process and may support the implementation of the PA. However, the region will remain much more unstable and insecure in comparison to all other districts regarding the overall security situation, especially the risk of attacks against the civilian population ● However, there is a risk that the groups that demand an end of the Peace Process and a separation of the South from Carana will become more powerful. This may end the participation and also will end the support to implement any PA.

Key Factor	Assessment	Dynamics
		•
El Hasar: El Hasar operates mainly in Katasi and partly in Sumora. However, El Hasar uses the western part of Carana as a retreat and carries out raids and atrocities on a smaller scale against the civilian population. France, invited by the Government of Katasi, deployed a brigade-sized force to Katasi to support the Katasi government in neutralizing El Hasar.	Currently, El Hasar is still able to operate on a smaller scale in Katasi and to further destabilize the situation. Until now, the bilateral engagement of Katasi and France has not had any decisive impact on El Hasar operative capabilities. However, since France is operating in Katasi, El Hasar has increased their activities in the western part of Carana.	• El Hasar will most likely continue to operate mainly in Katasi, partly in Sumora and uses Carana as retreat area. They may increase their activities depending on the success of the FRAFOR and Katasi force deployment. • If the ability to operate in Katasi is more limited because of the strong presence of FARFOR and Katasi Force, there is a risk that they will increase their operations to western Carana in order to secure their negotiating position and to set MPC and GOC under pressure. That may cause the MPC will leave the current negotiation and not support the running Peace process.
Warlords: Various warlords exercise power over large areas in central Carana. They finance themselves by mining diamonds and make great profits from them. They are not actively involved in the current peace process.	The warlords in central Carana are currently well established. They exercise executive power in that region. Neither the GOC, MPC nor CISC have sufficient power to regain control over the area. However, the diamond mines are important for the economic rise of the Carana.	• The planned transitional GOC will not be able to solve this problem without any support from the international community. As long as nobody is engaging the warlords, they will continue their activities and will most probably increase security concerns in the controlled areas.
Elassi Liberation Front (ELF): The ELF has been infiltrating South Carana from Rimoso beginning of 2019. The ELF is suspected to cooperate with splinter groups of the CISC. ELF is further destabilizing the overall security situation in the south by randomly assaulting the civilian population.	The ELF is a further uncontrolled armed group destabilizing the overall security situation in the south. They are most probably interested in strong cooperation with CISC, however not interested in a peaceful development of Carana.	• In any case, the activities can lead to further fragmentation of the CISC. In addition, the activities of the ELF lead to an increasing danger for the civilian population, from which they are neither protected by the government nor the CISC.
French Forces (FRAFOR): FRAFOR, a brigade-size force invited by the Government of Katasi, supports to neutralize El Hasar. By consent of the GOC, FRAFOR also deploys occasionally to the El Hasar	The FRAFOR engagement will stabilize the situation in Katasi. Until now the French forces were not able to neutralize El Hasar decisively or to prevent El Hasar any border crossing	• The support of FRAFOR to in Katasi will have a decisive effect on the ability of El Hasar to operate freely in Katasi. However, neutralization of El Hasar will be not possible

Key Factor	Assessment	Dynamics
retreat areas in Carana. Until now the French forces were not able to defeat El Hasar decisively or to prevent El Hasar from entering the territory of Carana.	activities to Carana.	within the next year. Moreover, the operations in Katasi may increase the activities of El Hasar in western Carana, which may negatively affect the current peace process.
Humanitarian Situation: Carana has been showing all elements of a humanitarian emergency for the past two years. Aid and assistance coverage is especially low in the South due to cited security issues. Main problems are: Food insecurity for 46 % of the population, very limited access to medical support, 700,000 IDPs and 30,000 refugees.	The current means to tackle the humanitarian emergency are not sufficient or effective. Humanitarian actors, especially in the South, need protection and a secured right to free movement. The main problems may undermine confidence in the new transitional government and strengthen groups opposed to the PA.	Due to the current political and economic situation, the humanitarian situation will remain a humanitarian crisis and a major risk in implementing the PA. The overall security situation restricts or limits the access for Humanitarian Actors especially in the South and the border region to Katasi.
Economic Situation: The lack of infrastructure in rural areas impedes most trade activities across communities. Education opportunities are scarce. Due to the unclear legal and security situation, foreign direct investment has stagnated at 2.6% of GDP and is mainly reserved to mining. Economic growth has been negative for the past 6 years.	The poor economic situation in Carana is one of the causes of the dissatisfaction of the population with the conditions in the country. This leaves the population vulnerable to all forms of influence and propaganda. In addition, it might bring more fighters to the various armed groups.	The numerous international development projects have improved the situation slightly, but the process is very slow. The unreliable security and judicial sectors and the lack of infrastructure impede economic growth. That will not change in the near future.
EEZ Disputes with Rimosa: The dispute over the oil reserves on the coast of Carana and Rimosa is currently a purely political dispute that has not yet led to any military conflicts. At present, none of the affected states has the capable naval force to enforce their claims at sea.	Even though the conflict has not yet led to military clashes, it has the potential to become an armed conflict. Although none of them has the means to operate and control the sea area, it can still lead to clashes at the border or to the support of armed groups. In any case, this conflict has the potential to destabilize the south of Carana and can lead to a disruption of the peace process.	The dispute between the GOC and Rimosa will remain on the political level. Border clashes, support of CISC in gaining more power or to destabilize the situation in Carana cannot be ruled out.



SG's Planning Directive

Secretary-General's Planning Directive Planning for a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Carana

1. The United Nations Security Council, in its Presidential Statement S/PRST/2020/24 of 14 December 2020 stated its preparedness to consider measures to assist in the implementation of an effective ceasefire agreement and an agreed process for political settlement of the conflict in Carana.
2. In light of the ongoing violence and consistent violation of human rights in Carana, the displacement of more than 700,000 people, and the implications of the conflict for the region more generally, the objective of the United Nations should be to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in a united Carana, where human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens is assured and in which internally displaced persons and refugees can return home in safety and dignity; and to contribute to the protection of civilians at risk. This should be achieved through a multidimensional presence, including political, military, police, humanitarian and human rights elements.
3. The deployment of a United Nations operation in Carana assumes that the Kalari process will have produced effective ceasefire arrangements and a comprehensive peace agreement, and that the United Nations should be prepared to supervise and directly support the implementation of such an agreement. The success of a United Nations operation in Carana will require the provision to the United Nations, by Member States, of military and police personnel to deploy into Carana; as well as critical intelligence and logistical capabilities, and sustained political and humanitarian support.
4. In consideration of the of the above, the Under Secretary General for peacekeeping operations will identify a course of action for the United Nations system which will produce options for a multi-dimensional United Nations Mission in Carana. These options should be prepared by 23 July 2021 for my review and subsequent presentation to the United Nations Security Council. These options should reflect an integrated mission that should include political, military, police, human rights, public information and support elements; they should reflect a close linkage to the existing humanitarian operation and should be based on the findings of a thorough technical assessment carried out in Carana, and should factor in the physical and logistical challenges presented by the general degradation of Carana infrastructure. These options should clearly define the obligations of all major stakeholders and should be developed with the full participation of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, which have an operational presence in Carana, and in close

consultation with Carana, the Fasias Union (FU), the Peace Building Commission, key partners, and members of the Security Council.

5. All identified options should allow the United Nations to achieve its objective as described above.

23rd May 2021

USG DPO's Planning Directive



Under Secretary-General's Planning Directive Planning for a United Nations Operation in Carana

SITUATION

The conflict in Carana has reached a stalemate in which the government can no longer control significant portions of the country and other elements have stepped in to fill the vacuum. In the east and south, an alternative structure is evolving in areas controlled by the Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) and Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC). No single entity is capable of achieving a successful military outcome to the conflict, resources are tight, and ethnic tensions have been increasingly evident with atrocities being committed in a number of areas. The worst-case scenario would see the stalemate that exists now sliding into a state of general anarchy, or see a de facto break-up of the country under individual factions. The ongoing peace process offers the only real option for sustainable peace, and is an essential precursor to any long-term ability to address the root causes of the conflict.

The International Community, led by the Fasia Union (FU) has played a significant role in moving the peace process forward and is increasingly optimistic that an agreement will be reached in the near future, key aspects of are likely to include:

- Mechanisms for disengagement, implementation and monitoring of a ceasefire;
- Confidence building measures, including the release of prisoners;
- Respect for human rights;
- Establishment of a National Transitional Government of Carana (NTGC);
- Commitment to the longer term establishment of a democratically elected government;
- Disarmament of armed groups;
- Restructured military and police capacities.

United Nations Security Council S/PRST/2020/24 confirmed the Council's readiness to consider active UN involvement and with a letter from President of the Security Council, dated 13 May 2021, tasked the Secretariat to initiate planning a multidimensional UN Mission to support the implementation of a ceasefire and a long-term political settlement.

Based on the SG Planning Directive of 17th December 2020 an Integrated Task Force (ITF) has been formed conducting a Strategic Assessment and Department of Peace Operations (DPO) has

assumed lead responsibility to conclude the operational planning and prepare the deployment of a UN multi-dimensional Mission to Carana.

The operational imperative is to ensure that the UN system is prepared to act quickly and deploy an integrated mission as soon as the terms of a peace -/ceasefire agreement are confirmed. The conditions for such a deployment are generally good but any delay will create an opportunity for disaffected groups to undermine the process, and result in a renewed cycle of violence with consequences for both the long-term political situation and the immediate humanitarian problem.

The plan produced under DPO's directive must synchronise the immediate stabilisation objectives within the overall framework of recovery, reconstruction and development, which is essential for long-term stability in Carana.

STRATEGIC DIRECTION

Strategic direction was given by Security Council S/PRST/2020/24 which stated that: *"The objective of the United Nations should be to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in a united Carana, where human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens assured and in which internally displaced persons and refugees can return home in safety and dignity, and to contribute to the protection of civilians at risk."*

Within the International Community and the parties to the conflict it was agreed that the role of the UN in Carana, will be to assist the parties in all aspects of the implementation of the peace agreement, in the establishment of the rule of law, in the revitalization of the economy, in the restoration of trust between all war factions and in the relief of humanitarian emergencies. National ownership of the process will be key to success.

A potential multi-dimensional UN Mission in Carana will consist of:

- A civilian component to advise and assist the transitional government and to support the parties in their peace process; particularly in the field of:
 - re-establishment of acceptable standards of human rights
 - protecting civilian, particularly the most vulnerable groups
 - rebuilding the necessary governmental institutions
 - re-establishment of the rule of law,
 - strengthening the structures and institutions of the civil society,
 - building a Forces de la Défense et Sécurité du Carana (FDSC),
 - incorporate and reintegrate armed groups into Carana's security institutions, the civil service and societal institutions
 - establishing and restructuring the national police force in Carana,
 - preparing for elections on whatever timescale is established by the peace agreement,

- addressing the economic needs of Carana, as a basis for sustainable peace,
 - rebuilding the education and public health system shattered by the conflict
 - coordination of humanitarian and development activities in Carana, in accordance with the mandate of a potential Mission in Carana
 - providing Good Offices in addressing and resolving the disputes between Carana and its neighbouring countries.
- A military component with the task to:
 - observe and monitor the ceasefire, report violations and contribute to the rebuilding of trust between the parties,
 - provide protection to UN personnel and facilities, as well as protection of civilians
 - prevent spoilers from disrupting the implementation of the Peace Agreement and protect civilians within capabilities in imminent threat, within the vicinity, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Carana,
 - provide assistance in support of programmes to disarm armed groups, demobilize and assist in the reintegration of former combatants,
 - provide assistance in demining and security sector reform (SSR),
 - provide support to humanitarian assistance; this is defined as providing physical protection when necessary and requested.
 - A police component with the task to:
 - advice Carana national authorities on all police issues,
 - support the establishment and restructuring of an efficient nationwide Carana police service which acts in accordance with the law and international standards of human rights,
 - support Carana, national authorities to create an efficient vetting system for the recruitment of police officers,
 - support Carana national authorities to establish an efficient police education and training system.
 - provide protection for IDP – camps in close coordination with the local police authorities,
 - fight organized crime in support of local authorities,
 - support and train the police service in crowd and riot control activities.

- A Mission Support Component with the task to:
 - plan, coordinate, set-up, and maintain the administration and logistics structures to deploy, operate and sustain the UN PKM in Carana,
 - be able to support other UN entities in the field if required and within capabilities,
 - plan, coordinate and manage the Mission Budget.

STAKEHOLDERS

Achieving the objective will require a concerted effort by all stakeholders. The full involvement of the United Nation Country Team (UNCT) in the work of the Integrated Task Force (ITF) is essential from the outset.

In addition to those represented in the ITF, it is essential to ensure that:

- The Government of Carana, is included, and that its responsibilities are clearly understood by all parties,
- Individual Member States, International Organisations and donors who are prepared to support the reconstruction effort are encouraged to do so, and engaged at an early stage.

AREA OF OPERATIONS

The Area of Operation is strictly defined as the territory of Carana.

INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY

To use the momentum and to meet the pace of the peace agreement, the mission shall reach an initial operational capability no later than M + 120.

ASSUMPTIONS

The finally signed Ceasefire and Peace Agreement between the FDC, MPC and CISC will not differ in its essential parts from the current discussed and negotiated documents.

The parties will continue to cooperate with the UN and a potential UN Peacekeeping Mission.

If an agreement is signed, the parties will comply with the Peace Agreement.

2nd June 2021

Report of the UN Technical Survey Team for Carana



June 2021

1. Political

1.1 Overview

Even after the beginning of the negotiations for the Ceasefire- and Peace Agreement, Carana can be described as politically unstable. The government lost control over the West and the South of the country. Even in the government-controlled areas its real power is very limited. An increasing level of public resistance can be barely handled by the security forces. The administration displays a dramatic lack of efficiency. Official administration in the rebel-controlled areas is non-existent. Institutional political mechanisms, such as parties or formal civil society gatherings, are currently non-existent.

1.2 Political Parties

Political parties beside the PDC do not yet exist in Carana. Remaining elements of former parties have lost their internal structure and are more politically motivated individuals than organized political parties.

Some smaller unimportant political movements could be identified during the survey. These are small groups in the capital and Maldosa as well as ethnical motivated minority groups of Kori along the coastline. These groups are not organized and have little importance because of their specific interest and suffer from a lack of followers. The unions of the coal and copper miners and the teachers' union are better organized, but single-interest groups and without clear political aims. The National Bar Association and Carana Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture are well-established civil society organizations, but fraught with internal struggles and divided among government supporters and opposition.

Realizing that participation in power will in future eventually be determined by elections, the Mouvement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) leadership is currently formulating comprehensive political aims and preparing for a political role. Based on the shown discipline and organization of this rebel movement, it can be assessed that MPC might be able to develop a political arm or transform itself into a political movement. With strong public support in the West, the MPC is likely to become a strong political power.

The Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC) currently are far away from a potential transition into a political movement. The dynamic of this rebel group was motivated by the poor living conditions, the dissatisfaction with the current government and by ethnical motives. Clear political motives and aims do currently not exist within this movement.

Carana has no organized political exile groups in other countries.

1.3 Elections

Having free and democratic elections within 6 months of the adoption of the new constitution of Carana, as foreseen by the Kalari peace negotiations, will be very difficult, full of obstacles and will require the support of the international community.

After years of violated human rights, despotism, civil war and corruption, public trust in governmental institutions and activities is almost gone. Efficient structures of political opposition groups and parties currently do not exist. Inefficient administration, civil war and large population movements (IDPs) have caused a clear lack of popular registration.

If all parties adhere to the commitments of the Kalari Peace Treaty, it can be assumed that the MPC will participate on future elections and try to play a political role in Carana. In the case of the CISC this is uncertain. Additionally, uncontrolled armed groups create a severe security risk in the CISC area and are expected to challenge the preparation and conduct of elections.

1.4 International relations

Although relations with Katasi and Rimosa remain tense, currently the likelihood of intra-state conflict is considered low. New external threats evolved with the formation of the El Hasar terrorist group in Katasi, as well as with rebellion groups (ELF and associated) in Rimosa. ELF groups are known to collaborate with CISC splinter groups and plan to establish a Caliphate in Rimosa and perhaps in southern Carana. While not considered an immediate threat to Caranese territorial sovereignty, these groups need to be observed closely.

A French counter-insurgency operation (Opération Aigle) is stationed in Katasi to eliminate El Hasar fighters and in accordance with GOC and MPC forces actively pursues El Hasar across the Katasi-Carana border.

Rimosa and Carana still dispute the ownership of some of the islands along the southern coastline of Carana and their surrounding Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). The main issues underpinning this dispute are recently discovered oilfields in the general area, as well as fishing rights.

2. Human rights situation

The armed conflict in Carana has also resulted in serious violations and abuses of human rights and humanitarian law, including deliberate and arbitrary killings, disappearances, torture, widespread rape and sexual violence against women, girls and young boys, arbitrary arrests and detention, forced conscription, recruitment and use of child soldiers, systematic and forced displacement, and indiscriminate targeting of civilians. Of the estimated 150,000 people who have lost their lives in war-related circumstances since 2014 at least half were civilian non-combatants. There are eyewitness accounts of massacres of civilians and reports of mass graves, some dating back to 2011. All sides have been responsible for violations and abuses. Torture was widely used by all parties to the conflict. Government militias, police and paramilitary units are known to maintain torture chambers.

The conflict militarized Carana's society with a proliferation of militia groups that lacked any statutory command and control structures. Children were forcibly recruited and constitute a substantial portion of the fighting forces on all sides. Estimates indicate that one out of every 10 children may have been recruited at some time or another into the war effort. In the southern

regions, children and adolescents also frequently are members of local protection units aiming to spare their villages from militia raids.

There has been a severe deterioration and gradual attrition of the institutions for the protection and promotion of human rights and the rule of law. As noted above, the police and judiciary have been severely degraded. In these circumstances, extortion has become institutionalized. Civil society is extremely weak and lacks the resources and capacity to be effective.

For several years, Carana has been a focus of attention for the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and human rights special procedures. Since the peace process has started, a number of human rights assessment missions has been conducted in some parts of the country that have recently become accessible. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) has been supporting a protection programme implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to improve security in camps for internally displaced persons. By means of that programme some monitoring mechanisms were established and maintained in the camps, including the posting of 20 monitors there.

3. Constitution and Judicial System

The Constitution and judicial system in Carana are based on modern democratic principles. The human rights violations in Carana are not the result of an insufficient legal framework, but rather the result of the Ogavo administration's inability to uphold law and order. Under the "State of Emergency" a system of mixed civilian/military courts, with very limited rights of appeal, has been put in place to try all treason, terrorist and other similar cases. Carana courts regularly impose the death penalty for serious crimes.

The current administration has announced that changes will be made to court appointments, but to date no changes have been made in practice. It needs to be seen how the review of the justice system, which has been discussed as part of the draft peace agreement, will result in changes to the current system and if a fair representation of police and judicial personnel can be implemented. Enough trained and qualified personnel needs to be available to revitalize the Rule of Law sector. The international community might be requested for assistance in providing guidance and training, especially for legal training and qualifications.

4. Security

4.1 Overview

As a result of the intense fighting between government forces and rebels, the poor economic situation, the high number of displaced people, the low police presence outside of the capital and the widespread dissatisfaction with the government, the level of general security in Carana is low. Civil unrest is widespread, smaller uprisings occur on a regular basis and the level of crime is high. In general, the security situation in Carana must be assessed as "medium risk".

Increased and more radicalised level of criminal activity, some of it organized in urban areas, resulting from the poor economic situation. In the North and West there is increasing evidence of criminal usurpation of the diamond mining, probably with government connivance and controlled by cartels based in Sumora.

Some areas have to be assessed as “high risk”. These are the areas around Galasi, Akkabar and the Leppko province.

4.1.1 Galasi – Fellari Province

In Galasi the risk is based on the high level of crime in the suburbs and IDP camps around and towards the West of the capital. In the suburbs of Galasi gangs of youngsters in strength up to 100 rule the streets. These gangs are not well organized but can cause a severe threat even to smaller military formations.

Criminality in the IDP camps is mostly a result of poverty and hopelessness. The people in the camps are victims as well as perpetrators.

4.1.2 Akkabar- Hanno Province

In Akkabar, the coal mine workers started a revolt after they had not been paid for months and because of the dramatic increase of the price level for food. As a result of poverty and disappointment small groups formed spontaneously and attacked government institutions and police stations. These groups are not very well organized but receive a lot of support from the population.

4.1.3 East Mahbek – West Barin Province

The diamond fields along the Kalesi River west of the Kilu Reservoir have been exploited by several actors. During the war, MPC gained control over most of the diamond fields and has drawn the majority of its funding from this source. Different attempts by government forces to regain control of these national resources failed. During years of heavy fighting, landmines were used intensively.

Seizing their chance among the conflict between government forces and rebels, different criminal groups got more and more involved in the exploitation and smuggling of diamonds. Impact on the peace process and threats to the local population posed by the In the North and West there is growing evidence of criminal usurpation of the diamond mining, probably with government knowledge, and supposedly controlled by cartels based in Sumora. To gather work force, many groups consider it common practice to abduct children in the surrounding villages and use them as forced mine workers. Adult mine workers often suffer from payment systems akin to slavery. UNODC has reported several instances of police forces colluding or actively participating in diamond smuggling and related human and drug trafficking. Armed groups, mainly rebel groups pertaining to major warlords in the region, have frequently abducted, exploited and trafficked civilians.

4.1.4 Leppko Province

The lack of authority in Leppko province resulted in a surge of uncontrolled armed groups that together with CISC combatants loot and conduct atrocities against local communities. These groups are mostly made up by former rebels from Rimosa frequently crossing the border. Links between CISC and these uncontrolled armed groups are denied by CISC, but several reports of incidents are at least indicators of the existence of such links.

Ex-rebels, especially from younger age groups, formed armed local gangs and create a serious threat for the local population and any developing representation of state authority.

Recently, some splinter groups of CISC have declared their opposition to the peace negotiations and have instead called for separation. Some of these splinter groups are reported to cooperate with ELF fighter cells. In some hotspots where both ELF and CISC splinter groups were present word travelled about an independent state of Rimosa and southern Carana that was to be established by CISC and ELF. Several humanitarian actors have reported raids and at times incidents of sexual violence against non-aligned communities.

On another note, the political dispute between Rimosa and Carana over the ownership of some of the islands along the southern coastline of Carana has slightly intensified. So far, good offices provided by the UN and FU have not helped to ease the tensions over EEZ demarcations, which have flared up mainly because of oilfields newly discovered in the general area and because of fishing rights. Uncorroborated reports allege Rimosan support of ELF and CISC splinter group elements.

4.1.5 Koloni and Tereni Province

The French COIN operations against the El Hasar insurgency in neighbouring Katasi have pushed El Hasar into Caranese territory. In western Koloni and Tereni, El Hasar fighters now exploit local communities for logistics and supply, and have also begun to recruit locals for their purposes, so far ineffectively. The government of Carana and MPC have agreed to coordinate its actions against El Hasar with Operation Aigle (FRAFOR), given prior notification by FRAFOR, and the situation is deemed stable. In the medium-term, this joint effort may create an obstacle to the DDR of MPC fighters. Government institutions and FDC troops are currently not present on the ground there.

4.2 Military Forces and Armed Groups

Coming closer to the expected Ceasefire / Peace Agreement all parties have mainly stayed in their positions along the boundaries between rebel-controlled and government-controlled areas. Even though the parties were very reluctant to provide information about their positions, talks with NGOs and UN security gave a picture about the current deployment of FDC, MPC and CISC forces. It can be assumed that the information contained in this report is 80% to 90 % accurate.

4.2.1 Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC)

The FDC currently has a strength of 20,000 (all services), the land forces are organized in four brigades. Their HQs are located in Galasi, Corma and Maroni. The majority of their troops are engaged close to the rebel-controlled areas. As a result of the increasing logistical problems, the

units operate more and more statically and have lost the ability to run large-scale mobile operations.

Although many of the FDC soldiers have gained remarkable combat experience, their overall training level must be considered to be low. During the fact-finding mission, no training activities could be observed in any of the barracks. Talks with FDC officers revealed that no firing training was conducted with the tanks or the artillery guns. The rank-and-file personnel at the external outposts and checkpoints did not appear to be highly motivated and suffered from poor leadership. In the course of the few talks with rank-and-file personnel, it became evident that they neither knew their exact mission, nor did they know how long they would stay in the specific location and what the situation was like in their immediate surroundings.

Within the Carana Air force only few aircrafts are still operational. They are normally stationed in Galasi and operate from this base. Naval Forces are stationed in Galasi and Maldosa. The readiness of the boats is assessed to be low. The regular land forces are composed of three brigades and some additional units. They are dislocated as follows:

Brigade	Location	Unit
Luomo Brigade		
	Galasi	Brig HQ, Inf Bn, Heli Sqdr
	Kalei	Inf Bn
	Lisbo	Inf Bn
Soxu Brigade		
	Maroni	Brig HQ, Inf Bn, Eng Coy, Trp Coy, Art Bty
	Akkabar	Inf Bn, Tank Coy
	Karo	Inf Bn, Recce Coy
Alduro Brigade		
	Folsa	Brig HQ, Inf Bn, Art Bty
	Faro	Inf Bn
	Xalksa	Inf Bn, Recce Coy
Opota Brigade		
	Corma	Brig HQ, Inf Bn, Eng Coy
	Muka	Inf Bn, Trp Coy
	Maldosa	Inf Bn

Most of the deployed FDC units are spread out in the area. Normally they have less than 100 troops in the official battalion locations. The majority of the troops are dislocated in platoon formations around the battalion HQs. The area one battalion covers can be up to 200 square miles.

Identified field positions

Cerska, Rekl, Grid, Karo, Maxel, Faron, Treppek, Ames, Focca, Xalksa, Hikei, Maui, Akkabar, Sulo, Supsa, Rark, Mufo, Hilla, Hofsa, Zerbke, Folsa, Ovel, Bakso, Maroni, Muka, Lauro, Corma, Lisbo, Arte, Samsong, Sorso, Sirkef, Kalu, Amsan, Asak, Dropok, Schwarz

All military aircrafts are posted at the military part of Galasi airports.

There are two naval bases in Carana, one in Galasi and a smaller one in Maldosa.

4.2.2 Presidential Guards

The Presidential Guard has a strength equivalent to two infantry battalions and it is not part of the regular defence force. The units are mainly stationed in and around Galasi. The commanders and most officers are from the tribe of President Ogavo.

Members of the Presidential Guard received intensive training and are entitled to several privileges. The units are a loyal elite force with the task to protect the President. They are also used for special purpose tasks. In the recent past, the elements of the Presidential Guard were used several times, together with Gendarmerie units, to fight against rebel groups, and has a reputation for being particularly brutal.

4.2.3 Movement Patriotique du Carana (MPC)

The MPC has an assessed strength of 10,000 fighters. It is expected that they will not return to their villages until the Peace Agreement is signed. The positions of the MPC are mostly austere field camps with some hundred fighters attached to villages or little towns. The field camps are normally not fortified and the boundaries between the camps and the villages are fluent.

All locations with MPC presence established a rudimentary communal system to provide security and some administrative functions without any legitimation. In the mainland of the rebels, Alur, Maki and Norke became regional centres with some administrative importance.

The MPC still has a relatively strong coherence based on ethnical structures and loyalty to their leaders. Assumedly, the aim of the MPC leadership is still pursuing to participate at the national government. The likelihood that MPC will comply with a future peace agreement is assessed high.

Identified field positions:

Kaso, Alur, Hixop, Molle, Sigel, Maki, Kissoli, Irasmok, Ykso, Pellet, Norke, Bondallo, Lurok, Risaan, Koepi, Apo, Roskur, Astra, Beks, Malzek, Ballard, Buske, Salbu, Spatoka, Fonskoll, Ludee, Vorbuk, Pifke, Jerkso, Soda, Polli, Perkes, Piksek, Trith, Recke, Gobel, Vuso, Osoni, Lurchi, Leergut, Mogot, Kalei, Luxel, Nusbet, Kiku, Takeri, Suppo, Klappe

Initial assessment on age composition of MPC:

- Min. 15% female soldiers (above 18)
- Approx. 20% under 18 (boys and girls), of which the youngest actively fighting are estimated to be 14 years of age
- There are children attached to armed forces of younger age (supporters or children of soldiers)
- There has been increasing recruitment of civilians in the last phases of the war, partly forced
- All MPC forces have family members with them, but the numbers are not known.

4.2.4 Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC)

During the fighting, CISC fighters operated primarily from their villages without deploying in camps or permanent positions. After the fighting stopped, it can be assumed that most CISC rebels were living in their home villages and group only occasionally. The loose structure of CISC makes it very difficult to assess their strength and positions precisely. It can be assumed that the number of active fighters has not changed and is about 3,000 - 5,000 fighters.

Even though CISC did not until now attack FDC positions and no activities of CISC outside the claimed area are reported, there are doubts that CISC will stay consequently to the formally agreed obligations. During the last four weeks several acts of violence against ethnic minorities were reported in the rebel-controlled area by international organizations. At least participation of some individual rebels seems likely.

In contrast to the MPC, CISC has not tried to establish administrative functions and exercises control in the region only by the rule of the force.

Identified field positions:

Agati, Munro, Saksa, Rumro, Egro, Kika, Lufto, Mia, Libol, Rummke, Berla, Tuarik,

Initial assessment on age composition of CISC:

- Only very vague data available on gender composition; there is a small number of female soldiers above 18
- Approx. 20% under 18-year-olds (boys and girls); there are "special youth-squads"
- Forced recruitment of civilians is frequent

4.2.5 Militias

The militias in southern Carana do not have any clearly identifiable command and control structures and territorial borders. They are strongly influenced by the individual leader and his personality. Allegiance is frequently based on the question of how well a militia leader takes care of his people and what he has to distribute. There seemed to be no cooperation or coordination between the individual militia groups. Frequently, the cohesion within a militia group and its coordination of actions is quite loose and only momentary.

While several of these groups fought on the side of the government or the rebels, they did not establish a firm relationship with the parties to the conflict. Some of these armed groups changed sides several times. In particular over the last few years most of the militias have been operating on the side of the government.

Information about loyalty, internal structures and objectives of individual militias should be considered with care, since the militia commanders' loyalty is not strongly developed and since these armed groups do not have any political objectives. They all pursue objectives of their own. Territorial claims and the struggle for power are their essential motives.

Identified field positions and estimated strength:

Militia	Commander	Strength	Loyalty	Location
Mituro Army	Alan Gesamo	600	FDC	Zumi
Medari Forces	Benedict Colamo	500	uncertain	Ghermo
CISC Oloma	Abdul Khasar	1,100	CISC	Olso
Gefaso Forces	Herit Gefaso	800	uncertain	Vortre
South Liberation Army	Hamus Gedomo	900	CISC	Bokso

Note: All information on the estimated number of children attached to armed groups has been obtained from the international NGO "Group against Child Soldiers."

4.2.6 Warlords

During the years of fighting, several smaller armed groups have formed in Leppko. Some of these groups are fragmentations of the CISC or deserters from the government forces. Other groups have arisen from local vigilant groups built to protect their villages from attacks from soldiers and rebels.

These groups operate mainly in the northern Leppko province, chiefly for economic reasons (theft, illegal exploitation of resources, ransom) and are perceived as loyal to their leaders (warlords). Initial information indicates that these groups consist of 300 up to 1,000 fighters with light weapons.

The aims and loyalties of these groups are very uncertain and the boundary from local militias to armed bandits is fluent. None of these groups is part of the ongoing peace process.

4.2.7 El Hasar

The El Hasar group was formed in 2018 in the neighbouring country of Katasi and turned into a "terror organisation" requesting their own state and engaging in guerrilla type terror operations against the Katasi government. Following anti-terror operations conducted by the Government of Katasi supported by the French Forces, El Hasar fighters/elements frequently cross the border into Carana in the western parts of the Koloni and Tereni Region.

Recent El Hasar incursions into Carana were reported in the area North and South along the Kalesi River into the direction of Terpil and Herai villages in the North and towards Pukka and Maki in the South of the River. Local communities continue to report armed attacks and raids on villages by

these elements, the latter stealing money, food, supply items like spare parts, gas and ammunition. Reports also indicate violence against civilians such as rape, torture and other casualties. While attacking local communities El Hasar is avoiding direct engagement / confrontation with the MPC.

Unconfirmed reports claim the fundamentalist elements from both the Tatsi and Kori communities are supporting / sympathising with the El Hasar fighters/elements. The FDC and MPC do not have the capability to engage the El Hasar elements. Both, however, agreed to allow the French Forces to pursue the fighters into the territory of Carana.

4.2.8 Elassi Liberation Front (ELF)

The ELF was formed in 2018 in the neighbouring country of Rimosa and is conducting insurgency operations against the Rimosa government. They mainly operate south of the Carana border in Rimosa, but have begun to challenge CISC in southern Carana and collaborate with some CISC splinter groups. Recruitment for ELF has surged both in Carana and Rimosa during the past year.

Carana communities along the border and along the road from Eres to Kika continue to report armed attacks and raids on villages by ELF elements, who are held to be stealing money, food, supply items like spare parts, gas and ammunition. Reports also indicate violence against civilians like rape, torture and other casualties.

4.3 Rule of law and Security institutions

Almost two decades of internal conflict, mismanagement and lack of progress have influenced negatively on all government institutions, civil society and public life in general. Institutions upholding the rule of law often lack strong democratic structures, are neglected in terms of resources and funding and are often misused for other purposes. Against this backdrop and the critical challenges that lie ahead following the signing of the Peace Agreement (PA), there is an urgent need to assist these institutions to bolster their capacity to develop within democratic parameters.

The estimated number of CNP and gendarmerie amount to about 10,000 officers, or one officer for every 1,700 citizens. Very few of these are women. There is no clarity about the exact figure of national police, or even if those in police uniforms are certified police officers. Police stations in the districts and regions are run down and in need of repair.

Land and maritime border policing, immigration, customs, port authority and other related sectors of internal security have ceased to function. In recent months, evidence of organised criminal activities, especially drug and human trafficking have come to light, in some cases involving collusion or active participation by law enforcement officials. Crime rates particularly in population centres are high and there are numerous reports of abuses perpetrated by the law enforcement agencies. This inefficiency and erosion of professional standards has led to a widespread loss of credibility in the eyes of the population.

4.3.1 Rule of Law

The local police are part of the Ministry of Interior and maintain the police presence in rural areas and was responsible for border security. However, in recent years the local police were used more often to suppress opposition political groups than for rural security or border control. In addition, FDC units often exercise police tasks, representing government power in the internal security role. For these reasons, the relationship between civil society and the police force is not very good, with many people being suspicious of the police. There is a crisis of credibility and impunity.

The institutional and operational gaps in the rule of law sector are further compounded by a massive circulation of small arms, continued low-intensity conflict in some parts of the country, and a problem of confidence amongst parts of the populace in the justice system. In governance issues, decades of over-centralized government, rule of law practices, development disparities between the centre and the regions, and weak or non-existent administrative capacities in some parts of the East and South of Carana compound the situation.

Military activities, tribal fighting and small arms represent the greatest threat to the enforcement of the rule of law. Military and security forces are the principal agents of 'law and order', sometimes at the cost of human rights. It is anticipated that violence will continue to plague certain areas in spite of the coming PA. In the current environment and imbued with a strong sense of a right to own arms, communities view their arms as the only means of protection in the atmosphere of insecurity. The problem is further amplified by the lack of infrastructure, skilled professionals, and communication, all of which prevent access to formal justice systems.

4.3.2 Government of Carana (GoC) National Police

The Carana National Police (CNP) currently operates only in GoC controlled areas. Drawing its authority from the Police Act, April 2013, the force was initially organized under the Ministry of Interior with national jurisdiction based on a colonial policing model. For many years, it has been largely isolated from international policing developments while other security agencies and military forces under special emergency legislation dominate police powers. The FDC in recent years took over the basic police functions and the only Police Academy in a GoC area, in Galasi, was transformed into FDC barracks.

The Police Act from April 2013 gave the police a very broad responsibility including all civil police duties, prisons, border control, customs, issue of passports, driving licences and identity documents, immigration, public morality, fire brigade and wildlife services.

Formal training for all police personnel is military in nature. Outside of Galasi, logistical and technical support does practically not exist. The overall strength of the Carana Police Force is a little more than 10,000 officers. Police stations exist in:

Location	# of stations	Location	# of stations
Galasi	12, incl. Police Academy	Faron	4
Cereni	5	Focca	1
Lora	3	Treppek	1
Turen	4	Tekkla	1
Maldosa	5	Torta	1
Corma	3	Lisbo	1
Amsan	3	Maroni	4
Folsa	3	Kalei	2
Arum	2	Akkabar	2
Maui	2	Ames	1
Muka	1	Karo	1
Xalksa	2	Sureen	2

Beside these established police stations, some police officers in the smaller communities live as part of the population.

4.3.3 Movement Patriotique du Carana (MPC) held areas

The Police Act from April 2013, under the Ministry of Interior, also theoretically governs policing in West Carana. However, the police structure is rudimentary; some areas in the line of conflict have no police force at all. There are currently about 50 formally trained police officers and up to 300 personnel appointed from the ranks of the MPC. They are unpaid and most have no uniform. They are largely untrained, although the Carana Police trained a small number prior to joining the MPC. Infrastructure and other logistic and technical support is almost non-existent. The MPC appointed police officers are subordinate to the respective Army HQ.

4.3.4 Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC) held areas

No regular police force services the South anymore. The CISC have taken over all police functions.

4.3.5 Police Training Facilities

The Police Academy in Galasi, originally built for training and education of specialists and police commanders, has ceased to operate since 2017. The Carana Defence Forces (FDC) is using the facility as barracks. It is overall in quite a bad shape and needs serious refurbishment.

Training facilities for the basic training of police recruits exist in Galasi, Sureen, Amsan, Corma and Folsa. They are still used and offer at least accommodation for police recruits and classrooms with basic equipment (black board etc.). Currently rudimentary training for police recruits with the focus on basic military skills (weapon handling, formal drill, and physical fitness) is conducted in these facilities. The former training facilities in the MPC and CISC held areas, in Alur, Norke, Maki, Kika and Lora are no longer in use. They have been taken over by the MPC and CISC respectively.

The expected inflow of UN police capacity to be employed, as observers, mentors, coaches and trainers need to be evaluated, together with both parties, based on personnel training capabilities available and prevailing security situation in the area.

5. Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR)

All parties to the negotiations, the FDC, MPC and CISC, clearly state their willingness to disarm and establish the FDSC in the draft Kalari Peace Treaty. Assumedly MPC will adhere to this commitment if all parties conform to the Peace Agreement and the MPC get the desired share of senior military and political positions in the country. The reintegration of MPC in the FDSC will be a particularly contested point, given their engagement in the deterrence of El Hasar fighters along the Carana-Katasi border. There, MPC forces continue to provide the only source of border protection and will most likely refuse to disarm these contingents. Supposedly, the FDSC will not be established soon enough to take over border protection there. The FRAFOR mandate only covers Katasi, and so far, an extension of their mandate also to cover Caranese border control until the FDSC is operational is unlikely.

Even though there are currently no indicators that CISC will not disarm, the structures of CISC are loose, the level of discipline is low and the influence and control of the leadership is limited. If CISC rebels do not see clear personal advantages in the disarmament, their commitment will be uncertain and may threaten the process.

However, the most difficult part in the DDR process will be the disarmament and reintegration of the other, less identifiable armed groups. These groups as well as armed parts of the civilian population have not been included in negotiations for the Kalari Peace Treaty and focus more on criminal economic activity than on political participation.

There is a substantial number of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) available throughout Carana. Among the urban rich, people mainly carry rifles in sport shooting clubs and for self-protection. The bulk of these weapons are small-calibre rifles, air arms, and pistols and revolvers.

Civilians are not allowed to own military arms. No licenses are required for hunting rifles, but a license that is required for hunting (of which 560,000 were issued before the war) records the weapon to be used. Prior to the war, the price of a new hunting rifle was USD \$ 130. It is estimated that the number of illegal hunting rifles is much higher, and that many families (40% of households) especially in rural areas own at least one hunting rifle, mainly of older make, but generally well-maintained.

Data obtained by the field research teams of Small Arms Survey yields the following results:

- 16 million rural population, 6 persons/household = 2.7 million households
- 40% of households are estimated to own at least one hunting rifle = 1.07 million weapons

It is estimated that 5% of all households (about 4.5 million) own at least one other type of illegal SALW (other than hunting rifles). These include mainly semi-automatic rifles, as well as pistols and revolvers; most are in good state. This amounts to about 225,000 illegally held SALW.

Combining these numbers, the total number of illegally held and unregistered weapons in Carana is approximately 1,295,000.

6. Economy

Prior to the civil war, the economy of Carana was already suffering from several years of negative growth due to non-functional infrastructure, missing international investment, debt obligations with the international community that could not be serviced, excessive governmental control, corruption and a lack of efficient public administration. The failing economic state of Carana further deteriorated with the outbreak of the war. The production of copper and diamonds was severely affected by fighting close to the mines in the regions of Leppko and Mahbek. Foreign currency influx decreased and limited the ability of the government and population to buy imported goods. Agriculture and trade in the areas close to the fighting were also affected, and the export of timber was severely hampered.

As a result of this economic disturbance, the price level for basic goods and grocery increased dramatically. For many people, earning a living has become extremely difficult and the level of public dissatisfaction has substantially increased. The lack of functional infrastructure, especially dire in rural areas, hinders farmers and traders from reaching markets. Trade routes in central Carana are mostly controlled by an expanding organized crime network demanding tariffs and protection money.

The taxation system is perceived as dysfunctional and corrupt, and employment opportunities in the formal job market are scarce. Carana hosts an elaborate and well-established informal economy. The inflated bureaucracy and the strongly overvalued Carana Franc pegged to the Euro have resulted in a globally non-competitive Caranese formal economy and little manoeuvrability for national fiscal policy. Debtor demands and debt relief conditioned on terms that are not suited to the Caranese context cemented the vicious cycle of financial mismanagement and economic downturn.

The deterioration of the economy has resulted in widespread poverty. In some areas of Carana, a sufficient supply of food cannot be accessed or guaranteed.

7. Infrastructure

7.1 Roads

Carana has a network of capable paved roads, which connect most parts of the country, especially local centres. In the West and the North these roads also ensure communication with the neighbouring countries. All paved roads are mostly unaffected by meteorological effects

especially the rainy season. Carana also has a dense network of partially robust unpaved roads and tracks. Unpaved roads and tracks are mostly very vulnerable against meteorological influence and deteriorate fast if not maintained. Availability of the unpaved roads during the rainy season and the following weeks is highly uncertain.

Bridges along the paved roads are normally steel and concrete constructions, which can carry trucks and heavy vehicles. Bridges along the unpaved roads are normally of wooden construction and must be assessed individually. An assessment of all unpaved roads and bridges during the short time of this survey was not possible.

The paved roads were assessed during this survey and can be considered as mostly intact and capable. But as a result of fighting and a lack of maintenance some parts of the road system are destroyed or in very bad shape. This can especially cause limitations in movement and transportation in Hanno and Leppko. An assessment of all unpaved roads and bridges during the short time of this assessment mission was not possible.

7.2 Railways

The two railway tracks running between Galasi and Akkabar, and between Maldosa and Mia are both mostly in bad shape but operational. Even though the track from Maroni to Akkabar is operational, the north lines end at in Maroni because the railway bridge west of Maroni was damaged by flooding in March 2020. The stations in Galasi, Maroni, Akkabar and Maldosa are sufficiently equipped for loading and unloading of containers, vehicles and all types of goods. The station in Mia is specialized for the transport of copper and has no container facilities.

The condition of the tracks is mostly bad. On some points, damaged tracks cause limitations in speed. With no maintenance, the condition of the railway tracks will further deteriorate and will cause severe problems in the near future.

7.3 Harbours

Carana has three harbours for deep-water ships and some smaller harbours for fishing boats. The smaller harbours have no capacity to support the loading and unloading of ships, but they are suitable for coastal vessels.

The main harbour in Galasi is well equipped with sufficient capacity for large ships and with RoRo capability. By capacity and technical equipment, this harbour will not cause any limitations for deployment and support of a potential Mission. The harbour in Cereni has no RoRo capability but capable cranes and sufficient transport equipment to handle heavy loads.

The harbour in Maldosa is mostly specialized for the transport of copper but it is also capable to handle regular transport ships. The fact that just two wharves are equipped with cranes for vehicles and containers can cause limitations for deployment and support. The location of the harbour in the town results in a lack of free space to store containers or to assemble vehicles. Plenty of space for this purpose is available outside the city.

7.4 Airports

The international airports in Galasi and Corma are both operational and meet international standards for air traffic. Both airports are suitable for heavy and extremely heavy transport aircraft. The airport in Galasi is well equipped for handling heavy material but space for storing equipment and assembling vehicles is limited in and close to the airport. The airport in Galasi is suitable for deployment of personnel and equipment. The airport in Corma has clear limitations for handling heavy air cargo but because of its location outside the city, it has plenty of space close to the airport. The airport in Corma is suitable for the deployment of personnel but is limited by equipment to handle heavy air cargo.

The airports in Alur and Folsa are suitable for medium transport aircraft, but they do not have equipment to handle heavy air cargo. All other airfields, without additional construction work are only suitable for light fixed wing aircraft. They can be used for communication and small size personnel transport. Fuel supplies are only available in Galasi and Corma.

7.5 Electricity

Carana hosts three power plants, the Kilu Dam, the Salobo Dam and a coal power plant in Galasi. In recent years Carana was an energy exporter especially during and after the rainy season. During the fighting most of the power supply equipment around the Salobo Dam was destroyed or damaged.

The rebellion of the workers in the coal mining area in Hanno caused a shortage in coal and limited the production of electricity. In the area supplied from the coal power plant, power shutdowns occur on a regular basis.

Since the power supply system is organized in a regionally oriented star pattern rather than as a network with redundancies, the damage of one main line can cut off a whole area from power. The majority of the country is currently without regular power supply and is relying on generators.

7.6 Water and sanitation

Water is available in most parts of the country, but the quality of water varies. In dry areas south-west of Maldosa and west of Galasi, during the dry season drinking water is mostly taken from small ponds and slow-flowing brooks. The quality of this water is low and causes several diseases. The wells in these regions are not deep enough to reach clean water.

The drinking water close to the coal and copper mining areas is highly polluted and causes different health problems. Here the ground water is already affected by the pollution. The quality of drinking water along the big rivers is mostly high but needs purification.

General water shortages affect all ecosystems in Fasia. In the mountains, less snowfall leads to noticeably less refill of drinking water basins. In the jungle regions, droughts have led to an increase in wildfires and a general degradation of the rainforests.

The forest regions in Fasia often face problems of erosion. Sudden heavy rainfalls on hill slopes that are subject to uncontrolled logging and exhausted aquifers (pools of ground water) frequently

lead to landslides or suddenly sinking ground, thereby destroying shelter, interrupting food and water supplies and are at times accompanied by epidemics. Combined with the non-existent sewage and garbage removal systems, especially in rural regions, at times the landslides have led to a long-term contamination of potable water sources. Permanent disease and health problems are common particularly in the heavy populated areas.

In the coastal regions of Mosana, Namuna, Carana and Rimosa, rising sea levels have caused the inundation of critical infrastructure with salt water, a severe reduction of arable land and the long-term contamination of drinking water. Migration and depletion of fish stocks due to the changing ocean chemistry have increased the strain on resources in all fishing economies and provoked conflicts overfishing territory between Mosana and Namuna, as well as between Carana and Rimosa. Over the past 10 years, the coastal highlands in Sumora have been experiencing a surge in climate-sensitive diseases, mainly malaria and tuberculosis, which previously were confined only to the Lonari river valley and the hot areas in southern Fasias.

8. Landmines and explosives

8.1 Landmines

During the conflict between FDC and rebels, landmines were used by both sides as a means of terror and deterrent and to prevent access to certain areas, and mine obstacles were not documented. As a result of this conduct of mine warfare, as well as through flooding and landslides displacing minefields, the precise location of mines and explosive devices is not documented and mostly unknown.

The mine problem in Carana originates from the military regime of Colonel Tarakoni in the period from 1994-2003. During this time, several military outposts and operation centres were mined for protection, including two key areas in the south province of Leppko, where the military was active in resource extraction activities. Following the signing of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 2011, President Ogavo reported the known locations of mined areas in Carana, which are mainly concentrated in the north and west of the country. However, according to local sources, these areas are not well marked or fenced, and civilian casualties occur on a regular basis.

Despite President Ogavo's declaration of intent to take care of the mine problem in the early days of his regime, there is no formal or planned mine action program in Carana. Due to lack of expertise in de-mining operations, many of these suspected minefields are haphazard and constitute a significant risk for the local communities as well as for the deployment and sustainment of a UN Peacekeeping Mission in Carana.

Currently, the precise locations of additional mined areas are not known due to the ongoing civil war in the country. In a UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) survey conducted in April 2020, the survey team was not granted access to the CISC-controlled part of Leppko province. In addition to the explosive's locations recorded in 2017, the survey found the most affected areas to be those surrounding the frontlines of MPC/FDC and CISC/FDC conflict. 33 communities were affected in central Mahbek and large parts of Koloni, which reported upwards of 130 casualties per year

through landmines and ERWs. In eastern Koloni and throughout Hanno, 40 communities reported suspected minefields and 70 casualties/year. Similar numbers of victims and affected communities are expected in Leppko.

Throughout the rest of the country, landmines are rarely suspected. Mostly men and boys fall victim to ERWs (83% male vs. 17% female), most commonly during farm work or travel by foot. Given the bad transport and health infrastructure, 57% of mine victims did not receive emergency care after the incident. Whereas the actual incidents are a concern of itself, the suspected presence of explosives also hinders farmers and vendors from movement required to make a living, leads families not to send their children to school through suspected minefields, kills livestock. More than 62% of IDPs have fled from mine-impacted communities. During floods and mudslides, mine fields are washed away and reappear elsewhere, making sustainable charting nearly impossible.

8.2 Explosives

The FDC and MPC have exhibited a minimal use of modern explosives, lacking the technical expertise to deal with them. In the later years of the war, all sides appear to have used improvised explosive devices (IED). Moreover, government troops were known to have sold shells and other explosive ammunition to the various armed groups. As a result, the explosive picture is chaotic and there are no reliable data or estimates of the amounts of explosives available.

Nevertheless, there is evidence of the use of the following as IEDs and booby traps:

- Anti-personnel mines
- 120mm mortar shells
- 122mm howitzer shells

To add to the problem, mines, shells, and other explosive ordnance have had their explosive contents removed, either for use in the conflict or for 'civilian' use. This problem is particularly prominent in Tereni and Koloni – where IEDs have been used to dig for minerals – and in East Leppko, where explosives have been used by local fishermen.




Figure 1 - Overview of areas with increased threat of landmines and ERW

9. Humanitarian Situation

9.1 Current situation

Carana is a very young country, with 44% of the population younger than 15 years, and an additional 13% between 15 and 18 years. Elderly people make up less than 4% of the overall population. At an average rate of 5.1 children per woman and 9.1 deaths per 100 births, infant mortality is a frequent issue. An estimated 14% of the population has a physical or mental disability. Approx. 45% live below the poverty line, with the poorest regions traditionally in the Leppko province and in the highlands of Tereni.

Carana remains one of the countries hardest hit by global warming. The annual interplay of dry and rainy season has evolved into severe droughts and desertification in the South and East, shorter and more intense rainfalls which reliably lead to flood disasters in the Mahbek and Barin regions. Meanwhile, the increasing number of cyclones and sudden heavy rainfalls on hill slopes in western and northern Carana frequently cause landslides, thereby destroying shelter, interrupting food and water supplies. The overuse of pastures and agricultural lands adds to the long-term degradation of soil.

Of the roughly 17 million population of Carana, 5.3 million are currently in need of humanitarian assistance. The overarching immediate humanitarian issues that need to be tackled in a

comprehensive and coordinated fashion include food insecurity and livelihoods, protection from exposure to conflict and human trafficking, health and education. Communities most at risk are IDP camp populations, returning IDPs, refugee communities, those hosting IDPs and refugees, children and adolescents, as well as women-headed households and survivors of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). In terms of development, protection of people and livelihoods, infrastructure, access to credit and markets are key concerns.

As consequence of the economic crisis and the war, the price level for food and basic goods has increased dramatically. Even though all basic goods are available, large parts of the population cannot afford sufficient nutrition.

During the past 10 years of civil war, approx. 700,000 Caranese people have become internally displaced (IDPs) and settled in IDP camps around the harbour cities, most in the Galasi area. Approx. 20,000 fled to Sumora and 10,000 to Rimosa and periodically attempt to return to their lands for the farming season. With the peace process in reach, this year a substantial number of IDPs has begun to leave Galasi to return to their lands in Koloni, Tereni and Mahbek. Carana itself hosts refugee populations from Katasi (approx. 30,000 mainly in Tereni and western Koloni) and Rimosa (approx. 20,000 mainly in southern Leppko).

9.2 Humanitarian Concerns for UN Engagement

In the borderlands between Carana-Rimosa and Carana-Katasi that are already experiencing resource strain, armed groups exploit farmers to secure both troop nutrition and their stronghold in the region. Given the lack of livelihood opportunities for new and old inhabitants in cities, poverty-related crime such as extortion, theft, illicit weapons trade as well as piracy in coastal communities etc. is constantly expanding. Tensions over land for farming and grazing and over water sources frequently escalate between returnees, militias and current occupants of the land. Sexual and gender-based violence is another widespread, largely untreated and severely underreported issue. Finally, Landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERWs) continue to pose a threat to people's movement, to farming activities and to further developing existing infrastructure.

The lack of drainage systems and insufficient quality of drinking water have created hotspots for cholera around Akkabar and Torta, Hanno region, in the Guthar region, especially in Balkro. Meningitis prevails around Galasi, Amsan and in the Kalari river delta.

Humanitarian access has overall proven difficult in the CISC-controlled South and in flooded areas during the rainy season. Visa for humanitarian organisations operating in the South have routinely been delayed. Travel permits from Galasi to the CISC- and MPC-controlled areas are issued reluctantly and only after considerable waiting periods. Transports and travel across lines of control is often obstructed. Government participation in assessment missions is a common demand throughout the entire country. Technical agreements are often caught up in feedback loops. Other obstacles include the road conditions during the raining season, fuel shortages, the frequent interruptions of mobile phone coverage and access to cash, both because of the thin banking infrastructure and the high and fast-evolving inflation.

Capacities for air transport are low, with 2 helicopters stationed in Galasi (one ICRC, one UNHAS). In 2019, the International NGO Safety Organisation recorded 429 incidents of restriction of movement through illegal checkpoints, ambushes or because of military operations, 153 incidents of stolen aid goods or transport vehicles, 74 harassments and 8 temporarily abducted humanitarian workers.

10. Public Information

In Carana, radio, TV and the major newspapers are controlled by the government. They are more an instrument of propaganda than a free source of information. International newspapers are only available in Galasi. National newspapers are available in the provincial capitals and in some other towns. For some months MPC has been producing a regional newspaper and operates one radio station.

As a result of the war several transmission stations for radio and TV are destroyed. Whole areas are without access to official TV and radio programs. The initial assessed infrastructure / capabilities are:

- Advanced, modern system managed by Telecom Carana Ltd., kept on serving during the civil war.
- Carrier-equipped, open-wire lines, coaxial cables, radio relay links, fibre optic cable, and radio communication stations.
- Key centres: Galasi, Maldosa, Kika, Folsa, Corma, Faron, Norke and Sureen.
- State-owned Caranan Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) operates three main TV channels with broadcasts in Caranan and French.
- Radio service from fourteen amplitude modulation (AM) stations, 286 frequency modulation (FM) stations; estimated 7,5 million radios, not licensed.
- At least 650,000 televisions are in the country.
- There are more than 195,000 telephones in the country (2017), with a priority on service to rural areas; cellular telephone service is expanding rapidly.

11. Education

The Department of Schools coordinates the implementation of educational programmes, projects and activities of the Ministry. Currently, the Department oversees 250 primary schools, 26 secondary and 4 higher academic institutions. Teachers from these schools are also required to be registered by the Ministry.

No statistics on primary and secondary school enrolment or the impact of the civil war on the education system are currently available; however, enrolment levels are known to have dropped and damage to local school structures sustained. As result of war and the bad economic situation,

the number of schools and students had declined dramatically. The number of registered teachers has also decreased significantly.

12. Medical System

An initial assessment conducted showed that the medical facilities in the major cities might be sufficient for minor treatment of UN personnel. A more detailed analysis on the medical facilities needs to be conducted and UN clinics might need to be contracted for the medical provisions of UN personnel outside of the major cities. An overview on the health situation, showing recent outbreaks of cholera and meningitis is shown in Figure 2 below.




Figure 2 – Health overview

13. Support

13.1 Availability of Goods and Services

Even though the economic situation in Carana is bad, most basic goods and supplies are principally available. The quality of goods varies and the availability is sometimes limited. The major supply goods for a UN Mission like fuel, construction material and food can be purchased or contracted in the country, however not consistently throughout the country.

Fuel and rations can be purchased in Galasi, Cereni, and Maldosa from international contractors. Construction material for wooden constructions can be purchased from local dealers in larger cities. Concrete and steel is only available in Galasi, Maroni, Corma and Maldosa. Specific construction materials like plumbing parts, windows or doors are hard to get on the local market. Also furniture in adequate quality are practically not available. Basic construction work can be contracted in all larger towns.

Technical goods like PCs, printers etc. and spare parts are not available at all.

Transport service can be contracted in the Harbour cities. Several strikes of the truck driver during the last year make the reliability of these contractors at least questionable. An official renting business for cars or airplanes is not existing in Carana. Cars can be sometimes rented on individual basis.

The increased frequency and higher intensity of potentially disastrous natural phenomena such as flooding, sandstorms, landslides etc. also need to be recognized as having an impact on the peacekeeping mission itself. Logistics, security and maintenance of personnel and equipment need to be adapted to the variety of harsh conditions. For example, the mission's action radius may be suddenly disturbed and supply routes interrupted. On another note, UN camps and facilities use relatively large areas of land in the host communities. At least two problems may occur: perhaps the land has previously been used for agricultural and/or pasture purposes and is now not available anymore, or the land has not been used because it is/or has been especially vulnerable to environmental problems.

13.2 Mission impact on the environment

The PK mission itself has a significant impact on local environments, creating immediate and long-term ecological damage, issues of mission legitimacy, additional tensions and security concerns for the deployed personnel.

In building and servicing mission quarters, the main immediate effects on the surrounding ecosystem are pollution caused by Diesel generators and waste disposal, soil contamination through sewage and leaks, soil compaction by frequent movement of tanks and heavy vehicles and soil sealing through camp and road building. On the other hand, importing and servicing goods, equipment, machinery and personnel, as well as servicing fleets of vessels, land and air vehicles requires vast amounts of carbon fuel, adding to the overall mission carbon footprint.

Water, wood and petroleum are key resources to camp building and maintenance, potentially depleting local stocks more than affordable. In addition, often the consumption and waste produced by peacekeepers much higher than in the neighbouring village communities. The mismanagement of wastewater may cause epidemics not only affecting UN personnel, but also spreading to the local population. Health disaster and failed do-no-harm principle, but also severely undermines local trust in the PK mission. The UN mission may also be a competitor for scarce resources such as food and water. Combined with higher budgets and financial strength than the local population, UN PK presence jacks up prices for agricultural commodities, housing, services and water and may add to causing climate-related refugee movements. The perception

of the UN as competitor for resources may be intensified through fortification of the bases (as reported in Corma, Carana), and create violent confrontations between locals and UN personnel.

13.3 Local Labour

In Carana a trained local workforce is existing, but the percentage of first and second level educated people with good English language abilities is small.

13.4 Banking

A full operational banking system is just in Galasi, Cereni and Maldosa existing. In some provincial capitals and in some other towns basic banking functions are provided. Electronic cash transfer is not possible here.

13.5 Availability of Real Estate

In all towns over 50,000 inhabitants, real estate for offices and accommodation is available and can be rented. Surveyed examples of potential real estate showed that most of the offered objects are in unsatisfying condition and need basic maintenance. Particularly the water, sanitation and power systems in these objects were not working or in unacceptable condition. None of the offered objects had air conditioning.

List of Appendices

Appendix 1 – Logistics Situation in Carana

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Appendix 1 – Logistics Situation in Carana

1. Logistics

1.1 Availability of Goods

Outside Galasi and the harbour cities, the offer of goods is limited to foodstuff and basic items for daily life. Canned food and bottled water in larger quantities is only available in the mentioned cities.

Fuel in larger quantities is available in Galasi, Cereni, Maldosa, Corma, Alur and Faron. Jet fuel in larger quantities is only available in Galasi and Corma.

1.2 Services

In Galasi there are some bigger construction companies with horizontal and vertical construction capabilities. Here also other construction services and architectural services are available. In the harbour, cities some smaller construction companies with very limited capabilities do exist. In the east, construction is possible with local labour, provided the necessary expertise and machinery.

Transport services are available in all harbour cities and in Galasi for small amounts of goods. The used vehicles seem not very reliable.

1.3 Reliability of Local Contractors

Most potential local contractors seem to be sufficiently reliable.

1.4 Money Transfer

International money transfer in Carana is just possible through the Carana National Bank and three International Banks. All four institutes have branches in Galasi. In all other major cities only the Bank of Carana is active.

2. Infrastructure

2.1 Roads

There are just a few paved and capable roads in Carana, interconnecting the major cities and are predominantly running in east-westerly direction. Due to the bad maintenance and because of the conflict they need repair for permanent heavy traffic use.

Some other roads are suitable for all weather use but have no hardened surface. Most roads in Carana are gravel roads or simple trails. All sand roads are sufficient for slow movement during the dry season. During the rainy season these roads are difficult to use or unusable at all. During rainy season it can be assumed that unpaved roads are not usable 50 % of the time.

Average speed for 4 x 4 vehicles are listed below:

Paved roads	30 - 40 km/h
Unpaved road (dry season)	20 - 30 km/h
Unpaved road (rainy season)	10 - 20 km/h
Sand road (dry season)	10 - 20 km/h
Sand road (rainy season)	0 - 10 km/h

Wadis and small rivers are during the rainy season an absolute obstacle for all kind of vehicles.

An overview on the damaged / destroyed infrastructure is provided with **Figure 1**.




Figure 1- Initial assessment of the roads and objects damaged or destroyed

2.2 Airports

Airport	Paved Runway	Runway length	Paved Apron (Sqm)	IFR*	Loading Equipment	Fuel	Remarks
Galasi	yes	3200 m	40 000	yes	yes	yes	Runway will need maintenance for permanent use, limited storage space
Corma	yes	2900 m	10 000	yes	yes	yes	Limited heavy cargo handling capabilities
Alur	no	1200 m	-	no	no		Fuel supply uncertain No heavy cargo handling
Folsa	no	1200 m	-	no	no		Fuel supply uncertain No heavy cargo handling
Amsan	no	1200 m	-	no	no		Fuel supply uncertain
Mia	no	1100 m	-	no	no		Fuel supply uncertain

* IFR – Instrument Flight Rules

2.3 Railroads

The railroads in Carana are single-track connection with several double track pieces. Two tracks are still in use, one in the North from Galasi to Akabar and one in the South from Moldosa to Mia. Even though the maintenance condition is not satisfying, it is operated on a daily basis for the transport of coal in the north and copper on the southern track. They are currently used with 80 % of its capacity. Flat wagons are available.

Stations at Galasi, Maroni, Akabar and Maldosa are sufficiently equipped for loading and unloading of containers, vehicles and all types of goods. The station in Mia is specialized for transport of copper and has no container facilities.

2.4 River Transport

The rivers in Carana are navigable for transport vessels. Currently all existing vessels are used up to capacity by the local economy.

2.5 Harbours

The harbour in Galasi is the most capable harbour in the country. It has capabilities for container and vehicle handling. Cereni has limited container capabilities. Maldosa is specialized in transport of copper but is suitable for small vessels with own loading equipment.

Location	Max Depth	Kay	Cranes	Container Handling	Port Capacity*	Storage area	Ware-houses	RoRo capability
Galasi	14 m	320 m 210 m 180m 80 m	3 x 30 t 2 x 20 t 2 x 20 t 2 x 10 t	yes	2 ships parallel 2.300 t /day 3.600 t /day	yes	30,000 sqm	Yes
Cereni	12 m	200 m 180 m 120 m 110 m	2 x 30 t 2 x 20 t 2 x 10 t	limited	2 ships parallel 1.500 t /day 2.300 t /day	yes	30,000 sqm	No
Maldosa	8 m	150 m 100 m	1 x 20 t 2 x 10 t	no	1.500 t /day	yes	No	No

* It is estimated that for UNMIC appr. 50% of the recourses are only available as they need to be shared with Carana and Humanitarian Aid / Assistance Organizations.

** Total capacity to be deduced from overall port capacity. UN limits container handling to 20' containers with maximum total weight of 10 t.

3. Estimated Operative and Administrative Costs

3.1 Humanitarian Aid

Food Assistance

A "Humaniration Daily Ration" for complete food assistance should consist of 2100 kcal.

Individual energy requirements are estimated for different population groups according to age, gender, weight and physical activity level. Adjustments need to be made based on factors such as temperature, health or nutritional status of the population, demographic distribution of the population and activity levels. Population sub-groups with obvious additional nutritional requirements (e.g. malnourished children) may require an additional ration over and above the standard basic ration. For example, adding an allowance of 100 kcal for every 5° below 20°C and an additional 100–200 kcal should be added to the basic ration in extreme situations, when the nutritional status of the population is extremely poor.

These rations should meet the basic energy, protein, fat and micronutrient requirements. The table below show examples of adequate rations in terms of energy, protein and fat:

ITEMS	RATIONS (quantity in g)				
	Example 1	Example 2	Example 3	Example 4	Example 5
Cereal	400	450	350	400	400
Pulses*	60	60	100	60	50
Oil (vit. A fortified)	25	25	25	30	30
Fish/meat	-	10	-	30	-
Fortified blended foods	50	40	50	40	45
Sugar	15	-	20	-	25
Iodized salt	5	5	5	5	5
Energy: kcal	2,113	2,075	2,113	2,146	2,100
Protein (in g and in % kcal)	58 g: 11%	71 g: 13%	65 g: 12%	55 g: 10%	65 g: 12%
Fat (in g and in % kcal)	43 g: 18%	43 g: 18%	42 g: 18%	42 g: 17%	39 g: 17%

A ration according to these requirements has a weight of 0,85 kg and will cost US \$ 1.5 delivered to a harbour in the crisis area.

Food Security

The average cost/beneficiary of seed distributions is \$ 2.63 with a range of \$ 1.42 to \$ 17.50 depending upon seed package components and ancillary inputs. The problem is that the outputs in terms of harvest are not known. If one looks at the example of FAO's second project (ZWE/210/2003/01005), with little more project components than the distribution of seed and fertiliser at a cost of \$ 2.73 per beneficiary and with their anticipated outputs/beneficiary (from their Kit I 44) of:

80.0 kg maize;
36.5 kg sorghum;
7.3 kg millet;
18.3 kg cowpeas.

142.1 kg Food

=====

then the cost of 1 MT of food produced would be \$ 19.21.

Shelter

Basic shelter can be provided through distribution of plastic sheets and provision of temporary space. The minimum shelter space is 3,5 m²/person; minimum total site area is 45 m²/person for temporary or self-settled camp. One sheet will cover the first needs of a family of five. One sheet has a weight of 10 kg and costs \$ 45 delivered to a harbour in the crisis area. One all-weather tent for a family of five has a weight of 50 kg and costs \$ 650.

Water

Drilling and equipping a well with a hand pump cost \$ 5 to 10.000. Such a well will provide potable water for 300 (including animals) to 1000 people.

Minimum Water requirements (Ref. SPERE-Handbook)

Minimum maintenance	15 l / day / person
Feeding Centres	30 l / day / person
Health centres & hospitals	40-60 l / day / person
Schools	3 l / day / pupil
Mosque	2-5 l / day / person

3.2 Transport

All Transport costs include handling costs, airport fees and port charges.

Land transport

Metric Tonne (MT) or 2 m³ whatever is higher

Road per 100 km US \$ 80

Rail per 100 km US \$ 250



Air transport



AN 124



IL 76



C 130



Beechcraft 1900 D**DC 3****DC 10****Puma****MI-8****MI-26****Transport costs for 1 kg in US \$ (all inclusive)**

Aircraft	Up to 200 km	200 km to 600 km	Over 600 km	Remarks
AN 124	-	2,4	2,5	Strategic lift
IL 76	-	2,4	2,5	Strategic lift
DC 10 F	-	2,9	2,8	Strategic lift / Pax
Beechcraft 1900 D	-	-	-	Pax
C-130	0,9	1,3	1,5	
Cessna Grand Caravan	3,8	4,2	4,5	
DC 3	2,7	3,3	3,9	
MI-8	2100 \$ per hour		-	
MI-26	10.000 \$ per hour		-	
Puma	3800 \$ per hour		-	

Sea transport

Transport costs include all harbour, loading-unloading and custom charges.

Type	Size / capacity	Costs < 5000 km	Costs > 5000 Km
Cargo Carrier	50.000 tons	50 \$ per ton	65 \$ per ton
Container ship	10.000 TEU	3.000 \$ per TEU	3.300 \$ per TEU
Reefer ship	400 TEU	4.500 \$ per TEU	4.800 \$ per TEU
RoRo Ship	30.000 tons	5.000 \$ per TEU	5.300 \$ per TEU
TEU - Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units			



Container ship



Reefer ship



Bulk carrier

River transport

Metric Tonne (MT) or 2 m³ whatever is higher

Per 100 km > US \$ 60



River barge

3.3 Medical Support

Local Support

A medical clinic for full support of 10.000 people in IDP- or refugee camps costs \$ 80.000 a month. A medical clinic for emergency support of 10.000 people (regular population) costs \$ 25.000 a month.

Vaccination

Costs for Vaccination per person:

Yellow fever:	\$ 0.45
Small Pocks:	\$ 0.6
Meningitis:	\$ 1.2
Polio:	\$ 0.5
Measles:	\$ 0.8
Cholera:	\$ 0.5

3.4 Personnel

UN Military Observers (UNMOs), Staff Officer (SOs) and Civilian Police officers, who have been generated/recruited on an individual basis, receive a daily Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA). Current MSA rate for Carana is 147 \$ US / per day.

The salaries of the UN contracted personnel (UN civilians) can be calculated as follows - Costs in average per month (including post adjustment):

- International P-Staff: \$ US 9.500
- International F-Staff: \$ US 5.500
- Consultant: \$ US 11.500
- Local Professional: \$ US 850
- Local General Staff: \$ US 450

3.5 Office Equipment

- Office equipment per staff member (one time investment): \$ 10.500
- Office supply and maintenance per staff member per year: \$ 350

Communication

- VSAT: \$ 800 per month per location
- Mobile Phone: \$ 100 per month per user
- HF/VHF: \$ 1.200 per staff member (one time investment)

Vehicles

One 4x4 vehicle for 2.5 staff members.

- One 4x4 vehicle (one time investment): \$ 25.000
- Vehicle maintenance costs per vehicle per year: \$ 4.000

3.8 Accommodation for International Staff

Accommodation

- in Containers \$ 1.500 per staff member per month
- in "shared bungalow" \$ 2.200 per staff member per month

4. Definitions, Indicators and Thresholds

Definitions

Crude Mortality Rate (CMR) = Deaths per 10.000 per day

Mortality Rate amongst Children (U5MR) = Deaths per 10.000 children under 5 years per day

Global Malnutrition = Weight/height < 80 % and/or presence of oedema

Severe Malnutrition = Weight/height < 70 % and/or presence of oedema

Thresholds

CMR = 0.3 to 0.5 normal for emerging countries

CMR > 1 or U5MR > 2 = threshold for humanitarian intervention

CMR > 2 or U5MR > 4 = humanitarian emergency

Malnutrition Rate amongst Children > 15 % = humanitarian emergency

Appendix 2 – Public Information Situation in Carana

1. Public Opinion / Perception in Carana

The perception of a possible UN peacekeeping mission in Carana varies gradually throughout the country. While in the West of Carana and in rural communities, the public opinion towards the UN is more positive, it looks different in the East Carana, especially in the bigger cities along the coast.

Through agitation and manipulation of youth Groups in Galasi, Cereni and Maldosa a more hostile atmosphere has been created against the arrival of the UN peacekeepers/international presence in Carana. Due to the climate of uncertainty and general lack of access to unbiased and fair information especially the Youth, but also criminal gangs are increasingly politicized and might become a concern for the international community. The increasing opposition against the peace negotiations by some CISC factions have added to the worsening reputation of the mission in southern Carana.

2. Planning in the area of Civil Affairs / Public Information

In support of the peace agreement, Part II Article IV and V the mission should establish offices in Galasi and the provincial capitals to support the peace process through participation in the JCC and RJTs and accompany the process of transition of provincial and community responsibilities from the individual conflict parties to the Transitional Government and its institutions. Currently only a few civil affairs personnel are deployed with the advanced mission, but an eventual UN PK mission needs to ensure that by M+30 a sizeable number is deployed to man the offices in these major cities.

Equal emphasis needs to be given to Galasi and the coastal cities to demonstrate that the UN is impartial and open to address the concerns of all Carana people. Special programmes (focus) should be given to address the reservations especially from the Youth Groups.


3. Public Information

The public information component needs to implement a proactive, comprehensive public information campaign designed to explain and promote the mandate of the planned UN PKO as well as the activities of other stakeholders. This needs to include dedicated aspects of the operation's work, aimed at specific audiences across the AOR.

The PI component needs to consider that, while limited communication/broadcasting assets are available in Carana, it can be expected that the government will be open to provide access to these resources. The MPC and CISC, however, are expected to be reluctant to the UN and they have almost no communication means available.

A number of communication assets is available through the Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS) in the UN stock at UNGSC, Brindisi.

4. Carana Media Coverage



HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

REPUBLIC OF CARANA

HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMME CYCLE 2021

ISSUED DECEMBER 2020



About

The figures and findings reflected in the 2021 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) represent the independent analysis of the United Nations (UN) and its humanitarian partners based on information available to them. While the Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) aims to provide consolidated humanitarian analysis and data to help inform joint strategic planning, many of the figures provided throughout the document are estimates based on sometimes incomplete and partial data sets using the methodologies for collection that were available at the time. The Government of Carana has expressed its reservations over the data sources and

methodology of assessments used to inform the HNO as well as on a number of HNO findings reflected in the HRP. This applies throughout the document.

The designations employed and the presentation of material in the report do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

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OCHA coordinates humanitarian action to ensure crisis-affected people receive the assistance and protection they need. It works to overcome obstacles that impede humanitarian assistance from reaching people affected by crises, and provides leadership in mobilizing assistance and resources on behalf of the humanitarian system.
www.unocha.org/carana
twitter.com/ochacarana



Humanitarian Response aims to be the central website for information management tools and services, enabling information exchange between clusters and Inter-Agency Standing Committee members operating within a protracted or sudden onset crisis.
www.humanitarianresponse.info/carana



Humanitarian InSight supports decision-makers by giving them access to key humanitarian data. It provides the latest


verified information on needs and delivery of the humanitarian response, as well as financial contributions.

<https://hum-insight.info>



The Financial Tracking Service (FTS) is the primary provider of updated data on global humanitarian funding, and is a major contributor to strategic decision-making by highlighting gaps and priorities, thus contributing to effective, efficient and principled humanitarian assistance.
fts.unocha.org/

Carana Reference Map



Part 1

1.1 Introduction

As result of natural and manmade causes, living conditions in Carana have worsened dramatically during the last decade for the majority of the population. Throughout the country, supply with all kinds of goods has reached an alarming level.

Particularly medical support, widespread malnutrition and high rates of infant mortality are to mention in this context. Of the roughly 17 million population of Carana, 6.3 million are currently in need of humanitarian assistance.

The developments in the region south of Hanno, the area between Faron and Folsa and the coastal area south of Cereni are most dramatic. Here the humanitarian situation is expected to escalate into a severe humanitarian emergency due to the unavailability of food together with the worsening of the health situation during the next six months if no external assistance is given.

The Committee on Food Aid (CFA) members are wrestling with the challenge of meeting needs in the face of impending pipeline shortfalls due to the ongoing fighting

and overall donor fatigue. Already, WFP has been forced to cut back food programs for the rest of the year by 50% in order to priorities vulnerable groups, supplementary / therapeutic and school feeding programs.

The overarching immediate humanitarian issues that need to be tackled in a comprehensive and coordinated fashion include food insecurity and livelihoods, protection from exposure to conflict and human trafficking, nutrition, health, WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene) and education. Communities most at risk are IDP camp populations, returning IDPs, refugee communities, those hosting IDPs and refugees, children and adolescents, as well as women-headed households and survivors of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV).

The 2021 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) builds the foundation for the humanitarian community response to the largescale humanitarian and protection needs in Carana throughout 2021. The HRP, based on United Nations' (UN) assessments and analysis, presents urgent funding requirements to address these needs. It is

anchored by two strategic objectives: save lives and secure livelihoods. As these objectives are interlinked and often inter-dependent, achieving positive outcomes for affected people requires concerted action.

Protection and early recovery are mainstreamed across the HRP framework, adding coherence to the humanitarian response. Progress made towards attaining one objective is often dependent upon incremental steps towards achieving another. Achieving these objectives is contingent upon the availability of sufficient resources and the existence of an enabling operational environment. Humanitarian activities under the HRP are coordinated at field level and benefit from an overarching effort to harmonize assistance across response areas.

The HRP was developed by the UN on behalf of humanitarian partners working in Carana, under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Carana (HC) and the Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Carana Crisis (RHC), with support from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The HRP was collectively prepared by all partners, consulted with the Government of Carana and endorsed by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), in line with General Assembly resolution 46/182 (A/RES/46/182). Affected people were consulted during the humanitarian needs identification and planning processes.

Humanitarian organizations working under this plan, namely: UN agencies, funds and programs, the Carana Red Crescent/Carana Red Cross (CRC) and humanitarian international and national non-governmental organizations (NGoC), remain committed to providing needs-based humanitarian assistance, in accordance with the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence and to providing assistance without discrimination to people in need. In this capacity, they are protected under international law.

Organizations participating in the HRP acknowledge that it is first through the efforts of the Caranese people, through state institutions at both central and local level, and national non-governmental organizations that the basic needs of the affected population are met. Partners also recognize that, under IHL, the state has the primary role and responsibility for the provision of assistance and protection of those affected by the crisis.

1.2 The Humanitarian Response Plan



1.3 Humanitarian Needs

As of December 2020, the most acute crises are concentrated along the Caranese coast and the Kalesi River. The interplay of ongoing drought and soil degradation, irregular rainfalls and conflict-induced migration has created severe food insecurity, and the increased pressure on the already fragile healthcare provided adds to the pending humanitarian emergency in much of eastern Carana. Severe outbreaks of cholera and meningitis are to be expected in the Hanno and Barin region, as well as along the coast, as are famine and famine-related diseases especially in the strained and decertified Barin region. Resource conflicts between farmers and herders, as well as between resident and displaced communities in the border regions to Katasi and Rimsa add to the cycle of violence in Carana. During the annual rainy seasons, frequent landslides and flooding occur along the major rivers. In the Barin region, the desertified grounds are not able to retain the water masses and approx. 10,000 people regularly lose their homes and documentation during these events.

People in need and prioritized for response

In 2020, around 5.3 million people have been identified as the most affected, with 3.1 million people having the most severe needs and requiring humanitarian assistance. 35.4 per cent of these are displaced (1.1 million people, 700,000 of which are in camps), 8 per cent are returnees (248,000 people), 44.3 per cent are non-displaced Caranese (1.37 million people), 10 per cent are migrants (318,000 people) and 0.9 per cent have refugee status (30,000). An additional 90,000 Caranese have fled to the neighboring countries of Sumora (30,000), Katasi (40,000) and Rimsa (20,000), many of which periodically return to their lands for

the farming seasons. This is the result of a deterioration or partial collapse of living standards and basic services, an increased reliance on the use of negative coping strategies and widespread grave violations of human rights and significant impact on physical and mental wellbeing. Of the number of people in severe need, 1.6 million are women and girls and 1.9 million are under 18 years of age.

In areas where hostilities have subsided, life remains a daily struggle due to limited access to basic services and livelihood opportunities, increasing financial hardship and an eroding capacity to cope. More than forty-five per cent of the population are estimated to live under the poverty line. Recent economic shocks stand to further set back the recovery of the Caranese people and render many more vulnerable. Millions of women, children and men continue to rely on humanitarian assistance as a vital lifeline and to meet their basic needs.

Many Caranese, especially those in the border regions to Rimosa and Katasi, continue to suffer from increasingly localized, intensified hostilities, which uproot families from their homes, claim civilian lives, damage and destroy basic infrastructure, and limit freedom of movement. Almost 40 per cent of internally displaced families have been displaced more than three times, with every displacement further eroding coping capacity. Repeat displacement numbers are particularly high for internally displaced persons (IDPs) along the Kalesi River, where the majority of the 1.1 million displacement movements were recorded in 2020. Some of those displaced were again uprooted a few months later, forming part of the over 250,000 people who fled environmental disasters and moved mostly eastwards towards Cereni during the period 1 December 2019 to the end of February 2020. In the southeast, more than 250,000 people were forced to flee their home during a two-week period in October 2020, with over 85,000 people remaining displaced after that two-week period.

Many of those displaced sought refuge in and added to an already high number of IDPs living in last resort sites, i.e. mainly informal settlements and collective centers in which shelter and WASH facilities are sub-standard, and health and protection risks are elevated. In total, the number of IDPs in last resort sites and camps increased by 42 per cent in 2020 compared to 2018, and as of February 2020 stands at over 700,000.

Humanitarian Consequences related to Health

Although proportionate morbidity of overall waterborne illness remained relatively stable in 2019, rates of total acute diarrhoea increased eight per cent since the previous year. Suspected leishmaniosis cases also increased in absolute number (16,310) and proportionate morbidity (14 per cent) as compared to 2018.

Based on available data, as many as 7 million people live in areas contaminated by explosive hazards, exposing them to significant risks. 57 per cent of those who have survived contact with explosive hazards in 2020 have

sustained lifelong impairment. 2.4 million are estimated to be living with a disability. The crisis continues to affect the mental well-being of those affected by new and prolonged displacement, exposure to violence, loss of income and reduced access to basic services, touching the youngest in particular. 22 per cent of surveyed households report signs of psychosocial distress in children – nightmares, lasting sadness and anxiety, amongst others – in the last 30 days, suggesting that many girls and boys are in a situation of prolonged distress. More than 260,000 children are chronically malnourished, of which 80,000 children under five years of age are suffering from severe acute malnutrition, heightening their exposure to preventable morbidity and mortality.

Maternal malnutrition rates have doubled compared to 2019, particularly in the Guthar and eastern Leppko regions where acute malnutrition was prevalent in 21 per cent of displaced pregnant and breastfeeding women. Anaemia is also on the rise. One out of every three pregnant and lactating women is anaemic, leading to poor intrauterine growth, high-risk pregnancies, and childbirth complications. One out of every four children 6-59 months are anaemic, and the youngest are most affected with 44 per cent of children 6-23 months suffering from anaemia. In 2020, the number of critically food insecure people has increased by 15 per cent, from 500,000 in 2019 to 514,000 people in 2020.

Humanitarian Consequences related to Protection

An estimated 2.5 million children aged five to seventeen are out of school and face elevated protection risks related to, among others, child marriage and engagement in child labour, including in coal and copper mines under hazardous conditions. In 2019, 23 per cent of victims of explosive hazards accidents were children, of whom 42 per cent were injured or killed while playing.

Missing or absent civilian documentation frequently represents a barrier to exercising housing, land and property rights, and freedom of movement and is referenced by affected populations as the top concern for accessing assistance and services. Insecure shelter/housing tenure due to the lack of civil documentation generates additional physical and mental consequences for communities, often leaving them with little choice but to reside in unsafe, sub-standard buildings or in other sites of last resort.

Fuelled also by increasing economic hardship and a dramatic loss of purchasing power due to the devaluation of the Carana Franc, affected population have little choice but to increasingly resort to harmful coping mechanisms, many of which disproportionately affect women and girls, including child/ forced marriage and various forms of gender-based violence.

Humanitarian Consequences related to Living Standards

Years of crisis have exacerbated living conditions for most Caranese due to significant reductions in the availability of,


and access to essential services, destructions of housing infrastructure, loss of livelihoods and reduced purchasing power as a result of economic decline.

Healthcare coverage is low and expensive, with single primary healthcare centers servicing areas of up to 200 km² in rural areas, and an estimated 78% of necessary pharmaceuticals not being available in July 2020. Over twelve million people have to rely on alternative and often unsafe water sources to meet or complement their water needs, increasing public health risk, with indicators on water availability and quality being worst for IDPs in northern central Carana.

Over half of all IDPs have now been displaced for over five years, many requiring sustained basic service delivery and livelihood support. A deteriorating economic situation caused chiefly by the protracted crisis and hostility-induced loss of economic assets and underinvestment has contributed to the continued loss of livelihoods and reduction in household purchasing power.

The ongoing devaluation of the Carana Franc (CF), which since October 2019 has lost over a third of its value on the informal market and reached a low of 1,8 CF per US dollar (US\$) in January 2020, has further reduced families' purchasing power. These factors combined have contributed, amongst others, to the increase in the number of food insecure people and are likely to lead to further increases in poverty.

Overview over severe humanitarian needs by region



1.4 What if We Fail to Respond?

Barin and Cereni Region

The below average amount of rain during subsequent five years led to a severe reduction of the thin vegetation and lowered the groundwater levels. Altogether, the usable grazing grounds and water resources are not sufficient any more to provide for the existing nomad population and their livestock.

Estimates show that during the last year 30 % of the livestock was lost in the Barin and Cereni region. Landslides

and floods have destroyed grain reserves, and IDP camps along the Kalesi River have occupied former arable land previously cultivated by resident farmers. So far, people in the region could manage the situation by adopting alternative nutrition strategies and slaughtering animals. Reserves and stockpiles, however, have been depleted and any further reduction of the livestock poses a severe threat to the nomads' livelihoods.

To cope with this development, the nomads have expanded their traditional moving patterns. During the last years repeated fighting occurred between the nomads and the farmers in the Hanno Region on the southern banks of Kalesi River. Some nomads have already migrated north and east of Kalesi River. On top of the pending food crisis, severe conflicts between the nomads and farmers in central Carana are certain to erupt and are likely also to spread into Mahbek.

IDP camps in central and northern Carana

In the Barin and Guthar regions, approximately another 300,000 IDPs from East-Carana are currently living in camps under catastrophic conditions and at loss of a perspective either to return or to establish themselves in the current location. The already poor food situation in the DP camps has significantly deteriorated with the arrival of the majority of IDPs within the last 12 months. The nutrition situation is insufficient and there is no medical support.

Recently started projects of the UN World Food Programme (WFP) and NGOs on scene are not sufficiently funded and cannot prevent a widespread humanitarian crisis. Seasonal rains and accompanying floods are still a main hazard for the IDP camps along the river, can be a risk factor for cholera outbreaks and hamper humanitarian access to the camps.

East and south Carana

The east and south of Carana have been most affected by the ongoing civil war. During the last years, the most intensive fighting occurred along the Mahbek - Barin and Koloni - Hanno regional boundaries and along the road from Sureen to Akkabar in the east, as well as along the roads from Muka via Mia to Kika and from Kika to Eres. Along these lines, many villages have suffered from raids, massacres and exploitation repeatedly as they found themselves on changing sides of the frontline. Extensive landmine use has caused lasting terror to residents and hampers day-to-day activities.

Because of the fighting, many people left their homelands and those who could not find rented accommodation or stay with relatives now live in IDP camps in central Carana. An estimated 400,000 people outside the camps are only scarcely supported by the local population and have to access to international community support. Considering the general food crisis, which already affects both local non-displaced and displaced communities, these undocumented; IDPs are threatened by humanitarian emergency within the next months. Meanwhile, the

additional burden on local resources strains host community endurance and increases the potential for intra- communal conflict in the Barin region.

Fighting and landmines have also affected the non-displaced population. For at least three years, landmines deny access to the fields and planting cycles in east and south Carana have been severely interrupted or disturbed. The regular food production here is reduced to a level of under 50 % of usual production rates, not nearly enough to sustain the local population. While food is available in the markets, inflation rates and soaring grain prices have caused up to 85% of the South Caranese population to be unable to afford basic foods.



1.5 Response Objectives and Strategy

The humanitarian community will strive to contribute to the achievement of two key objectives in the 2021 HRP:

- 1) Save lives and alleviate the suffering of the most vulnerable people and
- 2) Secure livelihoods.

These objectives are interlinked and interdependent, with progress on each being essential towards positive outcomes against the other.

Strategic Objectives 2021

 Strategic objective 1 Save lives Provide immediate food relief, shelter, healthcare and protection to the most vulnerable.	 Strategic objective 2 Secure livelihoods Facilitate safe, equitable and dignified access to critical services and livelihoods to enhance people's resilience and ensure they meet their basic needs.

Response Objectives

In accordance with international law, the UN renews its commitment to deliver humanitarian aid and implement the response plan with full respect to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the Republic of Carana and in accordance with General Assembly resolution 46/182.

The 2021 HRP complements the humanitarian response undertaken by the Government of Carana, as well as efforts of the Caranese Red Crescent/Red Cross (CRC) and

other humanitarian actors. Other international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) are contributing to meet the needs of affected people.

The strategic objectives articulated in the HRP for 2021 build upon the humanitarian community's efforts in 2020 and previous years and reflect the current complexity of the humanitarian situation in Carana. Under the framework of the 2021 HRP, the humanitarian community aims to provide lifesaving and life-sustaining humanitarian assistance to people in need across the country while seeking to strengthen delivery models for greater resilience. Sectoral and inter-sectoral coordination will be key to ensuring that humanitarian assistance reaches those most in need with a focus on the most vulnerable communities, households, and groups across the country – with particular emphasis on children, women, youth and adolescents, older people, people living with disabilities or who are chronically ill or injured.

Response Strategy

Humanitarian action remains focused on saving lives, maintaining dignity and bringing hope for people in Carana.

The 2021 response takes into account the fluidity of the context, ongoing hostilities in central and parts of southern Carana, significant needs related to the lack of access to basic services and livelihoods in other areas of the country, including areas of spontaneous return by IDP and refugees; the emergence of new needs related to population movements, as well as the access opportunities that humanitarian actors may have to reach households and communities experiencing dire need. The strategy underlines the necessity for flexible operational approaches, enhanced coordination among humanitarian actors within and across sectors and response areas, and continuous advocacy to reach those most in need.

Additionally, deepening humanitarian needs resulting from limited access to, and availability of basic services due to damaged infrastructure, explosive hazard contamination, and a reduced technical work force, as well as growing levels of vulnerability resulting from loss of livelihoods and reduced purchasing power, also need to be addressed in order to mitigate any further deterioration of the humanitarian situation, including in overburdened communities with high levels of protracted displacement and/or spontaneous returns.

Scope and Priorities of the Humanitarian Response

Against this backdrop, the 2021 Carana HRP sets out a strategy to address humanitarian needs identified across the country at sector and inter-sectoral levels. According to a recent sector and inter- sector humanitarian analysis, the humanitarian needs in Carana remain similar in scale and severity to those of 2020, with sectoral variations.

Consequently, the 2021 response strategy builds on 2020 response efforts and aims to increase the capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies; enhance approaches to multi-sectoral delivery and response prioritization, improve the quality of various programming aspects, and capitalize on opportunities to enhance the dignity of affected populations and reduce their overall level of needs through more sustainable programming modalities.

Response Targets

Intended programming under the 2021 HRP recognizes that the scale, scope and severity of all humanitarian needs in Carana continue to exceed the response capacity of the humanitarian community.

Taking into account assessed inter-sector and sector-specific needs identified across the country as well as operational capacities and constraints, humanitarian partners in 2021 aim to assist 3.1 million people in need with direct humanitarian assistance (target) and carry out 4.3 million service delivery interventions to persons in need by leveraging all response modalities and assets. This is equivalent to approximately 48 per cent of those in need and represents a 5 per cent increase compared to 2020.

A changing operating environment may challenge the ability of humanitarian actors to fully meet these targets and quality programming objectives. Limiting factors may include: insecurity related to hostilities, particularly in the central and south-eastern regions; explosive hazard contamination; limited or unpredictable humanitarian access; insufficient funding; administrative regulations by all parties; capacity constraints and lack of partners on the ground; potential interference in humanitarian operations; the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures imposed on Carana, on the import of goods – by humanitarian actors – required for basic service delivery; as well as the impact of the economic crisis, including reduced purchasing power, issues related to local procurement and the possibly reduced viability of market based programming.



Strategic Objective 1: Save Lives

Efforts under this objective will focus on people living in areas with a high severity of need and where access to basic goods and services is most limited, as well as on particularly vulnerable people who live in areas with lower severity of need. Priority areas will include areas affected by hostilities, areas hosting high numbers of displaced persons, especially vulnerable IDPs in “last resort” sites and open spaces. Overburdened communities – i.e. communities with a large proportion of IDPs or spontaneous returnees relative to the host population – will also be prioritized.

While recognizing the distinct profiles and needs of these groups, there is likely to be a general crosscutting need for life-saving multi-sectoral interventions in these areas,

including explosive hazard risk reduction interventions and sustained basic services provision. People facing life-threatening humanitarian needs will be prioritized, including children with acute and chronic malnutrition, acutely malnourished pregnant and lactating women, as well as those presenting micronutrient deficiencies, people identified as being severely food insecure and with respiratory and infectious diseases which are exacerbated by overcrowding, including poor water and sanitary conditions and limited access to health care. These areas and population groups will therefore be prioritized under Strategic Objective 1.

- **Access to quality lifesaving and sustaining services and assistance, including health, water and food security.**

Outcome Indicators:

- Ratio of essential health workers (doctors, midwives, nurses) to 10,000 population.
- Ratio of fully functional health facilities providing primary health care services per 10,000 population.
- Percentage of targeted households with improved food consumption score.
- Number of medical procedures per person in need per year.

Output Indicators:

- People reached on average each month in communities in acute need (severity four and above in the inter-sector severity classification).
- Number of people with access to safe water as a result of provision of water disinfectants.
- Targeted crisis-affected households are provided with timely life- saving and life-sustaining shelter support (medium-term/temporary shelter), including those in protracted displacement, returnees, refugees.
- **IDPs in camps, last resort sites and open spaces regularly access quality lifesaving and life-sustaining basic services and humanitarian assistance.**

Output indicator:

- Number of IDPs living in IDP sites provided with humanitarian life- saving, multi-sectoral assistance.
- **The health, nutrition and food security status of pregnant and lactating women (PLW) and children under 5 years of age is improved.**

Outcome indicators:

- Average number of Ante-Natal Care (ANC) visits per pregnant woman.

Output indicators:

- Number of girls and boys under five and pregnant and lactating women receiving life-saving preventive maternal and child nutrition support services.

- Number of boys and girls (6–59 months) screened for malnutrition.
- Number of PLWs screened for malnutrition.
- Number of girls and boys engaging in structured, sustained child protection programs, including psychosocial support.
- Number of women and men engaging in parenting programs.



Strategic Objective 2: Secure Livelihoods

The response will focus on ensuring safe, equitable and dignified access to quality basic services, such as schools, appropriate shelter and WASH facilities, with protection at its centre. Efforts under this objective will enhance people's resilience by expanding access to livelihoods and ability to meet their needs. Partners will support capacity building across all sectors to strengthen the capacity of national and local partners, including governmental and non-governmental stakeholders. This includes teachers, health workers, WASH partners, protection actors and mine disposal operators.

Training and capacity-building will focus on technical and sector-specific training, in line with global guidelines and best practice, as well as on preparedness and contingency planning. The humanitarian response is committed to ensuring increased efforts to address issues of safe, dignified and meaningful access and accountability to affected populations.

The humanitarian response will be underpinned by strengthened monitoring, data collection and analysis. This includes prioritizing a people-centered and accountable humanitarian response through an enhanced feedback mechanism. This will be actualized through strengthening the interagency communication and coordination, including improved referral systems and regularly reporting to ensure affected communities' access to information related to humanitarian assistance and to provide feedback on their needs and preferences, as well as on organizations' conduct and performance.

Growing needs relating to civil status documentation, housing, land and property issues will also be addressed through technical support by UN agencies and humanitarian actors. These activities will be carried out in consultation with Caranese state institutions in accordance with the Charter of the UN and as per General Assembly resolution 46/182 and governed by the framework of agreements between the Caranese state and the UN agencies, funds and programs, as well as relevant Security Council resolutions.

- **Specific protection needs are mitigated through the provision of quality and integrated protection services.**

Output indicators:

- Number of GBV response services provided to survivors and/or women and girls at risk.

- **The impact of explosive hazards on civilians and on humanitarian access is reduced.**

Indicators:

- Number of men, women, boys and girls reached by specialized services, including emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, MHPSS.
- Number of communities where contamination survey has been conducted.
- Number of men, women, boys and girls who receive risk education from humanitarian risk-education actors.
- Number of men, women, boys and girls who receive risk education from public service providers.
- People live in improved housing and have improved access to quality basic service delivery, including through the light rehabilitation of key infrastructure.

Output indicators:

- Number of children (3-17 years, girls/boys) benefitting from classrooms constructed, established or rehabilitated.
- Number of people assisted by rehabilitated damaged houses.
- Number of people assisted by repaired/rehabilitated community/ public infrastructure and facilities.
- Number of health facilities refurbished or rehabilitated.
- Estimated number of people with improved access to water as a result of repair and rehabilitation of water systems.
- **Households have improved livelihoods and generate income, based on productive assets, short-term work opportunities or regular employment.**

Outcome indicators:

- Percentage of targeted households with improved reduced coping strategy.
- Percentage of targeted households with reduced expenditure on food.
- Percentage of targeted households with Negative Livelihoods Coping Strategy.

Output indicators:

- Number of short-term work opportunities created including through market-based modalities.
- Number of people obtaining or accessing regular employment, because of sector support.
- Number of people supported to rehabilitate, develop or start a social or business entrepreneurship initiative.

Prioritization Approach

The 2021 HRP sets out a holistic response, reflecting the complexity of the humanitarian situation in Carana where people's needs are multiple and interrelated, encompassing humanitarian lifesaving, protection, livelihood, and basic service domains. It therefore requires full funding to ensure that humanitarian actors can deliver the entirety of sectoral and multi-sectoral responses which they have planned for. At the same time, the 2021 HRP includes a strengthened approach to prioritization which aims to ensure that people's most urgent needs are addressed at certain key stages during implementation. This prioritization approach is guided by two main considerations: 1) severity of needs, at both inter-sectoral and sectoral levels, and 2) identified vulnerable groups.

Severity of Need

The response identifies levels of severity, ranging from the most critically affected areas where people generally face more immediate survival needs, to areas where there are significant needs for service delivery, livelihood and resilience interventions. These categorizations are based on several sector-based and multi-sectoral indicators considered to be particularly reflective of living conditions and humanitarian needs, including the intensity of hostilities, the number of new displaced people, the ratio of displaced people and returnees to host communities, access to basic services, as well as the level of price increases for basic commodities. Indicators for the inter-sector severity have been developed through a collaborative and consultative inter-agency process.

Areas with the highest severity levels typically indicate situations where the scope and depth of needs are greater and more urgent. However, inter-sector severity categorization is not intended to exclude areas from being assisted. People in lower severity areas also require humanitarian assistance, mainly related to basic services and livelihoods, to prevent these areas from slipping into more severe need. Severity of need also needs to be interpreted in conjunction with magnitude, i.e. some areas might show slightly lower severity but have a high concentration of people in need and hence need to be assisted.

Some key service delivery infrastructure such as hospitals, water and sanitation systems, or facilities delivering protection services are located in lower severity level areas and provide critical services to population groups that may partially reside in high severity areas. Sector severity

analyses indicate the severity of needs across the country according to sector-specific indicators, such as malnutrition, food insecurity, access to health services, water, sanitation and waste management, access to education and protection related issues. Given the constantly evolving situation in Carana, partners will continue to require flexibility and adjust their response according to changes in context, needs and access.

Vulnerable Groups

Acknowledging that there are people in need of humanitarian assistance across Carana – and taking into account sector-specific considerations – humanitarian actors in Carana have identified multiple vulnerability characteristics and acute needs, which tend to be present and compound each other in the following six vulnerable groups. In addition to severity analysis outlined above, needs and vulnerability analysis pertaining to each of these groups will be used to further prioritize assistance:

- People living in areas with limited access, or in areas where control has changed, where freedom of movement and access to services have been significantly interrupted or remain extremely limited and challenging, including due to the reduced presence of humanitarian actors or administrative regulations on humanitarian actors.
- People currently living in areas that have seen high intensity hostilities or have high levels of contamination with explosive hazards.
- IDPs living in last resort sites, collective centres, and/or living in open areas, who have limited/or no access to core services and where freedom of movement might be limited – open areas are locations where displaced people are staying without covered shelter for a period of longer than one week.
- Populations that are newly displaced due to hostilities or natural hazards and are therefore likely to face immediate and acute needs during their initial stages of displacement.
- Spontaneous/self-organized returnees, requiring specific and dedicated assistance to avoid secondary displacement or resorting to harmful coping strategies as a foundation for their return, including in newly accessible areas.
- Over-burdened communities, where, due to the large number of IDPs and/or spontaneous returnees and/or prolonged interruption of basic services, the entire population (including both host communities and IDPs) is exposed to increased challenges in accessing services, livelihoods, and economic opportunities.

The six priority groups outlined above are broad categories of people who present need across all sectors. At sector level, each sector has also developed household targeting criteria that takes into account sector specific-indicators for assessing vulnerability by activity aligned with sector

objectives. The analysis recognizes that, at a more granular level, individual/household vulnerability within these priority population groups are likely to vary, with children, youth, older people, women and girls as well as people with chronic illnesses, disabilities and injuries or people with varying levels of self-reliance, requiring specific consideration when planning and prioritizing the response.

Coordinated Multi-Sectoral Responses

In view of promoting a coordinated multi-sectoral response for people considered most in need or vulnerable in areas with “high” or “major” severity of needs, a series of joint and multi-sector response approaches have been elaborated. These do not provide a complete picture of the anticipated response but highlight areas where coordinated implementation across sectors will be particularly important to reduce the most immediate protection, lifesaving and life-sustaining needs.

- **Humanitarian response to people living in areas with limited access, or in newly accessible areas, including due to the necessity to (re)-establish the presence of humanitarian actors:**

Access permitting, response efforts will focus on the provision of life-saving humanitarian supplies including food assistance, nutrition and health supplies, as well as core relief items for shelter, cooking, hygiene and clothing. Support to trauma and emergency healthcare; re-establishing vaccination activities; system repairs or operational support to increase the availability of safe water, sanitation and solid waste management, as well as the distribution of education learning materials are also planned.

These efforts will be complemented by the provision of protection services in line with the protection sector strategy, including the provision of GBV emergency responses, child protection interventions, humanitarian mine action, and supporting people to obtain civil status documentation in accordance with national legislation in areas where some governmental services are available but not sufficient to cover the needs. Livelihood activities and appropriate livestock inputs will be implemented to enhance the self-sufficiency of affected populations.

- **Humanitarian response to IDPs in last resort camps, settlements and transit centres:**

Depending on the location and the situation, response efforts to IDPs living in last resort sites depend on whether people transit through sites or may be compelled to remain in sites for prolonged periods of time. For those in transit, response efforts will remain limited, focusing on life-saving humanitarian activities such as the distribution of basic goods at household level, including ready to eat rations, micro-nutrients, emergency shelter and core relief items, including light hygiene and dignity kits, psychosocial first aid in situation of emergency, measures to enhance a protective environment for children (e.g. avoiding family separation), and measures to mainstream GBV during site

set-up. Basic service provision through emergency water-trucking, sanitation and solid waste management services, health surveillance and emergency health support through mobile clinics will also be priorities. Response efforts will also include the verification of, and reporting on, population movements as well as conditions in sites.

Overall response efforts will be complemented largely by mobile protection presence and activities, with interventions tailored to the situation and the fluidity of movements. In cases of prolonged stay, these efforts will be expanded to include the repeat distribution of food baskets and livelihood interventions for the most vulnerable, as well as more sustained service delivery, including more comprehensive protection services through static facilities for all displaced populations remaining in the sites, integrated protection services and education.

- **Humanitarian response to newly displaced populations (other than in sites):**

Newly displaced populations are considered particularly vulnerable within the first stages of displacement. Similar to IDPs staying in last resort sites, response efforts will focus on the immediate provision of quality life-saving humanitarian supplies, including ready-to-eat rations and food baskets, basic relief items for the most vulnerable households, including light hygiene and dignity kits, and a series of initial – and largely mobile – emergency protection interventions. Delivery of basic services will be supported through the reinforcement of available service providers relating to sectors including health, WASH, shelter, protection and education in the areas hosting those newly displaced.

- **Humanitarian response to spontaneous / self-organized returnees:**

Return movements generate a variety of needs (including shelter, access to basic services and self-reliance opportunities, civil documentation and housing, land and property-related issues) that often outstrip the response capacity of duty-bearers. As with other persons in need who remain displaced or otherwise affected by the crisis, humanitarian actors will continue to address the needs of those who choose to return spontaneously and of the communities where they attempt to reintegrate, which are often impoverished.

Support will be provided through activities aimed at restoring housing, providing water and basic services (particularly health and education), re-establishing livelihoods, providing specialized support (including in GBV, child protection, psychosocial support to persons with specific protection needs), supporting the reactivation of

critical social services (with particular reference to those issuing civil status documentation) in support of national authorities and providing legal advice on housing, land and property issues in line with the national legal framework and international standards. Risk education,

clearance of explosive hazards and victim assistance will also be provided where needed.

• Humanitarian response in overburdened communities:

In areas hosting a large number of displaced persons or returnees in relation to the host population, community-based support will be needed to facilitate access to basic services and livelihood opportunities that may be overstretched. Activities foreseen include the establishment and expansion of protection services, including through static facilities (community centers, women and girls safe spaces, child protection services facilities), as well as efforts to build and expand the capacity of existing health, water, sanitation, solid waste management and education service providers.

Underpinning the Response

Key Principles



“Do no harm”: i.e. preventing and minimizing any unintended negative effects of activities that can increase people’s vulnerability to physical and psychosocial risks.



Equity: ensuring affected civilians have meaningful access to impartial assistance and services in proportion to need and without any barriers or discrimination, paying special attention to individuals and groups who may be particularly vulnerable or have difficulty accessing assistance and services. Ensuring affected populations have information on assistance, can share feedback on assistance received, including through appropriate feedback and complaints mechanisms, and are able to participate in the provision of adequate assistance. Affected people were consulted during the 2020 needs identification and planning process through individual and household consultations as well as focus group discussions. Feedback and complaint mechanisms are activated at both agency and inter-sector levels for affected populations to provide feedback on the quality of the humanitarian assistance received.



Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by

humanitarian actors (PSEA): in line with the Secretary-General’s bulletin “Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse” (October 2003), humanitarian partners remain committed to pursue efforts to improve the way they prevent and respond to sexual exploitation and abuse.

Unequal power dynamics between humanitarian aid workers and affected populations can generate risks of exploitation and abuse of affected populations, including sexual exploitation and abuse, with women and girls being particularly vulnerable. Sexual exploitation and abuse, like

all forms of Gender-Based Violence (GBV), remains chronically under-reported in all crises.

Findings of a survey conducted in Carana in 2019 suggest that sexual exploitation and abuse is an issue of concern for communities, with respondents indicating that they have been exposed to exploitation and abuse when accessing humanitarian assistance. Data gathered suggests that groups such as female-headed households, especially older, with disabilities, and divorced or widowed women are vulnerable to discrimination which could lead to exploitation and abuse, with the situation likely to be exacerbated as the crisis continues and affected people resort to increasingly harmful coping mechanisms.

This includes reporting mechanisms, referral pathways, awareness raising and supporting the capacity of specialized centers and caregivers, which allow beneficiaries to safely and confidentially report sexual exploitation and abuse concerns using a wide variety of channels. 32 % of surveyed community respondents in Carana reported that they were aware of complaint mechanisms in the community to report requests for sexual favours in return for humanitarian aid.

An important focus of humanitarian responders therefore is on strengthening local level prevention and response measures through enhancing awareness, including through distribution of awareness materials, use of social media and television to disseminate information, and through building capacity among frontline humanitarian organizations.

• Response planning under the 2021 HRP continued to build on needs and vulnerability analysis related to:



Gender and Age: conditions for women and girls have deteriorated significantly in many areas of Carana since the start of the crisis. Factors such as high exposure to violence, including gender-based violence; displacement; restrictions on access to healthcare; including access to sexual and reproductive healthcare; poverty; as well as growing unemployment, including related to the impact of unilateral coercive measures; are rendering women and girls increasingly vulnerable. Women are shouldering much of the economic burden, and many are struggling to ensure livelihoods for themselves and their families.

Ensuring humanitarian assistance responds to the distinct needs and concerns of women, girls, boys, and men, of different ages and abilities, is vital in order to ensure access to assistance and services, as well as to have a more meaningful impact on their lives, including promoting the empowerment of women and girls where opportunities exist. Programming should adapt to the particular vulnerabilities and access opportunities of individuals and communities, including persons with disabilities, to reduce exposure to violence and strengthen resilience. As a matter of principle, humanitarian actors are committed to

fully incorporating gender in assessments, strategic and operational planning as well as response and monitoring efforts.



Disability: persons with disabilities are considered to be disproportionately affected by the crisis. While a comprehensive, crisis-wide survey has not yet been conducted in Carana, one assessment amongst persons older than 12 years of age indicated that up to 19 per cent of people might live with some form of disability. Households in Carana including persons with disabilities report a lower ability to generate sufficient income to meet their needs when compared to households with no

members with disabilities. The situation is significantly worse for IDP households with members living with disabilities.

Women and girls with disabilities are particularly vulnerable to discrimination, exploitation and violence, including gender-based violence. They are far more likely to experience difficulty in accessing support and services that could reduce their risk and vulnerability. At the same time, older persons with disabilities in Carana face increased barriers in accessing information and services, and they are more likely to be affected psychologically by the crisis.

1.6 Summary of Needs, Targets and Requirements

By sector

People in need	People targeted	Requirements (US\$)
5.3M People in need of humanitarian assistance	3.1M Direct assistance 4M Service delivery	362.7M

SECTORS	REQUIREMENTS (US\$)	PARTNERS	PROJECTS	PEOPLE IN NEED	PEOPLE TARGETED
Camp Coordination and Camp Management	\$15.1 M	9	9	730K	730K
Food Security and Livelihoods	\$127.2M	19	19	1.5M	1.0M
Education	\$32 M	8	8	4.8	1.3
Protection	\$54.3M	15	34	2M	1.4M
Health	\$23.7M	17	17	1.6;	1.6M
Nutrition	\$24.5M	12	12	954K	706K
Shelter and Non-Food Items	\$28.1M	17	17	1.2M	800K
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene	\$41.6M	18	21	1.9M	1.2M
Coordination and Logistics	\$16.2M	6	8	NA	N
Total	\$362.7M		146		

Part 2 Operational Response Plans



2.1 Protection

PEOPLE IN NEED	TARGET	REQUIREMENTS (US\$)	PARTNERS	PROJECTS
2M	1.4M	\$54.3M	15	34

Needs Analysis

Protection

In the absence of police and accountable military forces in Carana, protection of civilians needs to be a key priority for civilian and military actors in supporting the Carana peace process. Near IDP camps in central and southern Carana, the additional strain on the already scarce resources has increased the risk of riots in the host community. Given the lack of livelihood opportunities for new and old inhabitants in cities, poverty-related crime such as extortion, theft, illicit weapons trade as well as piracy in coastal communities etc. is constantly expanding. Tensions over land for farming and grazing and over water sources frequently escalate between returnees, militias and current occupants of the land. Returnees report harassment, militias deny farmers access to their land, and extortion, abduction and sexual abuse are common practices. Ongoing displacement, tribal clashes, cyclical floods, malnutrition, social and political instability, gender inequality, and the effects of the current economic situation contribute to the absence of protective environments and monitoring mechanisms.

Protection of Livelihoods

Extensive landmine use has caused lasting terror to residents and hampers day-to-day activities. During the conflict between FDC and rebels, both sides used landmines as a means of terror and deterrent and mine obstacles were not documented. During floods and

mudslides, minefields are washed away and reappear elsewhere, making sustainable charting nearly impossible.

For at least three years, planting cycles in east and south Carana have been severely interrupted or disturbed due to landmines denying access to the fields. The regular food production is here reduced to a level of under 50 %.

In a UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) survey conducted in April 2020, the survey team was not granted access to the CISC-controlled part of Leppko province. In addition to the explosives locations recorded in the context of the Carana Mine Ban Treaty 2011, the survey found the most affected areas to be those surrounding the frontlines of Mouvement Patriotique du Carana (MPC) / FDC and Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC) / Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC) conflict. 33 communities were affected in central Mahbek and large parts of Koloni, which reported upwards of 130 casualties per year through landmines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERWs). In eastern Koloni and throughout Hanno, 40 communities reported suspected minefields and 70 casualties/year. Similar numbers of victims and affected communities are expected in Leppko.

Throughout the rest of the country, landmines are rarely suspected. Mostly men and boys fall victim to ERWs (83% male vs. 17% female), most commonly during farmwork or travel by foot. Given the bad transport and health infrastructure, 57% of mine victims did not receive emergency care after the incident. Whereas the actual incidents are a concern of itself, the suspected presence of explosives also hinders farmers and vendors from movement required to make a living, leads families not to send their children to school through suspected minefields, and kills livestock. More than 62% of IDPs have fled from mine-impacted communities.

Protection from SGBV

Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) is another widespread, largely untreated and severely underreported issue. Incidents happen most frequently as domestic violence (34% of women report to have been victims of domestic violence), in overcrowded camps and during farming season (migration to and from pastures, markets, fields). A culture of denial, the social stigma, fear of further harassment when reporting the assaults, physical and psychological trauma, the lack of protection afforded to victims and witnesses, and the perceived inaction of law enforcement and justice institutions both further bruise the victims and hinder the prevention of future crimes.

Child Protection

Children and adolescents are among the most vulnerable groups. The conflict has produced an estimate of 420,000 unaccompanied minors (UM), which are at risk of being recruited for hazardous child labour. Recruitment takes place mainly in communities close to mines, especially in the Hanno district. Unconfirmed reports indicate continued recruitment of child soldiers by Ellassi Liberation Front (ELF)

and CISC splinter groups. Additionally, village elders to protect their villages from raiding militias and tribal conflicts often recruit youth. These nightly protection duties are more often than not incompatible with regularly attending school or farm work and feed into the vicious cycle of food insecurity and economic downturn.

Child marriage is a common practice, with an estimated 13% of girls married before the age of 13, and an additional 37% before 18. Child marriage not only increases the risk for sexually transmitted infections (STIs), sexual violence, malnutrition during pregnancy and lactation, death in labour and infant disability or death, but also leads to high rates in discontinued education, illiteracy and economic precariat.

In the urban port areas around Galasi, Cereni and Maldosa, homeless children are at risk of human trafficking and many have formed violent street gangs. Access to education is further hampered by school closures due to protests, fighting, because their facilities have been occupied by militia and government forces or damaged through flooding. The long and unsafe way to school puts school children at even more risk of abduction, trafficking and violence on the way. The risk of SGBV on the way to school disproportionately affects girls (71% of female drop-outs have reported dangerous itineraries as reason for dropping out, compared to 29% of male drop-outs).

Response Strategy

In 2021, the Protection Sector and its areas of responsibility (AoRs) will maintain a community-based approach; continue adapting to the evolving situation; maintain capacity to respond to emergencies, largely carried out through the rapid deployment of mobile teams to address urgent protection needs in renewed hostilities or sudden displacement, and providing initial measures to ensure basic protection and risk mitigation, with a focus on women, adolescent girls and children.

The Sector will expand its regular coverage to areas of severe needs characterized by new and protracted displacement, reception of spontaneous return movements, a large number of displaced persons or returnees in relation to the host population, and exposure to hostilities. The Sector will continue provision of integrated protection services through community-based facilities and specialized centres. Types of services offered at these facilities will include: 1) psychosocial support; 2) individual case management; 3) referrals to specialized services; 4) targeted in-kind or market-based assistance to address specific needs and prevent further exposure to protection risks; 5) legal assistance activities; 6) community-based initiatives to foster social cohesion and community participation and inclusion; 7) support to vulnerable children.

Outreach capacity (through mobile teams and community volunteers) will be integrated in order to maximize coverage and extend presence to rural

communities with information on available services, aiming to reduce susceptibility to risks, strengthen referrals, and build stronger relations with beneficiaries for needs identification.

Protection needs assessments and monitoring will be pursued to better identify needs and inform a strategic response in coordination with state institutions. Technical capacity-building of protection actors, including duty bearers, to improve quality of interventions; and on protection, gender, child protection, mine action, and GBV mainstreaming will continue. Considering the widespread high level of explosive hazards contamination, humanitarian mine action activities will be more integrated into other sectors.



SGBV Response

The SGBV response will aim to ensure that survivors of SGBV can access specialized/response services and that the risks of SGBV are prevented and mitigated through: 1) providing psychosocial support and case management; 2) strengthening referral pathways; 3) establishing and maintaining women and girl safe spaces, community centers/community well-being centers and safe spaces within health facilities; 4) enhancing integrated SGBV/reproductive health (RH) services and access for SGBV survivors to health services; and 5) distributing life-saving dignity kits.

Strategies will be further developed to contribute to the prevention of GBV with a focus on changing harmful social practices through community participation, including with men and boys. Mobile responses will be strengthened to help overcome movement restrictions imposed on women and girls where they occur, provide services in remote areas and emergency response during displacements or where services have been disrupted. Services will be inclusive and consider the specific needs, priorities and vulnerabilities of people with disabilities, older people, women, adolescent girls and girl children, child labourers, children survivors of violence, female-headed households, vulnerable returnees and women who have experienced divorce or widowhood.



Mine Action Response

Risk education tailored by age, gender, localized threats, and specific activity patterns, will remain essential to providing civilians, including humanitarian workers, with the knowledge and awareness to reduce exposure and the risk of accidents. Explosive hazards survey will be a priority, to inform at-risk communities of local threats, enable tailored risk education messaging, and assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid. Surveys will provide a more granular view of the scope and scale of contamination and lay the foundation for clearance operations. Comprehensive

explosive hazard clearance is also critical to reduce the impact of explosive hazards, render areas safe for the civilian population, and enable delivery of humanitarian services.



Child Protection Response

The Child Protection will enhance equitable access to quality child protection services, including for children with disabilities, through two main priorities: 1) improving the quality of community-based child protection through behaviour change and awareness raising on specific risks and psychosocial support; and 2) improving the reach and quality of specialized services for child survivors of violence, exploitation, neglect and abuse (including child recruits, labourers, GBV survivors, and unaccompanied or separated children).

Protection Risk Analysis and mitigating measures

In community-based protection services, protection actors need to avoid perceptions of discriminations in relation to choice of locations and targeting of beneficiaries. Partners should be guided by the sector severity analysis; analysis of existing services through mapping tools; transparent, participatory, and inclusive communication with communities on available services; and consultation with communities and duty bearers in the planning, implementing, and feedback stages of service provision.

GBV actors may need to overcome resistance from parts of the community to accept the direct engagement in the provision of services to women, girls and boys, particularly those who may have limited access to facilities. Mobile teams to overcome mobility challenges, and gender-balanced staffing will be critical. Key goals include the engagement of men and boys in awareness and sensitization on GBV topics, to advocate for and provide services through an integrated GBV/RH approach to expand entry points for survivors and improve overall access to GBV services without fear of stigma. Data protocols will be adapted, based on global guidance, to ensure confidentiality of GBV survivors.

Needs assessments may trigger grievances and mistrust if not followed by an adequate response. Actors must communicate with communities and build trust with them; manage expectations; ensure that referral pathways are functioning; and coordinate between partners to avoid assessment fatigue. The quality-of-service provision may be impacted by a lack of continuity in reliable access and service provision linked to increased hostilities and security concerns, staff turnover, lack of technical capacities – particularly in specialized protection interventions.

Response Priorities

In prioritizing the response, the sector will take into consideration various needs assessments; sector severity

scale; and specific vulnerabilities and groups particularly exposed to protection risks. Priorities will include: 1) life-saving interventions in situations of emergency for individuals exposed to hostilities and forcibly displaced, particularly in IDP sites/collective sites/collective accommodation. This will include the direct presence of protection staff to identify needs, consult with affected populations, provide a first protection response and referrals; 2) expanded and integrated protection services, focused on increasingly specialized support, particularly for individuals and communities who may not previously have had access to services. Complemented by outreach initiatives of protection risk awareness and community participation.

Monitoring

The Sector and its AoRs have updated its 4Ws template (Who does What, Where and When) to better capture the activities and targets. Partners will continue to be encouraged and supported in regular reporting through 4Ws. Monthly 4W data will reflect both planned and actual implementation covering all sector objectives into a monthly sector dashboard that will be produced and shared with all key stakeholders detailing the achievements of the month in relation to the sector targets. The resulting monthly and quarterly reports would enable protection partners to report on achievements, identify and address gaps and mobilize resources effectively. This will also be informative for new partners and activities and help direct any expansions, as well as inform emergency preparedness efforts whenever needed.

2.2 Camp Coordination and Camp Management

PEOPLE IN NEED	TARGET	REQUIREMENTS (US\$)	PARTNERS	PROJECTS
730K	730K	\$15M	9	9


Needs Analysis

The needs of the 1.1 million internally displaced persons in Carana span across all sectors of humanitarian assistance. IDP sites are a last resort for displaced persons that have exhausted financial and social assets to meet their basic needs. An estimated 0.73 million, or 60 per cent of all internally displaced persons are currently residing in informal settlements, collective centres, planned camps and reception centres. 265,000 displaced persons live in central Carana; the majority along the Kalesi River. IDP settlements around the capital zone of Galasi have increased sharply during the past year, and now host approx. 305,000 IDPs.

Multi-sectoral assistance in IDP sites cannot be guaranteed and families often face challenges to access basic services. The challenges faced by IDPs in sites vary according to the type of site. However, delivery of services is a challenge in all types of sites, particularly for water, sanitation and energy (electrical power, solar panels, fuel

for generators and fuel for cooking and heating purposes). Shelter conditions, including the lack of heating and privacy in sleeping and bathing areas, as well as poor hygiene, have also been reported as major issues. Informal sites are particularly vulnerable to weather conditions, particularly during heavy rains and storms.

People in need by Province



Response Strategy

In 2021, the CCCM Cluster response strategy will focus on four critical and inter-related areas: 1) monitor the provision of streamlined lifesaving, multi-sectoral assistance in IDP sites; 2) improve the camp management quality and accountability in IDP sites; 3) strengthen household and communal coping strategies in IDP sites and develop exit strategies; 4) disseminate operational information on IDP figures and movements on a timely basis.

Under the first response area, CCCM members provide life-saving humanitarian interventions focusing on their respective geographic or sector-specific areas of operation. Under the second response area the CCCM cluster will focus on developing the capacity of humanitarian actors operating in IDP sites, establishing and expanding IDP Committees and promoting other participatory management approaches and structures. Mobile Site Management Teams will support the establishment of IDP Committees in 120 self-settled sites.

Under the third response area, the CCCM cluster will continue in coordination with Food Security and Agriculture and Food security and livelihoods sectors to guide its members to implement tailored livelihood activities designed to enable IDP households to restore their assets and leave IDP sites for more sustainable solutions. This includes providing vocational training, small business incentives and other initiatives such as "go-and-see" visits for vulnerable IDPs to allow them to make informed decisions about their return to an area of choice.

In addition to contributing to durable solutions, these activities will decrease aid-dependency and strengthen

resilience at both household and community levels. IDP sites will be more resilient to shocks and more responsive to emergencies as a result. Under the fourth response area, the CCCM cluster will continue to track displacement, including sudden mass displacements and analyse trends and intentions. This will allow for the quick identification of IDPs in need of lifesaving humanitarian assistance.

As the last resort for the most vulnerable displaced population CCCM cluster is coordinating the expansion / establishment of IDP sites. Site selection criteria regard the context in north-west Carana to minimize the risk of flooding, maintain safe distance from frontlines and ensure the access to services.

CCCM will continue advocacy efforts for efficient responses, whilst maintaining the temporary nature of assistance in IDP sites as these continue being considered as a last-resort solution and protracted displacement in these areas should be avoided.

Protection Risk Analysis

Do No Harm will remain an integral principle of the CCCM Cluster in Carana. The CCCM Cluster strives to strike a balance between ensuring that dignified life-saving assistance is provided to IDPs in all sites, while ensuring that sites don't contribute to any push or pull factor that could expose IDPs to physical safety risks if sites are located in unsafe areas. Sites must be away from risk areas, such as those vulnerable to floods and earthquakes, in proximity to hostilities, or contaminated by explosive hazards. CCCM will apply site selection criteria for new sites as a standard to identify safe locations, where the assistance provided does not contribute to aid-dependency and IDP sites remain a measure of last resort. These sites will grow important during the next cyclical rains, when many already existing informal settlements on the Kalesi riverbanks are expected to become flooded.

The Cluster will reduce the risk of GBV by implementing GBV prevention and mitigation strategies at site planning stage, and implementing measures for the inclusion of persons with specific needs in terms of accessibility and participation in camp resident committees.

To avoid forced eviction risks and court cases against CCCM actors, due diligence on HLP issues will be conducted to clarify ownership and rights to use land for project activities, by obtaining authorization from the rightful owners. IDP camps will continue to receive humanitarian life-saving assistance and management support. Concurrently, efforts will continue to ensure IDPs are given the chance to leave the camps when they identify better solutions. The establishment and support of IDP camps will take freedom of movement of IDPs into consideration.

Response Priorities

An estimated nine per cent of IDPs living in sites are still in need to receive minimum food assistance on a monthly

basis. Approximately 17 and 26 per cent of the population in sites are still seeking proper shelter and NFI assistance respectively. Challenges also persist in sanitation, waste removal and provision of potable water affecting nine per cent of the site population.

Monitoring life-saving activities will remain a priority of the CCCM humanitarian response. A further priority of the cluster will promote set up site management system in each IDP site and ensure that all categories of the displaced of the community have equal access to services and represented in decision-making processes.

Finally, helping IDPs rebuild their physical and financial assets through livelihoods and resilience support will also be prioritized. At the camp management level, CCCM will continue capacity building for camp management teams to reduce their reliance on humanitarian assistance.


Monitoring

CCCM is monitoring through the 4Ws, ISIMM and ISIMM-Plus the services provided in the sites (Camps/Collective Centre) in 80 per cent of the listed camps in CCCM database. CCCM members are working on the remaining 20 per cent of the camps to be listed, noting that they are all newly established sites.

Prioritization Approach

The CCCM cluster will ensure that IDP sites remain available as a last resort. Using the 4Ws tool for monitoring services provided according to the indicators, the cluster will ensure that minimal thresholds for life-saving assistance are met, and gaps are reported to the concerned clusters.

Beyond IDP sites with individual household tents, the CCCM cluster will continue to support reception centres with communal tents in view of providing emergency shelter for a short period during sudden displacements. These reception centres are designed to provide shelter and assistance for IDPs only for short periods and encourage them to leave once other more durable solutions are identified.



2.2 Food Security and Livelihoods

PEOPLE IN NEED	TARGET	REQUIREMENTS (US\$)	PARTNERS	PROJECTS
1.5 M	1 M	\$127.2M	19	19

Needs Analysis

Despite the improvement in the security situation as most of areas are accessible now, in many densely populated areas of the country, millions of Caranese continue to face huge socio- economic challenges due to widespread damage and destruction of infrastructure, erosion of the productive base and protracted displacement. The social fabric of the country has been severely damaged and an estimated 42-47 per cent of people are living below the national poverty line. The erosion of living conditions has severely undermined the ability of affected people to cope with the consequences of the crisis, and after-effects will likely continue for many years due to the cumulative impact of the crisis.

Based on results from a countrywide household assessment, an estimated 7.9 million people in Carana are food insecure and an additional 1.9 million people are at risk of food insecurity, an estimated increase of 8 per cent from last year's people in need (PiN). The main drivers to food insecurity remain to be conflict and protracted displacement, loss or lack of livelihoods and reduced production capacity and economic sanctions on the country. Economic sanctions have had a major impact on the import of agriculture production inputs and critical supplies putting a strain on the availability of quality agricultural inputs in the market as well as their affordability. Fuel shortages too have further resulted in the spike of transportation and agriculture production costs.

These factors have resulted in limited physical and financial access to food, soaring prices and inflation, contributing to reduced purchasing power and continuous livelihood depletion for the most vulnerable. Moreover, in 2020, food security and livelihoods responses were highly underfunded undermining prospects for economic recovery, stabilization of national food systems and improvement in household food security.

Of the surveyed IDP or returnee households, 82 per cent reported having been displaced for more than 12 months.

Of the displaced population, an estimated 761,000 people living in last resort camps have limited access to a diversified diet or income opportunities. With at least 69 per cent of people living below \$1.90 a day and with an estimated cumulative GDP loss of \$226 billion between 2012 and 2017 (\$16 billion of which are attributable to the agriculture sector alone), the relationship between poverty and food security remains particularly strong. A monthly food ration with staple items costs at least 90 per cent of an unskilled labourers average monthly salary and between 50 and 80 per cent of a public service employee's average monthly salary.

Continued conflict across north-west, central and south Carana will only deteriorate the national food insecurity further as production remains affected. Emergency response at the early onset of any sudden population movement as well as targeted food assistance and life-saving emergency agricultural assistance to meet the nutritional and kilocalorie deficits of the most vulnerable populations as per food security indicators are crucial across Carana. This includes providing sustainable assistance, which will enhance the investment of available resources towards saving, rehabilitating and protecting agriculture-related livelihoods and value chains and rehabilitation of damaged infrastructure, particularly in rural areas including direct support to returnees. This will be critical to stabilize food production, food access and increase the self-reliance and resilience of Caranese.

The humanitarian response must be flexible to cater for longer-term drivers of vulnerability, while continuing to focus on life-saving needs. The anticipated returns of IDPs and refugees in 2021 would add to the socio-economic needs in the near future. Ensuring safe, dignified and voluntary return and sustainable reintegration of displaced people will depend on availability of basic and social infrastructure and services, a secure environment, and viable livelihood opportunities.

Response Strategy

The response strategy of the Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL) Sector is based on two overarching objectives: improving positive coping mechanisms of affected people and communities; and reducing dependency on emergency supplies and services. The FSL Sector will also adopt a recovery and resilience-oriented approach, as the emphasis will be on supporting the communities' own efforts to enhance self-recovery and to cover critical gaps. Response planning and analysis will be multi-sectoral with a comprehensive, flexible and integrated approach, driven by communities' own priorities. The response consists of four thematic areas:

Emergency response

for short-term support such as Ready-to-Eat Rations (RTE), cooked meals and/or bread provided using appropriate modalities (in-kind or market-based interventions) at the onset of a crisis to provide 2,100 kcal per person/per day, in line with SPHERE standards. The estimated target for this activity is a projected caseload of 300,000 newly crisis-affected people and 700,000 IDPs in previously inaccessible areas and returnees. Based on experience to date, it can be expected that approximately half of this caseload may need to be transferred beyond the emergency response, to monthly food assistance based on needs. The sector will take appropriate measures to ensure that returnees and IDPs are integrated in sustainable livelihood programs to ensure that they transition from food assistance to self-reliance.

Access to Livelihoods

Creating income-generating opportunities: The FSL Sector will support local initiatives, in partnership with communities, FSL actors, and duty bearers that provide the means and opportunities for community members to earn a sustainable minimum income and to access social and other services, with a view to build capacities to positively cope with the crisis. The sector plans to create short-term jobs to supporting small businesses and entrepreneurship, and to provide vocational training and start-up kits that match the needs of the job market. Efforts will be made to link the beneficiaries of income generating activities with the providers of psychosocial support to ensure a holistic recovery.

The sector aims to restore and strengthen productive assets and create livelihood opportunities for the targeted populations, thus contributing to the overall food production and food availability in Carana. Through Food Security and Livelihood assistance, the sector aims to reach 1 million households (5 million people) out of the total number of food insecure people (8.7 million).

Appropriate agricultural inputs will be provided along with technical capacity building targeting 700,000 households to ensure that the most vulnerable households receive timely inputs as per the seasonal calendar and contribute to domestic production requirements. Out of these, an estimated 300,000 of the most vulnerable farming households will receive protection food rations to protect their assets until harvesting.

A further 200,000 households will be supported for small-scale food production such as horticulture, poultry-egg laying hens, market gardens. 500,000 households will also be targeted for asset building and asset-protection, specifically for livestock keepers. Out of these, 200,000 households will be targeted with emergency livestock treatment and training for veterinary services, including community animal health workers. Another 200,000 households will be targeted with livelihood support programs including vocational trainings and income generation related to small businesses and enterprises.

Local procurement will be encouraged to create demand, where markets have sufficient capacity. With 1.9 million individuals at risk of food insecurity, it is vital to restore and create livelihood opportunities for households to reduce use of negative coping mechanism in order to meet their daily needs. Improving access to productive and market infrastructure to restore economic recovery. The sector will emphasize needs-driven rehabilitation of basic infrastructure that is critical to support local economic activity and thus livelihood opportunities. This covers the rehabilitation of collective assets such as local markets; critical infrastructure for market access; lighting in public areas; shared production resources (cooperative assets); agro-based enterprises; irrigation canals, and milling facilities.

Regular food response

Reaching assessed food insecure people to meet monthly food needs through the most feasible and contextually appropriate modality, including in-kind food baskets or equivalent market-based interventions where feasible. The sector will seek to reach the same household a minimum of eight out of twelve months, dependent on access and resource constraints. This response will ensure a minimum of 1545 kcal person/ day, making up just over 70 per cent of the daily caloric needs of food insecure households, with remaining requirements covered by people's own means or other contributions. However, the sector will also adapt the required kilocalorie intake going up to 2100 kcal/person/day where needed as per assessed data and thresholds of food insecurity. Through the monthly regular response, the sector will target 1 million food insecure people, including approximately 60 % of the caseload from newly affected IDPs and returnees in central Carana and 65% of severely food insecure residents in the famine-affected Guthar and Leppko provinces.

Supporting Social Cohesion

The sector will support affected communities and local governance structures in setting up mechanisms for settling complaints and disputes through developing the capacity of community activists, paralegals, civil society and local governance actors (both men and women); establishing community-based legal assistance services with a focus on documentation, housing, land and property issues, family matters and gender-based violence; and creating inclusive dialogue platforms to discuss social cohesion related matters and solutions.

Resilience and Early Recovery Mainstreaming in other sectors

The Sector will coordinate closely with other sectors to promote synergies and avoid overlap and duplication while implementing its multi-faceted community-focused strategy. The restoration of basic services will be closely coordinated with a variety of areas including: (1) the Shelter, Health, Education and WASH Sectors to promote geographical convergence and complementarity; (2) continued and enhanced collaboration with Nutrition sector at field level; (3) a deeper focus on protection analysis with the inclusion of the protection matrix at sector and project levels with specific emphasis on GBV and child protection.

Protection Risk Analysis

The main protection risks are likely be related to the overall food, agriculture and livelihood inputs distribution processes – whether regular or emergency – and the negative impacts that such distributions may have on civilians. Programming needs to act sensitively towards avoid any perceived inequities and disagreement and to support targeted initiatives promoting collective action by the community members. These inequities may be felt based on the location in which they are taking place,

primarily in areas witnessing active hostilities; but also in relatively stable areas, with girls and women being highly vulnerable to sexual exploitation and abuse by humanitarian actors.

Additionally, tensions between IDPs, returnees and host communities have been highlighted as a risk, as have dynamics and interaction between affected people and armed actors. To mitigate such risks several sector-specific measures are recommended to partners to ensure protection mainstreaming is included throughout the program cycle, such as aligning with sector-recommended response packages for a harmonized response, ensuring the understanding and monitoring of the contextual environment is well known, up-to- date and integrated into the distribution processes, and applying needs-based targeting/selection criteria. Furthermore, the sector recommends enhanced efforts to support partners to train their staff on the ground while equipping them with adequate tools to limit and monitor the liability and effect of these risks.

Response Priorities

The food security and livelihoods sector will ensure immediate as well as consistent access to food to the most food insecure people in Carana as well as integration of GBV survivors. The response will be driven by both geographical and household level targeting and needs-based assistance. The sector will also ensure availability of food by boosting household/ local productive capacity through provision of inputs and trainings as well as enhancing communities' capacity to sustain their productive assets. Supporting the rehabilitation of critical agriculture infrastructure to boost household food production will also be one of the core responses under agriculture and livelihoods. Seasonal criticality as well as interventions around drought mitigation and early warning will be key aspects of the response.

The strategy has been translated into seven priority areas (better living conditions and access to utilities; increased livelihood opportunities; improved access to social infrastructure; enhanced access to basic productive infrastructure; protection of the most socio-economically vulnerable; strengthened local service delivery capacity; strengthening of community engagement and participation). Nineteen quantifiable targets and indicators have been defined for these response areas, and all project proposals will be appraised on the basis of their planned contribution to these sector-specific targets.

Monitoring

The progress against the activities will be monitored through a collation of the 4Ws data on monthly basis, against the nineteen indicators included in the Sector logframe. The partners would be continually informed of the trends emerging and the outstanding gaps through meetings and communication. The Mid-Year Review of

HNO and the thematic studies will feed into the course of correction and future programming.

Consequences of Underfunding

Underfunding (and under-budgeting) of the Early Recovery response will impact the ability of the sector to improve the resilience and self-reliance of people in Carana as well as their capacity to cope with shocks and stresses created by more than eight years of crisis. Secondly, under-investment in FSL risks prolonging and deepening people's dependency on humanitarian deliveries, which may have negative social, psychological and ethical implications for their well-being. Thirdly, living in wretched conditions, and lacking gainful employment opportunities and incentives may drive particularly the youth towards harmful and undesirable coping mechanisms, such as involvement in violent extremism.

2.3 Education

PEOPLE IN NEED	TARGET	REQUIREMENTS (US\$)	PARTNERS	PROJECTS
4.8 M 4.2M Children	1.3 M	\$32M	8	9

Needs Analysis

After nearly nine years of crisis, insufficient availability of, and access to, continuous protective quality education remains a critical need in Carana. Among resident Caranese, in urban communities roughly 70% of children are enrolled in primary school, and 40% in secondary

schools, tendency declining. Among IDPs and refugees, these numbers drop significantly: 33% of IDP children receive primary education, and only 6% of them proceed to secondary schooling. In rural areas and in the MPC/CISC-controlled sectors, school infrastructure has been repurposed and only very few children receive formal education. An estimated 78% of women aged 15-24 are illiterate.

Without education, economic upturn is much more difficult, as is navigating bureaucracy, democratic participation and staffing reliable and accountable institutions. Currently, lacking WASH facilities, unaffordable school fees, the often long and dangerous walks to school and the security situation all are significant hindrances to school education, especially to girls' attendance.

In the Barin and Guthar regions, in Mahbek and around Maldosa and Eres, during the last UNICEF survey interview stage up to 25% of facilities were at least temporarily occupied by IDPs, refugees or armed groups.

The poor building conditions make many schools especially volatile during the rainy season. Skilled teachers are scarce. Around Akkabar and Maroni in northern Hanno schools frequently close during civil unrest. Teacher training, raising awareness for the importance of school education, gender-separated and functional WASH facilities, school feedings, safe transport to school and alternative facilities for refugees and IDPs need to be

provided in order to give the Caranese people an escape from the current economic and humanitarian crisis. Restricted humanitarian access to the currently CISC-controlled southern areas prevents partners from designing programs targeted to the Leppko region. In western Carana, few school structures have existed even before the war. The programs there provide mainly informal education services to IDP and host communities alike.

A multisector approach to food security, protection, WASH and education is needed. Children who are out of school are more likely to be exposed to protection risks. These risks are often linked to families resorting to harmful coping strategies such as child labour and early marriage. Furthermore, it is less likely that children and their families will prioritize education if they feel that the quality of services provided will not lead to economic opportunities and/or if they feel that traveling to school or being in school may pose a risk in some areas. These risks may be attacks on education, unsafe learning facilities or bullying and harassment.

Response Strategy

The education response strategy focuses on improving access to education services, the quality of the services provided and the systems that support these services. With a commitment to sustainability, the response aims to complement existing systems rather than creating parallel ones. The response focuses on getting out of school children (OOSC) back to learning and ensuring that enrolled students continue to learn and improve the quality of the provided education. Most OOSC are internally displaced, often more than once, and/or children living in communities or displacement sites where there are little education services available.

The cost of school fees is unattainable for vulnerable families as their livelihood opportunities are affected by recurring crises. Hence, to mitigate the economic challenges on impacted livelihoods, the education response will provide emergency teacher incentives to maintain teachers in schools during these difficult times as well as lowering the cost for education. Additionally, as part of the response plan to retain crisis-affected children in schools, emergency school feeding will continue to support the most affected households, as will the provision of safe drinking water and enhanced hygiene promotion.

The education response plan will increase access to education services for all children, including children with disabilities, by establishing or rehabilitating temporary learning spaces. These facilities will include gender-friendly and disaggregated WASH facilities, school furniture and teaching/learning materials. In addition, teachers will benefit from incentives and educational training on inclusive, protective and socio-emotional learning. Capacity-building initiatives in school management and school safety will also be provided to Community Education Committees.

The response will further prioritize the provision of emergency school feeding programs, safe water provision and storage, in addition to enhancing hygiene and sanitation promotion. It will emphasize the importance of integrating child protection activities in schools. It will also help ensure schools are safe learning environments, and keep schools protected from attacks.

Protection Risk Analysis

There are two main categories of education related protection risks, threats to a learning facility and threats within a learning facility. Education members have limited influence on preventing attacks on education. Efforts are focused on mitigating the impact of attacks. This may include ensuring schools in insecure locations are structurally strengthened, safety protocols are in place, preparedness trainings regularly practiced and that psychosocial support services are provided. Learning facilities or their surroundings may be structurally unsafe, unsanitary or not provide sufficient protection from the weather. The sector aims for learning facilities to be improved to ensure that buildings and grounds are safe and protected and provide sufficient and appropriate gender and disability appropriate WASH facilities. Within the learning facility children may be exposed to harm or bullying. Learning facilities should have effective Child Safeguarding, PSEA, feedback mechanism policies, and systems in place and these should be regularly monitored, and corrective action taken when needed.

Response Priorities

With at least 900,000 children permanently out of school and around 62 per cent of school-aged children, living in areas with acute and immediate need of humanitarian education assistance the overall approach is to get children into schools and learning centres that provide quality education in a protective and welcoming environment and ensure that those students remain in school. The sector uses a two-pronged approach that addresses acute emergency needs and protracted emergency needs. The first priority is to increase the availability of appropriate and safe learning spaces, second priority is to increased access to those learning spaces and the third priority is to ensure that services meet the quality needed to for a quality education that is, against multiple priorities, prioritized by children and caregivers. Close coordination with the food security, health, WASH and protection sectors are key to an optimal response.

Monitoring

Members commit to attending coordination meetings, submitting comprehensive monthly 4Ws, contributing to sector processes and sharing assessments and studies. These elements contribute to monitoring, readiness and response efforts. The sector is working on better ensuring that analysis promotes informed planning and response. Specific efforts are made to track the reach to under-served groups such as younger children, adolescents,

youth, IDP children and children with disabilities and areas where there is the highest gap between the severity of need, the number of people in need and the response.

Prioritization Approach

The Education Sector's prioritization approach is guided by an analysis of education severity in accordance with the sector's severity analysis and categorization against key access, quality and systems related indicators. The priority for the Education Sector is to respond to the education needs of children, adolescents and youth in areas with severe to catastrophic education needs (severity areas 4-6).

Further priority is given to geographic areas with the largest gap between needs and response. Within these areas, the sector pays specific attention to groups that are in need of emergency education services. This includes children who are out of school, children living in acute and protracted displacement, children living in areas with no accessible education services, young children, adolescents, youth and children with specific physical and psychological needs. Projects are vetted based on an established set of 14 weighted criteria, including the quality of programming, need-based targeting and value for money. The sector placed budget caps on support and recovery costs. Projects must be reasonable and achievable based on the demonstrated financial capacity and programmatic ability.



2.4 Health

PEOPLE IN NEED	TARGET	REQUIREMENTS (US\$)	PARTNERS	PROJECTS
1.6 M	1.6 M	\$23.7M	17	17

Needs Analysis

The medical system in Carana is poor in urban areas and non-existent in rural regions. The general availability of hospitals, vaccination, emergency capabilities, WASH, gender-based violence centers and rape services are all negligible. Whereas in urban areas 61% of the population have medical facilities in reach, a mere 20% can actually afford the mostly private healthcare facilities. Rimosan and Katasi refugees report having to pay fees approx. double

the usual local prices. In rural zones, level 2 health facilities service areas of up to 200 km² each. Rural hospitals are usually refugee health clinics in or close to camps. An estimated 30-50% of consultations stem from host community members.

The lack of drainage systems and insufficient quality of drinking water have created hotspots for cholera around Akkabar and Maroni, Hanno region, in the Guthar region, especially in Balkro. Meningitis prevails around Galasi, Amsan and in the Kalari river delta. While health actors have made progress in addressing communicable disease, disrupted water networks and waste management, combined with food insecurity and continued high levels of displacement, leave millions vulnerable to epidemic-prone diseases and place heavy demands on surveillance networks and immunization activities. Chronic shortages of health care workers, particularly in north-east Carana, prevent full functionalization of health facilities and essential services with reproductive health and maternal health services heavily impacted.

Children below the age of 5 are most susceptible to malnutrition, septicemia, malaria and diarrheal diseases. Women frequently experience pregnancy-related health issues, sexual violence, and STIs. As men provide the vast majority of combatants and most victims of weapon violence, conflict-related injuries and disabilities are very common among them. The elderly suffer from chronic conditions and even higher problems of accessing remote clinics.

For the rainy season in 2021, outbreaks of endemic, water-borne, and vector-borne diseases like typhoid, dysentery, haemorrhagic fevers, and malaria can already be anticipated. Vaccine preventable diseases can recur on a wide scale due to low herd immunity and shortages in immunization coverage in several areas. Seasonal rains and accompanied floods area still a main hazard that can affect hundreds of thousands and be a risk factor for cholera outbreaks. Episodes of conflict regularly overburden surgical units and blood bank capacity. As of July 2020, an estimated 78% of essential medicines was not available in sufficient quantities, and inflation of drug prices was 30% higher than that of other goods and commodities. Continued shortages in essential medical supplies and medicines will worsen the anticipated crises.

Response Strategy

In 2021, the health sector remains focused on sustaining and expanding essential, quality health services at community, primary, secondary and tertiary care levels – ensuring the availability and accessibility of routine, emergency, and specialized health services is essential to meeting the needs of the most vulnerable groups. A holistic approach to humanitarian health assistance enables the health system to perform its essential functions; respond to emergencies; ensure health protection of vulnerable populations – including to IDPs and refugees returning to

their communities of origin as well as survivors of gender-based violence (GBV); and prevent, detect and respond to outbreaks of diseases of epidemic potential.

The health sector continues to invest its efforts in critical interventions to revitalize health system functionality, including:

- Improving access to primary, secondary and tertiary health care services.
- Expanding availability of essential primary health service package, with particular emphasis on gaps such as availability of essential medicines and diagnostic services.
- Improving the emergency referral system, as well as trauma, triage and emergency services.
- Establishing and expanding specialized services, such physical rehabilitation, tuberculosis, dialysis, severe acute malnutrition with complications, and burns, across affected populations.
- Strengthening linkages between levels of care, as well as between general and specialized care providers through comprehensive service mapping, improved patient tracking and training of health care workers.
- Ensuring reliable supply of safe, quality medicines and medical supplies.
- Deploying mobile medical teams/units, particularly to displaced populations and under-served areas with non-functional or partially functional facilities
- Expanding mental health and psychosocial support services capacity and coverage, including training of health care workers and provision of psychotropic medicines to certified professionals.
- Providing comprehensive reproductive health services, including the Minimum Initial Service Package, first line care for GBV survivors and tailored services for adolescents.
- Strengthening child health services – including integrated management of childhood illness and ensuring routine vaccination for children, including immunization campaigns as well as catch-up activities in low coverage areas.
- Preventing, detecting and responding to epidemic-prone diseases, including support to rapid response teams and pre-positioning outbreak supplies.
- Strengthening epidemiological and laboratory surveillance system at all levels.
- Improving infection prevention and control measures within communities and health facilities.
- Refurbishing and re-equipping of essential equipment to public health facilities.

- Training of health care workers and community health workers.
- Expanding community health programming, particularly to vulnerable and high-risk populations.

Additionally, health services are inherently cross-cutting, intersecting with the protection, nutrition and WASH sectors. Where feasible, health actors strive to mainstream key services such as micronutrient supplementation for children and women of reproductive age – particularly pregnant and lactating women, and as well as referrals to specialized services such as GBV case management. Coordination with WASH actors is essential for infection prevention and control measures within health facilities, including medical waste management. Integrating hygiene promotion as part of a community health worker (CHW) core curriculum helps to reduce incidence of epidemic-prone disease and encourage timely health-seeking behaviours. Coordinated water testing among vulnerable populations –particularly in camps and last resort sites reliant upon water trucking – is essential to prevention of waterborne illness.

Finally, as the political and conflict dynamics of the Caranese crisis continue to evolve on the ground, coordination of the health response and adequate contingency and transition planning remain critical. Core functions of information management and monitoring – such as analysis of 4Ws, continuous monitoring of early warning systems for incidents of suspected disease, quarterly tracking of health system functionality via Health Resources and Services Availability Monitoring System (HeRAMS) – are critical to ensuring a rapid and flexible response according to needs and severity, as well as emerging threats. Further, protection of health care remains a critical concern for the sector – ensuring risk mitigation measures, reporting of attacks on health care, and engaging in advocacy at all levels are priorities for 2021.

Protection Risk Analysis

The health sector protection analysis document identifies the most pressing, health-related protection risks facing healthcare providers and the affected population. Health actors are required to consider mitigation strategies for possible protection risks that may emerge during the delivery of humanitarian health assistance including violence against health care; gender-based violence; sexual exploitation and abuse; discrimination against vulnerable groups; and inequitable access to health services –particularly for persons with disabilities.

Response Priorities

While all people have been affected by the crisis in Carana and have a right to receive health care, certain groups and locations have particularly high needs. The health sector recognizes five population groups as the most vulnerable: children under 5 years of age, women of reproductive age (15-49 years), older persons (59 years

and above), IDPs and spontaneous returnees and persons with disabilities. Additionally, areas of active hostilities, IDP camps, last resort sites, overburdened hosting communities, and locations without reliable water, sanitation and shelter remain highly vulnerable to epidemic-prone disease.

Monitoring

In addition to the required monitoring mechanism for each health project at the programmatic level, the Health sector will monitor the response throughout 2020 against a set of strategic and activity indicators utilizing monitoring tools such as 4Ws, HeRAMS, early warning alert and response EWARS/EWARN, and the surveillance system of attacks on healthcare. The resulting monthly and quarterly reports should inform the response and present an update of the health situation across Carana in a manner enabling health partners to address existing gaps and mobilize resources effectively.

Prioritisation Approach

As in previous years, the sector will prioritise programs addressing the specific needs of the aforementioned health sector vulnerable groups and targeting areas of highest severity. Humanitarian health projects are required to outline a credible budget that reflects both the capacity of the submitting partner as well as realistic funding expectations based on financial projections and operational realities for 2021.

Prioritisation is given to integrated approaches with protection, nutrition and WASH sectors where feasible, as well as to projects that foster resilience and early recovery through health programming such as investments in longer term in-service training of health workers; inclusive infrastructure design during rehabilitation of health facilities; promotion of community participation and awareness; and increasing the capacity of local partners to respond to future shocks.

Finally, health projects must address protection risks, ensure accountability to affected populations; and articulate strong monitoring and evaluation approaches.

2.5 Nutrition

PEOPLE IN NEED	TARGET	REQUIREMENTS (US\$)	PARTNERS	PROJECTS
954 K	706 K	\$24.5M	12	12

Needs Analysis

Chronic malnutrition is evident in most sub-districts throughout south-eastern Carana, and frequent among IDPs in last resort camps. Chronic malnutrition is also on the rise with almost 200,000 children stunted (low height for age) in 2021 and face losing their future due to hindered learning and physical developments, as well as early death. While at least one out of eight children in Carana is chronically malnourished, this ratio is worse in areas affected by displacements, returns and over-burdened

communities. In the Cereni district and along the border to Rimoso, one in three children suffers from acute malnutrition. Stunting in Carana is largely caused by poor infant feeding practices; access to quality diversified diet, and repeated illnesses. To prevent chronic malnutrition, strengthening optimal infant feeding practices and maternal nutrition throughout the first 1,000 days of life is critical not only to the survival of children in Carana, but for their future.

Acute malnutrition remains relatively high among internally displaced children and mothers as well as population affected by conflict. Throughout Carana, about 80,000 children under the age of five years are in need for urgent lifesaving curative nutrition services. Maternal malnutrition rates have doubled compared to 2020, particularly in the Guthar and eastern Leppko regions where acute malnutrition was prevalent in 21 per cent of displaced pregnant and breastfeeding women at the time of drafting. Anaemia is also on the rise. One out of every three pregnant and lactating women is anaemic, leading to poor intrauterine growth, high-risk pregnancies, and childbirth complications. One out of every four children 6-59 months are anaemic, and the youngest are most affected with 44 per cent of children 6-23 months suffering from anaemia. Anaemia among mothers and children is a multifaceted problem caused by limited access to health care, reduced quality meals (diverse diet) as well as negative coping mechanisms such as child marriage, which could lead to negative outcomes such as increased maternal mortality and morbidity, particularly in conflict-affected, overburdened, and underserved areas.

Response Strategy

The nutrition response will follow a multi-sectoral approach to prevent and treat malnutrition. Intersectoral collaboration will be considered during nutrition assessments, resource mobilization, implementation, coordination, monitoring, and evaluation. The response will target vulnerable population groups focusing on protecting and strengthening WHO-recommended infant and young child feeding (IYCF) practices, age-appropriate micronutrient and anaemia prevention interventions, and maternal nutrition through direct service delivery and integration with health and food security sectors at both national and subnational levels. Modalities include social protection elements such as cash and voucher-based programs combined with nutrition counselling to increase dietary diversity during pregnancy and improve complementary feeding practices for children 6-24 months.

The Nutrition Sector will also collaborate with the Child Protection AoR to strengthen the links between case management and nutrition to uphold WHO/UNICEF recommended feeding and care practices that are negatively impacted by neglect, caregiver distress, GBV and other associated protection risks. WASH will be scaled up in the nutrition response by installing handwashing

facilities in Community-Based Management of Acute Malnutrition centres to promote hygiene practices and address diarrheal

links to malnutrition, and the Health and Nutrition sectors will collaborate on addressing anaemia of PLWs and children.

Infant and young child feeding interventions will be provided in or attached to communities, health facilities, Mother-baby Areas and child friendly spaces in close collaboration and coordination with the health sector, reproductive health sub-cluster, food security and child protection sectors. IYCF service provision will focus on improving feeding and care practices during the first 1,000 days of life (from pregnancy to 24 months), early childhood survival and development, and maternal nutrition support during pregnancy and lactation. The capacity of stakeholders including health practitioners, nutrition staff, and community workers will be strengthened with specialised skills to facilitate IYCF and maternal nutrition support – in particular a strong focus on one-to-one IYCF counselling skills which is one of the most effective interventions to improve feeding practices.

Micronutrient deficiency prevention and control initiatives will be promoted through service platforms such as micronutrients supplementation within health facilities, during accelerated campaigns, and improving vitamin A coverage for children 6-59 months using immunization campaigns. Children 6-59 months among the populations in hard-to-reach areas, IDP last resort sites, overburdened communities, or areas affected by a high intensity of hostilities, as well as recently displaced IDP children or returnees, will be provided with specialized nutritious food to prevent malnutrition. These nutrition actions will target 0.3 million Women at childbearing age and care givers as well as 280,000 children under the age of 3 years including 68,000 disabled children.

The Nutrition response will improve equitable access to high quality, lifesaving, curative nutrition services through early identification, referral, and treatment of acutely malnourished boys and girls under five years and pregnant and lactation women (PLW). Provision of management of acute malnutrition will be provided at the health facility and community levels and in integration with infant and young child feeding services and primary health care services. Critically, the nutrition sector will provide technical support and capacity building of health staff in the northeast to strengthen inpatient treatment of acute malnutrition, in particular infants under 6 months. Curative nutrition activities will target 21,880 severely malnourished children as well as 67,542 moderately malnourished children, including 13,413 disabled children. The nutrition sector will also continue evidence-based programming by investing in robust and real-time sex and age disaggregated nutrition information systems including capacity development of central and local authorities.

Protection Risk Analysis

Nutrition is a human right and underpins success in education, poverty alleviation, and the empowerment of women and girls. It is critical that nutrition programs in Carana assess, plan, and implement nutrition interventions with a protection lens and take a Do No Harm approach to ensure affected populations are protected from risks associated with the conflict in Carana as well as avoid unintended adverse effects of nutrition assistance.

Therefore, the nutrition sector will carry out both sectoral and project level protection risk analyses to demonstrate thoughtful and safe mitigation measures in all planned nutrition interventions. These protection risks include:

- Violence against health and nutrition facilities and health and nutrition providers
- Gender Based Violence
- Child Protection
- Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA)
- Provision of and equitable access to nutrition services for vulnerable groups
- Conflict Sensitivity Protection of Humanitarian staff, volunteers and associated personnel
- Nutrition Data protection
- Explosive Hazard Considerations

Response Priorities

The nutrition sector will deliver lifesaving nutrition services to PLW and children under five years of age, with a specific focus on the first 1,000 days of life. Affected populations residing in hard-to-reach areas, IDP sites, returnees, overburdened communities, areas affected by a high intensity of hostilities will be prioritized as well as areas of high severity. The nutrition response will scale-up multi-sectoral interventions to address the immediate and underlying causes of malnutrition and improve stunting, wasting, and micronutrient deficiencies, to stop the intergenerational cycle of malnutrition in Carana.

Monitoring

Monitoring the nutrition situation of PLW and children: The sector will monitor the nutrition status of the target population through key nutrition surveys such as Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) and rapid nutrition assessments in emergency and conflict areas. These surveys and other assessments will include both nutrition specific and nutrition sensitive indicators where/when feasible. Other specialized methods will be used for monitoring specific programmatic areas such as coverage surveys. The sector will also scale up nutrition surveillance systems for a real time grip on the nutrition situation in Carana. The frequency of nutrition assessments will be based on context (relevancy, accessibility, etc.), but aims to be conducted at least once

annually for surveys and monthly for surveillance. All assessments and surveillance will include IYCF indicators and factor in appropriate measurements for children under the age of 6 months.

Prioritisation Approach

Context and Severity based approach: The nutrition response will ensure readiness to respond to the ongoing protracted and new emergencies and areas showing increase in acute and chronic malnutrition among children and mothers. While severity is not a stable status, the nutrition sector will ensure monitoring of the nutrition situation and amend priorities accordingly in coordination with stakeholders.

A mother-and-child centred approach: The nutrition response will prioritize delivering comprehensive mother and child interventions based on actual needs resulting from robust nutrition assessments, integrated with other sectors such as health, WASH, food security, and child protection. Cross cutting issues such as GBV, disability, and MHPSS will be factored into the design, implementation, and monitoring of nutrition interventions.

Operational approach: The nutrition response will prioritize provision of life-saving nutrition interventions within a resilience and system building approach. Nutrition will prioritize interventions based on need, access, resources available and capabilities of implementing partners. Cost efficiency of nutrition programs will be maximized through quality integration with other sectors.



2.6 Shelter and Non-Food Items

PEOPLE IN NEED	TARGET	REQUIREMENTS (US\$)	PARTNERS	PROJECTS
1.2 M	800 K	\$28.1	16	17

Needs Analysis

Shelter: An estimated 1.2 million people, including IDPs, returnees, host communities and Katasi refugees are in need of shelter and Non-Food-Item (NFI) support, representing a 10 per cent increase from 2020. This includes those in need of emergency assistance due to sudden displacement, millions in temporary hosting arrangements, and people living in damaged, crowded, unfinished or otherwise inadequate shelters who urgently need more durable shelter. This increase has been driven by loss of

capital, destruction of infrastructure through flooding and mudslides, and compounded by new displacement, protracted displacement and return movements alongside a very limited shelter response. An increase in return after a possible peace agreement could further add to the number of people in need of both emergency and durable shelter. The need for rehabilitation of damaged houses and infrastructure across the country is at a scale that goes beyond the Sector's humanitarian focus, as well as its capacity.

Response Strategy

In 2021, the Shelter and NFI sectors will aim to target 0.8 million people; however, this will depend on the displacement context and possible emergencies. The first objective for the Shelter and NFI response is to save and sustain lives through the provision of timely, targeted and appropriate shelter assistance and emergency relief items. This includes the provision, distribution, installation or replacement of tents and emergency shelter kits to displaced people in temporary and last-resort sites such as formal and informal camps, transit centres, collective shelters and spontaneous settlements. It also includes the rehabilitation and repair of collective shelters, unfinished buildings or other emergency shelter that are below minimum standards.

Kit-based core relief items will continue to be distributed to those who have experienced sudden onset displacement or are cut-off from markets. Seasonal items, such as warm clothing and thermal blankets for winter, will also be distributed to reduce the impact of exposure to extreme conditions. Existing mechanisms for stockpiling and prepositioning of emergency response stock will continue to be supported, to ensure timeliness of emergency response.

The second objective of the Shelter and NFI response is to continue strengthening the resilience and cohesion of vulnerable communities by improving housing and related community or public infrastructure. Activities include housing repair and rehabilitation, including associated small-scale infrastructure that is part of an integrated and coordinated response e.g., basic repairs to water, sanitation, roads and electrical infrastructure. Housing Land and Property (HLP) issues are integral to shelter, as the availability of documentation remains an issue to be addressed in coordination with the Government of Carana, and the infrastructure to recuperate documents is not equally functional, across the country.

The response modalities used will include in-kind and direct assistance, cash-for-work and labour provision, with market-based assistance continuing to be used where markets can support this type of intervention, where there will not be a negative impact on people and/or markets. The majority of the response, about 83 per cent is expected to be in-kind, but where feasible, the sector will continue to advocate for alternative modalities.

Vulnerable groups targeted include new IDPs, people living in protracted displacement, those living in underserved or newly accessible communities, returnees and refugees. This includes contextualized assistance to children, the disabled and the elderly, especially those who are dependent on others and have no direct access to income. The Sector will continue to support increased accountability to affected populations.

The Sector recognizes that shelter and NFIs can be the cornerstone of access to services and improvements in resilience across several dimensions. Complementarity and integration with other sectors are critical. The Sector will continue to work closely with partners to support integrated response that contributes to an overall improvement of the humanitarian situation while mainstreaming gender and GBV related issues across the response.

Protection Risk Analysis

The risk of inter- and intra-community tension can be mitigated by ensuring participation of the population in program design, transparent and clearly communicated beneficiary selection criteria, and established complaint mechanisms. Engagement with communities is encouraged. Aid diversion and corruption are also substantial risks, which will be addressed through monitoring, financial audits and implemented procurement policies.

To reduce discrepancies in assistance, the Sector will continue to harmonize and coordinate assistance packages, including the quality of materials through the development of technical standards and guidelines. Regarding shelter, the Sector will not encourage the establishment of spontaneous settlements, which do not have access to services or are in insecure locations while guidance will be given to partners to reduce GBV risks in rehabilitation of collective centres and individual shelters. Specifically, for NFIs, the timing, structure and implementation of distributions must follow sector and international guidance to ensure the physical safety and accessibility of all groups.

Response Priorities

The Sector's response priorities aim to align with the needs of the population and reduce humanitarian consequences associated with inadequate living standards and physical and mental well-being. In determining severity of need for both Shelter and NFI assistance, the Sector considers the ratio of the number of IDPs and returnees to the size of the host community, the prevalence of temporary shelter arrangements such as collective centres, camps, unfinished buildings, transit sites and exposure to the crisis. In addition, for shelter, hosting arrangements, shelter availability, integration of basic services, and the ability to afford rent and/or repair shelter damage are factored in. For NFIs, access to markets, availability and affordability of items are also considered.

Monitoring

Monthly 4Ws, which partners report on activities, beneficiaries disaggregated by age and gender, items/supplies distributed as well as mitigating GBV measures. This enables the Sector to analyse and report on a monthly basis the progress towards achieving targets and outcome-level objectives. Funding gaps will be tracked on a quarterly basis. The Sector will launch a Post Distribution Monitoring template for partners in early 2021 to help assess beneficiaries' satisfaction, but also to measure impact to enable comparison across the Sector. Results will help inform future programming and project adjustments.

Prioritization Approach

At the strategic level, the Sector will prioritize immediate humanitarian lifesaving and life-sustaining activities particularly in areas experiencing new displacement or underserved areas. The Sector prioritization process is also guided by the geographical distribution of population combined with the severity of needs. The Sector response will be oriented towards geographic areas where the greatest number of people face the most severe needs.

To be included in the HRP, projects are rigorously vetted against an established set of criteria including the targeting of identified vulnerable groups and communities within the overall distribution of severity. Projects must demonstrate alignment with sector priorities and that target groups have been selected based on needs confirmed by assessment data. In addition, partners are requested to explain how further prioritization would be conducted should there be funding shortfalls.

2.7 Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

PEOPLE IN NEED	TARGET	REQUIREMENTS (US\$)	PARTNERS	PROJECTS
1.9 M	1.9 M	\$41.6 M	18	21

Needs Analysis

Droughts and lacking capacities to retain water are key WASH issues that need to be addressed in order to comprehensively approach the humanitarian portfolio.

Sufficient access to affordable safe water, adequate sanitation, solid waste management and/or hygiene supplies remain a challenge for newly displaced populations, internally displaced persons (IDP) and other vulnerable households with limited livelihood opportunities and access to basic WASH services. WASH systems have suffered from damage owing to years of functioning at high capacity, limited or no maintenance, destruction, displacement of technical staff and poor water resource management. Reports have documented cutting off water infrastructure e.g. through mining or hampering the delivery and trade of water along other aid. These incidents (4 in the past year, trend upwards) weave into the standing issues of the non-existent sewage treatment and unregulated garbage disposal, leakage of industrial

sewage into residential areas. WASH-related diseases and outbreaks are aided by flooding and the spiral of malnutrition – contaminated water – diarrhoea.

WASH concerns are further driven by the worsening economic crisis, the lack of investment in already weak and ageing WASH services, the poor knowledge, attitude and practices related to WASH and huge disparities amongst the rich and poor. 36% of households currently have access to improved sanitation, with rural areas faring much worse. 42% of schools have basic WASH facilities, 36% access to an improved water source, and a mere 8% can regularly provide hand soap.

Access to WASH in schools and primary health centres is desperately needed. Key factors to facilitate girls' school education are the possibility to conduct menstrual hygiene management and gender-segregated sanitation facilities. WASH facilities need to be more easily accessible to physically disabled children. In rural communities, portable and easy-to-maintain systems of water purification must be available. Water sources need to be in short reach to minimize SGBV and to save time that could be invested in creating other livelihoods. Sewage and garbage treatment need to be established, open defecation discouraged, and sanitary facilities set as standard.

Response Strategy

The 2021 WASH response strategy focuses on four strategic pillars 1) water, sanitation and solid waste management systems; 2) emergency life-saving WASH interventions; 3) coordination and enabling environment (including protection risk analysis and mitigation); and 4) WASH in institutions. The response will be delivered by using combination of available response modalities (service delivery, in-kind, market-based programming) depending on the context, vulnerabilities, preferences of affected people and operational feasibility. The sector will create opportunities for all people to provide input to projects as partners will ensure the involvement of women, men and adolescents (boys and girls) in decision making, committee leadership, feedback mechanisms and as enumerators.

Water Infrastructures and Water Quality Assurance

While at least 1.9 million people are in critical need of improved water quality and quantity, the needs are broader to keep systems functioning at the minimum level of operation. In addition, approx. three quarters of the population in Carana rely on drinking water treatment chemicals provided by humanitarian actors.

The sector will continue to support existing water systems to stabilize their decline, and to restore piped water supplies in areas currently dependent on water trucking. Critical activities include light rehabilitation of infrastructure for lifesaving and/or resilience- oriented purposes; distribution of supplies, consumables, water treatment and disinfection products; introduction of minimum cost-recovery to support operation and maintenance; capacity-building and financial support of staff; improvements to water

supply in schools, child-friendly spaces and health care facilities.

In areas without or with limited power supply, standby generators and fuel will continue to be needed. The introduction of renewable energy sources (solar and wind power) will provide sustainable solutions for smaller scale water supply systems. The sector will scale up efforts around water quality assurance according to Caranese standards wherever feasible, because of largely unregulated private water supply market.

Sanitation and Solid Waste Management

Available data indicates that at least 1 million people face sanitation related issues, while further 0.9 million people requires support to solid waste management. Existing sewage treatment plants require urgent improvement/light rehabilitation to prevent the discharge of raw sewage and contamination of water sources and soils. Considering very limited wastewater treatment capacities across the country, alternative sanitation solutions (Decentralised Wastewater Treatment Systems, Fecal Sludge Management), should be considered. Additionally, capacity-building for staff and operations, maintenance of wastewater infrastructure and municipal and medical solid waste management systems will be supported to reduce overall public health risks and environmental pollution. There is a significant need for vector-control activities including solid waste management particularly in areas with high prevalence of leishmaniosis. WASH infrastructure in schools and healthcare facilities also need to be addressed online with increased awareness of the beneficiaries.

Hygiene

Available data indicates that up to 4 million people face challenges in regularly accessing basic hygiene supplies. WASH partners consider market-based programming /assistance as a viable option to mitigate decreased purchasing capacity of the most deprived families. Therefore, in-kind assistance will be progressively scaled down in favour of market-based assistance in areas where the market is functional. Alongside distribution of NFIs aiming to improve and encourage beneficiaries to strengthen already well-established hygienic behaviour and practices, comprehensive social and behaviour change communication interventions will be promoted to improve overall hygienic knowledge, attitude and practices.

Emergency WASH interventions

Assistance to IDP sites, with people highly dependent on continuous humanitarian support, will continue with a focus on sustainable solutions like connection of key camps and sites to existing water networks and/or establishment of simplified water and sewer networks when possible. The sector will enhance efforts to improve the quality of sanitation facilities both in terms of the quality of services and gender/protection considerations, as substandard

conditions of sanitation facilities are particularly concerning for women and girls, people with disabilities and older people because of greater risk of humiliation, physical violence, sexual harassment and abuse. Contingency planning for WASH related diseases, particularly acute bloody, watery diarrhoea will also be kept up to date, in collaboration with the Health Sector.

Protection Risk Analysis

The WASH Sector will ensure that the 'do no harm' principle is applied and that potential protection risks related to the implementation of the WASH related activities, along with a description of the relevant mitigation measures and resources required for monitoring those risks have been identified. WASH partners will take adequate measures to minimize exposure of the most vulnerable groups, including women, adolescent girls, children, people with disabilities, female-headed households, to greater protection risks, particularly GBV.

WASH staff will be trained on key GBV concepts and referral pathways. Women, adolescent girls and people with disabilities will be consulted during project cycle steps to facilitate feedback. High level of explosive hazard contamination close to water and sanitation infrastructure, or contamination of accumulated garbage/rubbles, which potentially put humanitarian staff in danger during WASH assessments and related rehabilitation works and operation/ maintenance will be considered. Where relevant, WASH staff will be trained on explosive hazard risk mitigation, while risk education sessions and awareness-raising materials for beneficiaries will be integrated into WASH programming.

Response Priorities

The sector will prioritize both activities that directly support life- saving WASH interventions as well as activities that focus on the maintenance and/or light rehabilitations of existing WASH systems. The Sector will prioritize people living in IDP sites, as those people are among the most vulnerable groups often exclusively relying on humanitarian aid.

The full WASH package must be unconditionally delivered to IDPs in last-resort sites and more sustainable solutions like connection to existing water networks and/or establishment of simplified water and sewer networks considered, where possible. Sector partners will pay attention to adequate sanitation facilities, as sub-standard facilities increase protection risks. The sector will prioritize activities supporting existing water, sanitation and solid waste management systems, including water quality assurance and light rehabilitation of infrastructure. Durable solutions will be provided to address underlying drivers of deprivation and vulnerabilities. In areas with well-functioning markets, WASH related market-based programming might be considered and prioritized as the most appropriate response modality.

Monitoring

The Sector will monitor the response based on results framework and standardized sector indicators and activities, via the sex, age and disability disaggregated 4Ws. The Sector will use 4 strategic objectives with 19 related output indicators that capture sector partners' efforts to 1) restore or keep water, sanitation and solid waste management systems at minimum levels of operation; 2) provide emergency WASH interventions; 3) coordination including prevention and mitigation of protection related risks; and 4) WASH in institutions. In northern and central Carana, the Sector will continue to support field level monitoring and quality assurance through field facilitators, especially in areas that are identified as prone to water-borne diseases and concerned by mass displacements.

Prioritization Approach

The WASH response prioritisation is based on an in-depth analysis of household-level needs aggregated into a geographic distribution of needs in accordance with the sector severity analysis. At the individual household-level six key WASH parameters are considered: 1) Water quality; 2) Water sufficiency; 3) Availability and affordability of hygiene items; 4) Solid waste disposal; 5) Issues related to sanitation; and 6) Water affordability.

Additionally, three external indicators were factored into severity calculations: 7) Proportionate water-borne disease morbidity; 8) Proportion of IDPs and returnees vis-à-vis residents; and 9) Intensity of hostilities.

WASH activities will focus on high severity ranking sub-districts, as identified through the WASH sector needs and vulnerabilities analysis. Thanks to the new approach rolled out for the 2021 HRP, the Sector can also prioritise individual projects based on a high severity score of specific WASH needs even if the overall sub-district severity is low, for instance, a sanitation intervention in a sub-district with an overall low severity, could be prioritised if the severity for the sanitation indicator is high, indicating acute need for this WASH sub-component.

The sector will pay specific attention to most vulnerable groups (people living in areas with restricted access or exposed to high intensity of hostilities, areas contaminated with explosive hazards, IDPs living in last resort sites, newly displaced people, self-organized returnees, overburdened host communities, female-headed households and/or refugees. For instance, female-headed households in general face more challenges in accessing WASH items and services, partially due to higher economic hardship, than male-headed households and other population groups. The sector emphasizes areas largely dependent on water trucking for water systems rehabilitation and underserved with other public WASH services.

2.8 Coordination and Logistics

PEOPLE IN NEED	TARGET	REQUIREMENTS (US\$)	PARTNERS	PROJECTS
Support to the humanitarian community	Support to the humanitarian community	\$16.2M	6	8

Needs Analysis

The humanitarian response in Carana remains a complex operation delivered from locations within Carana and neighbouring countries. The large scale of needs, complex displacement patterns and rapidly changing operational environment require dynamic and flexible coordination support and systems to facilitate effective humanitarian response. Numerous Caranese NGOs, international NGOs, the Red Cross/ Crescent Movement, and United Nations agencies provide humanitarian assistance across Carana using all response modalities: Carana-based humanitarian program, interagency convoys, and cross-border response.

Response efforts are led through the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator system. In line with its global mandate, OCHA supports humanitarian leadership in ensuring the effective and efficient coordination of the overall humanitarian response in Carana. Multiple NGO coordination networks work also support coordination efforts.

Key logistics needs identified in support to the Carana humanitarian response are common storage and transport services, including transportation to areas with restricted access and areas where state control has been restored, cross-border coordination and transshipment services. Due to unreliable road conditions, air access is considered to be the safest and most efficient way for humanitarian workers to travel between Galasi and remote areas. This, coupled with limited access to commercial airlines requires an efficient passenger and cargo air service.

Coordination, information management, capacity-enhancement through trainings, and purchase of equipment are required to continue to provide humanitarian supplies, mitigate breaks in supply chain and augment existing capacity. The Sector maintains a flexible approach that allows it to adapt its services, taking into account situational needs, and augment or reduce capacities as required.

Response Strategy

In 2021, coordination and common service efforts will build on the 2020 strategy, including the following components:

Supporting more effective sector and inter-sector coordination for all response modalities through a more harmonized response strategy, more effective advocacy, streamlined information sharing and joined-up analysis of needs and response. Information management and operational coordination will continue to be enhanced, building on the progress made in 2020, including in relation to ensuring optimal engagement between UN and non-UN partners such as the Caranese Arab Red Crescent. NGO

fora will remain key to the articulation and implementation of the response through all modalities, by facilitating coordination, representation and participation of the NGO community. Training of humanitarian partners on a range of issues remains an important area of support to the humanitarian community.

Country-based pooled funds will remain valuable as flexible funding instruments to enable humanitarian organisations (particularly national NGOs) to deliver humanitarian assistance in a timely and prioritized manner. In 2021, the Carana Humanitarian Fund (CHF) and the Carana Cross-Border Humanitarian Fund (CCHF) will continue to disburse funds in line with the programmatic framework of the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP).

Support for the secure implementation of humanitarian action will remain essential. With an ongoing complex situation and related risks for UN staff and assets, there is need for adequate protection support for UN offices and sub-offices inside Carana. UNDSS is responsible for providing oversight and operational support for the safety management system in Carana and plays a crucial role in supporting UN operations. Furthermore, it is crucial that UNDSS maintain a Security Information Operations Centre (SIOC) to provide 24/7 safety-related operational and analytical support to the UN Agencies and implementing partners and strengthen risk-based humanitarian delivery to the most vulnerable in Carana while keeping humanitarian personnel safe.

In addition, UNDSS will continue to undertake awareness and training sessions (SSAFE, First Aid, Defensive Driving, ETB, etc.) for staff of UN agencies and humanitarian partners. In collaboration with WHO, UNDSS will also maintain medical emergency response team in UN offices in order to enhance Medical and Trauma Emergency as well as strengthen Mass Casualties Incidents plans.

The Logistics Sector will continue to provide humanitarian partners with crucial logistics coordination, information management support and services, including storage, surface transportation and cross-border transshipment services.

Around 11,500 m² of free-to-user common warehousing will continue to be made available in Galasi, Cereni, Alur, Sureen, Faron, Folsa and Maroni to the whole humanitarian community. The Logistics Sector will increase common storage capacity or deploy warehouse space to additional locations if needed. A robust logistics coordination and information platform will be maintained in 2021, with meetings organized in operational areas. Information products, including maps, snapshots, situation updates, meeting minutes, and capacity assessments, will continue to be produced and shared with the humanitarian community.

UNHAS will also be established in Carana to ensure safe, reliable and sustainable air access to beneficiaries for the humanitarian community mainly in those parts of Carana

that are not easily accessible by road. In addition, it will provide the required capacity for medical and emergency evacuation and benefit all humanitarian actors such as UN agencies, NGOs, and International Organizations - as well as diplomatic missions - operating in Carana. All these activities will transform the humanitarian landscape by facilitating more efficient and timely delivery of humanitarian assistance to populations in need.

In line with humanitarian partners' needs to enhance logistics capacity, dedicated logistics trainings will be organized in 2021, focusing on more diverse areas within logistics, including warehouse management, fleet management, advanced procurement, and shipping and port operations. Required logistics equipment will be purchased to bolster humanitarian partners' response capacity.

Prevention and response to sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by humanitarian actors will continue to be strengthened across all areas of the Carana response. Efforts in 2021 will include maintaining PSEA Networks, training and awareness raising amongst humanitarian workers, and the roll-out of inter-agency community-based complaints mechanisms, which will allow beneficiaries to safely and confidentially report SEA concerns using a wide variety of channels.

Protection Risk Analysis

The Logistics Sector facilitates access to logistics services that are provided ultimately by commercial service providers. The Logistics Sector therefore ensures that the contracted service providers abide by in-country labour rules and regulations. The Sector will maintain the already implemented reporting mechanism for harassment cases in Logistics Sector warehouses, and furthermore, organisations will be encouraged to nominate female candidates to attend trainings organized by the Sector. Gender sensitive and gender appropriate facilities will also be made available during trainings. Finally, GBV focal points will be invited to meetings with contracted service providers and humanitarian organisations to give guidance on issues related to harassment, abuse and gender-based violence.

Response Priorities

The Coordination and Logistics sector will continue to prioritize improved collaboration among humanitarian actors throughout the Humanitarian Programme Cycle (needs assessment, strategic planning, implementation, resource mobilisation, monitoring and accountability) and in information management.

In line with Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) guidelines, operational coordination mechanisms will be streamlined to strengthen operations, enhance advocacy and facilitate safe, secure and timely access to people in need through the most effective routes. The IASC-mandated coordination structures will work closely with

NGO coordination platforms and assist with reinforcing the capacity of all humanitarian partners.

The prioritization of the Logistics Sector activities will be based on the logistics needs of partner organizations. As the context remains dynamic and volatile, organizations will be given the opportunity to voice their priority requirements through regular coordination meetings and bilateral consultations.

Efforts to strengthen the response capacity of national humanitarian actors and improve the coordination in all aspects of the response will continue in 2021. The safety and protection of humanitarian personnel operating within Carana will also remain crucial and a key priority for the sector.

Monitoring

Implemented logistics services, such as storage and free-to-user transport, will be monitored through the Relief-Item Tracking system (RITA) in almost real-time. In addition, two user satisfaction surveys will be circulated to partners, once in mid-cycle, and once at the end of the annual cycle to ensure satisfactory performance of the Sector as a whole. Finally, a dedicated Information Management Officer will ensure monthly monitoring of sector activities, for example monitoring the number of trucks transhipped and training figures, as well as other activities outlined in the log frame. Coordination meetings will also act as a platform for organisations to raise concerns and give feedback related to logistics services. A thorough gaps and needs analysis will also be undertaken to inform how to strategize for future activities.

Part 3 Annexes

3.1 Risk Mitigation

The UN and its humanitarian partners have a strict zero tolerance approach towards the diversion of humanitarian assistance in Carana. The humanitarian community, at both the inter-agency and the individual agency level, implements a host of “checks and balances” to ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches people most in need, and to monitor service delivery, which further strengthens transparency and accountability to all stakeholders. Humanitarian actors are committed to following a baseline of monitoring standards across all humanitarian programming and response modalities, in line with international standards.

Humanitarian access has overall proven difficult in the CISC-controlled South and in flooded areas during the rainy season. Visa for humanitarian organisations operating in the South have routinely been delayed. Travel permits from Galasi to the CISC- and MPC-controlled areas are issued reluctantly and only after considerable waiting periods. Transports and travel across lines of control is often obstructed. Government participation in assessment missions is a common demand throughout the entire country. Technical agreements are often caught up in feedback loops.

While the humanitarian community is committed to following a baseline of monitoring standards, in areas without regular access additional checks and balances are put in place to ensure humanitarian assistance reaches its intended beneficiaries. Such due diligence is critical to ensure confidence that the humanitarian community delivers in a transparent, principled and accountable manner. To accomplish this, measures to control or reduce risk are undertaken. This enables the efficient use of resources and protection of assets to minimize the negative impact on people served and humanitarian personnel.

Monitoring is undertaken through different independent monitoring mechanisms to triangulate information, such as third-party monitors, the use of social media to show real-time delivery of assistance, and commodity tracking systems. The humanitarian community also engages with affected communities to manage risks. Feedback mechanisms enable aid recipients to report directly to humanitarian organizations on any problems or concerns.

Setting and achieving standards, such as those in the Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability, creates transparent norms for humanitarian partners. Due diligence is also ensured through the vetting of humanitarian partners, vendors, and procurement entities. For example, UN operational partners are vetted to ensure

that they comply with core humanitarian principles as well as the principles of partnership, and good governance, including transparency, accountability and sound financial Management.

3.2 Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

Under the joint leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator and co-chaired by UN Women and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the system-wide national Task Force on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse has established 15 community-based complaint mechanisms across Carana to support and improve reporting and assistance. In partnership with the NGO Forum and with the support of the Community Communication and Engagement Working Group, the task force completed the first inter-agency assessment of a high-risk area and community-based complaint mechanisms, and the Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Task Force developed findings and four key recommendations.

First, it will fast track the activation of community-based complaints mechanisms in high-risk locations and strengthen internal reporting processes and feedback mechanisms for survivors.

Second, the task force will strengthen the GBV referral pathway, which support sexual exploitation and abuse survivors, by improving the availability of longer-term funding.

Third, it will undertake strategic and consistent advocacy and capacity-building to enable different actors to understand their roles and meet their responsibilities with regard to protection from sexual exploitation and abuse.

This includes undertaking awareness raising and training on sexual exploitation and abuse with police, community-based complaint mechanisms, United Nations and NGO focal points, local government, traditional chiefs, women leaders and community representatives. Finally, the task force and the Community Communication and Engagement Working Group are collaborating to develop and implement a comprehensive protection from sexual exploitation and abuse community engagement strategy that is well-adapted to the South Sudan context and underscores the rights of survivors and the importance of confidentiality.

The strategy will include an awareness-raising campaign to sensitize communities on sexual exploitation and abuse; reporting mechanisms and procedures for ensuring confidentiality and the rights of survivors; the establishment of a hotline to reach linguistic minorities; and mainstreaming of sexual exploitation and abuse in humanitarian workshops and training.

3.3 Participants Organizations

Project Organization Name	Sector	# of projects	Requirements (US \$)
ACT Alliance / Christian Aid		1	150.716
ACT Alliance / DanChurchAid		2	2.100.000
ACT Alliance / Finn Church Aid		2	585.000
ACT Alliance / Lutheran World Federation		3	734.662
ACT Alliance / Norwegian Church Aid		2	615.000
Action Against Hunger		4	8.050.000
Action for Development		4	1.560.425
Action for Peace and Development		1	200.000
Action for Sustainable Improvement and Management Organization		1	321.360
Active Partner for Development Agency		1	420.000
Active Youth Agency		2	589.996
Advance Africa Initiative		1	150.000
Adventist Development and Relief Agency		2	1.580.000
Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development		6	8.605.000
Aid Support Community Organization		2	1.510.000
Alliance for International Medical Action		1	1.872.720
Alliance for Medical and Relief Services		1	248.000
American Refugee Committee (Alight)		3	2.168.228
Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale		4	2.768.250
Carana International Peace Institute		1	120.000
Caranese United		5	500.000
CARE International		4	8.151.503
Care for Humanity Organization		1	200.000
Catholic Agency for Overseas Development		2	1.150.000
Catholic Medical Missons Board		2	580.000
Catholic Organisation for Relief and Development Aid		3	5.287.945
Catholic Relief Services		3	2.274.779
Centre for Emergency and Development Support		2	600.000
Centre for Livelihoods, Peace Research and Poverty Reduction Organization		1	74.999
Charity Mission Corps		3	600.000
Charity and Empowerment Foundation		2	513.000
Child Hope Organization		1	300.000
Child Rehabilitation Organization		1	230.000
Child's Destiny and Development Organization		2	543.650
Christian Agenda for Development		1	325.000
Christian Mission Aid		2	2.185.825
Christian Mission for Development		5	4.787.500
Christian Recovery and Development Agency		2	799.980
Comitato Collaborazione Medica		2	1.993.499

Project Organization Name	Sector	# of projects	Requirements (US \$)
Community Action Organization		6	2.296.250
Community Aid for Fisheries and Agriculture Development		1	370.000
Community Health Aid Services		1	171.000
Community Initiative for Development Organization		6	1.760.000
Community Initiative for Sustainable Development Agency		1	215.000
Community Response for Development		1	150.000
Concern Worldwide		5	10.269.910
Confident Children out of Conflict		1	350.000
Danish Refugee Council		8	14.917.835
Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e.V. (German Agro Action)		1	432.000
Development Aid and Relief Organization		1	100.000
Égalité		1	25.000
Farmer's Life Development Agency		1	175.500
Food & Agriculture Organization of the United Nations		1	70.000.000
Food Agriculture and Disaster Management		1	400.000
Front for Civil Order		4	350.000
Grassroot Empowerment and Development Organization		3	1.192.817
Grassroots Relief and Development Agency		2	655.841
Green Belt Initiative		2	1.700.000
Handicap International / Humanity & Inclusion		3	2.730.000
Help - Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe e.V.		2	2.475.000
Hope for Children and Women Foundation		1	500.000
IMPACT Initiatives		1	150.000
International Aid Services		1	600.000
International Medical Corps UK		2	3.786.032
International Organization for Migration		11	75.217.900
International Rescue Committee		5	7.718.084
Internews Europe		2	1.504.791
Islamic Relief Worldwide		4	3.576.247
Johanniter Unfallhilfe e.V.		1	187.500
Joint Aid Management International		2	3.780.030
MEDAIR		5	14.232.500
Médecins du Monde France		2	800.000
Malaria Consortium		1	1.500.000
Medicos del Mundo Spain		1	1.499.158
Mercy Corps		4	3.211.000
Mines Advisory Group		1	1.200.000
Mobile Theatre Team		2	900.000
Mother and Children Development Aid		5	1.229.500
Norwegian People's Aid		1	513.641
Norwegian Refugee Council		5	9.833.104

Project Organization Name	Sector	# of projects	Requirements (US \$)
OXFAM		1	1.400.000
OXFAM GB		2	4.425.000
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs		1	12.000.000
Organization for Peace, Relief and Development		1	117.000
Organization for Peoples' Empowerment and Needs		1	399.997
Peace Corps Organization		3	1.674.267
Peace Winds Japan		1	1.500.000
Plan International		5	5.451.021
Polish Humanitarian Action		4	6.935.600
REACH Initiative		5	1.710.000
Relief International		4	8.889.090
Rural Community Action for Peace and Development		2	1.200.000
Rural Community Development Initiative		1	364.629
Rural Health Services		1	150.000
Rural Initiative for Peace and Development Organization		1	130.000
Rural Water and Sanitation Support Agency		1	800.000
Samaritan's Purse		4	4.086.679
Save the Children		5	18.794.818
Solidarités International (SI)		2	1.500.000
Stop Poverty Communal Initiative		2	700.000
Terre des Hommes - Lausanne		3	840.000
Top Relief Organization		1	250.474
Union des Femmes pour la Paix		2	90.000
United Nations Association of Carana		1	200.000
United Nations Children's Emergency Fund		7	166.707.983
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization		1	1.275.000
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees		4	142.015.280
United Nations Humanitarian Air Service		1	52.177.012
United Nations Mine Action Service		1	3.692.275
United Nations Population Fund		2	16.674.825
Veterans for Peace		1	75.000
Vétérinaires sans Frontières (Germany)		1	200.000
Vétérinaires sans Frontières (Switzerland)		2	2.350.000
Widows and Orphans Charitable Organization		1	200.000
Women Advancement Organization		1	250.000
Women Aid Vision		3	810.000
World Food Programme		3	620.084.625
World Health Organization		2	25.070.685
World Relief		4	3.047.257
World Vision International		1	1.300.000
Total			1.417.661.194,00

3.4 2021 HRP Funding Requirements by Organization Type

Funding requirements

by organization type

SECTORS	REQUIREMENTS ■ UN Agencies	REQUIREMENTS ■ NGoC	
Camp Coordination and Camp Management	\$15 M	\$14.8 M	51% 49%
Food Security and Livelihoods	\$127.2 M	\$56.8 M	71% 29%
Education	\$32.1 M	\$60.3 M	34% 66%
Protection	\$54.3 M	\$22.7 M	77% 23%
Health	\$23.7 M	\$90.9 M	27% 73%
Nutrition	24.5 M	\$15.2 M	64% 36%
Shelter and Non Food Items	\$28.1 M	\$16.5 M	63% 37%
Water, sanitation and Hygiene	\$41.6 M	\$120.0 M	36% 64%
Logistics	\$11.8 M	\$0.0 M	100% 0%
Coordination	\$4.3 M	\$0.9 M	82% 18%

3.5 Acronyms

4W	Who does What, Where and When	ISIMM	IDP Sites Integrated Monitoring Matrix
ANC	Ante-Natal Care	IYCF	Infant and Young Child Feeding
AoR	Area of Responsibility	IYCF-E	Infant and Young Child Feeding in Emergencies
CBPF	Country-Based Pooled Fund	JOP	Joint Operating Principles
CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management	LNS	Lipid-based nutrient supplements
CCHF	Carana Cross-border Humanitarian Fund	MA	Mine Action
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund	MHPSS	Mental Health and Psychosocial Support
CF	Carana Franc	MPC	Mouvement Patriotique du Carana
CFA	Committee on Food Aid	MSNA	Multi-Sector Needs Assessment
CFSAM	Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission	FDC	Forces de la Defense de Carana
CHW	Community health worker	NFE	Non-formal education
CISC	Combattants Indépendants du Sud-Carana	NFI	Non-Food Item
CMAM	Community-Based Management of Acute Malnutrition	NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
CP	Child Protection	OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
CRC	Carana Red Crescent / Red Cross	OOSC	Out of school children
ECCE	Early Childhood Care and Education	PHC	Primary healthcare centers
EiE	Education in Emergencies	PiN	People in Need
ELF	Elassi Liberation Front	PLW	Pregnant and Lactating Women
EmONC	Emergency Obstetric and Newborn Care	PMR	Periodic Monitoring Reports
ERC	Emergency Relief Coordinator	PRA	Protection risk analysis
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War	PSEA	Prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse
ETB	Emergency Trauma Bag	PSN	Persons with Specific Needs
EWARN	Early Warning, Alert and Response Network	PSS	Psychosocial support
FSL	Food Security and Livelihoods	RH	Reproductive health
FTS	Financial Tracking System	RHC	Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Syria Crisis
GAM	Global acute malnutrition	RITA	Relief-Item Tracking System
GBV	Gender-Based Violence	RTE	Ready-to-Eat Rations
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	SAD	Sex and age disaggregated
GoC	Government of Carana	SEA	Sexual exploitation and abuse
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator for Carana	SIOC	Security Information Operations Center
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team	SLP	Self-Learning Programme
HeRAMS	Health Resources and Services Availability Monitoring System	SMART	Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions
HH	Household	SOC	United Nations Security Operation Centers
HLP	Housing, Land and Property	SSAFE	Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments
HNO	Humanitarian Needs Overview	SWM	Solid Waste Management
HPC	Humanitarian Programme Cycle	TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan	UN	United Nations
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee	UNDSS	United Nations Department for Safety and Security
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross	UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
ICT	Information and communications technology	UNHAS	UN Humanitarian Air Service
IDP	Internally Displaced Person	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
IHL	International Humanitarian Law	UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
IHRL	International Human Rights Law	US\$	U.S. Dollar
IM	Information Management	WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
INEE	Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergency	WFP	United Nations World Food Programme
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization	WHO	United Nations World Health Organization
ISC	Inter-Sector Coordination	WoC	Whole of Carana

3.6 How to Contribute



Contributing to the 2021 Carana Humanitarian Response Plan

To learn more about the 2021 Carana Humanitarian Needs Overview and donate directly to the 2021 Carana Humanitarian

Response Plan, visit OCHA's Carana web page: www.unocha.org/Carana

Donating through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)

CERF provides rapid initial funding for life-saving actions at the onset of emergencies and for poorly funded, essential humanitarian operations in protracted crises. The OCHA-managed CERF receives contributions from various donors – mainly Member States, but also private companies, foundations, charities and individuals – which are combined into a single fund. This is used for crises anywhere in the world. Find out more about the CERF and how to donate by visiting the CERF website:

www.unocha.org/cerf/ourdonors/how-donate

Donating through Country-Based Pooled Funds for the Carana Crisis

The Country-Based Pooled Funds (CBPFs) are multi-donor humanitarian financing instruments established by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) and managed by OCHA under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator. CBPFs receive un-earmarked funding from donors and allocate it in response to priority humanitarian needs identified in joint response planning processes at the field level. Three separate CBPFs have been established in Carana, Rimosa and Katasi to support country level strategic decision-

making. In addition, a CBPF in Sumora is dedicated to funding cross-border projects. The CBPFs in the region have been designed to support and align a comprehensive response to the Carana crisis by expanding the delivery of humanitarian assistance, increasing humanitarian access, and strengthening partnerships with local and international non-governmental organizations. For more information, visit the OCHA Carana web page: www.unocha.org/Carana

In-kind relief aid

The United Nations urges donors to make cash rather than in-kind donations, for maximum speed and flexibility, and to ensure the aid materials that are most needed are the ones delivered. If you can make only in-kind contributions in response to disasters and emergencies, please contact: logik@un.org

Registering and recognizing your contributions

OCHA manages the Financial Tracking Service (FTS), which records all reported humanitarian contributions (cash, in-kind, multilateral and bilateral) to emergencies. Its purpose is to give credit and visibility to donors for their generosity and to show the total amount of funding and expose gaps in humanitarian plans. Please report yours to FTS, either by email to fts@un.org or through the online contribution report form at <http://fts.unocha.org>

HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN

REPUBLIC OF CARANA

ISSUED DECEMBER 2020

Appendix 4 – Development Consolidated Framework for Carana

United Nations

DP/DCP/CAF/4



**Executive Board of the
United Nations Development
Programme, the United Nations Population Fund
and the
United Nations Office for
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Country programmes and related matters

Draft country programme document for Carana (2021-2022)

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Annex 1. UNDP trust funds

Annex 2. Ongoing development projects in Carana (non-exhaustive)

I. Programme Rationale

1. Carana continues to face significant challenges marked by growing fragility and multifaceted crises. The country is emerging from an unprecedented security and humanitarian crisis due to the civil war that has been ongoing since 2014 and has resulted in the loss of thousands of lives and the displacement of hundreds of thousands in recent years. Despite the presence of international forces in neighboring Katasi and Sumora and ongoing peace negotiations between the major warring factions, violent extremism and radicalization continue to have a devastating effect on people's lives and livelihoods. The rapid rise in insecurity was a cause and consequence of long-standing structural challenges the country has faced since independence, including chronic poverty; highly centralized state structure; a weak justice system, and recurring 10-year cycle of insecurity fuelled by eroded social networks, availability of weapons and competition over natural resources.

2. Prior to the crisis, the country saw continued GDP growth of approx. 3 per cent per year from 1990 until 2014, which contracted by 4 per cent in 2014 immediately after the onset of the conflict, and by roughly 3 per cent in each of the following years. The primary sector accounts for 59 per cent of the country's economy and agriculture is the main economic activity: half the population is engaged mainly in subsistence farming. The country is rich in natural resources such as rare wood, diamonds, copper, coal, alkali as well as the recent discovery oil off the southern coastline of Carana. The country is endowed with significant mineral reserves and, prior to 2011, was ranked 23th in the world as a producer of copper (according to volume). Diamond mining activities are located along one of the main conflict lines, and have fuelled war efforts for MPC, government factions and warlords alike. World Bank estimates have shown the highest value stones leave the country illegally and equal 30 per cent of the country's diamond production.

3. Additionally, ongoing insecurity in the country has roots in broader regional conflicts involving Katasi and Rimosa, as well as the aftermath of the Sumoran conflict. Mercenaries take advantage of poor state structures and governance to cross borders, illegally trade natural resources and traffic weapons. The most recent crisis was fueled by social fragmentation, within and between communities, and along ethnic, religious and economic lines. Traditional tension between nomadic herders and agro-pastoral communities, as well as grievances along the ethnic-majority Falin elite and the marginalized Kori and Tatsi ethnic groups have resulted in the perpetuation of cycles of violence without justice or consequence. Added to this are resources seized by the political elite, and an imbalance of power between the capital and rest of the country. Exclusion has nurtured political grievances and undermined the legitimacy of the state. Large parts of eastern and southern Carana, which are inaccessible at certain times of the year due to poor or non-existent infrastructure, have not benefited from basic social service provision since the 1990's.

4. Massive population displacement has affected more than 1.4 million of the country's population. Close to a third of the population (approximately 5.3 million) is in need of humanitarian assistance with 1.1 internally displaced and approx. 300,000 registered as refugees

in neighbouring Rimosa, Sumora and Katasi. Violence, looting, and displacement led to a 50 per cent reduction in crop production in 2018 compared with the pre-crisis average, leaving an already vulnerable population at risk due to sharp increases in food prices. Women, internally displaced populations and refugees are most severely affected by food insecurity and weak community support networks. Approximately 8.7 million people are still affected by food insecurity in the central and southeastern parts of the country.

5. Carana is also vulnerable due to climate change and strong men made pressure on natural resources that threatens the ecosystem and the resilience of the people who depend on it. 60% of the country, the farmland areas in the north and east, are subject to droughts and uncontrollable flooding because of the effects of climate change and a negative impact on biodiversity. Human activities most damaging to biodiversity are land clearing, logging, bush fires, uncontrolled use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides and poor mining practices. Competition for limited resources has increased the population's vulnerability to climate change and conflicts. The root causes of conflicts over resources include unequal access and control, unsustainable use, insecure tenure and property rights, lack of governance systems, population growth and climate change. The persistence of drought and the frequency of conflicts have increased migration, particularly in the southern and central regions. Forests, which provide people with goods and services along with 93 per cent of energy needs, are disappearing at the estimated rate of 40,000 hectares annually with negative impact on biodiversity. Floods are relatively recurrent in Carana; 65 flood cases were observed in 2019-2020, causing considerable damage. People are also affected by the degradation of the quality of their living environment by urbanization, waste and environmental pollution.

6. Women have been more severely affected by the crisis as seen in the increase of female-headed households. A chronic lack of economic opportunity means that poverty rates for women in rural areas have hit 71 per cent, compared to 59 per cent for men. Weak gender equality indicators for the country provide context for the increase in sexual and gender-based violence, including women and girls who suffer from disabilities. In 2017, a total of 12,240 incidents (which include rape and physical aggression) were recorded, and this is estimated to be only a fraction of actual cases. Youth are another vulnerable group due to high levels of unemployment and the risk of being recruited into armed groups. As such, the government and its partners have a responsibility to provide opportunities for education, training, and employment that encourage women and youth to participate in the peacebuilding process.

7. The crisis has exacerbated the chronic failure of the state to secure borders; assert authority over all regions; foster rule of law; control the exploitation of natural resources, and ensure social protection for all. The security and judicial vacuum outside the capital has allowed parallel power systems to flourish in favour of armed groups. This severely affects human security.

8. Consequently, no United Nations Development Assistance Framework or country programme has been developed since the last cycle (2007-2011). Instead, United Nations organizations have operated under annual humanitarian response plans, the most recent of which is the Carana Humanitarian Response Plan 2020-2021, agreed between the Government of Carana and

United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. UNDP Carana has in turn adapted to the operating context, realigning its work from previous country programme focus areas (economic growth, governance, environmental management, and natural disaster risk management) to an approach focused on emergency livelihoods and early recovery through its resilience and livelihoods programme. The swift implementation of this programme shift against a background of growing volatility was possible due to UNDP experience and knowledge of the country, down to the community level. The modified approach enabled UNDP to take the lead on the early recovery and livelihoods sector within the strategic response plan framework. Since the onset of the crisis, UNDP has focused on the most vulnerable communities to support coping mechanisms and prevent further destitution, while laying the groundwork for mid-to longer-term sustainable, resilience-oriented programming, as proposed under the new programme.

9. UNDP learned key lessons and adapted its programme to the operating context in the country to increase the effectiveness of its field interventions and outreach to affected communities. In terms of the programme approach, this included making use of area-based interventions and partnerships to enhance the resilience of affected populations and their ability to cope with the impact of the crisis and mitigate displacement and movement of refugees. The deteriorating security situation and the difficult access to critical areas in need of support reinforced the importance of crisis-sensitive programming, working with local partners (non-governmental organizations, faith-based organizations, local authorities and local committees), developing their capacity and acknowledging and enhancing their role as central actors in service provision and recovery.

10. UNDP helped create approximately 3,000 emergency jobs by implementing programmes that focus on the socio-economic reintegration of youth at risk of recruitment into armed groups and income-generating activities (predominantly for women). Yet, despite critical partnerships formed within communities, and increased social cohesion as a result of new economic opportunities, these interventions have not been scaled up sufficiently to meet the needs of the population. This is partly related to challenges around resource mobilization in a peacekeeping and humanitarian-response context. Operationally, and in the spirit of utilizing all avenues to restart local economic activity, it became evident that local procurement, where possible, was both effective for economic recovery and efficient from a logistical perspective. Due to security risks and/or damaged infrastructure, local procurement and production was the only way to address the constraints in movement between provinces. It also led to the employment of members of the local community, including internally displaced persons, allowing for mutual support and stimulating local markets.

11. The peace negotiations, initiated in November 2020 however give hope for a possible disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation of ex-combatants, thus reducing, hopefully eliminating armed combat, further human, social, and material losses, depleting national human resources and crisis response capacities and mechanisms, and leading to revising the displacement, including illegal migration with its attendant risks of death and human trafficking. The peace negotiations might provide a framework for the parties to end hostilities

and begin key governance reforms designed to put Carana back on a path to sustainable peace and recovery.

12. The Transitional Government most likely will be tasked with initiating and overseeing a permanent constitution-making process leading to national elections; ensuring justice and accountability for crimes committed during the conflict; implementing institutional reforms related to economic and financial management and devolution of executive powers; facilitating reconstruction; and creating an enabling environment for the provision of humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, a deployment of a United Nations Peacekeeping Mission is being considered to assist Carana in the implantation of the Peace Agreement and to help in stabilising the country, especially the security situation.

13. Although there are countless challenges to human development in the country, there are many opportunities in the next four-year period. Within the framework of the peace-humanitarian-development nexus, UNDP will support national institutions to promote peace, security, good governance, rule of law and reconciliation through advocacy, capacity building, policy dialogue and supporting institutional. UNDP is well placed to reinforce links between peace and development by building on existing relationships with national institutions as well as the Transitional Government to be established if a peace agreement will be reached. UNDP will help strengthen core government functions and the redeployment of specific ministries for the provision of basic social services.

14. UNDP is aware that, for Carana to return to a sustainable development pathway, a rapid de-escalation of the crisis is necessary. Against continued volatility, and to establish the basis for a sustainable recovery, the new UNDP country programme is founded on a resilience-based approach, which is integral to and complements the ongoing humanitarian response in the country while expanding its scope to effectively bridge humanitarian and early recovery interventions. The resilience-based response strengthens the coping mechanisms of the most vulnerable communities and individuals within the humanitarian response. It promotes early recovery in areas where stabilization approaches are possible, mitigating displacement emanating not only from insecurity, but also from a lack of socio-economic opportunity; and it lays the foundation for sustained local economic development when the crisis ends. Complementary to this approach, expanded people-to-people cooperation is expected to reduce tension, improve community security and social cohesion, and enhance understanding and solidarity within the most affected populations.

II. Programme priorities and partnerships

15. Taking into account the security situation, the ongoing peace negotiations and the multifaceted challenges in governance, UNDP will mobilize and harness partnerships to play an integrator role across the policy programme front, the Sustainable Development Goals and the nationally determined contribution with improved coherence between the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF), the United Nations Integrated Strategic Framework and the country programme. UNDP interventions in the next cycle will focus

on two areas: (i) governance, peacebuilding and the rule of law, and (ii) stabilization, recovery and resilience-building.

16. The reduced time frame of the current programme will facilitate alignment with the transition laid out in the peace agreement and lay the groundwork for the next country programme. Whilst programme prioritisation is informed by the peace agreement and Agenda 2030, implementation is guided by the context, for instance when and if the peace negotiations can successfully be concluded and when the Transitional Government is put in place.

17. Over the next two-year period UNDP will promote improving functioning and new institutions to ensure access to security, justice and reconciliation for all. The organization will work with partners, including the Peacekeeping Mission (if authorised by the Security Council) to drive economic growth through the transparent management of natural resources in order to improve social protection and resilience, particularly for returning refugees and internally displaced people, women and youth.

18. The different components of the two priority areas revolve around the assumption that if democratic and inclusive national institutions can strengthen security, equitable access to justice and social cohesion throughout the country, and are capable of transparent and accountable management of natural resources, then the population, including returnees, women and youth, will be able to seize economic opportunities that will result in national resilience and recovery, and consolidate the foundations of lasting peace and socio-economic development.

Governance, Peacebuilding and the Rule of Law

19. The governance, peacebuilding and rule of law part of the programme will reinforce existing links between peace and development initiatives by enhancing the capacity of the government to lead ongoing stabilization efforts.

20. Envisaged interventions will promote a peaceful and inclusive society, ensure access to justice for all, and build effective, transparent and inclusive institutions at all levels of society (SDG 16), while also promoting gender equality (SDG 5). The latter corresponds to Pillar 1 on peace, security and reconciliation and parts of Pillar 2 on the renewal of the social contract between the state and citizens as outlined in the Carana Country Program.

21. UNDP will provide support in improving the following clusters: (i) citizen access to justice, security, human rights and reconciliation; (ii) local governance and development including elections; (iii) accountability, transparency and anti-corruption efforts, and (iv) national strategic planning, economic development and aid effectiveness.

22. Within the framework of the United Nations Global Focal Point for justice, police and corrections, and in partnership with donors, UNDP will improve population access to institutions that promote the rule of law and ensure citizens have protection from human rights violations. UNDP will encourage reconciliation efforts by supporting the national peace architecture, also based on the provisions of peace negotiations and revised constitutional framework of Carana,

through introducing a service-delivery approach in rule of law and human rights institutions that ensure social protection mechanisms exist for the most vulnerable populations. By providing support to the justice and security sectors, and human rights and reconciliation institutions—including a revised justice system (Special Criminal Courts) in partnership with the UN PKM considered for deployment to Carana - UNDP will continue to restore state authority and curb widespread impunity.

23. In the area of governance and local development, UNDP will equip public institutions with normative capacities, policies and mechanisms that favour the effective provision of services to the population and promote their participation in decision-making processes throughout the country. Parliament, the Ministry of Interior, and local municipalities will receive support so they can perform their functions effectively, particularly on gender mainstreaming under the gender parity law. UNDP will provide support within the overall framework of decentralization based on the proposed code of territorial administration, which will strengthen the institutional foundation for continued electoral cycle support, including municipal elections.

24. UNDP will work with the executive branch of the government to promote the implementation of anti-corruption mechanisms supported by civil society and media. This includes the management of natural resources. UNDP will support the reinforcement of core government functions at the centre of the executive branch to ensure prioritization and accountability on commitments to citizens.

25. In the area of aid coordination UNDP in partnership with the European Union and World Bank, will continue to support the implementation, which will involve strengthening national capacities on strategic planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluation, and aid management. Alongside this action, UNDP will continue to support government institutions, as well as the new Transitional Government envisaged in the peace negotiations, responsible for development cooperation, on improving transparency, accountability and information management.

26. To achieve expected results, strategies will focus on building the capacity of democratic governance institutions through policy guidance, research and advocacy, and disseminating tools and good practices on public accountability and aid management. This part of the programme will be linked with existing partnerships established under the previous programme cycle in the areas of justice, reconciliation and elections, as well as with other United Nations actors including the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), United Nations Volunteer (UNV) programme, the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), and the Team of Experts on the Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict. UNDP will continue to engage with multilateral institutions including the European Union, World Bank, Asian Union, and bilateral actors such as the governments of France, Netherlands, Denmark and the United States of America.

Stabilization, recovery and resilience-building

27. Prospects for stabilization and recovery at the local level are inextricably linked to resilience-building, the promotion of green-growth based on improving energy efficiency, and the sustainable and transparent management of agricultural, forest and mineral resources.

28. Under this priority area UNDP will promote: sustainable and inclusive economic growth; productive and decent work for all (SDG 8); fighting poverty (SDG 1); reducing inequalities (SDG 10), and the protection, restoration and promotion of the management of terrestrial ecosystems (SDG 15). Combined, these components correspond to Pillar 3 of the national recovery and peacebuilding plan (under development) on economic recovery and the revitalization of productive sectors.

29. To achieve this objective UNDP will support the following clusters: (i) resilience-building, rehabilitation and stabilization of communities of sustainable basic services and infrastructure in damaged areas, and through livelihoods and employment generation, (ii) promotion of green growth through agriculture, forestry, mining and energy, and (iii) sustainable and transparent management of the extractive industries.

30. Building on resilience, recovery and stabilization efforts within the ongoing humanitarian response, UNDP will work with other United Nations organizations to rehabilitate the socio-economic infrastructure of communities hosting displaced persons, returnees, ex-combatants and youth-at-risk. This collaboration will increase access to temporary and longer-term employment opportunities for women and youth (including the agro-forestry sector), and further develop social protection programmes that strengthen community resilience during times of insecurity and renewed violence. UNDP will work with micro-finance institutions and community leaders to promote savings networks that stabilize livelihoods and secure household revenues for local development. The assumption underlying this intervention is based on evidence generated from UNDP responses in other post-conflict settings, where livelihood support plays an important role in community stabilization by providing income to conflict-affected communities and reconstruction initiatives that create civic engagement, build social cohesion and improve human security.

31. To promote a green economy UNDP, with support from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF), will help integrate environmental issues into government sectoral debates and policies, as well as the strategies of public and private institutions. In addition, UNDP will support the establishment of green economies at the local level through the sustainable management of ecosystems, including forests, and provide technical expertise on ways to protect, restore and promote the sustainable use of territorial ecosystems. The latter will include methods to sustainably manage forests, halt the loss of biodiversity, and create sustainable livelihood opportunities for the most vulnerable citizens.

32. To improve management of natural resources in the extractive sector, UNDP will work with the Ministry of Natural Resources; Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Agriculture; and the Ministry of Interior to improve the governance and sustainable management of forest and mineral

resources by increasing transparency, reducing corruption in each sector, and increasing state revenues. These efforts are linked to national plan objectives on transparency in public affairs and anti-corruption measures and draw lessons from the uncontrolled exploitation of forest and mineral resources, which are key drivers of conflict.

33. In the country exclusion and discrimination is a trigger for violence. To support transformative and measurable changes in gender equality and women's empowerment, UNDP interventions will be based on inclusive approaches that take into account differentiated social protection needs of men and women, returnees and displaced persons, ex-combatants, youth at-risk and people living with disabilities. The skill sets required for different income-generating activities in peri-urban and rural zones will be taken into account to favour temporary opportunities for displaced persons who wish to resettle in their communities of origin, along with micro-finance agricultural initiatives that are based on existing practices for women and youth.

34. Programme implementation will be carried out in partnership with other United Nations organizations including, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); the International Labour Organization (ILO); United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). The GEF, World Bank and other technical partners will provide inputs on the design of green economy and sustainable economic growth programmes. The Government of Japan and UNDP will work with civil society and, where possible, private sector actors on resilience-building. UNDP will prioritize South-South and triangular cooperation efforts that have successfully generated results, particularly through partnerships with regional mechanisms like the Asian Development Bank.

35. The two outcomes are linked by cross-cutting and sectoral interventions that will improve programmatic integration. Support to anti-corruption and good governance at the central government level will intersect with interventions on transparency in natural resource management. Similarly, support to national reconciliation efforts at the central government level, via the national peace architecture, will link community-based recovery interventions on livelihoods and social cohesion, fostering progress in a critical policy area and translating it into immediate results for the population.

III. Programme and risk management

36. The context within which the proposed programme will be implemented is complex, marked by continued fragility and insecurity. Large parts of the country remain under the control of parties to the conflict and armed groups, underscoring significant programmatic and operational risks that affect United Nations efforts in the country. Insecurity, combined with political tension around eventual failure of the ongoing peace negotiations and lack of buy-in from a population that wants tangible peace dividends, all jeopardize the smooth implementation of the proposed programme.

37. Because these risks have the potential to delay or impede the implementation of the programme UNDP will, in consultation with partners, maintain a robust risk management system

that allows for the redirection of resources for urgent needs. This will be combined with a flexible and iterative approach to programme implementation based on stabilization efforts and availability of resources. The UNDP Country Office will improve its monitoring, evaluation and risk management capacities to ensure risk assessments and regular reviews are properly built into project design and undertaken with stakeholders. The Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) will guide justice and security interventions while the Business Continuity Plan and programme criticality will be activated in the event of a security breakdown.

38. UNDP will remain agile by relying on global service platforms, notably the Regional Hub in Doba, Namuna for programmatic support, and the service hubs for finance, human resources and procurement. UNDP will maintain robust business practices to uphold high levels of transparency through regular audits and spot checks to mitigate financial risks. The Internal Control Framework will be systematically enforced, while ensuring close involvement of national partners in the planning and implementation of interventions. These mechanisms will be built into project design, approval processes, monitoring requirements, performance assessments and closure mechanisms.

39. Although the international community pledged to generously support the government at the 2018 Geneva roundtable, the untimely follow through on financing will significantly impact the implementation of the Carana Country Program. To mitigate the fall out linked to this, UNDP will continue to support the government in transparently and effectively managing development aid. In addition, a resource mobilization strategy will guide UNDP action when increasing partnerships with non-traditional donors, including those from the region. By using existing and prospective partnerships with donors, UNDP will share the burden of programming risks by safeguarding the flexibility and iterative approaches that are built into partnership agreements from the outset. Further funding might become available at the High-Level International Donors Conference to be held in October 2021 in Accra, Ghana.

40. This country programme document outlines UNDP contributions to national results and serves as the primary unit of accountability to the Executive Board for results alignment and resources assigned to the programme at the country level. Accountabilities of managers at the country, regional and headquarters levels with respect to country programmes are prescribed in the UNDP programme and operations policies and procedures and its internal controls framework. In accordance with Executive Board decision 2013/9, all direct costs associated with project implementation should be charged to the concerned projects.

41. UNDP will retain some flexibility in planning and allocating resources through a concerted and coordinated framework with the government, and multilateral and bilateral partners. More generally, the implementation of the programme will be part of the overall response of the United Nations system and international community to address national challenges and priorities. Regular consultations will be held with United Nations organizations and other partners involved in priority areas of the programme.

IV. Monitoring and evaluation

42. As part of the lessons learned from the previous programme cycle, where the crisis negatively affected the ability of the Country Office to undertake systematic evaluations of programmes and projects, UNDP will ensure adequate human resources and systems are in place to properly monitor and evaluate programme outcomes.

43. A significant challenge in the country is the chronic lack of data to guide decision-making and programme interventions. This has a direct effect on the ability of the government and its partners to measure progress, often resulting in disparate estimations on the situation in country. The monitoring and evaluation framework of the Carana Country Program, managed by the Permanent Secretariat, is an opportunity to set mutually agreed baselines and benchmarks the international community can plan and/or revise initiatives (with the government) around. While the monitoring and evaluation framework is still being finalized, the UNDP programme will establish clear links between governance and resilience benchmarks under the three pillars that correspond to the outcomes of the proposed programme. Where possible, indicators will be harmonized to ensure a clear methodology and common platform for follow-up. In addition, the use of indicators from the UNDP strategic plan will measure progress at the global level.

44. UNDP will support joint efforts to develop national institutional capacity to collect, update and analyse data to strengthen evidenced-based development policies and strategies through national systems. UNDP will conduct regular monitoring missions and will support its counterpart ministries in the collection of data related to their sectors and will facilitate the development of systems for collecting, storing and analysing data related to monitoring government commitments. The UNDP Gender Marker, which rates and monitors projects for gender components, will be used to improve planning and decision-making on gender-based interventions across the programme. Fifteen per cent of resources will be dedicated to gender equality and women's empowerment initiatives.

Annex 1. UNDP trust funds

Trust fund	Task	Budget
UNDP Trust Fund for re-establishing a police force in South and West Carana	procure police equipment	US\$ 8 million
UNDP Trust Fund for salaries in the security sector	ensure regular salaries for the members of the security sector until the GOC can provide these salaries from tax funds	US\$ 16 million
UNDP Trust Fund for institution building	support rule of law reforms	US\$ 5 million
New Peacebuilding Trust Fund	post-conflict reconstruction and early peacebuilding, to be used in accordance with the aims and strategies of a potential peacekeeping mission in Carana	US\$ 60 million

Annex 2. Ongoing development projects in Carana (non-exhaustive)

Cluster	Location	Project	Budget in \$ US	Allocation	Donor	Execution	Time	Remarks
Accountability	Galasi	Carana Media Education Development Project. As part of the Strengthening Free and Independent Media in Carana project, CGCS has collaborated with Internews to contribute to the development of legal professionals and free expression activists in order to improve media and communications law, regulation, advocacy, and policy in Carana. This program involves the recruitment of journalists, media professionals, academics, and media lawyers from Carana o to participate in media law and policy events around the world.	1.800.000	total	EU	CGCS	2021	
Governance	Galasi	Construction of a new building for the GoC ministry of interior	4.500.000	total	China	MOFCOM	2020 to 2022	Planned
Governance	Galasi	Government capacity building. Developing capacity of Carana Government to provide public services.	1.400.000	total	Japan	JICA	2020 to 2022	
Governance	Galasi	The Program works with targeted ministries and agencies to improve financial management and policy implementation across key ministries, agencies and commissions, strengthen the Carana Institute of Public Administration to provide high-calibre, in-country training for Carana civil servants, and reform concessions management.	800.000	total	USA	USAID	2020 to 2021	
Governance	Tereni & Leppko region	Good Governance Capacity Building Program. Assist local authorities in implementing the principles and rules of good governance in existing administrative structures. Aiming for 22 smaller communities.	1.600.000	total	Germany	UNDP	2019 to 2021	Delayed – awaiting PA and SSR steps.
Green growth	Cereni	Construction of a solar powered desalination plant with a capacity of 200.000 ltrs a day.	4.200.000	total	Germany	GIZ	2020 to 2022	

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Cluster	Location	Project	Budgetin \$ US	Alloc ation	Donor	Execution	Time	Remarks
Green growth	Different Locations	Community water management project. To train community representatives how to attain, store and use the rare resource water efficiently. 600 trainees a year.	1.200.000	total	USA	USAID	Planned 2020 to 2022	
Green growth	Different rural locations	Clean Energy Initiative. The project activities in Carana increasingly incorporate clean and renewable energy technologies, including hydro and biomass energy sources.	1.700.000		Denmark	DDC	2019 to 2021	
Justice	Galasi	Contribution in kind to improve the material basis of Carana Police Forces. The contribution includes 60 police cars, 250 radios and a variety of small items.	1.900.000	total	Japan	JICA	Planned 2021	
Justice	Different locations	Rule of Law qualification program. Training programs for judges and prosecutors. 60 trainees a year.	900.000	total	UNDP	UNDP	2020 to 2021	Currently only in Galasi
Justice	Tereni & Koloni	Construction of 8 Police Stations.	4.600.000		Germany	GIZ	Planned 2020 to 2022	
National development	Galasi, Corna, Folsa, Faron, Turen, Maldosa, Maroni, Alur, Sureen, Amsan	Waste Management Project. The overall aim of the product is to improve the waste management in large cities of Carana to reduce the risk of disease and to prevent the economy from wasting resources.	1.400.000	total	EU	IFAD	2020 to 2022	Problems to establish offices & partners in MPC areas.
National development	Galasi	Carana Social Safety Net Project. To initiate first steps for the creation of a rudimentary social safety net system by providing the initial funding and assistance in the development of sustainable social net structures.	4.200.000	total	World Bank	World Bank	2020 to 2022	
National development	Faron, Folsa	Famine Early Warning Systems Network. The project provides timely food security information for Carana and other countries that allows donors to monitor emerging crises and respond to needs early.	700.000	total	USA	USAID	2020 to 2021	
National development	Galasi, Cereni, Turen, Maldosa	Effectiveness of Health Services Project. To increase access to free and quality health services for children under 14 years living in harbour city zones and the widespread awareness in the population of the importance of preventive health.	1.600.000	total	Italy	Openaid	2020 to 2022	
National development	Tereni, Leppko & Mahbek region	Capacity Development Project for the Provision of Services for Basic Human Needs.	3.700.000	total	Italy	Different NGOs	2019 to 2022	

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Cluster	Location	Project	Budgetin \$ US	Alloc ation	Donor	Execution	Time	Remarks
National development	Hanno, Barin Region	Feed the Future program. The Project supports Carana's efforts to refine and implement a country-led comprehensive food security strategy to reduce hunger and increase economic growth through market-led agricultural development. The FED program also improves the enabling environment for private sector investment in agriculture and focuses on developing new value chains, such as vegetables and goats, that hold the promise of generating higher incomes and providing diets that are more diverse to the Carana people.	7.600.000	total	Canada	Ca Riverside	2019 to 2023	Problem – high number of IDPs in the area.
Resilience-building	Galasi	Micro Credit Initiative. The Micro-credit Project for Carana aims to address private sector development and poverty alleviation by increasing the availability of financial services to urban micro-entrepreneurs and the self-employed.	3.200.000	total	WB	WB	2019 to 2022	
Resilience-building	Galasi, Ahur, Maldosa	Nurse Training Program for 120 Students a year.	2400000	total	Norway	NORAD	2018 to 2023	
Resilience-building	Galasi	Private business enhancement. Building and strengthening institutions and private sector actors in Carana by providing technical advice and / or support for capacity building.	2.400.000	total	Norway	NORAD	2019 to 2022	
Resilience-building	Galasi	Public access to electricity. Improving the existing electrical infrastructure in the capital	unknown		China		planned 2020 to unknown	
Resilience-building	Galasi	HIV/Aids education program. Lectures on HIV/Aids in schools and public institutions and distribution of information material.	800.000	total	Germany	GIZ	2020 to 2022	
Resilience-building	Ahur, Faron	Children back to school initiative.	700.000	total	Nether-lands	SDA	2021	Not yet in Ahur
Resilience-building	Galasi	Initiative for Women in Small Businesses. The initiative targets unemployed women without skills and financial resources. 1200 beneficiaries.	1.500.000	total	Sweden	SDA	2019 to 2022	
Resilience-building	Galasi, Folsa, Faron, Ahur	Women and HIV/Aids educational workshops. 20 Workshops with 30 participants each.	700.000	total	Norway	NORAD	Planned 2021 to 2022	Looking for facilities in Faron and Ahur.
Resilience-building	Galasi, Corma, Folsa, Faron, Turen, Maldosa, Maroni, Ahur,	Maternal and Child Health Empowerment Project. Training of nurses and midwives.	2.400.000	total	Sweden	Different NGOs	2019 to 2022	Problems to establish offices & partners in MPC areas.

Cluster	Location	Project	Budgetin \$ US	Alloc ation	Donor	Execution	Time	Remarks
	Sureen, Amsan							
Resilience-building	Galasi, Cereni, Turen, Maldosa, Sureen,	Establishment of vocational training centres, to improve the training system to meet the labour market and social needs by technical support through development and implementation of model course, curriculum development, Training of Trainers, and provision of equipment.	5.400.000	total	EU	IFAD	2020 to 2023	
Resilience-building	Galasi	Health Management Program. Training administrative staff for hospitals and government institutions. 200 participants	800.000	total	Japan	JICA	2020 to 2021	
Resilience-building	Ahur, Sureen, Faron	Access to Clean Water Project. Construction and refurbishment of water supply infrastructure.	2.700.000	total	Germany	GIZ	2020-2022	Ahur in the initial phase only.
Resilience-building	Cereni	Construction of a fish processing plant with the capability to process 600 tons of fish a year. The plan shall be capable of processing raw fish for local markets and export as canned fish.	1.200.000	total	Canada	Foreign Services	2020 to 2022	
Resilience-building	Galasi, Cereni, Maldosa	Construction of 3 fish processing plants with the capability to process 1500 tons fish a year.	5.000.000	total	UNDP Trust fund	World Bank	2019 to 2022	
Resilience-building	Different Locations	Livestock sustainability project. Preventing diseases and mismanagement in livestock.	22.000.000	total	UK	OXFAM	2019 to 2022	Limited access due to insecurity.
Resilience-building	Sureen	Project for Urgent Improvement of Water Supply Facilities. Maintenance and operation of wells, pumps, cisterns and water distribution equipment.	2.600.000	total	USA	USAID	2020 to 2021	
Resilience-building	Different Locations	Western Carana Resources Mgt Program for extremely poor small-scale farmers and herders. Long- term objective is to build up traditional rain fed agriculture and improve economic conditions in the rural area.	8.500.000	total	EU	IFAG	2019 to 2023	Very limited access to area due to insecurity.
Resilience-building	Different Locations	Integrated Rural Development Project. The overall project goal is to improve the livelihoods of poor rural households in the target area, and strengthen communities' resilience in the face of drought. The project targets smallholder pastoralist households in the sand dunes and clay plains of the region, households engaged in irrigated farming and smallholders who migrate seasonally with their herds.	2.300.000	total	France	AFD	2019 to 2022	Delayed due to limited access to areas in west and south.
Resilience-building	Faron, Folsa, Sureen	Livestock Marketing Program. This program is designed to increase the food security, incomes and climate resilience of poor households in pastoralist communities. It aims to increase earning opportunities and improve living conditions in livestock-based households.	1.800.000	total	Spain	AECID	2019 to 2021	

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Cluster	Location	Project	Budgetin \$ US	Alloc ation	Donor	Execution	Time	Remarks
Resilience-building	Different locations	Emergency Water projects. World Relief Canada is providing emergency water, sanitation and hygiene services to over 10,000 drought-affected people. Project activities include: (1) rehabilitating 40 boreholes within 5 communities, serving 5,000 people; (2) establishing 30 water committees and training 20 pump mechanics to manage, operate and maintain water points; (3) providing training for 120 new community water, sanitation and hygiene promoters.	2.100.000	total	Canada	WRC	2019 to 2022	
Resilience-building	Fellari & Guthar Region	Road Construction (paved road).	7.600.000	total	USA	Commercial Contractors	2019 to 2022	
Resilience-building	Hanno Region	Road Construction (paved road).	8.200.000	total	USA	Commercial Contractors	2019 to 2022	Not yet contracted due to insecurity
Resilience-building	Leppko Region	Road Construction (paved road).	1.200.000	total	USA	Commercial Contractors	2019 to 2022	Not yet contracted due to insecurity
Resilience-building	Mahbek, Tereni & Koloni Region	Road Construction (paved road).	11.700.000	total	USA	Commercial Contractors	2019 to 2022	Not yet contracted due to insecurity
Resilience-building	Galasi	8 workshops for young entrepreneurs. To improve the knowledge about business starting.	600.000	total	UNDP	UNDP	2010 to 2021	
Resilience-building	Galasi	Teacher Qualifying Project for 400 young Teachers a year	1.400.000	total	Germany	GLZ	2020 to 2022	
Resilience-building	Different locations	Provincial Education Project. Strengthening the provincial education structures by advising the provincial governments, providing learning material and conducting teacher qualification courses.	1.400.000	total	UK	DFID	2019 to 2022	
Resilience-building	Maroni to Sureen	Road Repair and Maintenance.	unknown		China	MOFCOM	Planned 2020-2021	Initial surveys being conducted
Resilience-building	Galasi, Ahur, Corma	Poverty reduction program by funding and assisting small businesses. 200 beneficiaries per year.	1.800.000	total	Netherlands	Agrico	2019 to 2022	
Resilience-building	Around Galasi	Rural Access Project. 300 km unpaved roads around the provincial capital	7.300.000	total	EU	IFAG	2019 to 2022	
Resilience-building	Different locations	Women Small Business Training. Training in commercial skills for trade and services. Aims for 300 participants.	800.000	total	Norway	Different NGOs	2021	
Resilience-building	South Carana	Rural Access Project. Building rural and inter-urban roads, highways and bridges	6.000.000	total	WB	IFAG	2020 to 2023	Slow progress due to insecurity and

Cluster	Location	Project	Budgetin \$ US	Alloc ation	Donor	Execution	Time	Remarks
								lack of local capacities.
Resilience-building	West Carana	Rural development program. The overall goal of the program is to improve the incomes of the poorest people in the state — smallholder and herder families, particularly those headed by women — and to provide them with access to social services.	1.800.000	total	EU	OXFAM	2019 to 2022	Slow progress due to insecurity and lack of local capacities.
Resilience-building	West Carana	Food Security and Livelihoods Assistance in the Barin Region The project aims to improve food security through improved, increased and diversified food production (agriculture and fishing). Activities include: 1) providing basic agricultural inputs (seeds and tools); 2) supporting vegetable production and fisher folk through agricultural training groups; 3) training in nutrition; and 4) training in animal traction cultivation.	1.700.000	total	France	AFD	2020 to 2022	
Resilience-building	Koloni, Tereni, Mahbek region	Promoting Integration of IDPs. The project aims to improve social, political and economic conditions in four counties in the Upper Kasoko Region by addressing the vulnerability of internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees, and host communities and promoting their stability. The project seeks to achieve this outcome through activities in environmental conservation, food security, income generation, capacity building of local NGOs and CBOs, and water and sanitation. 6000 Beneficiaries	1.800.000	total	France	AFD	Planned 2020 to 2022	Most IDPs located in the West – awaiting return of IDPs.
Resilience-building	Tereni & Leppko region	Education for Democracy. 6 Workshops to advise community leaders on principles and values of democratic systems. 220 participants.	800.000	total	Norway	UNDP	2020	Delayed – awaiting PA and SSR steps.
Resilience-building	Different locations	Small Business Initiative. This project includes micro credits and assistance to found and operate different labour-intensive small business. 600 beneficiaries in 2020.	4.600.000	total	WB	WB	2020 to 2022	
Resilience-building	Mahbek & Barin	Seeds development program. Approximately 30,000 traditional rain fed smallholder farmers, at least 10,000 of whom are women, are expected to benefit from the program through increased returns from the use of quality certified seed. Furthermore, around 520 seed growers are expected to benefit directly, with preference given to experience and dynamic young farmers.	4.800.000	total	USA	USAID	2020 to 2023	

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Cluster	Location	Project	Budget in \$ US	Allocation	Donor	Execution	Time	Remarks
Resilience-building	Different locations	Improving Crop Yields and Strengthening Livelihoods. The project aims to increase short and medium term food production to improve community resilience and family incomes in Activities include: 1) farmer and fisher folk training, as well as inputs (seeds and tools); 2) Training agriculture extension workers and community animal health workers; and 3) working with producers and community groups to reduce harvest losses for food products through better processing and storage.	2,400.000	total	Norway	Different NGOs	2019 to 2022	
Resilience-building	Mahbek & Barin	Dairy Processing Initiative. Construction and operating 6 dairy processing facilities to produce dairy products for the local markets. Expected employees 400. Expected participating farmer families 2000.	8,200.000	total	WB	WB	2020 to 2022	
Resilience-building	Hanno Region	Demining Projects. Mine clearing along rural roads.	5,200.000	total	Norway	UNMAS and contractors	2020 to 2023	
Resilience-building	Rural area in Mahbek Region	Mine Awareness Program. The program aims to spread the knowledge about landmines to prevent people to become mine victims and to learn how to report mines in their area.	1,900.000	total	Japan	UNMAS	2019 to 2021	
Sustainable mining	Xalksa, Faron, Ahur	increase human resources capacity and improve the performance of government oversight institutions in the hydropower and mining sectors	2,100.000	total	World Bank	UNDP	Planned 2021 to 2024	
Sustainable mining	Galasi	Design government audit programs and local participatory mining surveys	750.000	total	Australia	DFAT	Planned 2021 to 2023	
Sustainable mining	Different locations	facilitate nationwide stakeholder engagement process to inform policy and decision-making	800.000	total	UNDP	UNDP	Planned 2021 to 2022	
Sustainable mining	Different locations	Support government, communities and businesses to enact systematic procedures for establishing free prior and informed consent of indigenous and local communities	800.000	total	UK	DFID	Planned 2021 to 2023	
Sustainable mining	Galasi	Ensure that extractive industries are effectively represented in national development strategy	600.000	total	World Bank		Planned 2021 to 2024	
Total	Total		198,550.000					



Kalari Peace Treaty

Kalari Peace Treaty

11 August 2021

PREAMBLE:

WHEREAS the Government of Carana (GOC), Mouvement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) and Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC), (the Parties) having met under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) in Kalari, in respect of the issues related to an Inclusive Peace Agreement and its implementation;

REAFFIRMING their determination to build a State of democratic law and prosperity, guaranteeing the rights of citizens and harmonious and sustainable development in Carana;

REAFFIRMING their commitment to the Constitution of the Republic of Carana of 15 April 2013;

RECOGNIZING that a viable ceasefire and peace process can meaningfully be realized through adherence and commitment to the Kalari Peace Treaty;

AWARE of the overwhelming support shown by the people of Carana to the irreversible peace process and the will in resolving the outstanding issues of conflict in Carana, the peace process and the need for an expeditious conclusion of the peace agreement;

REITERATING their commitment to the final, just and comprehensive peace settlement, the security, welfare and stability of the people of Carana within the framework of a true and sincere national reconciliation;

CONSCIOUS of the need to promote true national reconciliation as the basis of sustainable peace in Carana;

DEEPLY ATTACHED to the values of democracy, good governance, justice and the protection and promotion of human rights in accordance with the relevant international instruments;

AWARE of the fact that Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants are crucial components for a secure and peaceful Carana and commit themselves to credible, transparent and effective DDR processes which will support the ex-combatants' transition to a productive civilian life;

THE PARTIES HEREBY AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

_____	_____
for: The Government of Carana	for: The Mouvement Patriotique de Carana (MPC)
_____	_____
for: The Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC)	for: The United Nations

PART ONE

General and Fundamental Provisions

ARTICLE I

1. A Peace Agreement (PA) is hereby established throughout the territory of CARANA, between the belligerents as defined. The PA shall enter into force upon signature and the implementation will be put into effect as soon as possible.
2. The **Ceasefire Agreement** (as part of the agreement) is the first stage of the peace process, which shall serve as a stable platform for further negotiations with the aim to re-establish complete peace and security in CARANA.
3. The final cessation of hostilities shall enter into force within seventy-two hours after the signing of the ceasefire agreement.

ARTICLE II

4. The Parties agree to a permanent ceasefire among all their forces with their broader objective of sustaining the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, promoting peace culture, reconciliation and confidence building;
5. The ceasefire shall uphold the following principles: Permanent cessation of hostilities between CDF, MPC and ICSC within 72 hours after the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
6. The permanent cessation of hostilities shall include the following activities:
 - a) The suspension of supplies of ammunition and weaponry.
 - b) Banning the distribution of lethal logistical supplies to or from any of the forces.
 - c) Upon signing of the Peace Agreement, the parties will discuss the issue of prisoner of war, political prisoners, and camps for displaced persons. The parties agree to release all civilian abductees and to demobilize combatants who are less than eighteen years.
 - d) A complete ban on any mine-laying operations and the hindering of operations to remove mines.
 - e) Cessation of all domestic and external propaganda between the parties and incitation of ethnic hatred.
 - f) Cessation of all acts of violence against the civilian population; acts of revenge; summary executions; torture; harassment; detention and persecution of civilians on the basis of ethnic origin, religious beliefs, or political affiliation; arming of civilians; use of child soldiers; sexual violence; sponsoring or promotion of terrorists or genocidal ideologies.

- g) Cessation of all attacks by air, land and sea, as well as all acts of sabotage.
- h) Cessation of any actions likely to impede the normal implementation of the process.

ARTICLE III

- 7. The Parties agree to request the United Nations to constitute an effective, sustainable and affordable UN Peace Support Mission to monitor and verify this agreement and to support the implementation of the Peace Agreement.
- 8. The size of the UN Peace Support Mission shall be determined by the UN in consolidation with the parties.
- 9. For the purpose of monitoring activities related to the cease fire, the international monitors shall have unrestricted access in accordance with a Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) and Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).
- 10. The Parties request the UN to provide cultural orientation to all its members to create conducive atmosphere for respect and better understanding of social values and cultures to ensure effective implementation of this agreement.

ARTICLE IV

- 11. The Joint Commission for the Ceasefire (JCC) will be composed of one senior representative from each party and one legal adviser of each party signatory of the agreement and the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General or his/her deputy.
- 12. It shall be established no later than 30 days (D¹+30) upon signing the Peace Agreement.
- 13. The Commission, which is the decision-making organ for the ceasefire shall be based in Galasi and shall be headed by the UN. The tasks include:
 - a. after signature of the present Agreement, developing the ceasefire measures to be taken, including in particular the security measures, the cantonment and disarmament of armed groups in Carana as well as the active redeployment of defence and security forces in Carana,
 - b. monitoring the security arrangements.
- 14. The Commission will discuss and decide on all disputes about allegations regarding the agreed Cease Fire reported by the Regional Joint Teams (RJTs).

¹ D = Day of signature of the peace agreement

ARTICLE V

15. The Regional Joint Teams will be composed of representatives of all signatories, and the United Nations. The RJTs shall be led by officers of the UN. The RJTs will be responsible to the Joint Commission for the Ceasefire (JCC).
16. The RJTs shall have a Secretariat made up of senior United Nations officers. It shall be based at Galasi. It may meet anywhere as convened by the JCC or upon request of the RJT leaders.
17. The RJT will share information and facilitate communication between parties in order to reduce the likelihood of violations of the Ceasefire Agreement and to clarify alleged violations of the agreement. They will thereby assist in building confidence amongst signatories and help create trust in the peace process.
18. The duties and tasks of the Regional Joint Teams will be established by an internal rule of order that will define the attributes, way of functioning, rights and general duties of this structure.
19. RJTs shall be established no later than 60 days (D+60) of signing the Peace Agreement in all provincial capitals of Carana.

ARTICLE VI

20. The signatories of the present agreement accept the following principles whose modalities of implementation specified in the Kalari Peace Treaty:
 - a. Re-establishment of the rule of law based on national unity, democracy, pluralism in all its forms and respect for human rights.
 - b. Formation and composition of the new CARANA National Defence and Security Forces shall consist of Government forces and combatants of the Armed Political Parties and Movements.
 - c. Establishment of power sharing within the framework of a broad-based inclusive Transitional Government.

ARTICLE VII

21. The government of CARANA will undertake any effort to conduct Presidential and National elections within six months of the adoption of a new constitution for Carana.

PART TWO

Ceasefire Agreements

1. A ceasefire is hereby established throughout the territory of Carana between the signatories of the Peace Agreement. The ceasefire shall enter into force upon signature and the implementation will be put into effect as soon as possible.
2. The final cessation of hostilities shall enter into force within 72 hours after the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement.
3. The Ceasefire Agreement is the first stage of the peace process and shall serve as a stable platform for further negotiations with the aim to re-establish complete peace and security in Carana.
4. The permanent cessation of hostilities shall include final termination of the following activities:
 - a. Military activities including movement, reconnaissance, reinforcement, recruitment, drafting and military exercises other than those permitted by the JCC.
 - b. Land, air and river operations;
 - c. Laying of mines and other subversive activities;
 - d. Use of force against and abuse of civilians;
 - e. Replenishment of ammunition, weapons and other lethal or military equipment;
 - f. Hostile propaganda from inside or outside the country;
 - g. Occupation of new locations; The cessation of all acts of violence against the civilian population, including acts of revenge, summary executions, torture, harassment, detention and persecution of civilians on the basis of ethnicity, religious beliefs or political affiliation. Parties also agree to cease the use of child soldiers, sexual violence, or the sponsorship and/or promotion of terrorists or genocide ideologies.
 - h. The cessation of all domestic and external propaganda between the parties and the incitation of ethnic hatred.
 - i. The cessation of any actions likely to impede the normal implementation of the Kalari Treaty and the peace process.
 - j. Any other actions that may impede the normal progress of the peace process.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)

5. To establish a National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) based in Galasi that shall be chaired by a representative of the transitional

Government of Carana and consist of twelve members: three each from the FDC, MPC, CISC and the UN. The Commission shall be responsible for all elements of the DDR programme.

- a. The commission shall have a military sub-commission chaired by the United Nations Head of Military Component with four members: one each from the FDC, MPC, CISC, and the UN.
 - b. The commission shall also have a reintegration sub-commission chaired by the transitional Government of Carana with representatives of the four organizations.
 - c. The commission shall also have a small arms and light weapons sub-commission chaired by the transitional Government of Carana with representative of the four organizations.
 - d. The commission may establish other sub-commissions as required.
 - e. The NCDDR shall have be constituted by D+30 and have its first meeting on D+60. The sub-commissions shall be established NLT D+90.
 - f. It reports regularly to the National Transitional Government and informs the Joint Commission for the Ceasefire. The Sub-commissions report to the NCDDR at regular intervals to be determined by the NCDDR.
6. To voluntarily commit all MPC and CISC forces to the DDR process. All FDC, MPC and CISC solders shall be registered.
 7. A complete ban on any mine-laying operations and the hindering of operations to remove mines. All parties further agree to declare all force structures, weapons, minefields and locations to the National Commission by D+45, and further agree to remain at their reported locations.
 8. The immediate suspension of supplies of ammunition and weaponry and a ban on the distribution of lethal logistical supplies to and from any of the parties to this agreement.
 9. To discuss, upon signing of the Kalari Treaty, the issue of prisoners of war, political prisoners, and camps for displaced persons. The parties also undertake to release all civilian abductees and to demobilize combatants who are less than 18 years of age.

National Army

10. A new national army, the Forces de la Défense et Sécurité du Carana (FDSC), shall be created of not more than 22,000 soldiers with up to 4,000 being drawn from former MPC combatants and 1,500 drawn from former CISC combatants. The FDSC shall operate under the authority of the new transitional Government of Carana, based on the establishment of a power-sharing arrangement outlined in the Kalari Treaty.
11. All belligerents will exchange detailed documents about the strength, capabilities and locations of their forces. The information is to be shared with the NCDDR and the JCC NLT D+45.
12. All forces of the FDC, MPC and CISC will withdraw from their field locations to respective Battalion HQ locations, by D+150.

13. All belligerents will decide on cantonment sites/locations for disarmament and demobilisation by D+180.
14. MPC and CISC will disarm and demobilise as soon the security situation allows, but NLT D+210.
15. To ensure that all weapons (including ammunition and mines) are surrendered to international authorities for storage or destruction no later than D+240.
16. 4,000 MPC and 1,500 CISC members will be integrated in the new FDSC NLT D+360.
17. All military personnel beyond 22,000 will need to be disarmed, demobilized and integrated into other government sectors or private sectors.

The Ceasefire Zone

18. The scope of the ceasefire shall be the whole territory of Carana.

Violations

19. The following acts shall be constituting violations of this agreement:
 - a. Any acts that may contravene this agreement
 - b. Unauthorized movements of troops
 - c. Unauthorized recruitment, draft and/or mobilization drive
 - d. Unauthorized replenishment of military equipment and supplies
 - e. Hostile acts
 - f. Violation of human rights, humanitarian law and obstruction of freedom of movement
 - g. Hostile propaganda and media warfare
 - h. Espionage, sabotage and acts of subversion to undermine either party and/or agreement
 - i. Recruitment of child soldiers

Other Armed Groups

20. The Parties agree to expedite the process of incorporation and reintegration of armed groups allied to either Party, into their armed forces, other organized forces, the civil service and societal institutions.
21. The Parties agree to guarantee all armed groups the freedom of choice, which forces or other institution they are joining.
22. By D + 360 all fighters of other armed groups shall be reintegrated or disarmed.

Verification, Monitoring, Complaints and Obligations

23. The structure and levels of verification and decision on disputes of the implementation of the Agreement shall be as follows:
 - a. Joint Commission for the Ceasefire (JCC)
 - b. Regional Joint Teams (RJTs).
24. The structure and levels for the implementation and verification of the Disarmament Process shall be as follows:
 - a. National Transitional Government (until new government is being elected)
 - b. National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR)
 - c. NCDDR sub-commissions.

National Police Force

25. A new national police service shall be created of not more than 12,500 officers with up to 3,000 are being drawn from former MPC combatants and up to 1,250 being drawn from former CISC combatants.
26. The United Nations will support the establishment and restructuring of the police service through the provision of training and monitoring.

PART THREE

GOVERNANCE

ARTICLE I

ARCHITECTURE

1. The Parties shall put in place an institutional architecture enabling the populations of the Carana to manage their own affairs in a spirit of participative citizenship, based on the principle of free administration and enabling wider representation of these populations within national institutions. To this end, the following provisions shall be made:
 - a. the representation of the population shall be enhanced by increasing the number of electoral constituencies and/or other appropriate measures; in particular of representatives of the traditional elites, and of women and young people;
 - b. there shall be better representation of the population of Carana in the institutions and main public services, bodies and administrations of the Republic of Carana; governance and wealth sharing agreements are to be developed.
2. The Parties acknowledge the need to share remit and responsibilities between the State and territorial collectively, to ensure that the latter are effective and able to meet the needs and demands of local communities and citizens.

ARTICLE II

ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT

1. An all-inclusive Transitional Government to be called the National Transitional Government of Carana, (NTGC), is hereby established to replace the present Government of Carana.
2. The NTGC shall consist of three branches, namely:
 - a. The National Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA);
 - b. The Executive; and
 - c. The Judiciary
3. The Executive Branch of the NTGC shall be inaugurated and fully commence operations by D + 30. The National Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA) and the Judiciary shall be inaugurated and fully commence operations by D + 90. Their mandate shall expire when the next elected Government of Carana shall be inaugurated.
4. Upon inauguration of the NTGC in Carana, all cabinet Ministers, Deputy and Assistant Ministers, heads of autonomous agencies, commissions, and heads of public corporations and State-

owned enterprises of the current GOC shall be deemed to have resigned. This does not preclude re-appointment according to the appropriate provisions of this Agreement.

5. The authority of the NTGC shall be established and recognised throughout the territory of Carana, immediately upon its installation in Galasi. The NTGC shall have control over the entire territory of Carana.
6. There shall be no restriction on members of the parties to the conflict to engage in national politics through the formation of political parties or otherwise, save and except those restrictions imposed on all parties and associations by the relevant laws of Carana.

ARTICLE III

MANDATE OF THE NATIONAL TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT OF CARANA

1. The primary responsibility of the NTGC shall be to ensure the scrupulous implementation of this Peace Agreement.
2. In addition to normal State functions, its mandate shall include the following:
 - a. Implementation of the provisions of the Peace Agreement;
 - b. Overseeing and coordinating implementation of the political and rehabilitation programs enunciated in this Peace Agreement;
 - c. Promotion of reconciliation to ensure the restoration of peace and stability to the country and its people;
 - d. Contribution to the preparation and conduct of internationally supervised elections, for the inauguration of an elected Government of Carana.

ARTICLE IV

THE NATIONAL TRANSITIONAL LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY (NTLA)

1. There is hereby established a National Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA) in Carana which shall reflect a broad spectrum of the Carana society.
2. The NTLA shall be unicameral in nature and shall replace, within the transitional period, the entire Legislature of the Republic of Carana.
3. The NTLA shall have a maximum of seventy-six (76) members who shall come from the following entities:
 - a. Each of the eight (8) Provinces.
 - b. The present Government of Carana, the MPC, the CISC, the political parties, civil society and interest groups including the National Bar Association, the Carana Chamber of

Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, women's organizations, trade unions, the Teachers' Union, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the youth.

- c. The formula for the composition of the NTLA shall be as follows: GOC -15 seats, MPC -15 seats, CISC -15 seats, Political Parties -15 seats, Civil Society and Special Interest Groups - 8 seats, Provinces -8 seats.
4. The NTLA shall elect a Speaker to head the Assembly as well as a Deputy Speaker. The Speaker and Deputy Speaker within the NTGC shall not contest for any elective office during the coming elections.
5. The NTLA shall have responsibility for the following:
 - a. Assuming responsibility for the country's legislative functions;
 - b. Encouraging and supporting the emergence of a new democratic space, particularly in the areas of human rights and freedom of expression.
6. Two-thirds (2/3) of members of the NTLA shall form the quorum for meetings of the Assembly.

ARTICLE V

CONSTITUTION AND ELECTIONS

1. Under the auspices of the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker, a constitutional board shall be established. The composition of this board shall be as follows:
 - a. Three (3) of the GoC, three (3) of the MPC, three (3) of the CISC, two (2) of the political parties, two (2) of the civil society and two (2) representatives of the International Community.
 - b. The board shall be established not later than three months after signing of the Peace agreement and shall complete the draft of a new constitution of Carana within one year.
 - c. The constitution shall be adopted by 2/3 (two thirds) of the NTLA.
 - d. Immediately after the new constitution is adopted elections shall be prepared and conducted within 6 months of the adoption.

ARTICLE VI

INSTITUTION OF THE PRESIDENCY

1. There shall be established the Institution of the Presidency consisting of the President and two Vice-Presidents.
2. The functions of the two Vice-Presidents shall be clearly defined by the parties to this Agreement.

3. Until such time as elections are held, the current incumbent President (or his successor) shall be President and the Commander-in Chief of the Forces de la Défense et Sécurité du Carana (FDSC). The current Mouvement Patriotique du Carana (MPC) Chairman (or his successor) shall be the First Vice President and at the same time holds the post of Commander-in Chief of the Mouvement Patriotique du Carana (MPC). The current Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC) Chairman (or his successor) shall be the Second Vice President and at the same time holds the post of Commander-in Chief of the Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC).).
4. In respect to the following matters, the President shall take decisions with the consent of both Vice-Presidents:
 - a. Declarations and termination of the state of emergency;
 - b. Declaration of war;
 - c. Appointments that the President is required to make according to the Peace Agreement, (to be specified), and
 - d. Summoning, adjourning and promulgating the National Legislature.
5. The President shall be elected in national elections, the timing shall be subject to the agreement, preferably together with the national election following the adoption of the new constitution. The President shall also appoint two Vice Presidents, ensuring representation of all three major ethnics groups in the Presidency.
6. Should the post of President fall vacant prior to the election, the functions of the President shall be assumed by a President Council comprising the Chairman of the National Transitional Assembly, the First Vice President and the Vice President.
7. Should the post of President fall vacant after the election, the post shall be filled through presidential elections which shall be held within sixty (60) days.

PART FOUR

WEALTH SHARING AND DEVELOPMNT

PRINCIPLES FOR WEALTH SHARING

1. The Parties agree that the guiding principles and provisions below shall be the basis for the comprehensive text on Wealth Sharing.
2. The wealth of Carana shall be shared equitably so as to enable each level of government to discharge its legal and constitutional responsibilities and duties.
3. The sharing and allocation of wealth emanating from the resources of Carana shall ensure that the quality of life, dignity and living conditions of all the citizens are promoted without discrimination on grounds of gender, race, religion, political affiliation, ethnicity, language, or region. The sharing and allocation of this wealth shall be based on the premise that all parts of Carana are entitled to development.
4. The Parties agree that those areas in need of construction/reconstruction shall be brought up to the same average level of socio-economic and public services throughout Carana. To achieve these objectives will take time and effort to build up local institutional, human, and economic capacity. For this purpose, two special funds shall be established as provided herein.
5. That revenue sharing should reflect a commitment to devolution of power and decentralisation of decision-making concerning development, service delivery and governance.
6. The development of infrastructure, human resources, sustainable economic development and the capacity to meet human needs shall be conducted within a framework of transparent and accountable government.
7. This Agreement sets out the respective types of income, revenue, taxes and other sources of wealth to which the various levels of government are entitled.
8. The Parties recognize that the National Transitional Government of Carana (NTGC), during the Interim Period, will need to mobilize additional national resources.
9. There is a limit on how many additional national resources can be mobilized and part of the national needs in a post-conflict Carana will have to be met by external assistance.
10. In agreeing to these wealth-sharing arrangements, the Parties signal to the international community that it will have to play a strong and constructive role in providing post-conflict construction/reconstruction assistance to Carana, especially to East and South Carana and other war-affected and least developed areas.

Reconstruction and Development Funds

Carana Reconstruction and Development Fund (CRDF)

1. By D+90 there shall be established a Carana Reconstruction and Development Fund (CRDF) to solicit, raise and collect funds from domestic and international donors and disburse such funds for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the infrastructure, for the resettlement and reintegration of internally and externally displaced persons, and to address past imbalances in regional development and infrastructure.
2. A monitoring and evaluation system shall be established to ensure accountability, transparency, efficiency, equity and fairness in the utilization of resources.
3. The Government / NTGC shall be responsible for expenditure from the fund and shall be entitled to raise additional funds by way of donation from foreign States, multilateral organizations, or other bodies for the purposes of the reconstruction and development of the states/regions.
4. The Fund shall be transparently administered and professionally managed subject to an oversight committee appointed by the Government /NTGC. It should include a representative of the National Ministry of Finance and of the National Audit Chamber.

Multi-Donor Trust Funds

1. The Parties recognize the need to establish a Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTF) to support urgent recurrent and investment budget costs under clearly stated criteria of eligible financing components. The Trust Funds shall be operational for the Interim Period and shall thereafter be transformed into the Carana Reconstruction and Development Fund.
2. The MDTF shall commence immediately to support, among other things, priority areas of capacity building and institutional strengthening and quick start/impact programs identified by the Parties.
3. The MDTF shall support urgent recurrent and investment budget costs under clearly stated criteria of eligible financing components, and shall have the right to solicit, raise and collect funds from foreign donors.
4. To ensure proper accountability for funds disbursed through the MDTF the Parties shall cause audits to be performed on funds used within six (6) months of the close of the recipient's financial year.
5. All trust funds shall report the flow of funds to the CBOC.

Institutional framework

1. The regions shall be competent, within the framework defined by legislation and provisions, in the following areas:
 - a. planning and programming economic, social and cultural development;
 - b. territorial management;
 - c. creation and management of public infrastructure and basic social services (basic education and professional training, health, environment, culture, regional road and communication infrastructure, water and sanitation);
 - d. agriculture, livestock, fishing, forestry management, transport, commerce, industry, handicrafts, tourism, interregional transport;
 - e. regional administrative budgets and accounts;
 - f. setting up and collecting local taxes and revenues using parameters specified by the State;
 - g. fee collection institutions;
 - h. accepting and refusing donations, subsidies and legacies;
 - i. disbursement of subsidies; acquisition of holdings; decentralised cooperation and twinning;
 - j. territorial police and civil protection.

PART FIVE

POST-CONFLICT REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

ARTICLE I

AMNESTY

The NTGC shall give consideration to a recommendation for general amnesty to all persons and parties engaged or involved in military activities during the Carana civil conflict.

ARTICLE II

HUMAN RIGHTS

1. The rights and duties proclaimed and guaranteed inter alia by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights, the Fasian Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child shall form an integral part of the Constitution of the Republic of Carana.
2. All women and men shall be equal. No one may be discriminated against, inter alia, on grounds of origin, race, ethnicity, gender, colour, language, social situation, or religious, philosophical or political convictions, or because of a physical or mental handicap. All citizens shall enjoy equal protection of the law, as well as equal treatment under the law.
3. The Parties agree on the need for the establishment of an Independent National Commission on Human Rights (INCHR) by D+ 180.
4. The INCHR shall monitor compliance with the basic rights guaranteed in the present Peace Agreement as well as promote human rights education throughout the various sectors of Carana society, including schools, the media, the police and the military.
5. The INCHR shall work together with local Carana human rights and civil society organizations, international human rights organisations and other relevant U.N. agencies to monitor and strengthen the observance of human rights in the country.
6. Technical, financial and material assistance may be sought by the INCHR from the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the African Commission on Human and People's Rights and other relevant international organizations.

ARTICLE III

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMISSION

1. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission shall be established by D + 120 to provide a forum that will address issues of impunity, as well as an opportunity for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to share their experiences, in order to get a clear picture of the past to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation.
2. In the spirit of national reconciliation, the Commission shall deal with the root causes of the crises in Carana, including human rights violations.
3. This Commission shall recommend measures to be taken for the rehabilitation of victims of human rights violations.
4. Membership of the Commission shall be drawn from a cross-section of Carana society, including women. The Parties request that the International Community provide the necessary financial and technical support for the operations of the Commission.

ARTICLE IV

RECONCILIATION AND JUSTICE

1. The Parties shall create the conditions needed to facilitate the rapid return, repatriation, reintegration and reinsertion of all displaced persons and refugees, and to set up mechanisms to take care of them, in accordance with the relevant international instruments.
2. The Parties shall promote genuine national reconciliation based on the following elements:
 - a. development of a National Charter for peace, unity and national reconciliation;
 - b. creation of transitional justice mechanisms in particular by operationalising the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Council;
 - c. creation of a Committee to fight corruption and financial mismanagement;
 - d. creation of an International Committee of Enquiry tasked with investigating all war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, sexual crimes and other serious violations of International Law, Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law throughout the territory of Carana;
 - e. reaffirmation of the inalienable character of war crimes and crimes against humanity and the commitment of the Parties to cooperate with the International Committee of Enquiry;
 - f. no amnesty for the authors of war crimes, crimes against humanity and serious violations of Human Rights, including violence against women, girls and infants, related to the conflict;
 - g. consolidation of judicial power in order to ensure the Rule of Law throughout the country; commitment to carry out an in-depth review of the justice system to bring it closer to the

litigants, improve its performance, end impunity and integrate traditional and customary regulations without prejudice in the sovereign law of the State;

- h. extension of legal and regulatory assistance, and information on citizens' rights;
- i. promotion of high quality training for all stakeholders and related personnel in the justice system, particularly concerning civil mediation, taking into account cultural, religious and traditional characteristics;
- j. acknowledgement of the status of traditional authorities within the regulations on protocol and precedence.

ARTICLE V

HUMANITARIAN ACTION

1. The Parties shall promote and respect the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, which guide humanitarian action. They shall also prevent any use of humanitarian aid for political, economic or military ends, and facilitate access for humanitarian agencies and guarantee the security of their personnel.
2. The Parties re-affirm the commitment made in the Ceasefire Agreement, to provide security guarantees for safe and unhindered access by all humanitarian agencies to vulnerable groups throughout the country, in order to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in accordance with international conventions, principles and norms governing humanitarian operations.
3. Accordingly, the Parties agree to guarantee the security and movement of humanitarian personnel, that of their properties, goods transported, stocked or distributed, as well as their projects and beneficiaries.
4. The Transitional Government provided for in this agreement shall ensure the establishment of effective administrative and security infrastructure to monitor and support the implementation of these guarantees.
5. The said Transitional Government shall request the International Community to assist in providing humanitarian assistance for those in need, including internally displaced persons, refugees and returnees.
6. The Parties shall ensure the presence of security guarantees for the safe return and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons and the free movement of persons and goods.

ARTICLE VI

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

1. The Parties call for the urgent establishment of a consolidated United Nations Peace Support Mission in Carana that will have the resources to facilitate the implementation and coordination of the Political, Social, Economic and Security assistance to be extended under this Agreement.
2. The Parties also call on the International Community, to set up a monitoring mechanism in the form of an Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC) in Galasi that will ensure effective and faithful implementation of the Peace Agreement by all the Parties.
3. The Parties agree on the need for regular joint meetings between this Implementation Monitoring Committee and representatives of the NTGC, in order to assess implementation of the provisions of this Agreement and agree on recommendations for enhanced implementation.
4. The Parties also agree on the need to organise periodic donor conferences for resource mobilisation for post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction in Carana.

ARTICLE VII

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

1. The NTGC, with the assistance of the International Community, shall design and implement a plan for the voluntary return and reintegration of Carana refugees and internally displaced persons, including non-combatants, in accordance with international conventions, norms and practices.
2. Refugees or internally displaced persons, desirous of returning to their original Counties or permanent residences, shall be assisted to do so.
3. The Parties commit themselves to peaceful co-existence amongst returnees and non-returnees in all Counties.

ARTICLE VIII

VULNERABLE GROUPS

1. The NTGC shall accord particular attention to the issue of the rehabilitation of vulnerable groups or war victims (children, women, the elderly and the disabled) within Carana, who have been severely affected by the conflict in Carana.
2. With the support of the International Community, the NTGC shall design and implement a program for the rehabilitation of such war victims.

3. The NTGC shall, in addition, accord special attention to the issue of child combatants.
4. It shall, accordingly, mobilize resources with the assistance of the International Community, especially in cooperation with the Office of the U.N. Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict, UNICEF, the Fasian Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and other relevant agencies, to address their special demobilisation and re-integration needs.
5. The NTGC, in formulating and implementing programs for national rehabilitation, reconstruction and development, for the moral, social and physical reconstruction of Carana in the post-conflict period, shall ensure that the needs and potentials of the war victims are taken into account and that gender balance is maintained in apportioning responsibilities for program implementation.



Report of the Secretary-General on Carana

Security Council

27 July 2021

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on Carana of 27 July 2021.

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council S/PRST/2019/4 dated 14 December 2020 considering an active involvement of the United Nations to assist in bringing peace and stability to Carana. The Council also declared its readiness to establish a United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Carana to support the transitional Government of Carana and to assist in the implementation of the Kalari Peace Treaty upon its signature by the parties. Current negotiations under the mediation by the Continent Regional Coalition and facilitation by the Special Envoy appointed by the Secretary General seem to reach their conclusions. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to submit recommendations for the size, structure and mandate and subsequent deployment of the United Nations multi-dimensional peacekeeping mission.

2. In order to prepare those recommendations, I dispatched an integrated Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) to Carana to evaluate the situation on the ground and consult with the Carana parties and other stakeholders. The mission began its work in Galasi on 07 Juni 2021 and comprised representatives from several Secretariat departments and a number of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. Meetings were held with the President of the Republic of Carana, Mr. Jackson Ogavo; the leadership of **the Mouvement Patriotique du Carana** (MPC), several regional leaders of the **Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana** (CISC), as well as local civil society leaders, representatives from the main churches and religions in Carana. The team also consulted with the UN Resident Coordinator, the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), international representatives, the World Bank and the wider diplomatic community. The mission completed its work on 17 June 2021.

II. Background

3. Carana historically formed a vital part of the ancient and early modern trading hub Fasia. Portuguese and Italian colonialism preceded the now dominant French colonial impact. The invading powers faced significant resistance by local kingdoms, the most bloody, of which the kingdom of Galasi upheld. The Italian army finally conquered the kingdom in 1898 and established formal colonial rule. After the Italian defeat in World War I, the French government took over the territory as French protectorate and developed the country according to their policy of "assimilation" with Galasi to remain the capital city. Since the French administration focused on the exploitation of the natural resources and accepted the tribal structure in the country, as well as the role of local authority, the period between 1919 and 1979 was relatively calm and peaceful.

4. The following period was characterised by rapidly evolving civil unrest based on the increasingly popular movement for national liberation. From 1979 unrest and riots were frequent and developed into more organised actions and violence against the colonial power. In the beginning of 1982, the French lost control of most of the country outside the capital and the main coastal cities. To retain a minimum level of control, the French were forced to agree to certain forms of cooperation and to an autonomous State of Carana, and the legal status of Carana changed from a French protectorate to a Republic of the French Community. Carana was finally granted full independence from France on 22 October 1986.

5. Because of a long period of French colonial rule, a strong French influence on nearly all-cultural, social and economic aspects of the country is still visible, and in some areas still dominates. Important parts of the infrastructure, particularly the railway and road systems were built during the French colonial period and have not been improved until now. The architecture of the political/administrative system in Carana also reflects the strong French influence imposed over recent decades. Given that the French sphere of influence had extended from coast to coast, the French language became the “unofficial” second language of Carana and is seen as the language of the ‘bourgeoisie’. Only some parts of the east and mainly the south speak Italian, and very few people know or speak Portuguese. These languages are in addition to the Carana language, which is the official language of the country.

6. The population of Carana consists of more than 15 ethnic groups. Most of these groups are small in number and socially and politically marginalised. The three major ethnic groups, the Falin, Kori and Tatsi represent 95 percent of the population. The Kori (20%) live in the West and are the dominant ethnic group in the provinces of Tereni and Koloni. The Falin (60%) are the ethnic majority in the country and mainly live in the East and centre of Carana. The Tatsi (15%) live in the South, and are a small but key group involved in the mining of copper and diamonds in the southern region.

III. History of the conflict

7. Language is one of the key problems: while Caranese is the official language, French is considered the best way to further one’s career prospects. In fact, some government offices only deal in French. Tribalism is rampant. Different foreign powers favoured different tribes and offered key posts in the government. This favouritism not only created a rift between the peoples of Carana, but also led to the growth of nepotism and corruption in the government. A number of small uprisings against the Carana Government in the decade following independence developed into armed protests and organized violence, which led to a military coup in 1991 by the former Chief of the Falin-dominated Army Christian Hakutu, who re-established links with France and other Western countries.

8. The successor regime under the Falin Colonel Tarakoni, in power until 2003, facilitated humanitarian, human rights and economic crises as well as strong civil political opposition. The death of Colonel Tarakoni in February 2003, however, created an opening for the country’s first democratic elections in many years, where Jackson Ogavo, a Falin, from the Parti Democratique de Carana (PDC) was elected President in April 2003.

9. During the early years, some economic and social reforms were realised but over time, Ogavo’s focus changed and he became preoccupied with suppressing all opposition groups and enhancing his own power base. Since 2008 he expanded the influence of the central government on all economic and social activities by laws and administrative rules. Ogavo was re-elected for four consecutive terms (2003, 2008, 2013, 2018), though opposition to his regime began to grow

early 2010 due to a lack of economic growth and increasing discrimination against Kori and Tatsi members by the ruling – and predominantly Falin – party. All opposition to the government was met with either the threat or use of armed force, and eventually escalated into civil conflict in January 2014.

10. Starting in 2014 some small rebel movements in the Tereni province joined the larger and better-organised rebel groups known as Mouvement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) and formed a well-structured and efficient military opposition. The MPC defeated the Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC) in some local battles and gained increasing support from the local population in the West. In February 2016 the FDC lost control of some areas in the western highlands. Though the MPC's military engagements were well coordinated and successfully executed, the rebels failed to formulate a comprehensive political program and failed to capitalise on their success. Their only clearly stated aim was to remove Ogavo from power. Early 2018 the MPC gained control of the three provinces in the West (Koloni, Tereni and Mahbek).

11. Low level but frequent MPC operations in the West increasingly tied down the FDC, leaving it with weak capability in the south of the country in Leppko province, and creating an opportunity for elements of the predominantly Muslim Tatsi minority to attack government institutions. Initially this amounted to little more than a few localised incidents but it quickly escalated into more radicalised activities including particularly brutal reprisals against ethnic Falin civilians. Realising that the government could do little against them, a number of these small rebel groups united and called themselves Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC). Both the MPC and the CISC took as their initial aim the removal of President Ogavo from power, though cooperation between the two groups has been minimal.

12. Because of the strong commitment of the FDC in the West, small ethnic based rebel movements took their chance and attacked the government institutions in the district of Leppko. The uprising in the South was characterized by brutal violence against members of the Falin ethnic group and looting. Some of these small rebel groups united and called themselves the Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC).

13. The civil conflict in Carana was therefore fought between government forces, the MPC in the western district of Tereni and the CISC in southern Carana. Both the MPC and the CISC took as their initial aim the removal of President Ogavo from power, though cooperation between the two groups has been minimal. All parties have suffered numerous defeats, though the civilian population of Carana has been particularly targeted by all parties, leading to an estimated 150,000 killed from violence, famine or disease, 700,000 displaced internally and 200,000 refugees in the neighbouring countries.

14. The CISC's lootings of villages and forced recruitment in the South have helped fuel their efforts, while the MPC has exploited the diamond resources along the Kalesi River and allegedly received external support from the neighbouring country of Katasi. A combination of war-weariness and strategic manoeuvring led the leaders of both the MPC and CISC, as well as President Ogavo, to start negotiating a cease-fire and peace treaty in November 2020. The "Kalari Peace Treaty" will most likely mandate all parties to disarm and establish a power-sharing arrangement in a new transitional government, including integration in a new Forces de la Défense et Sécurité du Carana (FDSC) and request the United Nations to deploy a UN Assistance Mission to assist in overseeing and verifying the ceasefire.

IV. Current situation

15. Despite the ongoing peace efforts Carana remains a politically unstable country. The government has lost control over the western and the southern provinces of the country. Even in government-controlled areas, the Ogavo administration's real power is very limited. With mostly non-existent police forces, the government focuses its military resources partly on countering the increasing level of public resistance. Governmental administration in the rebel-controlled areas is non-existent.

16. Political parties besides the Parti Démocratique du Carana (PDC) do not exist in Carana. Remaining elements of former parties have lost their internal structure and are represented by a few motivated individuals only. Some smaller political movements were nevertheless identified, including small communist groups in the capital of Galasi and in Maldosa, as well as ethnically motivated minority groups of Kori along the coastline. These groups are not very well organized and suffer from a lack of followers. Other groups with minimal political influence are the coal and copper miner's trade unions, which are focused on specific issues of material interest to their members. Women's organisations are starting to form at grassroots level but so far are poorly organised. Some local human rights organisations are becoming more active. Traditional structures in the form of chiefdoms with some de facto authority exist, particularly in the rural areas.

17. The well-established civil society organizations pre-dating Ogavo's crackdown on opposition outside of parliament, the National Bar Association and the Carana Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, are staffed by known members of the opposition as well as by close allies of the PDC. Their internal struggles have rendered them de facto unimportant in the process. Some members of the NBA have acted as advisers to the Peace Process; however, their agenda is unclear.

18. Realizing that political participation will eventually be determined by the elections, which are being included as provision in the ongoing peace talks, the leadership of the Mouvement Patriotique du Carana (MPC) is currently formulating a comprehensive political platform and is preparing for a long-term political role. Based on the shown discipline and organization of this rebel organization, it can be assessed that the MPC is able to develop a political arm or transform itself into a political movement. With strong public support in the west, MPC can become a strong political party.

19. By contrast, the Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC) lack any parallel political structure that would enable them to transition into an effective political party. Support for the CISC is based on frustration over poor living conditions primarily in the South, dissatisfaction with the Ogavo administration, and friction with the Falin ethnic segment of the Leppko province. Clear political motives and aims do not exist within this movement. Carana has no organized political exile groups in other countries.

20. The Sunni fundamentalist Elasi Liberation Front (ELF) continues to conduct insurgency operations against the Rimosan government, mainly operating south of the Caranese border in Rimoso. Recruitment for ELF has surged both in Carana and Rimoso during the past year and ELF is challenging the CISC influence in southern Carana and is collaborating with some CISC splinter groups. Recruitment for ELF has surged both in Carana and Rimoso during the past year. Carana communities along the border continue to report armed attacks and raids on villages by ELF elements.

21. The ongoing dispute between Carana and Rimosa over the ownership of the islands along the southern coastline of Carana, the surrounding Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), and the exploitation of the oilfields as well as fishing rights of the coast of Carana in the general area, further adds to the instability in the southern part of the Leppko region.

22. To evade ongoing anti-terror operations conducted by the Government of Katasi supported by the French Forces, El Hasar fighters/elements frequently cross the border into the Western parts of Carana. Most recent incursions were in the area North and South along the Kalesi River into the direction of Terpil and Herai villages in the North and towards Pukka and Maki in the South of the River. Local communities continue to report armed attacks and raids on villages by these elements, the latter stealing money, food, supply items like spare parts, gas and ammunition. Reports also indicate violence against civilians such as rape, torture and other casualties. While attacking local communities El Hasar is avoiding direct engagement / confrontation with the MPC.

23. Three Christian churches engage in humanitarian and social work and hold varying levels of political influence, the National Church of Carana, the Catholic Church of Carana and the Forest Cult. The (Sunni) Sufi brotherhoods in southern Carana, affiliated with local elites, is engaged in local charity, worship and patronage work. Recent growing Salafist influence in south-western Carana and Rimosa is due to arriving Gulf state imams and donations, mainly for mosques.

Elections

24. While the Kalari Peace Treaty will call for free and democratic elections, most likely in mid 2023, the current situation makes this outcome very difficult. After years of violated human rights, despotism, civil war and corruption, the public trust in governmental institutions and activities is almost non-existent. Effective political opposition groups are also non-existent.

25. As a result of years of inefficient administration, civil war and frequent migration movements, current census information and voter registration lists do not exist.

26. If all parties were to honour the commitments of the Kalari Peace Treaty, the MPC would likely participate in the elections and evolve into a long-term political party in Carana. The long-term political role of the CISC remains uncertain. Several other armed and rogue groups in the CISC-held area add to this uncertainty and present a severe security risk in the preparation and conduct of elections.

Constitution and Judicial System

27. The Constitution and judicial system in Carana are based on modern democratic principles. Human rights violations in Carana are not the result of an insufficient legal framework, but rather the result of the Ogavo administration's inability to uphold law and order.

28. Under the state of emergency imposed in March 2018 a system of mixed civilian/military courts with very limited rights of appeal has been put in place to try all treason, terrorist and other similar cases. Carana courts regularly impose the death penalty for serious crimes.

29. De facto, the judiciary sector has lacked institutional capacity and resources for years and has suffered from limited territorial coverage, with no actual presence in some districts, and endemic corruption. Basic administrative tools are missing, and, as a result, the case management flow does not work properly and response times for cases are extremely long. This has also exacerbated the overcrowding of prisons, from which convicts regularly manage to escape. Salaries of judicial staff often are unpaid for months, leading to absenteeism and corruption. Meanwhile, legislation remains outdated and often discriminatory against women, ethnic minorities and other vulnerable

groups. In some regions, local traditional authorities hold considerable influence over the district courts or act as de facto legal authorities in parallel to or in the absence of the state system.

30. A number of human rights organizations have issued reports outlining arrests, detention and execution of people without due legal process. There are also reports of torture and un-investigated deaths of detainees while in prison, many of which are members of opposition political groups. Prison conditions are a general cause for concern: official records of who is being held are impossible to obtain and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has had only limited access to the main prison in the capital city of Galasi.

31. There are reliable reports of children being held together with adults, as well as men and women being held in the same facilities. In general, prisoners suffer from harsh humanitarian conditions with inadequate nutrition and very limited access to medical assistance. No information is available regarding the identity of prisoners held in military holding facilities, while rebel groups are also known to be holding many detainees.

Security

32. The level of general security in Carana can be assessed as "medium risk" due to intense fighting between government and rebel forces, the poor economic situation, a high number of displaced persons, a low police presence outside of the capital, and widespread dissatisfaction with the government. Civil unrest and smaller uprisings occur on a regular basis in larger cities, while the level of crime is high.

33. Certain areas – such as those around Galasi, central Mahbek and large parts of Koloni, along the Kalesi River and in the Leppko province – can easily be assessed as "high risk". This is due to the presence of landmines, organized crime in the vicinity of IDP camps, clashes between returning IDPs and locals, clashes within and between armed factions, and ongoing child soldier recruitment. Armed groups, primarily by rebel factions, but also the national army, have abducted thousands of civilians. Abductees are often inducted into the fighting forces and are also used for portage and cooking. In the case of women and girls, sexual abuse as "wives" of the combatants is rampant.

34. In *Galasi*, the primary risk is the high level of crime in the suburbs and the IDP camps around the capital. In the suburbs of Galasi, youth gangs of up to 100 boys rule the streets. These gangs are not very well organized but can cause a severe threat even to smaller military formations. Criminality within the IDP camps is mostly a result of poverty and hopelessness. The people in the camps are both victims and perpetrators of violence. Recently, hints for a human/drug trafficking network spanning from Sumora to Galasi into central Carana have accumulated.

35. Recently, IDPs living in camps in Galasi and *along the Kalesi River* have begun to return to Mahbek, Koloni and Tereni. Along the same path, beside the fog of conflict between government forces and rebels different criminal groups took their chances and got more and more involved in the exploitation and smuggling of diamonds. Human trafficking of IDPs to work as mine workers is common, as are abductions, ambushes and SGB violence. IDP children are targeted especially often. These criminal groups are thought to be connected to several unmonitored armed groups which have formed around locally powerful and well-connected warlords in the *northern Leppko* region in central Carana. These groups operate mainly according to economic goals (theft, illegal exploitation of diamond, copper and wood, ransom) and are thought to be connected to the organized crime network in northern Carana. The warlords are not part of the peace agreement.

36. In *Leppko*, armed clashes between some CISC factions and ELF are common, and random violence, attacks and killing of civilians are reported. The lack of authority in the Leppko district has resulted in an increase in the number of uncontrolled armed groups that, together with CISC combatants, conduct atrocities against the local civilian population. These groups are mostly made up of former rebels from neighbouring Rimosa that frequently cross the border. Any link between the CISC and these armed groups are denied by CISC leaders, but several independent reports indicate that such linkages exist. Former rebels, especially from younger age groups, have also formed local armed gangs, which poses a serious threat to the population. It is not clear whether these gangs simply collaborate with or form part of a youth faction of the CISC. Data collection about landmines in Leppko was prohibited by CISC.

37. In *Akkabar*, the coal miners started a revolt after not having been paid for months and because of the dramatic increase in the price of food during the end of the civil war. As a result of this sudden financial hardship, small groups spontaneously attacked government institutions and police stations. These groups are not very well organized but hold a significant level of popular support.

38. El Hasar fighters/elements have started to regularly cross the border into Carana in the western parts of the Koloni and Tereni regions to evade the COIN operation run by the Government of Katasi and French Forces (Operation Aigle). Local communities report armed attacks and raids on villages by these elements, the latter stealing money, food, supply items like spare parts, gas and ammunition. Reports also indicate violence against civilians such as rape, torture and other casualties. The FDC and MPC do not have the capability to engage the El Hasar elements. Both, however, agreed to allow the French Forces to pursue the fighters into the territory of Carana, prior notification required.

Crime / Organized crime

39. High level of crime are reported in the suburbs of *Galasi* and the IDP camps around the capital by youth gangs which are not well organized but may pose a severe threat to smaller police / military formations.

40. In the *northern Leppko* region (central Carana) an expanding network criminal groups operate mainly according to economic goals (theft, illegal exploitation of diamond, copper and wood, ransom) and demanding tariffs and protection money mostly controls trade routes. These groups are most likely be connected to the organized crime network in northern Carana and to several unmonitored armed groups which have formed around locally powerful and well-connected warlords in the *northern Leppko* region.

Human rights capacity

41. Carana has ratified the following human rights treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); and the Convention Against Torture (CAT). It has also ratified the statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).

42. The Constitution states that all laws must be compliant with Carana's international human rights obligations. In reality, Carana retains many laws that were inherited from its colonial period and are incompatible with international human rights standards, such as the Carana criminal procedure code. The constitution also contains a Bill of Rights, which refers mostly to civil and political rights as opposed to economic, social and cultural rights.

43. In accordance with the provisions of the constitution, in 2013 the Carana government has declared a state of emergency which permits it to override all constitutional provisions during a time of internal crisis, including those relating to human rights.

44. The government does not have a Ministry of Human Rights – instead the lead responsibility for human rights is vested in the Minister of Justice. Since 2012, Carana has had a National Human Rights Commission, though the commission is non-compliant with international standards as set out in the *Paris Principles*. A few active human rights NGOs and church organizations operate very discretely. A number of international humanitarian NGOs have also taken an interest in human rights advocacy and protection in Carana.

45. In general, women experience multiple forms of discriminatory treatment in all aspects of life in Carana. They are under-represented in all parts of government and public institutions. Levels of domestic violence, including sexual abuse, are indicated to be very high. The conflict has greatly exacerbated the incidence of sexual violence and rape and the trafficking of women and children both internally and to neighbouring countries.

46. Children are at risk of forced conscription into armed groups, gang violence, denied access to aid and protection, as well as abduction and trafficking for work, care work or sexual exploitation. Children are further made vulnerable due to the nation-wide collapse of the birth registration system.

Public information

47. The government controls the radio, TV and major newspapers and their journalistic standards cannot be considered free and impartial. International newspapers are only available in Galasi, while national newspapers are available in the provincial capitals and in some other towns. For the past several months, the MPC has produced a regional newspaper and operates one radio station.

48. As a result of the war, several transmission stations for radio and TV are not functional. Whole areas within Carana are without access to official TV and radio programs.

Humanitarian situation

49. As result of the fighting, many people in Carana fled their homelands, but most remained in the country. Approximately 200,000 fled to Sumora, 100,000 to Rimosa and approximately 700,000 live in IDP camps around the harbour cities. The largest parts of these IDPs currently live in the camps around Galasi and have already lived there for more than one year. The majority of refugees in Sumora and Rimosa found accommodation with relatives or within their tribal structure. The situation of these refugees is unknown but suspected not to be ideal. Carana hosts approx. 40,000 Rimosan refugees in southern Leppko and approx. 30,000 Katasi refugees in western Tereni and Koloni.

50. The situation in the IDP camps is poor and has significantly deteriorated during the last months. The nutrition situation is insufficient and there is no medical support. Recently started projects of the UN World Food Programme (WFP) and other NGOs are not sufficient to prevent a widespread humanitarian crisis.

51. As consequence of the economic crisis and the war, the price level for food and basic goods has increased dramatically. Even though all basic goods are available, large parts of the population cannot afford sufficient nutrition. The child mortality rate has dramatically increased during the last several years. The most affected areas of malnutrition are the north of Hanno, the area between Faron and Folsa and the coastal area south of Cereni. These areas are already

experiencing humanitarian disasters. Frequent flooding and landslides worsen the problem, as does the expensive and thinly spread system of medical care.

Military

52. During the conflict, landmines were used extensively by both sides. Mine warfare was not conducted with documented mine obstacles. Landmines were used by both sides as a means of terror and deterrent and to prevent access to certain areas. As a result, the precise location of mines and explosive devices is not documented and mostly unknown. The central Mahbek region and large parts of Koloni district are confirmed to be affected, as is the Hanno region. Affected communities are also expected in Leppko. Further analysis is necessary to identify high mine threat areas.

53. It can be assumed that MPC will honour the commitment to DDR if there is confidence in the commitment level of all other parties, as well as if the MPC obtains their desired share of political power in the country. Depending on the terms of the DDR agreement, MPC's crucial function as border protection against El-Hasar elements may lead to conflicts. The reintegration of MPC rebels into the new defence force of Carana will be a critical issue.

54. While there are no concrete indications that the CISC will not disarm and fulfil its commitment, the loose leadership structure and discipline of the CISC may pose a threat to the political process if rebel members do not see a clear – and often personal – advantage in disarmament.

55. However, the most difficult part in the DDR process will be the disarmament and reintegration of the other, less identifiable armed groups. These groups have not been part of the Kalari peace negotiations and are focused more on criminal activity than on political participation.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

56. According to the current provisions in the draft of the Kalari Peace Agreement, all parties have to initially remain in their positions along the boundaries between rebel and government-controlled areas.

57. Current negotiations ask for the establishment of a National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) to become responsible for all aspects of the DDR programme, including the establishment of a new national army, the Forces de la Défense et Sécurité du Carana (FDSC), monitoring the ceasefire, disarmament, demobilisation, re-integration and the reduction / destruction of small arms and light weapons.

58. The new FDSC shall be created of not more than 22,000 soldiers with up to 4,000 being drawn from former MPC combatants and 1,500 drawn from former CISC combatants. The FDSC shall operate under the authority of the new transitional Government of Carana.

59. Approximately 5,000 MPC rebels have returned during the last month to their hometowns, though they are still holding their weapons and have not defected from the MPC. It is assessed that the remaining 5,000 MPC rebels sufficiently balance the presence of FDC troops on the separation line. The returning MPC members will ensure the group's control over the claimed area. The remaining rebels have established camps of a few hundred each and conduct patrols west of the separation line.

60. The MPC operates a harsh public order regime but fighters are perceived to respect human rights. As a result of broad public support, and dissatisfaction with the government, the new

administrative role of the MPC is well accepted by the majority of the population in the West, while smaller groups remain compliant out of fear of the MPC.

61. During the fighting, CISC fighters operated primarily from their villages without deploying in camps or permanent positions. After the fighting stopped, it can be assumed that most CISC rebels are still living in their home villages and group together only occasionally. The loose structure of the CISC makes it very difficult to assess their strength and positions precisely. It can be assumed, however, that the number of active fighters has not changed.

62. Even though the CISC has not yet attacked FDC positions and no CISC activities outside the claimed area have been reported, there are still doubts whether the CISC may commit to legal obligations included in the current draft of the Kalari Peace Treaty. During the last two weeks, several acts of violence against ethnic minorities were reported in their stronghold area by a number of international organizations (IOs). Some radical splinter groups have broken off from the negotiating faction of CISC and are reported to cooperate with the Rimosan militia ELF.

63. In contrast to the MPC, the CISC has not tried to establish an administrative/political branch and exercise control in the region only by the use of force. They are notably brutal in combat and show no regard for the rights of non-combatants.

Police

64. Outside the rebel-controlled areas, a national police presence is visible but not able to deal efficiently with the high level of crime. Recently, information has come to light involving officers either colluding or actively participating in organized crime activities. The role of the police is more symbolic than any guarantee of the rule of law. Police corruption is a severe problem in most government-controlled areas. Police stations have little or no equipment, while the police-training centre is basically a building shell. In the general mind-set, police expect to be feared by the population.

65. In the rebel-controlled areas, there is no governmental police presence. In the west, the MPC took over basic police functions to maintain civil order, while in the CISC area there is no policing at all.

Education

66. Until the civil war, Carana had one of the best developed educational systems in the region. Carana originally had first, second and third level education. As result of the conflict, government corruption and economic decline, the number of schools and students has decreased dramatically.

Religion

67. Three Christian churches engage in humanitarian and social work and hold varying levels of political influence, the National Church of Carana, the Catholic Church of Carana and the Forest Cult.

68. The (Sunni) Sufi societies in southern Carana, which have historically been closely affiliated with local elites, are engaged in local charity, worship and patronage work. In recent years CISC and ELF mobilizations, however, have been impacted by Salafist influence through the arrival of Gulf state imams and donations to mosques in south-western Carana and Rimosan.

Economy

69. Prior to the civil war, the economy of Carana was already suffering from several years of negative growth due to non-functional infrastructure, missing international investment, debt obligations with the international community that could not be serviced, excessive governmental control, corruption and a lack of efficient public administration. The failing economic state of Carana further deteriorated with the outbreak of the war. The production of copper and diamonds was severely affected by fighting close to the mines in the regions of Leppko and Mahbek. Foreign currency influx decreased and limited the ability of the government and population to buy imported goods. Agriculture and trade in the areas close to the fighting were also affected, and the export of timber was severely hampered.

70. As a result of this economic disturbance, the price level for basic goods and grocery increased dramatically. For many people, earning a living has become extremely difficult and the level of public dissatisfaction has substantially increased.

71. The taxation system is perceived as dysfunctional and corrupt, and employment opportunities in the formal job market are scarce. Carana hosts an elaborate and well-established informal economy. The inflated bureaucracy and the strongly overvalued Carana Franc pegged to the Euro have resulted in a globally non-competitive Caranese formal economy and little manoeuvrability for national fiscal policy. Debtor demands and debt relief conditioned on terms that are not suited to the Caranese context cemented the vicious cycle of financial mismanagement and economic downturn.

72. The deterioration of the economy has resulted in widespread poverty. In some areas of Carana, a sufficient supply of food cannot be accessed or guaranteed.

Roads, harbours and airport infrastructure

73. Carana has a system of capable paved roads, which connect most parts of the country and key urban centres. In the West and the North these roads also ensure cross border travel with neighbouring countries. Most paved roads can withstand the effects of the monsoon season. However, fighting and a lack of maintenance have left some parts of the road system completely destroyed or in very bad shape. Carana also has a dense network of partially robust unpaved roads and tracks. Unpaved roads and tracks are mostly very vulnerable to significant rains and floods and deteriorate quickly if not maintained. An assessment of all unpaved roads and bridges during the short time of this assessment mission was not possible.

74. Bridges along the paved roads are normally steel and concrete constructions, which can carry trucks and heavy vehicles. Bridges along the unpaved roads are normally of wooden construction and must be assessed individually.

75. The two railway tracks running between Galasi - Akkabar and Maldosa - Mia are both operational but not dependable. Even though the track from Maroni to Akkabar is operational, the northern line ends in Maroni. The condition of the tracks is generally poor.

76. Carana holds three harbours for deep-water ships and some smaller harbours for fishing boats. The smaller harbours have no capacity to support the loading and unloading of ships, but they are suitable for coastal vessels. The main harbour in Galasi is well equipped with sufficient capacity for large ships and with RoRo capability. This harbour is indented to be the main seaport for deployment and support of a potential Mission.

77. The international airports in Galasi and Corma are both operational and meet international standards for air traffic. Both airports are suitable for heavy and extremely heavy transport aircraft. The airports in Alur and Folsa are suitable for medium transport aircraft but they do not have equipment to handle heavy air cargo. All other airfields are only suitable for light fixed wing aircraft without additional construction work. Fuel supplies are only available in Galasi and Corma.

Electricity

78. Carana has three power plants, the Kilu Dam, the Salobo Dam and a coal power plant in Galasi. During the conflict, most of the power supply equipment around the Salobo Dam was destroyed or damaged. The majority of the country is currently without regular power supply.

Water

79. Potable water is available in most parts of the country, but the quality of water varies. The quality of this water is low and causes several diseases. The wells throughout Carana are not deep enough to reach clean water. The quality of drinking water along the big rivers is mostly high but needs purification. The increasing number of cyclones and sudden heavy rainfalls on hill slopes in western and northern Carana frequently cause landslides, thereby destroying shelter, interrupting food and water supplies.

80. Lack of drainage systems and much too dry ground cannot retain the masses of water and the excess water pools provide ideal breeding grounds for water- and vector-borne diseases as well as for locust infestations. Combined with the non-existent sewage and garbage removal systems and the improper disposal of mining slurry, the landslides have led to a long-term contamination of potable water sources in Hanno region around Akkabar and in Hanno region around Xalksa. In the lower highlands, especially around Corma, droughts additionally target agricultural plantations.

Availability of Goods and Services

81. Even though the economic situation in Carana is poor, most basic goods and supplies are principally available. The quality of goods varies and the availability is sometimes limited. The major supply goods for a UN Mission such as fuel, construction material and food can be purchased or contracted in the country. Basic construction work can be contracted in all larger towns. The percentage of first and second-level educated people with good English language abilities is very small. Combined with higher budgets and financial strength than the local population, UN PK presence raises prices for agricultural commodities, housing, services and water.

Banking

82. A fully operational banking system is only available in Galasi, Cereni and Maldosa. In some provincial capitals and in some other towns basic banking functions are provided. Electronic cash transfer is not possible. Inflation is high and fast-evolving.

The UN Country Team and Non-Governmental Organizations

83. Despite the troubles in Carana, the United Nations has maintained a presence in the country through several relief and development agencies. Additionally, a number of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) operate in Carana. In many cases, these agencies and organizations have been on the ground working in Carana for at least 5-10 years.

84. The UN Country Team in Carana includes the following:

- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), responsible for coordination of the Humanitarian Assistance and maintaining Offices in Galasi, Corma, Folsa and Alur.
- World Food Program (WFP), responsible for food distribution programs and maintaining offices in Galasi, Amsan, Corma, Folsa and Alur.
- United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) as the lead agency for programs helping children; it has offices in Galasi, Folsa and Corma.
- The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) focussing on protection and assistance of refugees; it has offices in Galasi, Alur and Lora.
- The World Health Organization (WHO), responsible for the coordination of international health programs; it has an office in Galasi.
- The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has a small team based in Galasi, who are responsible for monitoring and reporting on human rights issues throughout the country.
- The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), responsible for UN development activities. The UNDP Resident Coordinator chairs weekly UN Country Team meetings in Galasi, attended by the heads of all the agencies above.
- The International Organization for Migration (IOM), responsible for humanitarian efforts relating to IDPs and refugees in Carana.
- The World Bank and IMF, responsible for economic reform and capacity building.
- The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) assists the Caranese government in tackling issues of organized crime in central Carana and around Galasi, and oversees the implementation of anti-corruption programmes connected to the HIPC debt relief in 2005.
- UN Women, responsible for issues of maternal health, equal marital rights, girls' schooling and women economic empowerment.
- The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) runs campaigns against child marriage, female genital mutilation and gender-based violence.
- The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS (UNAIDS), responsible for the containment of the HIV/AIDS pandemic.
- The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), responsible for mine documentation and clearing. UNMAS is active in northern Carana and along the MPC-FDC frontier.

85. A total of 27 major international and foreign national and independent bodies have been active in Carana, providing services in various sectors including food, health, water, hygiene, sanitation, refugee and IDP issues, children's issues and gender issues. A few smaller national non-governmental organisations operate in the field of civil rights and peacebuilding, DDR, basic needs and development.

V. Recommendations for a United Nations Engagement in Carana

86. I recommend the establishment of a United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC). Recommendations for a possible mandate, structure and size of the force are described in the following sections.

Mandate

87. The mandate of UNAC should consist of the following:

- (a) To support the transitional Government of Carana and all parties in the effective and timely implementation of the Kalari Peace Treaty, upon its signature;
- (b) To monitor adherence to the ceasefire agreement;
- (c) To assist the Government in extending State authority throughout Carana;
- (d) To ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel;
- (e) To assist in establishing a safe and secure environment;
- (f) To support in solving the territorial disputes with Rimoso;
- (g) To assist in securing a safe environment in the East Carana Sea, and to support the Government of Carana in addressing piracy issues in coastal waters;
- (h) To assist the coordination with the Government of Katasi and FRAFOR efforts to neutralize El Hasar;
- (i) To facilitate the free movement of people, humanitarian assistance and goods throughout Carana and across its borders;
- (j) To support the safe and sustainable return of Carana refugees and internally displaced persons;
- (k) To protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence in the areas of immediate deployment of United Nations forces;
- (l) To assist the Carana Armed Forces in the creation of the new national defence forces (FDSC) through advising and training assistance.
- (m) To advise, train and assist the Carana law enforcement authorities and other criminal justice institutions, including the judiciary and corrections systems, and facilitate bilateral and multilateral assistance;
- (n) To assist the transitional Government in the implementation of a DDR programme and the rebuilding of a sufficient police force;
- (o) To guard weapons, ammunition and other military equipment collected from ex-combatants and to assist in their subsequent disposal or destruction;
- (p) To assist the new national army FDSC and reformed police forces in controlling organized crime;
- (q) To assist the transitional Government with preparations for elections;
- (r) To monitor and report on the human rights situation and provide training and capacity-building in the field of human rights and child protection;
- (s) To provide support for gender mainstreaming, including training in gender issues.

Structure and concept of operations

88. UNAC will be a multi-dimensional mission under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and consisting of military, civilian police and civilian components. The mission would work with all relevant parties to assist in observing the terms of the Kalari Peace Treaty. It would provide support to the transitional Government in efforts leading to the restoration

of stability, establishment of the rule of law and the installation of a democratically elected Government.

Build-up

89. The mission's support element would create the essential infrastructure to enable it to reach the required full operational capacity within 180 days of the beginning of the mandate and to maintain that capacity throughout the different phases of the mission.

Security

90. The mission would use a twin-track approach consisting of both diplomatic and military activity in order to assist all stakeholders in the Carana peace process to achieve lasting peace and stability. As the basis for this activity, integrated civil and military headquarters would be established in Galasi that would, together with coordinated political and economic encouragement from the wider international community, ensure total cessation of hostilities and compliance with the signed Kalari Peace Treaty. Physical deployment by UNAC forces to strategic areas and/or domination of those areas would be essential. In so doing, UNAC will ensure that all lines of communication remain open for the delivery of humanitarian relief.

91. A credible and loyal Carana security sector will be vital for the country's future. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) under the management of the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR), will be fundamental in creating the conditions leading to lasting peace and stability. The NCDDR, based in Galasi, will be composed of members from all sides of the conflict (Government of Carana, FDC, MPC, CISC), with the UN as an advisory member. UNAC would actively support NCDDR in disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating the combatants of the warring parties.

92. The restructuring of the army is likely to be undertaken on the basis of arrangements between the Carana Government and other partners. The size of the new national army has been discussed to be totalling 22,000 soldiers with up to 4,000 being drawn from MPC and up to 1,500 being drawn from CISC.

93. The continued activity of El Hasar along the border in western Carana will provide a significant obstacle to the DDR process. UNAC would act as a guarantor of those MPC forces not included in the DDR process because of their importance to the deterrence of EL Hasar, ensuring these forces do not engage in any other military activity.

94. Warlords in central Carana and organized crime networks throughout Carana will continue to act as significant spoilers to the implementation of the Kalari Peace Agreement. UNAC would take over security functions in central Carana and provide training for national security forces until the Security Sector Reform and DDR processes have ensured the Caranese forces to ensure nationwide security themselves.

95. UNAC would be actively involved through its civilian police component in enhancing the present capacity and subsequent restructuring of the Carana National Police. The new national police force as discussed shall not exceed 12,500 officers with up to 3,000 being drawn from MPC and up to 1,250 being drawn from CISC. UNAC would work with other United Nations partners to establish and staff police training facilities. It would also support the operations of the new national police through on-the-job training, monitoring and the conduct of joint patrols. Support would also be provided for the reform of other elements of the security sector, including the establishment of a Border Police unit composed of 1,300 officers.

96. Effective protection of important national infrastructure, aid convoys and UN international staff, aid workers, and civilians under threat of violence will be a vital step towards creating a path to lasting peace and stability.

Troop deployment

97. The UNAC Area of Responsibility (AOR) throughout Carana would be divided into three sectors. Sectors and force levels have been defined by a number of factors, which include the centres of gravity of each of the two main parties, the need to monitor the border areas, locations of areas of humanitarian priority, administrative boundaries, lines of communication and the need to have a balanced deployment covering the whole country.

98. Deployment of military personnel would take place during four phases. In Phase I, three battalions would be deployed as United Nations peacekeepers. Primary tasks during this phase would include separating the warring parties along the de facto boundaries and establishing the interim Mission / Force Headquarters in Galasi. Logistics assets and other key capabilities such as engineers and aviation would also be deployed during this phase. To enhance mission capacities, fully integrated structures like a Joint Operations Centre (JOC), a Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC) and a Joint Logistics Operation Centre (JLOC) would be established to widen and increase the flow and assessment of information.

99. During Phase II of the operation, three additional battalions would be deployed, one each in Sectors Central, West and South. Main tasks during this phase would include monitoring the ceasefire, securing the area, establishing Regional Force Headquarters in Kika and Alur and laying the foundation for further deployments. Limited troop capability would be reinforced by the early deployment of key assets such as attack helicopters, APCs and further enabling units.

100. Phase III of the military concept of operations would see the deployment of three more battalions, bringing the total troop strength to the mandated level of 13,315 UN military unit personnel, 185 military observers, 40 Liaison Officers and 300 Staff Officers. In the two sectors in the rebel-controlled areas, In Sector I, which is mainly under FDC control and includes the capital, Galasi about 4,400 military personnel would be deployed. In Sector II and Sector III about 4,700 military personnel in each sector. The military observers would be deployed evenly throughout the whole country.

101. Full deployment of troops should be completed 180 days after authorisation by the UNSC. On reaching full operational capability, the force would enter Phase IV, during which the mission would fully execute its mandate, although many of the tasks would have started in the previous phase. Phase IV would continue for as long as is necessary to achieve the successful conclusion of the Mission and would lead into Phase V, the final phase of downsizing and ultimately liquidation.

Humanitarian and development affairs

102. The Mission would work closely with the United Nations humanitarian and development agencies. The agencies would be provided with security protection, and where possible, the Mission will also provide logistical support within its means. The Mission will cooperate closely with the World Bank.

Elections

103. Mission activity would reach its peak during the preparations for and the conduct of free elections of a democratic government by the people of Carana. Elections are foreseen to be held in mid 2023.

Public information

104. UN support for the peace process would be closely linked to a convincing information campaign along with carefully coordinated humanitarian and human rights advocacy programmes to lay the foundation for lasting peace and stability. To this end, the UN Mission would have a fully integrated public information component.

105. The mission should set up a United Nations radio station to provide country-wide radio coverage. Through radio programming and by other means, the information component would undertake intensive public outreach and advocacy efforts in support of key mission activities, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, civic education including on the electoral process, humanitarian matters and human rights. The information capacity would also open up channels of communication with local, regional and international media outlets and should be well coordinated with other United Nations public information resources in Carana and the region.

Observations

106. The tasks of the future mission will not be easy. UNAC will have to work closely with the Carana parties to move the peace process along to a successful conclusion. A key requirement will be concerted efforts to help the parties create an environment of security and confidence and to maintain the good will they have demonstrated by concluding the Kalari Peace Treaty. These efforts will also require the good will and continued assistance of the international community.



Security Council Resolution 1544

United Nations



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S/RES/1544 (2021)

10 September 2021

Original: English

Resolution 1544 (2021)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5000th meeting, on 03 May 2021

The Security Council,

Recalling its Presidential Statements of 14 December 2020 (S/PRST/2020/24) and statements on Carana,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Carana,

Reaffirming the basic principles of peacekeeping, including consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, and *recognizing* that the mandate of each peacekeeping mission is specific to the need and situation of the country concerned,

Expressing its utmost concern at the dire consequences of the prolonged conflict for the civilian population throughout Carana, in particular the increase in the number of refugees and internally displaced persons,

Remaining seriously concerned over the significant ongoing food and humanitarian crisis in Carana and over the insecurity which hinders humanitarian access, the presence of landmines as well as the continued proliferation of weapons from within and outside the region that threatens the peace, security, and stability,

Emphasizing the need for all parties to uphold and respect the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence in order to ensure the continued provision of

humanitarian assistance, the safety of civilians receiving assistance and the security of humanitarian personnel operating in Carana and stressing the importance of humanitarian assistance being delivered on the basis of need,

Stressing the urgent need for substantial humanitarian assistance to the Carana population,

Deploring all violations of human rights, particularly atrocities against civilian populations, including widespread abduction of men, women and children, the use of landmines and sexual violence against women and children and,

Taking note with appreciation of the reports of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Carana,

Noting the continued conflict in the western border region, with regard to El Hasar fighters penetrating into Carana and inflicting violence on local communities there,

Observing the increasing tensions between Carana and Rimosa with regard to territorial disputes about Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and oil field exploration in the Indian Ocean,

Emphasizing the need for all parties to safeguard the welfare and security of humanitarian workers and UN personnel in accordance with applicable rules and principles of international law,

Deploring all violations of human rights, particularly against civilian population, and urging the new transitional Government of Carana to take all necessary measures to put an end to impunity and to ensure that the continued promotion and protection of human rights,

Mindful of the need for accountability for violations of international humanitarian law and urging the transitional government once established to ensure that the protection of human rights and the establishment of a state based on the rule of law and of an independent judiciary are among its highest priorities,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General (S/2021/4711), dated 27 July 2021, on the situation in Carana, including recommendations and options for establishing a United Nations Mission in Carana,

Taking note of the Kalari Peace Agreement reached by some of the key parties on 11 August 2021 in Kalari, Sumora and urging all parties to work without delay towards a broad political consensus on the nature and duration of the political transition,

Reaffirming that the primary responsibility for implementing the Kalari Peace Treaty rests with the parties, and urging the parties to move forward with implementation of these agreements immediately in order to ensure the peaceful formation of a new transitional government,

Stressing that lasting stability in Carana will depend on peace in the sub-region, and emphasizing the importance of cooperation among the countries of the sub-region toward this end, as well as the need for coordination of UN efforts to contribute to the consolidation of peace and security in the sub-region,

Noting the co-operation agreement between the Government of France, the Government of Carana and the MPC allowing French Forces (FRAFOR) to cross into Carana to pursue El Hasar elements, as well as noting the need for close coordination between the French Forces "Operation Aigle", Carana and the UN,

Encouraging the international community to provide broad support to resolve the crisis in Carana through coordinated actions for immediate and long-term needs, encompassing security, governance, development and humanitarian issues,

Looking forward to the high-level international donors' conference in Accra on 25 October 2021 to support the development of Carana, commending the contributions already made toward the 2021 Humanitarian Response Plan for Carana and urging all Member States and other donors to contribute generously for humanitarian operations,

Determining that the situation in Carana continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region and to the peace process for Carana,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council

1. *Decides* to establish the Multidimensional United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC) for an initial period of 12 months;
2. *Calls for* tangible achievements in the political process in Carana, which are of critical significance for the successful deployment and activities of UNAC;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to expeditiously appoint a Special Representative for Carana and Head of Mission of UNAC, who shall, from the date of appointment, assume overall authority on the ground for the coordination of all the activities of the United Nations, and its agencies, funds and programmes, in Carana and shall use good offices and coordinate efforts of the international community, and coordinate the overall support of the international community in Carana, including in the field of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR), further emphasizes that the Special Representative shall ensure optimal coordination between UNAC and the United Nations Country Team in Carana, in connection with the aspects of their respective mandates, and optimal coordination between UNAC, the Government of Carana, the Mouvement Patriotique du Carana (MPC) and French Forces Operation Aigle;
4. *Decides* that UNAC will comprise up to 13,315 United Nations military unit personnel, up to 185 military observers, 40 liaison officers and 300 staff officers, and up to 1,885 civilian police officers including formed units to assist in the maintenance of law and order throughout Carana, and the appropriate civilian component; *calls upon* Member States to provide troops and police

with adequate capabilities and equipment in order to establish the capacity of UNAC to operate, and discharge its responsibilities, effectively and requests the Secretary-General to recruit qualified staff, who have the professional experience and skills appropriate to the tasks defined under applicable competency areas;

5. Decides that UNAC shall have the following mandate:

(a) Support for Implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement:

- i.to observe and monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and investigate violations of the ceasefire;
- ii.to establish and maintain continuous liaison with the field headquarters of all parties' military forces;

(b) Support for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration:

- i.to assist in the development and implementation of a voluntary national disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programme for all armed parties, and to collect, store or destroy weapons and ammunition as part of an organized DDR programme as agreed by the Kalari Peace Treaty of 11 August 2021, and in cooperation with relevant international organizations and donor nations;
- ii.to support the reintegration and rehabilitation of former combatants with particular regard to the needs of child soldiers, women, and addressing the inclusion of non-Carana combatants;
- iii.to assist and carry out voluntary disarmament and to collect and destroy weapons and ammunition as part of an organized DDR programme;

(c) Protection of civilians and United Nations Personnel, Facilities and Civilians:

- i.to protect without prejudice to the efforts of the government, civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment,
- ii.to provide specific protection for women and children affected by armed conflict, including through the deployment of Child Protection Advisors and Women Protection Advisors, and address the needs of victims of sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict;
- iii.to protect UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel;

(d) Promotion and protection of human rights

- i.to monitor, help investigate and report to the Council on any abuses or violations of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law committed throughout Carana and to contribute to efforts to prevent such violations and abuses;

- ii.to support, in particular, the full deployment of UNAC human rights observers throughout the country;
- iii.to monitor, help investigate and report to the Council specifically on violations and abuses committed against children as well as violations committed against women including all forms of sexual violence in armed conflict;
- iv.to assist the authorities of Carana in their efforts to promote and protect human rights;
- v.to ensure an adequate human rights presence, capacity and expertise within UNAC to carry out human rights promotion, protection and monitoring activities;

(e) Support for Humanitarian Assistance:

To facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, including by helping to establish the necessary security conditions to protect refugees and internally displaced persons in accordance with humanitarian principles, and the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees in close coordination with humanitarian actors.

(f) Support for Security Sector Reform:

- i.to assist the new Carana transitional Government in monitoring and restructuring of the police force of Carana, consistent with democratic policing and international standards, to develop a police training programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of police in cooperation with interested organizations and interested States;
- ii.to assist the new transitional Government in the formation of a new and restructured Carana military in cooperation with international organizations and interested States;

(g) Support for Implementation of the Peace Process:

- i.to assist the new transitional Government in conjunction with other international partners to re-establish national authority throughout the country, including the establishment of a functioning administrative structure at both the national and local levels;
- ii.to assist the new transitional Government in restoring proper administration of natural resources;
- iii.to assist the new transitional Government in preparing for national elections to be held no later than six months after the adoption of the new constitution of Carana;
- iv.to assist the new transitional Government in conjunction with other international partners in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions;

6. Urges all parties in Carana to cooperate fully with the deployment and activities of UNAC, in particular by ensuring their safety, security and freedom of movement with unhindered

and immediate access throughout the territory of Carana to enable UNAC to carry out fully its mandate;

7. *Calls upon Member States, especially those in the region, to ensure the free, unhindered and expeditious movement to and from Carana of all personnel, as well as equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, including vehicles and spare parts, which are for the exclusive and official use of UNAC;*

8. *Stresses the importance to provide UNAC with the necessary performance capacities to fulfil its mandate in a complex security environment that includes asymmetric threats while ensuring the best possible level of safety and security for its personnel;*

9. *Urges Member States to provide troops and police that have adequate capabilities, including regarding language skills, pre-deployment and, where appropriate, in situ training, and equipment, including enablers, specific to the operating environment, notes the potential adverse effects on mandate implementation of national caveats which have not been declared and accepted by the Secretary General prior to deployment, and calls on Members State to declare all national caveats, provide troops and police with the minimum of declared caveats, and to fully and effectively implement the provisions of the Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) signed with the United Nations;*

10. *Requests the Secretary-General to ensure the full, effective and meaningful participation of women in all aspects of operations;*

11. *Reiterates that the training, consolidation and redeployment of the Carana Defence and Security Forces is vital to ensure Carana's long-term security and stability and to protect the people of Carana and stresses the importance of the Carana Defence and Security Forces assuming full responsibility for providing security throughout the Carana territory;*

12. *Demands that the parties cease hostilities throughout Carana and fulfil their obligations under the Kalari Peace Treaty;*

13. *Calls upon all parties to cooperate fully in the deployment and operations of UNAC, including through ensuring the safety, security and freedom of movement of UN and associated personnel throughout Carana;*

14. *Calls upon the parties to engage for the purpose of addressing the question of DDR on an urgent basis and urges the parties, in particular the Government of Carana, the Mouvement Patriotique du Carana (MPC) and Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC), to work closely with UNAC, relevant assistance organizations and donor nations in the implementation of a DDR programme;*

15. *Calls upon the international donor community to provide assistance for the implementation of a DDR programme and sustained international assistance to the peace process, and to contribute to consolidated humanitarian appeals;*

16. *Calls upon the Government of Carana, the Government of Katasi, the French Government and the French Operation in Katasi to coordinate the efforts to address the terrorist*

threat posed by El Hasar in order to ensure the implementation of the peace agreement, force protection and the protection of the civilian population in border regions of Carana and Katasi;

17. *Calls upon* the Government of Carana and the Government of Rimosa to settle their disputes with respect to the territorial ownership of the islands, the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), the exploitation of the oilfields as well as fishing rights of the coast of Carana;

18. *Emphasizes* that the protection of civilians, as described in paragraph 5, subparagraph (c), must be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources, over any of the other tasks described in that paragraph,

19. *Stresses* the need for an effective public information capacity, including the establishment as necessary of United Nations radio stations to promote understanding of the peace process and the role of UNAC among local communities and the parties;

20. *Encourages* UNAC within its capabilities and areas of deployment to support the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons;

21. *Requests* the new transitional Government to conclude a Status-of-Mission Agreement (SOMA) and Status-of-Force Agreement (SOFA) with the Secretary-General within 30 days of adoption of this resolution, and notes that pending the conclusion of such an agreement, the model Status-of-Force Agreement dated 9 October 1990 (A/45/594) shall apply provisionally;

22. *Calls upon* all parties to comply with obligations under international humanitarian law to respect and protect all civilians, including humanitarian personnel and civilian objects, as well as all medical personnel and humanitarian personnel exclusively engaged in medical duties, their means of transport and equipment, as well as hospitals and other medical facilities, and take all required steps to allow and facilitate the full, safe, immediate and unimpeded access of humanitarian actors for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all people in need, while respecting the humanitarian principles and applicable international law;

23. *Reiterates* that the transitional authorities of Carana have primary responsibility to protect civilians in Carana, further recalls its resolutions 1265 (1999), 1296 (2000), 1674 (2006), 1738 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, its resolutions 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009), 1998 (2011) and 2068 (2012) on Children And Armed Conflict and its resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), and 1960 (2010) on Women, Peace and Security and calls upon UNAC and all military forces in Carana to take them into account and to abide by international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, and recalls the importance of training in this regard;

24. *Demands* that all parties cease all use of child soldiers, that all parties cease all human rights violations and atrocities against the Carana population, and stresses the need to bring to justice those responsible;

25. *Reaffirms* the importance of a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations and post-conflict peace building in accordance with resolution 1325 (2000), recalls the need to address violence against women and girls as a tool of warfare, and encourages UNAC as well as the Carana parties to actively address these issues;

26. *Reiterates* its demand that all States in the region cease military support for armed groups in neighbouring countries, take action to prevent armed individuals and groups from using their territory to prepare and commit attacks on neighbouring countries and refrain from any actions that might contribute to further destabilization of the situation in the region, and declares its readiness to consider, if necessary, ways of promoting compliance with this demand;

27. *Calls upon* the international community to consider how it might help future economic development in Carana aimed at achieving long-term stability in Carana and improving the welfare of its people;

28. *Recognizes* that the effective implementation of peacekeeping mandates is the responsibility of all stakeholders and is contingent upon several critical factors, including well-defined, realistic, and achievable mandates, political will, leadership, performance and accountability at all levels, adequate resources, policy, planning, and operational guidelines, and training and equipment;

29. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure full compliance of UNAC with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuses and sexual harassment, including by making full use of the existing authority of the SRSG to ensure accountability of the Mission's staff and through effective mission support arrangement and to keep the Council fully informed if such cases of misconduct occur, and urges troop- and police-contributing countries to take appropriate preventative action, including vetting, pre-deployment and in-mission awareness training, and to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel, including through timely investigations of all allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, and repatriate units when there is credible evidence of widespread or systemic sexual exploitation and abuse by those units;

30. *Recalls* its request to standardize a culture of performance in UN peacekeeping, recalls its requests in resolution 2378 (2017) and resolution 2436 (2018) that the Secretary-General ensures that performance data related to the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations is used to improve mission operations, including decisions such as those regarding deployment, remediation, repatriation and incentives, reaffirms its support for the development of a comprehensive and integrated performance policy framework that identifies clear standards of performance for evaluating all United Nations civilian and uniformed personnel working in and supporting peacekeeping operations that facilitates effective and full implementation of mandates, and includes comprehensive and objective methodologies based on clear and well-defined benchmarks to ensure accountability for underperformance and incentives and recognition for outstanding performance, and calls on him to apply it to UNAC, in particular by investigating and taking action on underperformance, to include the rotation, repatriation, replacement or dismissal of any under-performing UNAC uniformed or civilian personnel, consistent with resolution 2436 (2018), and notes the efforts of the Secretary-General to develop a comprehensive performance assessment system;

31. *Requests* UNAC to consider the environmental impacts of its operations when fulfilling its mandated tasks and, in this context, to manage them as appropriate and in accordance with applicable and relevant General Assembly resolutions and United Nations rules and regulations;

32. *Requests the Secretary-General to provide regular updates, including a formal report every 90 days to the Council on the progress in the implementation of the Kalari Peace Treaty and this resolution, including the implementation of UNAC's mandate;*

33. *Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.*



Mission Concept of Operations

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN CARANA (UNAC)

MISSION CONCEPT

25 September 2021

References:

- A. Under Secretary General Planning Directive, dated 02 Jun 2021
- B. Strategic Assessment Report, dated 22 February 2021
- C. Report of the UN Technical Assessment Mission to Carana, 27 Jun 2021
- D. Kalari Peace Treaty (KPA), 11 August 2021
- E. United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/1544 (2021), 10 September 2021

INTRODUCTION

This Mission Concept defines the overall approach, priorities and sequencing of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC).

The main focus of UNAC in the initial period will be the deployment and establishment of the Mission and the support of the implementation of the Kalari Peace Agreement.

A. CONTEXT

1. On 11 August 2021, after years of violent conflict in Carana a ceasefire agreement was established and the Kalari Peace Agreement (KPA) was signed between the country's government and the main rebel forces – the Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) in the West and the Combattants Indépendants de Sud Carana (CISC) in the South West.
2. The KPA calls for a ceasefire, disengagement of forces, a mechanism to verify and control the ceasefire and the formation of a National Transitional Government of Carana, (NTGC). It commits to develop a new constitution within a year and subsequent elections within 6 months of adopting the new constitution, the disarmament of rebel forces and the integration of some of

their soldiers into a restructured national armed force. The NTGC replaces the largely one-party, one-ethnicity, repressive governance of President Ogavo, whose actions contributed to the start of the conflict.

3. The KPA has an ambitious timeline for its implementation and UNAC will not be fully operational in Carana until several months after the agreement. The success of the KPA depends on the continued political agreement between the parties and the confidence in the upcoming DDR and SSR Process. UNAC's early monitoring and observing presence, especially in the areas where parties to the conflict face each other, will reduce the risk of confrontation. Disarmament is unlikely before this time and thus subsequent events will be delayed. Holding elections within 6 months after the adoption of the new constitution presents a challenge as preconditions to do so include sufficient security throughout Carana, UNAC will advise NTGC on this issue and be prepared for postponement.

4. The ceasefire has largely been held since the KPA was signed. The forces have not significantly withdrawn, still leaving the potential for a swift return to conflict. The newly formed NTGC, while mostly united, may be struggling with its responsibilities, and will not have established full territorial control. There are areas controlled by Carana National Police, Carana Defence Forces (CDF) and state security agencies; areas controlled by MPC, areas loosely controlled but not administered by the CISC; and about a third of the country ungoverned. Internal security functions such as immigration, customs and port authority barely function.

5. The still ongoing operation to neutralize El Hasar in Katasi may push the terrorist group towards western Carana. The capabilities of FRAFOR are not sufficient to both maintain the security in Katasi and neutralize El Hasar in and across the border areas to Carana. This might have negative impact on the compliance to the KPA by MPC. Furthermore, it must be expected that the activities of CISC splinter groups, armed rebel groups, warlords, armed criminal elements and fundamentalist extremist groups will remain on the current level. However, these groups have the potential to delay or stall the implementation of the KPA.

6. Crime rates are currently at a very high level. Organized and transnational crime is evident in the narcotics and diamond trade. The suburbs of the capital, Galasi, are under the control of youth gangs. In Akkabar, there is an open conflict between miners and the police. In addition to the military conflict, there are longer-term law and order challenges. A continued security vacuum will enable organized criminal groups to become stronger and harder to tackle in the long run. Efforts to support Carana in tackling these issues need to be identified early.

7. UNAC cannot address all these issues during the initial deployment and priority must be given to maintaining political consent for the adoption of the KPA and avoiding a return to conflict and to the protection of the population in Carana.

8. The countries surrounding Carana are also part of the FU. Relations between Carana and Sumora are traditionally on a professional level. Those with Katasi have been strained. Carana has accused Katasi of supporting the MPC and these allegations have been corroborated by reports from a number international organizations. Relations with Rimosá, which has its own civil war, are

also strained with one of the rebel groups, the Elasi Liberation Front (ELF), having loose links with the CISC. In addition, the GoC and government of Rimosa have been entangled in disputes over islands of their shared coast and oil exploitation in these territories. The UN Regional Representative is responsible for this area. His office and UNAC will need a coordinated information strategy. UNAC will be unable to focus on border issues during the initial stages of the Mission but should support the FU in planning for future engagement.

9. As result of the war and of natural disasters, living conditions in Carana have worsened dramatically. Of the roughly 17 million population of Carana, 6.3 million are currently in need of humanitarian assistance, especially with regard to medical support, widespread malnutrition and food insecurity, mine action and sexual- and gender-based violence. Living conditions are most dramatic for the approx. 1.1 million IDPs, 700,000 of which currently live in provisional camps in central Carana. Another unquantified refugee and IDP population, estimated at approx. 30,000 refugees and 300,000 IDPs, is currently based along the borders to Katasi and Rimosa.

10. The Leppko province has not been accessible to the humanitarian community for the past five years. The most acute challenge to master will be large return movements of IDPs and refugees, alongside DDR reintegration and members of other armed groups, as soon as the KPA measures are being adopted. UNAC will need to coordinate closely with UNCT and other humanitarian actors, and provide technical, logistical and perhaps security support to relevant actors.

B. GUIDING PRINCIPLES

11. **Consent of the Parties.** UNAC has been invited by the parties to the conflict and will work with NTGC to deliver security and stability for Carana.

12. **Impartiality.** Ensuring an impartial approach will be critical considering the deep divisions along political, religious and ethnic lines and taking into account the perception of international actors by national actors and communities. This entails even-handedly engaging with stakeholders across the political spectrum and all parties to the conflict, including spoilers, armed groups and foreign-armed elements to maintain the consent and the cooperation of the main parties, but should not be confused with neutrality or inactivity. UNAC should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate.

13. Positioning of UNAC along political, religious and other fault lines from the outset will be essential by a) political positioning and messaging; b) perceived association with other international actors and ensuring clear distinction between the forces; c) the manner in which the UN implements its protection of civilians, state/institution building and human rights mandates; d) provision of support to all communities indiscriminately e) areas of civilian, police and military deployment and f) effective communication. Perceptions should be measures and tracked on a regular basis including through strengthening the Mission's analytical capacity and surveys.

14. **Non Use of Force except in Self-Defence and Defence of the Mandate.** The ROE and DUF will make it clear how the military and police components can utilize force to achieve the mandated tasks.

15. **National Ownership, inclusiveness.** Beyond the important role to be played by the Mission and other international actors, sustainable peace and stability in Carana will require the necessary national political commitment that will ensure the sustainability of all regional and international efforts to address the current crisis. As such, it is their responsibility to identify the key priorities and local initiatives that could benefit from urgent international support, while also ensuring sustainability and ownership.

16. Considering the weakness of the national institutions and the lack of legitimacy, national involvement will need to go beyond the Transitional Government and include representatives of minorities, civil society, relevant religious, community leaders, and women and youth groups. Considering the absence of a formal security and rule of law apparatus and the absence of State capacity, UNAC will have to provide substantial support in a range of areas. However, UNAC cannot replace Carana actors. Its role is to accompany and support them.

17. **Protection of civilians.** UNAC's PoC mandate is to protect civilians from physical violence inside its borders, consistent with obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law, without prejudice to the primary and sovereign responsibility of Carana. Where Carana is unable or unwilling to protect civilians, UNAC peacekeepers have a responsibility and obligation to provide such protection, within capabilities and areas of deployments.

18. The PoC mandate embodies an active duty to protect; UNAC will therefore not engage in protection only in reaction to an attack. Activities to protect civilians will be planned, deliberate and ongoing, and the mission will constantly work to analyse threats of physical violence and prevent, pre-empt or mitigate harm to civilians, including through a credible deterrent posture and the use of force in accordance with the mandate and the ROE/DUF.

19. All actions to protect civilians will have to be planned in consultation with women and men of the local community and in support of the mechanisms they have established to ensure their own protection. Bottom-up information on situations and priorities, stemming from engagement and consultations with communities, will guide the implementation of the three tiers of the PoC response.

20. Effective mandate implementation requires a focused and joint civil-military planning for all PoC actions under the three tiers, including military and police operations. PoC Operations planning and coordination fora will therefore ensure that all relevant military, police or civilian sections jointly define the required respective actions and their sequencing, to ensure a comprehensive response to imminent threats of violence on civilians.

21. In order to create the most effective working relationship between the political and humanitarian aspects of UNAC presence in CARANA under the current (security/political) situation, the integration of the humanitarian component will follow the "One foot in, one foot out"-

approach, having a combined DSRSG/RC/HC within the mission and OCHA structurally separated from mission.

22. In order of priority, UNAC will first deter and neutralize threats in villages or places of habitual residence of civilians under threat, including through the pro-active use of rapid and temporary deployments and operations. Should the mission lack the time, capacity or political space to do so, it may also provide direct physical security to civilians at risk and/or accompany and secure their flight to, more stable areas. Contingency plans must be in place to afford physical protection in areas identified for that purpose outside UN premises, including existing IDP camps. Whenever population displacement occurs, the mission will aim at creating the conditions for a safe and dignified return of those internally displaced populations, in close coordination with humanitarian partners.

23. **Other Success Factors.** Promotion of national and local ownership is key to the UN's success in Carana and is a guideline for both UNAC and the UN Country Team. UNAC is supporting NTGC both at the national and local level and must listen to their leadership and support their intent.

C. KEY ASSUMPTIONS AND RISKS

24. **Assumptions.**

- a. Continued cooperation and consent of the parties to the conflict to UNAC's deployment is granted.
- b. Sufficient access to Carana seaports and airports to enable deployment and sustainment is ensured.
- c. NTGC will be established within 30 days after signing the KPA.
- d. ELF activities in the Leppko Region will have no significant impact on the UNAC operations and the implementation of the KPA.
- e. El Hasar activities in western Carana will have no significant impact on the overall Peace Process in Carana.
- f. No further escalation in political and economic disputes between Fasian countries.
- g. The Transitional authorities, the Security Council, and the FU maintain their support for the peace development process in Carana.
- h. The national political dialogue is aimed at creating minimum national consensus around major policy issues, including the holding of the elections, strengthening the rule of law and accountability of Government services, DDR, the reconstitution of the national army, transitional justice mechanisms, SSR and the return of displaced persons.
- i. Neighbouring states remain supportive of the peace process in Carana.
- j. International donors support relief and development activities.

25. Constraints

- a. Initial Operational Capability has to be reached until M+120.
- b. Full Operational Capability has to be reached until M+180.
- c. Area of Operations is limited to Carana.

26. Risks and Mitigating Action.

- a. The parties return to the conflict before UNAC deploys and there is no peace to keep. Then, UNAC will not deploy to Carana.
- b. The parties return to conflict while UNAC is deploying. UNAC will protect UN personnel and installations and protect civilians within means and capabilities.
- c. The parties return to conflict when UNAC is already deployed. UNAC will establish buffer zones between the parties to the conflict, protect UN personnel and installations, and protect civilians within means and capabilities.
- d. UNAC may be seen as a party to the conflict by uncontrolled armed groups and associated communities and are likely to be targeted, especially at the beginning of the operation. UNAC will preventively deploy a strong Public Information department and bundle resources in community liaison. UNAC will protect UN personnel and installations and protect civilians within means and capabilities.
- e. Increased presence of elements of extremist groups. If deterrence fails, UNAC will take a robust approach towards neutralizing spoilers. UNAC civil affairs and humanitarian/development branches closely monitor the situation and develop adequate responses. UNAC police will protect civilians and deter extremist groups within means and capabilities.

D. MISSION OBJECTIVES

27. UN Strategic Objective in Carana. The objective of the United Nations is to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in a united Carana, where human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens is assured and in which internally displaced persons and refugees can return home in safety and dignity, and to contribute to the protection of civilians at risk.

28. UNAC Mission Objectives in Carana.

- a. A sustainable and credible peace process supported by regional actors that include processes at the national and sub-national levels, to foster the implementation of the peace agreement.
- b. Security and stabilization, through integrated efforts, in key areas critical to the peace process are restored and civilians under imminent threat are protected.
- c. Social well-being and economic prosperity are restored to a level that allows recovery without international support.

- d. Trustworthy and responsible security institutions and security forces who respect the law and order and human rights are capable and maintain security in Carana.

29. **UNAC End State.** A unified and peaceful Carana in its current boundaries, with a democratically elected government in which all ethnic groups of the country are represented and accountable security forces able to protect all its citizens, on a level of economic well-being so that nobody suffers from basic needs, with a functioning civil society and situation in which human rights, gender perspectives and the rights of the vulnerable people are respected.

E. INITIAL SRSG INTENT

30. UNAC operations will be focused on the achievement of the assigned mission objectives, the UNSCR S/RES/1544 (2021) and in accordance with the intent to:

- a. support of the transnational government of Carana in the implementation of the peace process and the creation of a DDR and SSR concept is taken up quickly and efficiently already with the initial deployment,
- b. ensure that early, visible and robust monitoring and observing posture is established especially in those areas, where the parties to the conflict have not been withdrawn,
- c. coordinate all UNAC efforts and humanitarian/development activities with the transitional government, the parties to the conflict and other organizations for mandate implementation, and
- d. conduct an information campaign in close coordination with the transitional government and all parties to the conflict in regard to the objectives of the UN Peacekeeping Mission.

F. MISSION PHASES – CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

31. The CONOPS covers the initial deployment in detail and the remaining phases in outline. There are four phases:

32. **PHASE I - Initial Deployment: (M- M+120).**

33. Priority: Early influence on KPA.

34. During the Initial Deployment Phase:

- a. UNAC will establish its HQ in GALASI in order to strengthen dialogue with NTGC, government departments and national security bodies. It will assume the chair of the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC) in accordance with the KPA and support the NTGC's DDR programme.
- b. UNAC will observe and monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and investigate violations of the ceasefire;
- c. UNAC will establish and maintain continuous liaison with the field headquarters of all parties' military forces;

- d. It will protect UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel;
- e. It will establish close coordination and sharing of information with the UNCT and implement a Senior Leaders Forum.
- f. The first UNAC Field Offices will be established in Alur and Corma to engage with local authorities including the leadership of MPC and CISC.
- g. After establishing a security presence in GALASI, the Military Component is to support the NTGC to ensure that the military aspects of the KPA are implemented. It is to ensure Freedom of Movement of the JLTs so that the JCC has the situational awareness to respond quickly to any threats to the KPA. A return to civil war is the greatest threat to civilians.
- h. The Military Component is to deter, pre-empt and if necessary, respond to breaches of the military aspects of the KPA, initially in areas where the parties to the conflict are in close contact and uncontrolled armed groups, warlords and terrorist groups are operating.
- i. UNAC will protect without prejudice to the efforts of the government, civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment,
- j. UNAC will build on the coordination with the UN Country Team and the humanitarian agencies to continue to identify areas where UNAC may support humanitarian access and human rights assistance access including, when requested, and as a last resort, the provision of security to the delivery of humanitarian aid.
- k. UNAC Humanitarian section will ensure that ongoing efforts to supply humanitarian aid are unhampered by UNAC troop deployment and will strive to harmonize the use of infrastructure between UNAC Mission Support and the UN Country Team.
- l. UNAC development branches will coordinate Quick Impact Projects to expand infrastructure relevant to mandate implementation and to facilitate the work of the NTGC.
- m. UNAC will support the NTGC's SSR (identified in the KPA) in particular the restructuring of the police force and the formation of a new and restructured Carana military through training, capacity-building, monitoring and in-kind assistance. All of these tasks will be in cooperation with interested organisations and states.
- n. Supporting the wider implementation of the Peace Process will include assisting the NTGC to establish national authority and institutions throughout the country; assist in the preparation and conduct of national elections and
- o. Assist in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions.

35. **Benchmarks include:**

- Mission HQ and Field Offices established;
- UNAC leading JCC and JLTs;
- Initial military presence in likely areas of confrontation between the armed groups;
- Police presence in Galasi.
- DDR and SSR outline plans agreed.

36. **PHASE II - Full Deployment: (M+121 – M+180).**

37. Priority: security presence throughout Carana.

38. During the Full Deployment Phase

- a. UNAC will assist in the development and implementation of a voluntary national disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programme for all armed parties, and to collect, store or destroy weapons and ammunition as part of an organized DDR programme as agreed by the Kalari Peace Treaty of 11 August 2021, and in cooperation with relevant international organizations and donor nations;
- b. UNAC will assist and carry out voluntary disarmament and to collect and destroy weapons and ammunition as part of an organized DDDR programme;
- c. UNAC will support, in particular, the full deployment of UNAC human rights observers throughout the country and assist the authorities of Carana in their efforts to promote and protect human rights;
- d. UNAC will facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, including by helping to establish the necessary security conditions to protect refugees and internally displaced persons; in accordance with humanitarian principles, and the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees in close coordination with humanitarian actors.
- e. UNAC will assist the new Carana transitional Government in monitoring and restructuring of the police force of Carana, consistent with democratic policing and international standards, to develop a police training programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of police in cooperation with interested organizations and interested States;
- f. UNAC, in cooperation with UNCT, will assist local and district administrations to implement crisis early-warning systems, increase resilience against natural disasters and Explosive Remnants of War (ERWs), and provide alternatives to armed conflict through industry development, civic education and livelihood programs.

39. **Benchmarks to be reached within Phase II include:**

- a. Military Component at 80% of authorized strength with reach throughout Carana;
- b. Disarmament has begun; armed groups are cantoned, and 70% of CDF are in barracks;

- c. Humanitarian access to 60% of Carana.
- d. All main roads cleared of ERWs.
- e. Election planning commenced.
- f. El Hasar activities in the West contained.
- g. Police presence re-established in 50% of the country.

40. **PHASE III - Consolidation: (M+181 – M+330).**

41. Priority: Conditions set for Elections

42. During the Consolidation Phase

- p. UNAC will support the reintegration and rehabilitation of former combatants with particular regard to the needs of child soldiers, women, and addressing the inclusion of non-Carana combatants;
- q. UNAC will provide specific protection for women and children affected by armed conflict, including through the deployment of Child Protection Advisors and Women Protection Advisors, and address the needs of victims of sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict;
- r. UNAC will monitor, help investigate and report to the Council on any abuses or violations of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law committed throughout Carana and to contribute to efforts to prevent such violations and abuses;
- s. UNAC will monitor, help investigate and report to the Council specifically on violations and abuses committed against children as well as violations committed against women including all forms of sexual violence in armed conflict;
- t. UNAC will ensure an adequate human rights presence, capacity and expertise within UNAC to carry out human rights promotion, protection and monitoring activities;
- u. UNAC will assist the new transitional Government in the formation of a new and restructured Carana military in cooperation with international organizations and interested States;
- v. UNAC will assist the new transitional Government in conjunction with other international partners to re-establish national authority throughout the country, including the establishment of a functioning and accountable administrative structure at both the national and local levels;
- w. UNAC will assist the new transitional Government in restoring proper administration of natural resources;
- x. UNAC will assist the new transitional Government in preparing for national elections to be held no later than six months after the adoption of the new constitution of Carana;

- y. UNAC will assist the new transitional Government in conjunction with other international partners in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions;
- z. UNAC will provide safe passage for returning IDPs and refugees?

43. **Benchmarks to be reached within Phase III include:**

- a. Sufficient security for free elections established;
- b. Military aspects of the KPA irreversible;
- c. MPC and CISC fully demobilized or integrated into new National Defence and Security Forces;
- d. FOM throughout Carana;
- e. Humanitarian access throughout Carana;
- f. functioning administrative offices in 80% of district capitals.

44. **PHASE IV - Capacity Building: (M+330 -)**

45. Priority: Carana Security Institutions are able to provide security throughout Carana. While capacity building will have begun earlier, Mission resources are now available to make this activity a main effort and implement the planning conducted earlier. Priority will be on Security Forces, as this will drive the rate of drawdown.

46. **Benchmarks include:**

- a. Successfully conducted free and democratic elections;
- b. Viable and accountable Carana Security Forces are established.

47. **PHASE V - Mission Drawdown:**

48. Options for a Mission Reconfiguration / Drawdown should be made to the Security Council following a Strategic Review conducted under the guidance of the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), in close coordination with key UN and international stakeholders.

G. PRIORITIES

49. **Protection of UN personnel and facilities.** For the police and military components, it must be accepted that some risk must be taken in order to defend our mandate and protect civilians. This risk must be managed through thorough understanding the operational environment, planning, preparation and coordination.

50. **Monitoring the Ceasefire and Disengagement.** This is the key activity in the KPA. Accurate and timely reporting of incidents to the Regional Joint Teams (RJTs) and Joint Commission for the

Ceasefire (JCC) will enable early resolution. The military component must be prepared to deter, pre-empt and respond to incidents.

51. **Protection of Civilians.** At all times it is our responsibility to Protect Civilians under imminent threat within means and capabilities. In the first instance, the best way to protect civilians is to prevent a return to conflict. It is accepted that we have limited means and in Phase 1 limited presence, this requires increased situational awareness so that capabilities can be in the right place at the right time to pre-empt threats to civilians.

52. **Dialogue and Engagement.** At Mission level and in the field, we must constantly reach out to engage with government and other key actors, including the leaders of MPC, CISC, and traditional authorities. This engagement needs to be managed and coordinated so that the Mission speaks in one voice and is seen to be robust, impartial and here to help.

53. **Support to Humanitarians and Human Rights Assistance.** UNAC will reach out to humanitarian and Human Rights organisations, primarily through the DSRSG (HC) but also at Field Office level to identify how our capabilities can assist their operations. In Phase 1 we will be limited by our capacity and the need to focus on the confrontation areas but our wider deployment in Phase 2 should be influenced by the humanitarian and Human Rights priorities for access.

54. Close coordination with UNCT in order to harmonize running UN operations with mission actions.

H. CORE OUTPUTS

55. The core outputs necessary to the achievement of the Objectives are provided at Annex D.

I. TASKS TO COMPONENTS

56. General. Cross pillar planning, thematic coordination and coordination with Carana authorities and the UN Country Team apply to all components so that UNAC delivers its mandate effectively. COS UNAC will detail the HQ coordination mechanisms.

57. Political Component is to advise and assist the transitional government and to support the parties to the conflict in their peace process including the reestablishment of acceptable standards of human rights and rule of law, the protection of civilians, in the rebuilding of essential governmental institutions, in strengthening the structures and institutions of the civil society, in preparing for elections, and in addressing and resolving the disputes between Carana and its neighbouring countries.

58. Development/Humanitarian Component is to advise and assist the transitional government and to support the population of Carana by coordination of humanitarian and development activities in accordance with the given mandate, in addressing the economic needs, and rebuilding the education and public health system, and support efforts to ensure the rapid return, repatriation, reintegration and reinsertion of all displaced persons, including IDPs, refugees and demobilized fighters.

59. UNAC Military Component is to assist in the implementation and compliance of the Kalari Peace Agreement through monitoring and verifying the implementation of the military provisions of the ceasefire / peace agreement, establishing liaison with the forces of all parties to the conflict, supporting the DDR process and humanitarian operations, protecting UN personnel and infrastructure, and protecting the civilian population under imminent threat of physical violence, in order to contribute to a safe and secure environment in Carana.

60. Police Component to assist the new Carana transitional government in monitoring and restructuring of the Carana Police, consistent with democratic policing and international standards, to develop a Police training programme, and to further assist in the training of Carana Police in cooperation with interested organizations and interested States.

61. Mission Support Component plans, coordinates, and maintain the administration and logistics structures to deploy, operate and sustain the UN PKM in Carana, be able to support other UN entities in the field if required and within capabilities, plan, coordinate and manage the Mission Budget.

J. RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS

62. The Mission Structure, Military Resources, Police Resources and Support Concept are at Annexes E-F.

Acknowledgement. The SRSG will acknowledge receipt of the MISSION CONOPS and the requirement to produce the MISSION OPLAN, which is to be shared with DPO and DOS for approval.

Under-Secretary-General
Department of Peace Operations
United Nations


Under-Secretary-General
Department of Operational Support
United Nations

ANNEXES:

- A. UNAC Lines of Operation
- B. UNAC HQ Structure
- C. Military Resources
- D. Police Resources
- E. Timeline Peace Process
- F. Mission Objectives and Outputs
- G. Addressing cross-cutting issues


Annex A

UNAC Lines of Operation



Annex B


UNAC HQ Structure



In addition: Mission Field Offices at Galasi, Maroni, Amsan, Folsa, Sureen, Alur, Faron and Corma.


Annex C

Military Resources




Annex D

Police Resources



Annex E

Timeline Peace Process



Annex F

Mission Objectives and Outputs

A sustainable and credible peace process supported by regional actors that includes processes at the national and subnational levels, to foster the implementation of the peace agreement: KPA irreversible as MPC and CISC no longer military entities, successful elections conducted and legitimate political processes recognized as the way to improve the conditions of all people in Carana.				
OUTPUTS				
Phase I Initial Deployment	Phase II Full Deployment	Phase III Consolidation	Phase IV Capacity Building	Phase V Drawdown
Transitional institutions at national level formed in accordance with KPA	- Transitional institutions in accordance with KPA functional - Development of new constitution started	- New constitution developed - Information exchange between political actors visible - administrative conditions for elections established	- New constitution enacted - Election held	Stable Government after elections
Negative external influence on peace process reduced	International assistance established	Framework for self-sustaining stability and peace in Carana is developed	Democratically legitimized GoC is running state functions	Sustainable Structures (judicial, executive, legislative)
- Force structures, weapons minefields and locations are declared - Members/Soldiers of signatories are registered	- All Forces are withdrawn to Bn HQs - Locations for disarmament and demobilization are decided	- MPC and CISC are demobilized - All Weapons are surrendered to international authorities	- Respective MPC/CISC are integrated in FDSC - FDSC units of all background/composition are cooperating	Sustainable level of governance
- start of monitoring and reconstruction evaluation of Carana Police Service - TAA and partnering by IPO in Sector NORTH	- TAA and partnering in CENTRAL and SOUTH - start of support of SSR process	TAA and partnering countrywide		Reopening / implementation of courts
- attain early and visible monitoring and observing posture in likely areas of confrontation, - establish liaison teams to forces of all conflict parties	attain visible monitoring and observing posture throughout CARANA.	attain visible monitoring and observing posture throughout CARANA.	attain visible monitoring and observing posture throughout CARANA.	Respect of rule of law
Basic public information service in GALASI area provided	Basic public information service in 75% of Carana and 90% of populated areas provided	Basic public information service accepted as impartial and reliable source of information	Basic public information service accepted as impartial and reliable source of information	

Security and stabilization, through integrated efforts, in key areas critical to the peace process are restored and civilians under imminent threat are protected.				
Civilians able to move freely within Carana. Illegal armed groups and criminal gangs at a level that can be neutralized by Carana security forces.				
OUTPUTS				
Phase I Initial Deployment	Phase II Full Deployment	Phase III Consolidation	Phase IV Capacity Building	Phase V Drawdown
- Negative external influence on peace process reduced - Initial military presence in likely areas of confrontation between the armed groups established. - establishment of liaison platform to military key leaders	- International assistance established - Buildup/improvement of national security entities is started - Assistance to National Security Forces IOT prevent spoilers to KPA. - Patrols in defined areas in vicinity of the borders conducted IOT observe, monitor and show of force. - Observation and monitoring withdrawal and disarmament of FDC, MPC and CISC to respective Bn locations	- Framework for self-sustaining - stability and peace in Carana is developed - Significant national security capabilities are established - Successfully supported DDR process. - Sufficient security for free elections established;	National security capabilities represent whole people of and provide basic security in CARANA	
- food insecurity rate decrease - Carana Police Forces in Galasi and sector north operational	- introduction of the "Food for Arms" program - Carana Police Forces in sector central and south operational - IDPRE Camp security ensured	- gender awareness elevated - Carana Police Forces' presence in Carana reestablished - Carana Police reinforcement in accordance with DDR - rule of law and compliance with human rights visible	Carana Police reinforcement nearly completed	
- visible UN presence IVO capital and SHQs - Initial Force Protection (FP) is deployed prioritized to Sector II and III IOT protect UN facilities and personnel.	- visible and effective UN presence within the sectors - FOM for own Units along necessary LOC's ensured.	- Assistance to a SASE and military aspects of KPA provided. - Support / assistance to National Security Forces IOT establish a SASE prior to elections.	- Prosecuted SGBV cases through CNP officers have risen - Assistance to National Security Forces IOT establish and/or - maintain a SASE throughout Carana.	Population is free of violence
establish FOM along MLOC and CRITIS IVO capital (APODs/ SPODs)	establish FOM throughout the country			Freedom of Movement
quick start of observing HQs/ bases of regular forces and militias	- expansion of the Observer Mission into remote regions - confidence and trust building patrols in the area of deployment			Absence of Violence
Demining activities are started in the most affected areas and in order to gain freedom of movement	Demining is continued and training is started for host country demining personnel.	Demining projects are handed over to local personnel and UN and engineering personnel will assist, train and support where needed.	Carana is capable of own demining activities including training. UN supports in special situations in critical locations or when specialized personnel is needed.	

Social wellbeing and economic prosperity are restored to a level that allows recovering without international support. CDF, CNP and other security institutions on a path to being ethnically representative, effective and accountable security institutions, that operate under civilian control within a framework of the rule of law and human rights.

OUTPUTS				
Phase I Initial Deployment	Phase II Full Deployment	Phase III Consolidation	Phase IV Capacity Building	Phase V Drawdown
- Initial liaison/Link-Up with all relevant political factions/ actors and administration entities is established - Compliance with the ceasefire in accordance with the KPA	- Liaison Elements are fully integrated - Constant assessment of situation is established - General awareness for compliance is established	- Civil control of security institutions is integrated in constitution process - Compliance is integrated in training/structure of security institutions	National Security Forces are able to provide a SASE for all people throughout Carana	
- humanitarian aid network implemented - Initial crisis response in areas of greatest needs	- Coordinated humanitarian aid and increased efficiency - Continue humanitarian crisis response where necessary - Basic humanitarian access for 40% of Carana	- WASH infrastructure improved - Basic humanitarian access for 60 % of Carana	Basic humanitarian access for 80 % of Carana	- Sufficient Healthcare and WASH facilities - Sufficient Food Security
Facility for training Carana Police Service in <u>Galasi</u> in human rights and rule of law is operational	Facilities for training Carana Police Service in <u>Folsa</u> and <u>Coma</u> in human rights and rule of law is operational	- rule of law and compliance with human rights visible incl. gender based aspects - Focus on SGBV and communication	adherence to rule of law and human rights	Sufficient RoL Education
		Adaption and further development of economics and infrastructure		Sufficient Employment (especially for young Population)

Trustworthy and responsible security institutions and security forces who respect the law and order and human rights are capable and maintain security in Carana.
Through dialogue and engagement and supporting the creation of a protective environment UNAC has enabled national and local stake holders to commit to the peace process

OUTPUTS				
Phase I Initial Deployment	Phase II Full Deployment	Phase III Consolidation	Phase IV Capacity Building	Phase V Drawdown
Initial Conditions for start of SSR process are set, including established liaison and communication to relevant agencies	- Initial Assistance capacity for SSR process is established at national and province level - National state authority is committed to foster SSR	Progress in the SSR process is implemented in build-up of new institutions recognizable and for the population noticeable	- SSR process is implemented in national security structures and sustainable - National Security Forces are able to provide a SASE for all people throughout CARANA.	Trust in Security by Population
- Carana Police Services in <u>Galasi</u> and sector north operational - Facility for training in human rights and rule of law operational - monitoring of Police service started with visible footprint	- Carana Police Services in sector central and south operational - Trainings facilities in <u>Folsa</u> and <u>Coma</u> operational - support to IDPRE Camp security ensured	- Carana Police Services presence in Carana re-established - Carana Police Services reinforcement in accordance with DDR - Capacity of CNP is improved: rule of law according to international standards	- Carana Police Services reinforcement nearly completed - Security forces command and operational structure and deployment adjusted - gender based training growing incl. women in service and duty of Carana Police Service	Sufficient Security (Police and Military) to maintain Law and Order
		technical support and advisory assistance to Carana Police Service provided	- preventive policing programmes, including gender-sensitive and community oriented standards implemented - Number of police personnel is rising after vetting process - Increased reporting of SGBV cases to CNP	Sustainable level of Rule of Law

Annex G

Addressing Cross-Cutting Issues

Topic	Public Information	Political	Development	Humanitarian	Military	Police	Mission Support
SSR	contribute	lead	contribute		contribute	contribute	contribute
DDR	contribute	contribute	lead	contribute	contribute	contribute	contribute
Demining	contribute	contribute	lead		contribute	contribute	contribute
Election	contribute	lead	contribute		contribute	contribute	
Protection of Civilians	contribute	lead	contribute	contribute	contribute	contribute	contribute
Human Rights	contribute	lead	contribute	contribute	contribute	contribute	
Prot. of UN personnel	contribute		contribute	contribute	contribute	lead	contribute

SSR		
Lead: Political		
Task	Responsibility	Remark
institution building	Development	government & police infrastructure
training	Development	civil servants/justice/law enforcement/administration
capacity building	Development	provision of public services/local authorities/police equipment
TAA and partnering	Military	for FDSC
military training	Military	
TAA and partnering	Police	for CAR POL FOR
capacity building police training	Police	
accompanying info campaign	Public Information	aim: provide public information
provide facilities, supply and transport	Mission Support	for UN personnel

DDR		
Lead: Development		
Task	Responsibility	Remark
reintegration program for former rebel fighters	Development	
organize secure livelihood projects	Humanitarian Affairs	
support "Food for arms" campaign	Humanitarian Affairs	
provide expertise on weaponry	Military	
support to integration of MPC-, CISC- and FDC fighters into FDSC	Military	
Carana Police enforcement	Police	ethnic distribution, reintegration of former MPC/CISC fighters
monitoring of implemented measures	Political Affairs	durability/state of the process
mediate/negotiate disputed aspects	Political Affairs	prompt counteraction against impediments
facilitate cooperation at regional/local levels	Political Affairs	"vertical" synergy/unity of effort
media campaign	Public Information	promote DDR-process
support logistic handling of disarmament within capacities	Mission Support	

Demining		
Lead: Development		
Task	Responsibility	Remark
demining projects	Development	clearing along rural roads, mine awareness program
Demining of prioritized LOCs	Military	in close coordination with Mission Support
facilitate cooperation at regional/local levels	Political Affairs	"vertical" synergy/unity of effort
monitor the progress	Political Affairs	identify early signs of impediments/delays
media campaign	Public Information	aim: create awareness + promote process
provide additional EOD capacities	Mission Support	limitations in terms of mine clearance due to focus on protection of facilities

Election		
Lead: Political		
Task	Responsibility	Remark
capability development	Development	election administration
material support	Development	election infrastructure
training of election personnel	Development	polling clerks
protection	Military	focus on polling stations
protection of polling station	Police	Depending on threat level, 2. responder
protection of high rank candidates	Police	Depending on threat level, 2. responder
protection of election rallies	Police	Depending on threat level, 2. responder
BPT counter hostile demonstrations	Police	Depending on threat level, 2. responder
media campaign	Public Information	Aim: promote prep. + conduction

Protection of Civilians		
Lead: Political		
Task	Responsibility	Remark
capacity building	Development	provision of public services/food security programs/health projects
training	Development	health management
coordinate health care	Humanitarian Affairs	access to necessary medical support more than 60% of population
coordinate food supply	Humanitarian Affairs	reduce food insecurity
provide means for protection	Military	
contribute to protect IDPRE camps	Police	2. /3. responder
contribute to protect public service	Police	2. responder
contribute to protect CRITIS	Police	2. responder, primarily mission critical
information campaign	Public Information	aim: provide public information
build up public info service	Public Information	aim: strengthen to local ownership
provide constructional/physical protection	Mission Support	only within capacities
provide threat assessment and protection demands	Mission Support	only within capacities

Human Rights		
Lead: Political		
Task	Responsibility	Remark
Human Rights training programed for law enforcement and judiciary	Development	
HR-projects	Development	education, children, water
coordinate equal access to food, health and other needs	Humanitarian Affairs	aim: strengthens gender and age rights
coordinate gender specific nutrition	Humanitarian Affairs	aim: strengthens gender and age rights
coordinate age specific support	Humanitarian Affairs	aim: strengthens gender and age rights
Monitor violations	Military	intervention in case of POC
TAA military with focus on Human Rights	Military	
Monitor violations	Police	
Coordination Human Rights training	Police	req. Capabilities
media campaign	Public Information	aim: promote importance + progress
media campaign	Public Information	aim: promote UN PKM

Protection of UN personnel		
Lead: Police		
Task	Responsibility	Remark
contribute to situational awareness	Humanitarian Affairs	
provide means for protection	Military	
protection of UN facilities	Police	24/7, 1. Responder, 2. responder MIL
protection of UN transports	Police	ICCW military and support
contribute to protect of UN PODs	Police	2. responder, high readiness state
information campaign	Public Information	aim: provide public information
build up public info service	Public Information	aim: strengthen to local ownership
provide constructional/physical protection	Mission Support	
provide threat assessment and protection demands	Mission Support	

Peace consolidation plan

Towards a peaceful and prosper Carana

UN tasks and responsibilities



New York, 25 September 2021

Political Roadmap towards a peaceful and prosper Carana – UN support planning

1. Introduction

The following political roadmap builds on the national roadmap to peace as developed between the parties to the Kalari Peace Negotiations. This roadmap outlines UNAC tasks and responsibilities in support of the host nation-led transition to peace. UN tasks are structured in fields of action along the four UNAC mission objectives:

- A sustainable and credible peace process supported by regional actors that includes processes at the national and subnational levels, to foster the implementation of the peace agreement.
- Security and stabilization, through integrated efforts, in key areas critical to the peace process are restored and civilians under imminent threat are protected.
- Social wellbeing and economic prosperity are restored to a level that allows recovering without international support.
- Trustworthy and responsible security institutions and security forces who respect the law and order and human rights are capable and maintain security in Carana.

The roadmap is to be evaluated and reviewed prior to the extension of the UNAC mandate, and to be adapted accordingly. Its development has been guided by the following planning assumptions:

2. Planning assumptions and mission support initiatives

The ceasefire between the Government of Carana (GoC), the Mouvement Patriotique du Carana (MPC) and the Combattants Indépendants du Sud-Carana (CISC) on 11 August 2021, following the signing of the Kalari Peace Agreement, paves the way for a new, unified National Transitional Government including representatives of all signatory factions. The coming months will see DDR proceedings, drafting the new Carana constitution, preparations and conduct of National elections, the extension of state authority into the West and South of the country through a new unified National Police Force, the re-institution of a nationwide reliable judiciary and through training and deployment of a unified National Armed Forces to confront El Hasar on the Katasi border and ELF on the Rimosan border.

During the disarmament and demobilization of all but 16,500 FDC, 4,000 MPC and 1,500 CISC fighters, UNAC is expected to consolidate the negotiated peace and stabilize the country against spoilers to the peace agreement. This will enable UNAC and its partners to provide support for the strengthening of national capacity in the security and justice sectors as well as the cantonment and initial demobilization of former combatants of MPC and CISC.

Following the signing of the Kalari Peace Agreement, the first year of the Mission will be determined by high levels of insecurity, likely violations to the PA, high numbers of returnees, weak government structures and a political transition, including human rights challenges. During this phase, UNAC will need to quickly increase its staffing for protection of civilians; the civil affairs network; political affairs; the Joint Mission Analysis Centre/Joint Operations Centre; recovery, reintegration and

peacebuilding; human rights; public information; and United Nations police, while ensuring the protection of UN staff and facilities.

The Mission will establish the necessary capacity in the area of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and phase-in capacity in the areas of rule of law (including corrections and civil and military justice), as mandated by the Security Council and security sector reform. In the first year, the Mission will staff the 10 field offices and 16 of the envisaged 27 province support bases. The Mission will also provide support for the establishment of cantonment sites in the South, taking into account the harsh environmental conditions in the area. This activity will translate into the provision of logistics and transportation support to the cantonment operations with associated requirements.

At the same time, it will be vital for the legitimacy of the new Government to re-establish State authority in the western and southern regions, begin the delivery of basic social services and launch initiatives for equitable economic growth to avoid disillusionment with the peace and reconciliation processes. The early delivery of donor pledges of technical and financial support, including those made in Geneva in November 2018 at the international donor roundtable, will be essential to enable UNAC to play a catalytic role in providing support to authorities to re-establish their authority in the north and launch recovery and development programmes. The results achieved by the planned High-Level International Donors Conference in Accra three weeks from now will yield further means for locally owned Caranese development.

During the second year of the Mission, the constitution will be drafted, and preparation for election begins. It is expected that elections will be held, or at the very least, preparations will be well under way. If the elections are delayed or mismanaged, this could lead to increased insecurity and threaten progress in the expansion of state authority and respect for human rights. During this phase of the Mission, UNAC will request electoral staffing, in cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). During this phase, UNAC will need to maintain the staffing levels of the first year and increase its staffing for an expanded disarmament and demobilization programme. It will assist UNCT in its reintegration programme where needed. UNAC will also expand its presence at the province level in line with the expansion of state authority. The election facilitation tasks will require additional staffing for 6 new province support bases, bringing the total to 21, as well as the increased presence of the United Nations police.

In the third year, UNAC priorities will be shaped by the gradual consolidation of the newly unified GoC, continuing high numbers of returnees and the gradual expansion of state authority. The Mission will also continue to expand its disarmament, demobilization and reintegration staffing and United Nations police staffing, and will staff six additional province support bases, bringing the total to 27. During the third year, and depending on the request of the Government and the scale and scope of donor contributions, the staffing for rule of law and security sector reform may be reduced. Furthermore, it is foreseen that the number of United Nations police will reach 1250 within the three-year period, following the increased logistical capacity of the Mission.

As soon as the elections are scheduled, support will include continued logistical assistance to the United Nations integrated election team, the movement of electoral material to and from polling stations and the provision of security within capabilities and areas of deployment by formed police units and military contingents with associated support requirements. Support to military staff officers and United Nations police officers at both Mission headquarters and in sector headquarters will be provided at the same level as that provided to civilian personnel. For field offices, accommodations will be established within integrated facilities ensuring co-location of all civilian, military and police components. The Mission will strive to mitigate the environmental impact of its operations.

Staffing levels proposed are based on an expectation of what is realistically achievable within a three-year time frame. The staffing levels in the first year and the expected incremental increase in the following years are based on the circumstances on the ground, the level of government capacity and logistical realities. Mission staff will be embedded in government structures at the national, state and county levels in mandated areas to help expand state authority and build national capacities.

In line with its mandate to deliver at the national, state and local levels, and cognizant of the fact that most challenges are likely to arise at the state and county levels where government capacity is weak, most staff will be deployed at the state and county levels. Key political and advisory functions will be located at the Mission headquarters in Galasi. UNAC headquarters in Galasi will host the senior management team of the Mission, including the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the Deputy Special Representative (Political), the Deputy Special Representative (Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator), the Force Commander and the Police Commissioner. All senior managers will pay frequent visits to the province capitals and counties to ensure policy coherence and underline the decentralized approach of UNAC throughout the country.

Field offices will be established in each of the eight provinces in Carana, namely Koloni, Tereni, Mahbek, Hanno, Fellari, Barin, Guthar and Leppko. Due to its size, Leppko will have additional field offices in Maldosa and Lora. Each of the offices will be led by a state coordinator, who will have a high degree of authority to manage the day-to-day operations and coordinate the different functions of the Mission based on joint work plans agreed by the Mission leadership.

There will be clear mechanisms for the requesting and tasking of assets that are available only centrally. Close coordination with the United Nations country team at the province level will be ensured through regular meetings between field coordinators and the expanded county team, supported by the Recovery, Reintegration and Peacebuilding Section, which will serve as the liaison with the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. State coordinators in the field offices in Alur (Tereni), Corma (Leppko) and Galasi will serve as liaison elements to the respective Sector HQs.

3. Regional co-operation

The Mission will use the Regional Service Centre and the Regional Procurement Office in Entebbe (Uganda) for consolidating administrative and support functions. UNAC cooperates with the United Nations Office for Fasias (UNOF), the Fasian Union Political Advisory Mission to Sumora (FUPAMS), the UN Special Envoy to Rimosa and other relevant United Nations actors to improve analysis and information within the Organization on regional and transnational issues. It coordinates its actions in the western provinces with the French-led Opération Aigle in Katasi.

4. Country team coordination, partnerships and integrated missions

As the official responsible for addressing the situation in Carana in all its aspects, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General ensures that both the Mission and the agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations provide support for and coordinate efforts with the representatives and envoys of the Secretary-General, including the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict.

The coordination of humanitarian and development activities of the United Nations specialized agencies, funds and programmes and UNAC is led by the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator).and the alignment of United Nations programmes is currently based on a combination of the revised humanitarian response plan for Carana. However, given the rapidly evolving circumstances, including the deployment of a multidimensional integrated peacekeeping mission and the signing of the Kalari Peace Agreement, early recovery planning to identify and implement prioritized interventions to support the country's stabilization is also currently under way. The Mission's leadership team will also assess the potential impact of United Nations-led military operations on humanitarian activities and promote the development of appropriate risk mitigation strategies.

The United Nations country team is currently implementing programmes in Carana in the areas of IDP camp administration, service delivery, agricultural extension and food security, rule of law, governance, community security and conflict mitigation, among others. During the next three years as the implementation of the Carana Development Plan progresses, the United Nations country team will be increasing programme presence in accordance with its United Nations Development Assistance Framework in a number of key areas, including governance, service delivery, agricultural-led growth, social programmes, reintegration, rural development, rule of law and conflict mitigation. The scale and scope of these programmes, however, will depend on the availability of funding from donors.

UNAC cooperates with a number of regional bodies and international organizations, including the Fasian Union and the European Union to support dialogue to assist Caranese-led reconciliation efforts and socioeconomic development with other Member States within the region. The Integrated Task Force based at United Nations Headquarters ensures that coherent policy guidance and support is provided to UNAC. This mechanism promotes coordination, collaboration and information-sharing among the Department of Peace Operations, the Department of Mission Support, the Department of Safety and Security and the agencies, funds and programmes on issues related to the implementation of the Mission's mandate and broader United Nations policy guidance.

5. Fields of Action

The Mission's tasks are divided according to the four mission strategic objectives: supporting the implementation of the Kalari Peace Agreement, security and stabilization, social wellbeing and economic prosperity, and trustworthy security institutions and forces.

A. Supporting the implementation of the Peace Agreement and the peace process

The Kalari Peace Agreement foresees three major fields of action in order to facilitate its implementation of in terms of government building and the extension of state authority. First, monitoring the ceasefire agreement is most urgent, and closely connected to the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). Next, drafting a constitution in an inclusive and democratically accountable process is the key prerequisite to conduction national and presidential elections.

- a) **Political Affairs division** will assist in the timely establishment and support the effectiveness of the National Transitional Government of Carana NTGC, especially the National Transitional Legislative Assembly NTLA and the constitutional board; Caranese governmental institutions and infrastructure IOT assure the broadest possible participation and inclusion of all factions of Caranese society and commitment to the peace process. Special focus will be on the drafting and implementation of a new inclusive constitution for Carana.
- b) **DDR section** will assist the establishment of the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR) and its sub-commission. It supports an integrated DDR process to bind former combatants, supporters and other involved personnel IACW the Kalari Peace Agreement IOT achieve favourable security levels at an early stage.
- c) **Electoral Affairs section** will assist in the preparation and timely conduction of democratic elections IAW the implementation of the new Caranese constitution and ICCW NTGC IOT ensure broadest possible participation of Caranese constituency in the political rebuilding of Carana and the acceptance of accountable Caranese political institutions.
- d) **Civil Affairs division** will assist and coordinate civil affairs in a bottom-up approach IOT ensure that the broader Caranese population needs and rights are considered and respected in the peace process.

B. Security and Stabilization

The stabilization and PoC field of action focuses on the three most acute PoC challenges during the early stages of transition: the protection from non-signatory armed groups, such as ELF, El Hasar and organized crime networks; the return of over 700,000 IDPs from their current locations, and landmine threats.

- a) **Gender Affairs Advisory Unit** will mainstream gender issues across all levels and with all parties involved.
- b) **Humanitarian Affairs Office** will coordinate with OCHA to assist in the provision of basic services and commodities with special focus on IDPs IOT relieve humanitarian situation.
- c) **Civil Affairs division** will assist and coordinate Caranese population security needs in a bottom-up approach IOT ensure PoC and create stable, safe and secure living conditions.
- d) **Women's Protection Unit** will monitor and advise on women's needs IAW UN Res 1325 IOT ensure and enable women's protection and prevention of violence against women.
- e) **Child Protection Unit** will monitor and advice on protection and prevention of violence against minors IOT ensure their vulnerabilities and special needs are addressed and respected.

C. Forming trustworthy and responsible security institutions and security forces

The institutional reform section is divided in the reform of security institutions such as the judiciary and the national Security Council, and creating new, united Caranese police and military forces. A strong focus lies on human rights awareness and the rule of law in all layers of action.

- a) Security Sector Reform Unit** will assist in the rebuilding of the Caranese security sector with credible and accountable security forces IOT enable PoC and ensure territorial integrity of Carana.
- b) Corrections Advisory Section** will advise on the establishment of corrections institutions with special regard to transitional justice and IAW local and international law IOT ensure the upholding of rule of law, HR and sustainable reconciliation.
- c) Judicial Advisory Section** will advise on the establishment of a legal system with special regard to transitional justice and IAW local and international law IOT ensure the upholding of rule of law, HR and sustainable reconciliation.
- d) Military Justice Advisory Section** will advise on the establishment of a military legal system with special regard to transitional justice and IAW local and international law IOT ensure the upholding of rule of law, HR and sustainable reconciliation.
- e) Rule of Law/Security Institutions Support** will assist in the establishment of judicial and security institutions and infrastructure IOT ensure UN standards are met.

D. Enabling social wellbeing and economic prosperity

This area focuses on government accountability, the fight against corruption and impunity, and tackles issues of national and individual reconciliation.

- a) Civil Affairs division** will assist and coordinate civil affairs in a bottom-up approach IOT ensure that the broader Caranese population social wellbeing and economic prosperity are gradually improved.
- b) Human Rights division** will monitor and report human rights violations, train and assist state institutions and security forces in the upholding of HR standards and advise and educate Caranese population on HR IOT facilitate long-term national and individual reconciliation.
- c) Office of the DSRSG/ Resident Coordinator Humanitarian Affairs** will coordinate with OCHA and UNCT to assist in the provision of basic services and commodities with special focus on IDPs IOT relieve humanitarian situation.
- d) Political Affairs division** will advise and assist political state authorities on accountability, social and economic good practice IOT improve good governance and long-term stability.

Annexes:

Annex A: Political Roadmap towards a peaceful and prosper Carana

Annex B: Public Information Concept for UNAC

Annex A: Political Roadmap towards a peaceful and prosper Carana

Kalari Peace Negotiations

Kalari, 21 August 2021

**Political Roadmap towards a peaceful and
prosper Carana**

for: The Government of Carana

for: The Mouvement Patriotique de Carana
(MPC)

for: The Combattants Indépendants du Sud
Carana (CISC)

for: The United Nations

The following political roadmap has been devised in a participatory process between the parties to the Kalari Peace Negotiations under the leadership of President Ogavo (FDC), Cmdr. Sefu Akinyi (MPC) and Cmdr. Abdirahim Muhamed (CISC), and representatives of the UN and FU in Carana.

As the peace negotiations draw to a close, a transition to peace and a sustainable, democratic and inclusive government is more in reach than ever before. This roadmap outlines tasks and milestones in eight different fields of action: the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, a social stability pact to foster national cohesion at all community levels; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); reforms of the security, governance and education sectors, development and humanitarian issues as well as national reconciliation and transitional justice.

These fields of action elaborate on the ambitious goals set in the Kalari Peace Treaty. They support the coordination of action between all actors: the parties to the conflict, the UN assistance mission UNAC and the UN country team. It includes milestones, deadlines, indicators for their success and requirements in terms of personnel and budget. Periodic evaluations, both internally and externally, will document the progress towards a peaceful and unified Carana and increase donor confidence in the new interim National Transitional Government of Carana (NTGC). Following the steps outlined in this political roadmap, the NTGC will be succeeded by an inclusive, democratically elected new Government of Carana.

Axis 1: Implementing the Ceasefire Agreement

Parties	Milestone	Deadline	Indicator	UN
Implement the Ceasefire agreement	All attacks by air, land and sea, as well as all acts of sabotage ceased	D+3	Conflict-related deaths per 100,000 population	Monitor and verify
	All acts of violence against the civilian population; acts of revenge; summary executions; torture; harassment; detention and persecution of civilians on the basis of ethnic origin, religious beliefs, or political affiliation; arming of civilians; use of child soldiers; sexual violence; sponsoring or promotion of terrorists or genocidal ideologies ceased	D+3		Oversee, provide education measures and complaint mechanisms
	All domestic and external propaganda between the parties and incitation of ethnic hatred ceased	D+30		
	Supplies of ammunition, weaponry and lethal supplies ceased			
Discuss the issue of prisoner of war, political prisoners, and camps for displaced persons.	Camps and Prisoners Conference w/ UN officers and relevant spokespeople of all Parties	D+40	Joint strategy for IDP return released	Facilitate
			Joint strategy for PoW and political prisoners released	
Release all civilian abductees and demobilize combatants who are less than eighteen years			D+60	No. of released according to UN OCHA reports
Investigate any violations of the ceasefire using joint verification and observation groups created for this purpose	Regional Joint Teams rule of order established	D+60	RJT bi-weekly meetings	Verify and monitor the security arrangements
	RJTs installed in all province capitals			
Install Joint Commission for the Ceasefire (JCC)	Joint Commission for the Ceasefire (JCC) installed	D+30	No. of disputes about allegations regarding the agreed Cease Fire reported by the Regional Joint Teams (RJTs) discussed and decided upon	SRSG / DSRSG assumes seat.
Share information between parties in order to reduce the likelihood of violations of the Ceasefire Agreement and to clarify alleged violations of the agreement	Weekly meetings JCC	D+90		Assist in building confidence amongst signatories and help create trust in the peace process, facilitate communication
Engage factions absent to the negotiations to join the Peace Agreement				

Axis 2: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

Parties	Milestone	Deadline	Indicator	UN
Establish a National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR)	Members nominated to SRSG UNAC	D+30		Join NCDDR and sub-commissions
Establish a military sub-commission		D+90		
Establish a reintegration sub-commission	First meeting all commissions D+60	D+90		
Establish a small arms and light weapons sub-commission		D+90		
Oversee ban on any mine-laying operations and operations to remove mines	Full transfer of all mine location documents	D+45	No complaints RJTs	Monitor and coordinate (UNMAS)
Voluntarily commit all FDC, MPC and CISC forces to the DDR process	Full register all MPC, FDC, CISC fighters	D+90		Oversee and be prepared to support
	MPC and CISC disarm and demobilise as soon the security situation allows	D+210		
All military personnel beyond 22,000 needs to be disarmed, demobilized and integrated into other government sectors or private sectors	Cantonment sites/locations for disarmament and demobilisation chosen	D+180	No. of vocational training programs for ex-combatants	Monitor and be prepared to support
	All weapons (including ammunition and mines) surrendered to international authorities for storage or destruction	D+240		
	All armed groups have freely chosen which forces or other institution they are joining	D+360		
	4,000 MPC and 1,500 CISC members integrated in the new FDSC		In-depth DDR monitoring and evaluation survey	
			No. of re-integration measures for families and dependants	

Axis 3: Security Sector Reform

Parties	Milestone	Deadline	Indicator	UN
Create Forces de la Defense et Securité de Carana (FDSC)	All armed formations of FDC, MPC and CISC have stopped hostile acts, cease recruitment, cease laying of mines and stay at their reported locations until registration has been completed	D+45	Periodic reports NCDDR/JCC	Monitor
	All belligerents exchange detailed documents about the strength, capabilities and locations of their forces. The information is to be shared with the NCDDR and the JCC.			Facilitate
	Human rights, gender and SEA awareness training for military conducted	D+270	No. of UN training and monitoring programs	Administer
	Inauguration parade	D+360	Parade	Monitor
Create National Police Force	National Uniforms for 12,500 police ordered	D+90	No. of UN training, ToT and monitoring programs	Advise, monitor and provide support
	Locations for police stations designated	D+150	No. of police stations built/reconstructed	
	Police deployed throughout Carana	D+360	No. of fully functional police stations	
	Training concepts for a police academy in Galasi developed		% of women in police force	
			% Increase (decrease) in crime rate (Property, GBV, Assault, Murder)	
			Half-yearly reports on human rights and due diligence	
	Internal oversight mechanism established		Human rights awareness trainings	
Reform of Security Forces	Prison facilities renovated	D+500	No. of UN training, ToT and monitoring programs	Monitor & Advise
	Prison guards trained			
	Customs officials trained			
Protect the most vulnerable	Human rights trainings conducted for relevant security personnel in every province capital	D+500	Proportion of people with rule of law related grievances that receive satisfactory redress	Advise & Facilitate
	Coordination platform between civil affairs division, UNCT, donors and partners operationalized		No. of gender-segregated detention facilities	
			Human rights-related crime investigation taskforce established	
Reform of Judiciary	Judicial reform strategy disseminated	D+500	Reports by independent SBGV justice mechanism	Advise and train
	Embed Human Rights		No. of judges per district	
Improve Access to Justice for the most vulnerable	High quality training for all stakeholders and related personnel in the justice system, particularly concerning civil mediation promoted		No. of cases settled per judge	
	Status of traditional authorities within the regulations on protocol and precedence acknowledged			
			% reporting feeling very safe (disaggregated by group and demographics)	

Axis 4: Government accountability

Parties	Milestone	Deadline	Indicator	UN
Strengthen fight against corruption and impunity	Committee to fight corruption and financial mismanagement created	D+90	No. of institutional actors capacitated	Monitor and advise
	Public expenses decreased through reduction of "lifestyle" costs			
	Funds allocated to security sector, defense and justice audited	D+180	No. of inclusive politics priorities and milestones achieved	
	Enhanced Public understanding of local governance and local council's access to resources ensured		No. of local/district councils benefited from capacity development	
Re-build robust state institutions	Robust capacity building programs developed and implemented	D+300	No. of institutional actors capacitated	Advise and support
	Nation-wide household survey conducted		No. of inclusive politics priorities and milestones achieved	
			No. of local/district councils benefited from capacity development	
			% or amount of funding/resources availed to local councils	
	Institutional capacity for effective election management strengthened		No. of local governance awareness raising projects delivered	
	Adequate local government capacity for effective leadership and improved service delivery established		Women as a % of the institutional workforce	

Axis 5: Reconciliation and Transitional Justice

Parties	Milestone	Deadline	Indicator	UN
Promote civic engagement through education and culture	Government public accountability mechanism launched	D+60	No. of cases received	Support
	National Tourism initiative constitutive meeting	D+80	No. of state-registered travel programs	
Relaunch dialogue with radical groups, engage local actors and communities involved in conflict	Monthly community forums institutionalized in all province capitals	D+90	% of total no. of refugees due to conflict and violence who return	Facilitate
Develop and implement a National Charter for Peace, Unity and national Reconciliation (NCPUR)	All cabinet Ministers, Deputy and Assistant Ministers, heads of autonomous agencies, commissions, and heads of public corporations and State-owned enterprises of the current GOC have resigned	D+60	No. of areas NCPUR is devolved to and implemented	Assist
	Install NCPUR commission	D+90		
	NCPUR/processes devolved and implemented at all levels in the country	D+300	No. of reconciliation activities delivered % of people targeted/beneficiaries of reconciliation activities	
Draft new Constitution of Carana	National Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA) established	D+90	Availability of a new, ratified Carana Constitution	Monitor
	Constitutional board established			
	Draft new constitution of Carana completed	D+200		Advise
	Constitution (C) adopted	D+360		
Accelerate victims' compensation	Administrative pathways established	D+100	No. of compensation requests delivered	Train and advise
Facilitate return of IDPs and refugees	Joint strategy for IDP return implemented	D+180	% of total no. of people displaced internally due to conflict and violence who return	Support
	Legal and regulatory assistance and information on citizens' rights extended		No. of citizen's rights awareness workshops	
Operationalise the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Council	Peaceful co-existence and relationships built	D+500	No. of conflict issues – political, social, religious – resolved	Support
Conduct Presidential and National elections; Facilitate unrestricted formation of parties in national politics	Effective political parties formed and officially registered	D+540	No. of political parties registered and regions covered	Assist and be ready to support
	All eligible voters registered		No./% of eligible voters registered	
			No. of civic education and public awareness-raising activities delivered	
			% of female candidates	
			Civic education delivered – Informed electorate aware of its rights and duties	% of female candidates elected

Axis 6: Development and humanitarian issues

Parties	Milestone	Deadline	Indicator	UN
Government wealth-sharing	Carana Reconstruction and Development Fund (CRDF) established	D+90	No. of quick impact programs realized	Assist
	CRDF monitoring and evaluation system established			
	Oversight Committee appointed		No. of audits	Monitor
	Debt Management Unit formed			
Strengthen social protection	National strategy for IDPs completed	D+270	Land registry system implemented per district	Assist and advise
			UN OCHA report on free and unhindered movement	
	Invested in disaster risk management capacity	D+450	No. of early warning systems	
			No. of capacity-building trainings conducted on local/national level	
Create an enabling economic environment	Opportunities for disadvantaged created	D+270	% living under \$1.90 a day	Assist, coordinate UN Country Team with GoC and UNAC
			Share of women in work force (%)	
			% with birth certificates	
	Sustainable food production advanced	D+350	Export of livestock	
			% Annual Growth in Crop Production (in tons)	
			% Annual Growth in Livestock Production	
	Private sector diversified	D+400	Employment to Population Ratio (%)	Advise
			Domestic revenue for GoC (in \$)	
			Unemployment rate (Men, Women, Rural, Urban)	
			Informal/precarious employment rate (males, females, total)	
			Youth Unemployment Rate (males, females) (%)	
			Employment in manufacturing (share of total employment)	
	Infrastructure extended in rural regions	D+600	Proportion of the rural population who live within 2 km of an all-season road	Assist with QIPs, monitor
			Kilometres of main inter-city, inter-state and inter-region rehabilitated/constructed	
			% households with access to electricity	
			% mobile phone penetration	
			% with access to mobile banking	
	Sustainable communities fostered	D+600	No. of kW produced by renewable energy	Advise
			No. of floods per year	
			Exports/Imports of goods and services (in \$) - annual	
			Abroad (Diaspora) remittance transfers (% of GDP)	

Axis 7: Education Sector reform

Parties	Milestone	Deadline	Indicator	UN
Strengthen communication, coordination and management to improve oversight, monitoring and supervision	regular dialogue between education partners set in place	D+150	% of national budget allocated to the education sector	Monitor and advise
	national meetings on education organized		No. of national, state and county education managers trained in policy, M&E and financial management	
	Trainings for relevant personnel conducted		% national, district and schools that comply with internationally accepted standards of accounting, procurement and financial management	
Provide equitable and safe access to inclusive, quality education for all children, youth and adults	Education needs assessment conducted	D+180	% of national budget allocated to education	Coordinate and assist
			Youth unemployment rate	
			Human Capital Index rank	
	5,000 schools per province (re)inaugurated	D+600	Proportion of children enrolled in lower secondary school, disaggregated by gender and location	Run education programs
			% of learners completing their level, desegregated by gender & disability	Provide UNAC volunteer teachers
			No. of trained teachers (total and per student)	Provide teacher trainings
			No. of inclusive educational infrastructures constructed	Assist in infrastructure building through QIPs
			Density of schools/district	
			Proportion of children enrolled in grade 2/3, disaggregated by gender and location	

Annex B: Public Information Concept for UNAC

Public Information Concept for the UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN CARANA (UNAC)


1. Target audience and media environment analysis**1.1. Population**

Composition regarding Age:	< 15: 44%; 15 – 18: 13%; 18 – 60: 39%; > 60: 4%;
Communities most at risks	IDPs/Refugees and their hosts; Children and adolescents; women (-headed households);
Literacy:	40% of adult population can read and write; 20% of youth (under 18) can read and write;
Languages:	20 original languages or tribal dialects; administrative language is French;
Perception of a possible UNAC:	Western CARANA and rural areas: more positive; Eastern CARANA and urban areas: more hostile (especially by youth Groups in GALASI, VERENI and MALDOSA due to agitation and manipulation; Southern CARANA: worsening reputation due to increasing opposition against peace negotiations by some CISC factions

1.2. General overview of CARANAs media environment

Print Media:	Nearly 20 daily newspapers National Newspapers are available in province capitals and some other towns; International publications are only available in GALASI Additionally, several locally printed media (with only limited distribution); MPC started an own newspaper some month ago;
Radio:	2 radio stations (state owned); Additionally, some low power community-based radio stations with local focus); MPC started an own radio channel some month ago;
Television:	2 TV channels (state cooperatives);
Internet:	social media is frequently used via mobile phones; Tool of awareness and democratic mobilization, but also to spread hate speeches and to incite to ethnic violence;
Censorship:	The Caranese Ministry of Information controls in principle all media; While censorship is nearly absolute in the cases of radio and television channels as well as national newspapers, it is only limited in case of local media.

1.3 Technical coverage of CARANA by radio and television



2. Mission

2.1 Direct Tasks

- Analyse media situation IOT detect possible peace treaty violations;
- Promote UNAC as "impartial and here to help".

2.2. Supporting Tasks

- Promote national and local ownership;
- Contribute to SSR-, DDR- and demining-process;
- Deter violence;
- Promote humanitarian assistance and development;
- Promote democratic elections;
- Provide public information.

3. Intent

Public Information supports all phases of UNAC in a three-step approach:

1. Initially: Gain the support of the Caranese population for UNAC;
2. Medium-term: Promote and contribute to UNAC programs and concepts;
3. Long-term: Transfer UNAC media and information campaigns and initially provided services to Caranese national and local ownership.

The main staff elements will be located in GALASI. 4 mobile teams will be aligned with the Sector HQ.

4. Execution

4.1 Target Audiences

Group	Aim
1. Civil population - with a special focus on the youth and communities most at risk - Main Target Audience	➤ Gain support for UNAC; Create situational awareness; ➤ Contribute to prevention of violence.
2. MPC-, CICS- and FDC-fighters	➤ Gain support for Peace Treaty and UNAC; ➤ Detect possible Peace Treaty violations; ➤ Counter fake news and propaganda; ➤ Promote especially DDR-process.
3. Extremist fighters	➤ Counter fake news and propaganda; ➤ Promote especially DDR-process.
4. UNAC personnel	➤ Contribute to UNAC "speaks with one voice"; ➤ Create situational awareness; Ensure support for UNAC projects.
5. International community	➤ Gain international support for UNAC.

4.2 Channels

4.2.1 Primary Effort

- Radio: special focus: Western and Southern CARANA; rural areas;
- Social Media: special focus: Eastern CARANA; urban areas; youth (age 15-18).

4.2.2 Secondary Effort

- Print Media: special focus: UNAC internal information.

4.3 Information and Media Campaigns


	Topic	Task	Aim	Message
STEP 1: Initially – Gain the support of the Caranese population for UNAC				
1	Perception of UNAC	Conduct information and media campaign Rent "airtime" from governmental radio stations if possible, to send core messages via radio, promote a code of ethics for journalists to build trust, start the production of reports, broadcasts, together with other components.	1) Contribute to UNAC "speaks with one voice" 2) Gain support by Caranese population 3) Promote UNAC (regarding Caranese population and international community)	"UNAC – Impartial and here to help!"
2	Media and information environment	1) Monitor CARANAs media environment 2) Counter fake news and propaganda	1) Contribute to comprehensive situational awareness 2) Detect possible peace treaty violations 3) Contribute to the deterrence and preventions of violence	-
STEP 2: Medium-term – Promote and contribute to UNAC programs and concepts				
3	Local Ownership	Build up Caranese national and local capacities	1) Ensure inclusion of local civilians in all projects and campaigns	-
4	SSR	Conduct accompanying information campaign	1) Provide public information	-
5	DDR	Conduct media campaign	1) Promote DDR-process	"A journey to a civil life in peace and freedom"
6	Demining	Conduct media campaign	1) Create awareness 2) Promote demining-projects and process	"Mines and unexploded ammunition: A threat for all! – Be aware! – Don't touch! – Warn others!"
7	Elections	Conduct media campaign	1) Promote the preparation and conduction of democratic internationally supervised elections	"Election: Your chance to participate! – Your responsibility to take it!"

8	Protection of Civilians	1) Conduct information and media campaign 2) Build up a Caranese public information service	1) Provide public information 2) Promote UN engagement	"UNAC – My contribution to peace"
9	Human Rights	Conduct media campaign	1) Promote importance and progress 2) Promote UNAC (regarding Caranese population and international community)	"CARANA: Common life in Unity, Equality and Dignity"
STEP 3: Long-term – Transfer UNAC media and information campaigns and initially provided services to Caranese national and local ownership				
10	Local Ownership	Transfer campaigns and services	1) Hand over broad casting service 2) Promote UNAC by strengthening and Contribution to the concept of national and local ownership	"I am CARANA – My responsibility!"
11	Monitoring and Evaluation	Permanent ongoing actions: 1) monitor the information environment 2) observe public opinion	1) adjust messages 2) compose after-action reports	

4.4 Risk Assessment

Risk	Assessment	Deduction
1. Concentration on UN- owned Media and limited use of available information channels in CARANA	- UN media could perceived as a possible competitor for local media; - Risk as being perceived as partial - UN influence could be limited.	- Balance use of UN-owned and local media and information providers.
2. Addressing of especially young people (15-18) as main target audience fails	- UNAC would not be able to gain the support for its mission in CARANA; - UN mission success could be hampered.	- Primary use of social media IOT influence young people; - Youth should be addressed by special programs and topics of interests.
3. Perception of UNAC as primary military intervention due to unbalanced reporting	- UN-owned reporting could be used again UN engagement in CARANA IOT hamper programs and process by creating an UN-hostile environment	- Limited reporting of military-related topics; - Focus on civil engagement.

4.5 Timings and synchronisation



Phase 1: M-M+90:

< M+10: UN Department of Global Information initiates Campaign “UNAC – here to help CARANIA” via local and social media;

Until M+15: Public Information Office Core Staff is deployed in GALASI;

Until M+30: UNAC Broadcasting Service Technical Team (8) is deployed and setup of UNAC Broadcasting Station and Transmitter in GALASI begins;

Until M+45: Core Editors Office deployed in GALASI;

M+60: FM Broadcast and IP Broadcast of UNAC Broadcasting Service online with Basic

Information Service and Demining Awareness Campaign „Demining: Mines and unexploded ammunition“;

Until M+75: Special Campaign Team 1 and 2 deployed in GALASI;

Until M+90: Personnel of UNAC Broadcasting Service and Public Information Office MHQ deployed in Country.

Phase 2: M+90-M+180

M+90: Special Campaign Team 1: Transition from campaign "UNAC – here to help CARANA" to "I am UNAC – my contribution to peace"; Special Campaign Team 2: Campaign "DDR: A journey to a civilian life in peace and freedom" until M + 365;

Until M+120: 2 of 4 remote transmitters of UNAC Broadcasting Service operational; 2 of 4 mobile Teams arrived in country;

Until M+150: 4 of 4 mobile teams arrived in country and 2 of 4 deployed and operational; Special Campaign Team 3 deployed in GALASI;

Until M+180: 4 of 4 remote transmitters of UNAC broadcasting service operational; 4 of 4 mobile teams deployed and operational.

Phase 3: M+180 – M+330

M+180 - tbd: Special Campaign Team 3: Start of campaign: "Human Rights: CARANA – Common Life in Unity, Equality and Dignity" with focus on gender aspects and women's rights;

NLT M+330: Start of integration of local personnel to UNAC Broadcasting Service in Editorial Office and Technical Service.

Phase 4: M+330 – tbd:



M + 365 - 548: Special Campaign Teams 2: Start of Campaign: "Election: Your chance to participate – your responsibility to take it!"

Tbd: Integration of local personnel in Special Campaign Team 1;


Phase 5:

Tbd: Transition of UNAC Broadcasting Service to CARANA NBS.

5. Organization Structure



6. Radio and Relay Organization





Military Concept of Operations

MILITARY CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

FOR UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN CARANA

(UNAC)

25 September 21

1. References.

- A. Kalari Peace Agreement dated 11 August 2021.
- B. Security Council Resolution 1544 dated 10 September 2021 (S/RES/1544 (2021)).
- C. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations on the situation in Carana 4711 (2021). S/2021/4711, dated 27 July 2021.
- D. Strategic Guidance from USG DPO, dated 02 June 2021.
- E. UNAC Mission Concept, dated 25 September 2021.
- F. Strategic Assessment Report, dated 22 February 2021.
- G. UNAC Rules of Engagement, dated 25 September 2021.
- H. Logistics Support Concept / directive, dated 25 September 2021.
- I. Police Concept of Operations (CONOPS) / Directive, dated 25 September 2021.
- J. UN/DPO/DOS Policy - Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping, dated 25 October 2019.
- K. UN/DPO/DPPA/DOS/DSS Policy – Casualty Evacuation in the Field, effective 01 March 2020.

2. **Review.** The CONOPS should be reviewed when there is major change in a mandate or Mission Concept. It is to be drafted after the IOT revision of Mission Concept.

3. Introduction.

This Military Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the United Nations Multidimensional Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC), hereafter called the UNAC CONOPS, provides high-level guidance to military commanders and planning officers for the deployment and employment of the military component of the Mission. This guidance provides direction for subsequent operational level plans

including military operation orders, commander directives, contingency plans and operational coordination mechanisms.

The CONOPS will be reviewed annually or as determined by the Under-Secretary-General (USG) of the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), in close cooperation with the USG of the Department of Operational Support (DOS).

The UNAC Military Component has an authorised strength of up to 13,315 United Nations military unit personnel, up to 185 military observers, 40 Liaison Officer and 300 military staff officers as stipulated in UNSCR 1544 (Reference B) The detailed organisation of the UNAC Military Component is provided at Annex D.

4. Situation.

a. Background.

After gaining independence from France in 1986, and although being faced with multiple challenges, Carana experienced about 10 years of decent development and stability. Over time, however, problems resulting from the time of colonialism began to have a negative impact that led to the military taking control of the government by the end of 1991 to re-establish order.

In the period of military rule (1991 – 2003) the economic situation had deteriorated to such a degree that only a massive injection of international aid could prevent the country from falling into a humanitarian crisis. As a result of the economic situation and the discrimination of Kori and Tatsi by the government, political opposition groups and rebel movements evolved in the early 2000s and challenges to the General Tarakoni's regime became more frequent. The government suppressed most of these groups. Military and police used brutal force to suppress any attempt to challenge Tarakoni's regime.

After years of instability, and under international pressure free elections were conducted (observed by UN electoral delegates) in April 2003 and in the country's first democratic elections in many years, Jackson Ogavo, a Falin, from the Parti Démocratique de Carana (PDC) was elected President. Ogavo was re-elected for four consecutive terms (2003, 2008, 2013, 2018), though opposition to his regime began to grow in 2007 due to a lack of economic growth and increasing discrimination against Kori and Tatsi members by the ruling – and predominantly Falin – party.

In 2014 some small rebel movements in the Tereni province joined the larger and better organized rebel groups known as Mouvement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) and formed a well-structured and efficient military opposition. The MPC defeated the Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC) in some local battles and gained increasing support from the local population in the west. In February 2016 the FDC lost control of some areas in the western highlands. Though the MPC's military engagements were well coordinated and successfully executed, the rebels failed to formulate a comprehensive political program. The only clearly

stated aim was to remove Ogavo from power. Beginning 2018 the MPC gained control of the three provinces in the West (Koloni, Tereni and Mahbek).

Because of the strong commitment of the FDC in the west, small ethnic based rebel movements took their chances and attacked the government institutions in Leppko province. The uprising in the south was characterized by brutal violence against members of the ethnic group of the Falin and looting rebels. Some of these small rebel groups united and called themselves Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CICS).

A combination of war-weariness and strategic manoeuvring led the leaders of both the MPC and CISC, as well as President Ogavo, to start negotiating a cease-fire and peace treaty in September 2019.

b. Current Situation (Political, Security and Humanitarian).

After signing the Kalari Peace Agreement on 11 August 2021 all parties complied on a medium level of compliance. To ensure the compliance to the existing Peace Agreement the parties to the conflict invited the United Nation to support their efforts to implement the signed Peace Agreement. Even, the parties seem to be trustworthy, local skirmishes and conflicts still occur on a regular basis.

There is also an increase of armed rebel groups, warlords and fundamentalist / extremist groups as well-armed criminal elements that have the potential to delay/stall the implementation of the peace agreement and might see the UN as a lucrative target, including groups operating cross border.

The Katasi based El Hasar terrorist group infiltrating the west of Carana to avoid the French COIN operations in Katasi and exploiting local communities for logistics and supply. The NTGC signed an MOU with the French Forces requested by the Katasi government to address the threat posed by the terrorist group, allowing the French Forces to pursue El Hasar across the border into Tereni and Koloni regions in West Carana.

Illegal militia groups under the command of warlords are conducting illegal exploitation and trade of diamonds in central Leppko.

In addition, the political dispute between Rimoso and Carana over the ownership of some of the islands along the southern coastline of Carana, as well as over related fishing rights in the respective national territory, is threatening the already very fragile situation in Carana.

in the last six months, an estimated 12,000 people and a total of up to 200,000 people were forced to flee their homes because of the fighting between government forces and rebels in the North and the South. Due to the tensions, access of the humanitarian community is limited.

c. Threat Assessment. See Appendix 1 **(omitted)**

d. **Mission Uniformed Component.**

The UNAC Military Component has an authorised strength of up to 13,315 United Nations military unit personnel, up to 185 military observers, 40 Liaison Officer and 300 military staff officers as stipulated in UNSCR 1544 (Reference B) The detailed organisation of the UNAC Military Component is provided at Annex D.

e. **Non-UN Actors / Relevant Stakeholders.**

The main stakeholders outside UN are the FDC, MPC and CISC. It is crucial to establish a strong liaison to these parties. The current amount of civilian personnel of IOs and NGOs has to be determined after the deployment of own forces.

5. **Strategic Framework.**

a. **Mandate.**

UN will assist the transitional government and the signatories to the peace agreement in all aspects of rebuilding governmental functions, revitalizing the economy, restructuring the security sector and preparing free elections. UNAC will observe that all signing parties keep the "Kalari Peace Treaty" and will provide security throughout Carana.

UNAC will also assist the national DDR program and the establishment of new national army, the Forces de la Défense et Sécurité du Carana (FDSC), in the strength of not more than 22,000 soldiers with up to 4,000 being drawn from former MPC combatants and 1,500 drawn from former CISC combatants, with assistance of the UN.

b. **Mission End State.**

A unified and peaceful Carana in its current boundaries, with a democratically elected government in which all ethnic groups of the country are represented and accountable security forces able to protect all its citizens, on a level of economic well-being so that nobody suffers from basic needs, with a functioning civil society and situation in which human rights, gender perspectives and the rights of the vulnerable people are respected.

c. **UN Strategic Objectives.**

The objective of the United Nations is to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in a united Carana, where human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens is assured and in which internally displaced persons and refugees can return home in safety and dignity.

d. **UNAC Mission Objectives in Carana.**

- A sustainable and credible peace process supported by regional actors that include processes at the national and sub-national levels, to foster the implementation of the peace agreement.
- Security and stabilization, through integrated efforts, in key areas critical to the peace process are restored and civilians under imminent threat are protected.

- Social well-being and economic prosperity are restored to a level that allows recovery without international support.
- Trustworthy and responsible security institutions and security forces who respect the law and order and human rights are capable and maintain security in Carana.

e. **UNAC End State:**

A unified and peaceful Carana in its current boundaries, with a democratically elected government in which all ethnic groups of the country are represented and accountable security forces able to protect all its citizens, on a level of economic well-being so that nobody suffers from basic needs, with a functioning civil society and situation in which human rights, gender perspectives and the rights of the vulnerable people are respected.

6. **Planning Parameters.**

- Areas of Interest.** The Area of Operations (AO) is determined by the territory of the Republic of Carana.
- Area of Operations.** The Area of Interest (AI) includes the territories of the neighbouring countries.
- Assumptions.**
 1. The signatories of the Kalari Peace Agreement will stay committed to the agreement and will provide continued cooperation and support to UNAC, including sufficient access to Carana seaports and airports in Carana.
 2. The Transitional authorities, the Security Council, and the FU maintain their support for the peace development process in Carana.
 3. Neighbouring states remain supportive of the peace process in Carana.
 4. There will be no further escalation in political and economic disputes between Fasian countries.
 5. International donors support relief and development activities.
 6. ELF activities in the Leppko Region as well as El Hasar activities in western Carana will have no significant impact on the overall Peace Process in Carana.
- Constraints and Restraints.** **(omitted)** Political and Military constraints (*things that must be done*) and restraints (*things that must not be done*) will be covered in this paragraph.
- Risks.** **(omitted)** This paragraph should cover likely risks (both political and military) which may inhibit achievement of mission intent / strategic end state.

7. Military Component's mission.

- a) **UNAC Military Component** is to assist in the implementation and compliance of the Kalari Peace Agreement through observing and monitoring the implementation of the military provisions of the ceasefire/peace agreement, establishing liaison with the forces of all parties to the conflict, supporting the DDR process and humanitarian operations, protecting UN personnel and infrastructure, and protecting the civilian population under imminent threat of physical violence, in order to contribute to a safe and secure environment in Carana.
- b) **Military End State.** A safe and secure environment is ensured by well-trained and well-equipped national security forces.

8. Execution.

- a. **Statement of Force Requirements (SFR).** See Annex B
- b. **Task Organization of the Military Component.** See Annex D

Force HQ. FHQ staff will deploy to Galasi after completing induction training by M+45 and should be operational by M+60. Main tasks include:

- establish a liaison to key elements of the parties within the area of operation by M+60,
- collect and analyse all information provided by the parties and other sources,
- continue to finalize plans on the basis of detailed reconnaissance, to facilitate TCC reconnaissance and to prepare the reception of contingents,
- co-ordinate UN activities with all other Mission Components.

Reserve / Quick Reaction Force (QRF). An Infantry Battalion will be allocated as a reserve/quick reaction force to be employed/deployed as additional deterrence and to allow the FC to strengthen the sector troops in case of requirements / predicted threats. The Reserve will deploy to Galasi by M + 90, will be prepared to react on short notice to crisis situations throughout the mission area, will be prepared to reinforce temporarily in all sectors.

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Unit (ISR).

ISR units will be deployed to Sectors II and III linking battlefield functions together to assist a UN military force in employing its sensors and obtaining and managing the information critical information a part of the Peacekeeping-Intelligence cycle on behalf of the commander, improving the commander's decision-making through enhanced situational awareness. It provides early warning of threats as well as enable UN forces to increase effectiveness and coordination.

Sectors I – III. The Sectors HQs will be established by M+90 and will deploy the battalion elements through the respective sectors as laid out in the deployment map in the document. The main tasks are:

- to monitor and verify positions, strength and movement of the forces of all parties (current and planned) within the sector,
- to protect UN facilities and key infrastructure as soon as possible,
- to protect Civilians within means and capabilities in Areas of Deployment
- to monitor and report the overall security situation in the Sectors.

c. Scheme of Manoeuvre.

The forces will operate from Battalion camps and conduct patrols in platoon and company size. If necessary, they will establish temporary presence in hot spots or along the road Galasi-Akkabar and set up checkpoints. By visible presence, public information and proactive action they will deter and if deterrence fails, neutralize spoiler to the KPA, protect civilians under immanent threat, protect the UN operations and installations and maintain the security in the area.

In each of the three Sectors one Team Site will be co-located with the Sector HQ. The location of all other Team Sites will be determined by the location of the potential monitoring objects. Because of still existing limitations for detailed reconnaissance process and the still developing situation, the location of Team Sites will remain subject to adjustments.

It is intended to conduct the majority of patrols, inspections and investigations through day patrols from the team sites. Monitoring in remote locations away from Team Sites will be covered through the establishment of smaller, temporary team sites and airmobile patrols. Each COG must have the capability to detach one temporary Team Site. The COG fulfils its tasks by establishing liaison to the parties, establishing contacts to the population, conducting patrols, inspections and investigations.

The Team Site Commander determines on the basis of his assigned tasks and the assessment of the situation, the tasks of the Observer Teams, the composition of the patrols and the measures of protection. The representatives of the parties will always participate in joint patrols on their request.

Additional objects of monitoring and reporting, also pending on the requirements expressed by the mission and civilian actors, might be: the overall security situation, such as regular crime or the consequences of return of IDPs and refugees, the activities of militias and uncontrolled armed groups and the DDR process.

Observer Teams and protection forces must be seen as different operational elements, which should be used combined to build an operational entity and to achieve a common operational aim. Thereby the role and task of protection elements can vary in a wide range. If the security situation does not require protection, the UNMOs will operate without being accompanied by protection forces. If the security situation requires protection, protection forces in sufficient strength will accompany the UNMOs. Elements of the protection force can be also used to deter uncontrolled armed groups by visible presence of protection forces.

The Force Headquarters will be collocated with the Mission Headquarters in Galasi. All military personnel and units are under the command of the UNAC Force Commander (FC). The Mission HQ plan and conduct operations and assign the priorities. Force elements, which will be utilized will be under the direct operational command of the FC.

Enabling assets which will be utilized as mission assets, will remain under the operational command of the FC but will be under tasking authority of the Director Mission Support (DMS) for the conduct of routine tasks. A number of units will be deployed to the three sectors and will be under tactical command of the sector commander (SC), as delegated by the FC.

d. Phases.

Phase I – Initial Deployment (M – M+90)

UNAC will see the deployment of its HQ, main logistic Base, Aviation Forces, and 3 Sector HQs with assigned contingents, through sea and airport points of entry at GALASI, CERINI, MALDOSA and CORMA. Other organizations will also deploy and Joint Commission for the Ceasefire (JCC) will establish Joint Liaison Teams (JLT) down to provincial level throughout the Country.

Each UNAC sector will deploy all assigned forces to monitor the cease fire within boundary, establish Humanitarian corridors and establish liaison with all parties and related agencies. Force security will be maintained throughout by securing permanent locations and maintaining Quick Reaction Forces at Mission and Sector levels. An active public information campaign will be implemented down to contingent level during this phase.

Phase II – Full deployment (M+90 – M+180)

Military Component will maintain the established secure and stable environment and conduct operations in direct and indirect support to:

- Return of refugees and deportees,
- Establish cantonments and conduct DDR activities,
- Security operations in support of electoral process,
- Facilitate creation of the Country Legal structure.

Phase III – Consolidation (M+180 – M+330)

Military Component will maintain the established secure and stable environment and conduct operations focusing on:

- the conduct of elections,
- the formation of the National Army and, as required, the National Police Force,
- contingent rotations,
- monitor and report of HR violations.

Phase 4 – Capacity Building (M+330 – TBD)

Phase V – Mission Drawdown (**omitted**)

e. Rules of Engagement (ROE). see Annex G.

9. Logistics.

a. Support Concept. See UNAC Mission Support Concept.

b. Enabling Units.

Aviation

In each sector and at the FHQ an aviation unit is attached. Air operations must be coordinated by UNMIC Air Operations (AirOps) cell. The Aviation Unit needs to operate permanently in each Sector. Each Sector/team site will have military aviation operational 24 hour per day, 7 days per week, providing 40 flying hour per month per air asset.

Transport Coy

The Companies are to provide medium transport for movement of cargo, fuel, water and personnel beyond the self-sufficiency of deployed military units and to provide limited support to other components within a multi-role mission as requested.

Multi-Role Construction Engineers

The Chief Engineer, through the Chief of Staff, will centrally coordinate the construction engineering. Construction engineer companies will give priority of effort to reconstruction of main supply routes, keeping main supply routes open, supporting the establishment of contingent camps and installations.

The locations of specific tasks will generally align with the local sector and can be outside of the sector.

Demining Coy

De-mining will be centrally co-ordinated by UNMAS, through the Office of the DSRSG. De-mining undertaken by military units will be in support of the force; however, the units need to be qualified to undertake humanitarian de-mining tasks if considered as a mission priority.

Military Transport Unit

Military Transport Units, with a limited force protection capability (corresponding to existing threat levels, will be deployed in each Sector to provide medium lift transport support capability for UNAC.

Military Logistics Unit

Military Logistics Units (MLUs) will be deployed in each sector to provide transportation, supply, maintenance and self-sustainment capabilities to UNAC. These may include movement/transportation, receipt, warehousing and distribution of goods and material,

managing petroleum, oil and lubricants, fuel management and aviation fuel handling. Once UNAC has set full logistics civilian capabilities the requirement for MLUs might be re-evaluated.

Signal Unit

The signal units will operate and monitor UN Communications infrastructure (mission backbone network) under guidance and in close cooperation with the Mission Support. Elements of unit will be located throughout the mission area. The unit will deploy without COE and will be catered for by UNAC.

Military Medical hospitals

The military medical hospitals will provide and ensure medical services and treatment for all military personnel. Each Sector will have a Level II capability (the Level III capability in Galasi serves as Level II hospital for Sector Central. The hospitals are open to all UN personnel in case of emergency. Director Mission Support will establish policies and procedures in cooperation with the FC.

10. **Administrative Issues.**

- a. **Human Rights.** in accordance with UN Policy - Human Rights Due Diligence, dated 2013
- b. **Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA).** Any misconduct will be investigated according to our zero-tolerance policy. Offenders will be repatriated by the respective TCC.
- c. **Conduct and Discipline.** Has to be defined by the TCCs. The general guideline for the mission will be published before the deployment. An awareness training will be part of the in processing.
- d. **Performance of Military Personnel and Units.** TCC are responsible for the physical and mental readiness of their soldiers in order to achieve military tasks.

11. **Command, Control and Coordination.**

- a. **C2.** The FC reports directly to the SRSG exercises "UN Operational Command and Control (OPCON) over all military personnel in the Mission. The FC maintains a technical reporting and communications link with the DPO Military Advisor (MILAD) in the UN Headquarters (UNHQ). The FC is to establish and maintain a military operational chain of command for all military personnel in the Mission. The FC may delegate authority to act on his or her behalf through the chain of command. The FC will ensure that the military operational chain of command is maintained and that military reporting responsibility to the SRSG continues in the event of the FC's absence from the Mission or during any short-term incapacitation.

Military enablers and military combat helicopters will be under OPCON of the FC. The DMS/CMS exercises tasking authority over all assigned uniformed logistics personnel and

enabling units comprising medical, signal, logistics, construction engineering (except combat field engineers), transportation and movement units including military transport helicopters within the peacekeeping Mission).

The Sector Commanders report directly to the FC. The FC may delegate “UN Tactical Command and Control (TACON) to Sector Commanders, limited to the detailed and usually local direction and control of movements and activities necessary to accomplish the assigned tasks.

- c. **Civil-Military Interaction.** All components within UNAC are to support the integrated UN approach to information gathering, monitoring, verification, early warning and dissemination of information to ensure that decisions are based on sound advice and that actions are positive, pro-active and efficient.
 - d. **Reporting Procedures.** Attention is drawn to the SOP Integrated Reporting from DPO-Led Field Missions to UNHQ reference 2019.10 SOP Integrated Reporting from Peacekeeping Operations to UNHQ.
 - e. **Harm Mitigation.** All members of the mission respect IHL and ensure all possible steps to mitigate risks of civilian casualties. Accurate intelligence is critical for the protection of civilians. Intelligence enables situational understanding of the civilian vulnerabilities and threats, and it is important to comprehend how these are viewed from the population’s perspective. Intelligence activities and protection of civilians are mutually reinforcing; civilians will provide information more freely when they can do so safely and if it enhances their security. In turn, accurate intelligence should drive operations that improve protection of civilians and make the population more secure.
 - f. **Training.** TBD
2. **Acknowledgement.** The Force commander will acknowledge receipt of the CONOPS and the requirement to produce the Force OPORD, which is to be shared with DPO/OMA for approval.

Under-Secretary-General Department of Peace Operations United Nations	Military Adviser Department of Peace Operations United Nations

Annexes:

- A. Threat Assessment (omitted)
- B. Statement of Force Requirements
- C. Statement of Unit Requirements (omitted)
- D. Mission Map and Task Organization
- E. UNAC Military Lines of Operation

Annex B


Statement of Force Requirements

Unit Type	Number of Units	Unit Size	Total Troops	Remarks
Force Headquarters	1	192	195	Military Staff Officers
Brigade HQ, Sector HQ	3	35	105	Military Staff Officers
UN Military Experts on Mission	225		225	185 Military Observer 36 Liaison Officer 4 Liaison Officer to FRAFOR
FHQ Company	1	150	150	
Infantry Battalion	10	850	8.500	
Infantry Battalion QRF	1	850	850	
Infantry Company QRF	3	150	450	
Engineer Company	3	275	825	
Aviation Unit	3	160	480	
Level 3 Hospital	1	120	120	
Level 2 Hospital	2	70	140	
Military Police Company	1	100	100	
Military Police Platoon	3	25	75	
Signal Unit	4	120	480	
Demining Unit	1	130	130	Detached to the FHQ
ISR Unit	2	200	400	
Logistic Company	3	80	240	
Transport company	3	125	375	
Total			13.840	


Annex D

Mission Map and Task Organization

Deployment Map




Military Observers/Liaison Officers




Task Organization

Force HQ		Sector I		Sector II		Sector III	
	Galasi		Galasi		Alur		Corma
	Galasi QRF		Galasi		Alur		Corma
	Galasi Level 3		Galasi		Alur		Corma
	Galasi		Galasi		Alur		Corma
	Galasi		Galasi		Alur		Corma
	Galasi		Galasi		Alur		Corma
	Galasi		Galasi		Alur		Corma
			Galasi		Alur		Corma
			Maroni		Alur		Corma
			Folsa		Alur		Corma
					Alur		Corma
					Alur		Corma
					Alur		Lora
					Faron		Muka
					Sereen		Kika

Areas of Deployment – Tasks



UNAC Military Lines of Operations



Police Concept of Operations

POLICE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

FOR UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN CARANA (UNAC)

25 September 2021

References.

- A. Kalari Peace Agreement, dated 11 August 2021.
- B. Security Council Resolution 1544 dated 10 September 2021 (S/RES/1544 (2021)).
- C. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations on the situation in Carana 4711 (2021). S/2021/4711, dated 27 July 2021.
- D. Strategic Guidance from USG DPO, dated 02 Jun 2021.
- E. UNAC Mission Concept, dated 25 September 2021.
- F. Strategic Assessment Report, dated 22 February 2021.
- G. UNAC Direction on the Use of Force (DUF), dated 25 September 2021.
- H. Logistics Support Concept, dated 25 September 2021.
- I. Military Concept of Operations (CONOPS), dated 25 September 2021.
- J. UN/DPO/DOS Policy - Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping, dated 25 October 2019.

Review. The CONOPS should be reviewed when there is major change in a mandate or Mission Concept. It is to be drafted after the IOT revision of the Mission Concept.

1. Introduction

This Mission Concept defines the overall approach, priorities and sequencing of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC).

The UN Police CONOPS includes the roles of the Carana Police within the broad objective of ensuring the Rule of Law is re-established in CARANA and contributing to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation, harmony and lasting and sustainable peace and stability in Carana. It addresses the implementation of the envisioned Carana Police mandate vis-à-vis advising on arrangements to ensure a peaceful environment for the election security

requirements in support of the Kalari Peace Agreement implementation and the continued reform and restructure of the Carana Police Services.

It is stipulated that the UNAC Police Component needs to be mandated to assist the new Carana transitional government in monitoring and restructuring the Carana Police, consistent with democratic policing and international standards, to develop a Police training programme, and otherwise assist in the training of Carana Police in cooperation with interested organizations and interested States.

The main focus of UNAC in the initial period will be the deployment and establishment of the Mission and the support of the implementation of the Kalari Peace Agreement.

2. Situation

a. Background.

On 14 November 2020, UN facilitated peace negotiations were initiated leading to a draft ceasefire agreement was established and the (draft) Kalari Peace Agreement (KPA) was developed between the country's government and the main rebel forces MPC and CISC.

The KPA, dated 11 August 2021 calls for a ceasefire, disengagement of forces, a mechanism to verify and control the ceasefire and the formation of a NTGC with several further commitments.

The success of the KPA depends on continued political agreement between the parties and the confidence to the upcoming DDR and SSR Process.

Certain areas – such as those around Galasi, central Mahbek and large parts of Koloni, along the Kalesi River and in the Leppko province – can easily be assessed as “high risk” due to the presence of landmines, organized crime in the vicinity of IDP camps, clashes between returning IDPs and locals, clashes within and between armed factions, and ongoing child soldier recruitment. Thousands of civilians have been abducted by armed groups, primarily by rebel factions, but also by the national army. Abductees are often inducted into the fighting forces and are also used for portage and cooking. In the case of women and girls, sexual abuse as “wives” of the combatants is rampant.

In Galasi, the primary risk is the high level of crime in the suburbs and the IDP camps around the capital. In the suburbs of Galasi, youth gangs of up to 100 boys rule the streets. These gangs are not very well organized but can cause a severe threat even to smaller military formations. Criminality within the IDP camps is mostly a result of poverty and hopelessness. The people in the camps are both victims and perpetrators of violence. Recently, hints for a human/drug trafficking network spanning from Sumora to Galasi into central Carana have accumulated.

Recently, IDPs living in camps in Galasi and along the Kalesi River have begun to return to Mahbek, Koloni and Tereni. Along the same path, beside the fog of conflict between government forces and rebels as well as different criminal groups took their chances and got more and more involved in the exploitation and smuggling of diamonds. Human trafficking of IDPs to work as mineworkers is common, as are abductions, ambushes and SGB violence. IDP

children are targeted especially often. These criminal groups are thought to be connected to several unmonitored armed groups, which have formed around locally powerful and well-connected warlords in the northern Leppko region in central Carana. These groups operate mainly according to economic goals (theft, illegal exploitation of diamond, copper and wood, ransom) and are thought to be connected to the organized crime network in northern Carana. The warlords are not part of the peace agreement.

In Leppko, armed clashes between some CISC factions and ELF are common, and random violence, attacks and killing of civilians are reported. The lack of authority in the Leppko district has resulted in an increase in the number of uncontrolled armed groups that, together with CISC combatants, conduct atrocities against the local civilian population.

b. Current Situation

The forces have not withdrawn, still leaving the potential for a swift return to conflict. The newly formed NTGC may be struggling with its responsibilities, and will not have established full territorial control. The regions of Carana are controlled by different entities.

The still ongoing operation to neutralize El Hasar in Katasi may push the terrorist group towards western Carana. The capabilities of FRAFOR are not sufficient to both maintain the security in Katasi and neutralize El Hasar in and across the border areas to Carana. This might have negative impact on the compliance to the KPA by MPC.

Crime rates are currently on a very high level. The suburbs of the capital, Galasi, are under the control of youth gangs. In Akkabar, there is an open conflict between miners and the police. There are longer-term law and order challenges. A continued security vacuum will enable organized criminal groups to become stronger and harder to tackle in the long run.

UNAC cannot address all these issues during the initial deployment and priority must be given to maintaining political consent for the adoption of the KPA and avoiding a return to conflict and to the protection of the population in Carana.

As result of the war and of natural disasters, living conditions in Carana have worsened dramatically. Of the roughly 17 million population of Carana, 6.3 million are currently in need of humanitarian assistance. Living conditions are most dramatic for the approx. 1.1 million IDPs, 700,000 of which currently live in provisional camps in central Carana.

Another unquantified refugee and IDP population, estimated at approx. 30,000 refugees and 300,000 IDPs, is currently based along the borders to Katasi and Rimosa. The Leppko province has not been accessible to the humanitarian community for the past five years. The most acute challenge to master will be large return movements of IDPs and refugees, alongside DDR reintegration and members of other armed groups, as soon as the KPA measures are being adopted.

International communities as well as bilateral and multi-lateral donors have continued to provide their committed contributions to support the implementation of the Kalari Peace Treaty that will pave the way for a sustainable lasting peace and economic recovery.

The Carana law enforcement agencies are divided into the Carana National Police (CNP) and local police. CNP are located in population centres and are controlled by the provincial administration. The local police are part of the Ministry of Interior and maintain the police presence in rural areas and was responsible for border security. However, in recent years the local police were used more often to suppress opposition political groups than for rural security or border control. In addition, FDC units often exercise police tasks, representing government power in the internal security role. For these reasons, the relationship between civil society and the police force is not very good, with many people being suspicious of the police. There is a crisis of credibility and impunity.

The estimated number of CNP and local police officer's amount to about 10,000 officers, or one officer for every 1,700 citizens. Very few of these are women. However, there is no clarity about the exact figure of national police, or even if those in police uniforms are certified police officers.

Land and maritime border policing, immigration, customs, port authority and other related sectors of internal security have ceased to function. In recent months, evidence of organised criminal activities, especially drug and human trafficking have come to light, in some cases involving collusion or active participation by law enforcement officials.

Crime rates particularly in population centres are high and there are numerous reports of abuses perpetrated by the law enforcement agencies. This inefficiency and erosion of professional standards has led to a widespread loss of credibility in the eyes of the population.

Police stations in the districts and regions are run down and in need of repair.

3. Challenges to UN Police Operations:

1. Lack of effective command and control, delays in decision making, frequent changes in the top leadership, lack of accessibility and a volatile security situation caused by tribal clashes and unhindered movement of armed groups, delay the reform process in Carana.
2. The rebel groups continue to dominate the security concept in Carana, providing restricted space to the CNP and the Local police. Both police forces are very weak, being based along tribal lines and made up of mostly ex-combatants. Besides, acute lack of essential equipment and logistics, high level of illiteracy prevalent in the rank and file, especially amongst the women, continues to impede the development of CNP and Gendarmerie into a professional, responsive and community-based Police service.
3. The Military mind-set and attitude of the host state Police as an organisation to be feared by the community are major challenges encountered while dealing with the Police in Carana.
4. Lack of sustained and assured funding support adversely affects the development process.
5. Non availability of suitable trainees, lack of training venues, inadequate funding support and lack of basic infrastructure like Police stations, communication and transport, seriously impact the CNP and Gendarmerie from becoming fully operational.

6. Though the Police Act has been enacted, which gives the CNP and Gendarmerie legitimacy to act as the Police Service for Carana, various provisions under the Act are yet to be implemented, SOPs, Rules and Regulations yet to be formulated and disseminated to all the states. This prevents the CNP and Gendarmerie from following even minimum standards of internationally acceptable Policing norms.
7. The tight control of the Government on the Police in Carana will be challenging for UN Police to implement its mandated tasks, especially outside Galasi.

4. Core Assumptions of UN Police Operations

1. The Kalari Peace Treaty, which includes the principles of equitable power and resource sharing, will be achievable in practical terms and that the prevailing security situation will continue to be stable enough for the UNPOL to implement their mandate.
2. Cease-fire will continue to be respected and maintained by all parties. Volatile and unstable situation in Carana will be resolved through political and diplomatic mechanisms.
3. The mission will be multidimensional and unified including coordinated rule of law support plans with other UN agencies to ensure unity of effort and avoidance of duplication.
4. International community will continue its support and be committed to the achievement of the desired end state of lasting peace and stability in Carana. Bi-lateral and multi-lateral support programs will be coordinated within a framework of sustained Reform & Restructuring strategic goals. Support from all stakeholders for corrections and judicial reforms would be forthcoming concurrently with that of Police reforms.
5. UNAC military component will continue to establish a peaceful and secure environment for the deployment of the civil component.
6. Member states/Police Contributing Countries (PCC) will fully support and make adequate appropriate and timely contribution of resources and personnel to fulfil its mandated tasks.
7. "Trust Funds" or other sustainable financial mechanism will be established to support quick impact projects (QIP's) that will enhance the re-establishment of rule of law and promote the restoration and development of the criminal justice system (Police, Judiciary and Corrections). This will involve UNPOL component's engagement with donor countries and other components of the mission.
8. Appropriate UN, International agencies and other stake holders will make available the necessary logistical and technical support so that UN Police will be able to play its role appropriately in advising, monitoring and the supervision of the host state Police in the transitional areas, and Carana in general during the upcoming elections.
9. Volatile and unstable situation in Carana will be resolved through political and diplomatic mechanisms.

10. UN Security Council will approve of the request for the strength of the deployment of UN Police so that the projected programs can be fulfilled.
11. Neighbouring countries will respect Carana's territorial integrity and sovereignty and continue to support efforts for the prevention of cross border illegal activities (especially trafficking of persons, drugs, arms and ammunition and smuggling of goods) that could undermine economic, socio-political and internal security.
12. The Security Council, PCCs and the international community remain committed to support and resource, incl. through finance, logistics, personnel with appropriate skill sets, the roles and responsibilities of UNAC Police as determined by the applicable Security Council resolutions. Including in protection of civilians, including foreign nationals, under threats of physical violence including gender-based violence, to stabilize the security situation and security structure. Stressing national caveat that negatively affects the implementation of mandate effectiveness should not be accepted by the Secretary-General for effective mandate implementation.
13. The unpredictable security and humanitarian challenges including attacks, harassments, intimidation and hampered freedom of movements would cause ongoing civilians' displacements and keep the overall number of IDPRE at UNAC POC sites high and may deter their voluntary return.
14. existing resources, UNPOL's technical assistance and advice will strengthen SSNPS foundations and inculcate democratic principles policing essential for reassuring communities and that contribute to the fostering of a policing culture committed to the protection of civilians.

5. Strategic Framework

5.1 Mandate

Security Council Resolution 1544, dated 10 September 2021 decided that UNAC shall assist the transitional government and the signatories to the peace agreement in all aspects of rebuilding governmental functions, revitalizing the economy, restructuring the security sector and preparing free elections. UNAC will observe that all signing parties keep the "Kalari Peace Treaty" and will provide security throughout Carana.

As stipulated in Security Council Resolution 1544 (2021), the UNAC Police Component is mandated:

1. Protection of Civilians
 - to ensure the effective protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders, under imminent threat of physical violence, in particular violence emanating from any of the parties engaged in the conflict;
 - to ensure the protection of United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment;

- to support the efforts of the Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) to ensure the protection of civilians from violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses, including all forms of sexual and gender-based violence;
2. Support for Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance
 - to monitor the human rights situation, to contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Carana and to fight impunity, with particular attention to vulnerable groups including refugees, returning refugees and IDPs, abductees, women, children and demobilized child soldiers,
 - as well as provide human rights technical assistance as needed in close cooperation with other United Nations agencies, related organizations, government organizations and non-governmental organizations;
 3. Support for Security reform
 - to assist the Carana Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) in monitoring and restructuring of the police force of Carana, consistent with democratic policing and international standards, to develop a civilian police training programme, and
 - to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police in cooperation with interested organizations and interested States;

The mandate requests UNAC to continue taking forward its four core mandated tasks, including protection of civilians through monitoring of, ensuring respects for human rights by, and where compatible and in strict compliance with the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, coordination with police services, security and government institutions and civil society actors in relevant and protection-focused activities, such as sensitization to issues of sexual and gender-based violence and conflict-related sexual violence, as well as other serious human rights violations; monitoring and investigating abuses and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law; creating the conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance; and supporting the implementation of the Agreement on the delivery of humanitarian the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of Carana.

6. UN Police Mission

6.1 Police Adviser's Strategic Intent

The goal of the UN police mission in Carana is

- a) to reorganize, stabilize and expand national police structures,
- b) to protect IDP camps in close coordination with the Carana Police Service,
- c) to monitor, train, advice, educate and partner police and administration personnel and
- d) to enable a self-sustaining security architecture in the long term

In order to protect civilians from threats of physical violence, integrate human rights and international humanitarian law standards in structure and mindset.

6.2 Method of police operations

Through coordination with the hosts, donors and stakeholders to ensure balanced progress, coordinated approach and avoiding gaps or duplication of effort, and working in close coordination with all UNAC sections, the UNPOL, within the limits of its mandate, will:

- a) Promote Carana National Police (CNP) and Local police orientation to democratic policing and its overall modernization through enhancing its appreciation and observation of human rights issues, promoting community involvement in ensuring public safety and security, and limiting its dependence on military interventions in law-and-order maintenance;
- b) Enhance the capabilities of CNP and Local police to respond more effectively to the needs of the local community through a more responsive training and development curricula including robust basic training, intensified specialized training, including the following: forensic, CID-matters, border policing and control, airport security, immigration, formed police units, river and maritime Police, patrol units; and improving sustainability mechanisms (including training of trainers and promotion of personnel issues);
- c) Assist the development and implementation of CNP and Local police programmes of gender awareness, mainstreaming and response through promoting women police officers in the police, including their induction, improving the work environment and identifying best practices in supporting gender issues at the organizational level; training and development in technical issues including gender and juvenile issues, SGBV and HIV and AIDS; and assisting in setting up response programmes like Special Protection/ Family Protection Units to focus on gender issues;
- d) Towards the elections, provide pro-active advisory and supportive functions to CNP and Local police vis-à-vis training, advising, mentoring and dynamic co-location;
- e) Advice Carana national authorities on all police issues;
- f) Support the rebuilding of an efficient nationwide Carana Police Force which acts in accordance with law and international standards of human right including gender aspects;
- g) Support Carana and national authorities to create an efficient vetting system for recruitment of police officers;
- h) Support Carana and national authorities to establish an efficient police education and training system;
- i) Conduct specialized police training in methods of Crowd & Riot Control (CRC), Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), canine units and drug trafficking;
- j) Conduct the protection of UN personnel and property
- k) UN Police contributes to the end state by ensuring:

- a) a monitoring and restructuring process of the Carana Police by developing a Police Training Program,
- b) a train advice assist (TAA) & partnering program including human rights training as well as gender based violence and all gender aspects
- c) Support with FPU's in protection, patrolling and monitoring IDP Camps
- d) Situation awareness
- e) Support the improvement of prison structure and services
- f) Support review of Police Act 2013 including the re-organisation of subsidiary tasks.

6.3 End State

The desired end state of the UNAC Police Component is to ensure that the local and national police structure is itself capable of generating security, guaranteeing it in the long term and acting on the basis of human rights international standards, ensure the protection of civilians with respects for gender aspects, and to enable the safe and voluntary return of IDPs and refugees to the places and/or live in areas of their choice.

6.4 Strategies of the UN Police

6.4.1 In the implementation of its mandate, the UN Police will:

- a) assist in developing coordination mechanisms between policing and other law enforcement agencies and donors and other stakeholders to ensure a holistic, strategic approach to resource utilization, capacity building and development and,
- b) assist the host-state policing and other law enforcement agencies elevate their awareness, acceptance and compliance with the principles of gender, human rights and protection of juveniles and vulnerable persons.

6.4.2 In respect to Carana, the UN Police will:

- a) assist in the restructuring and capacity development of human resource administration, training and development and resource management of the CNP and Local police;
- b) assist in the development and subsequent implementation of an approved Community Policing model by CNP in order to promote community policing activities throughout Carana;
- c) provide advanced training to CNP and Local police trainers to enable them to take over basic and specialized training in areas like border policing and control, airport security, formed Police units, river, maritime and railway police, and patrol units;
- d) co-locate with the CNP and Local police at all levels to mentor and monitor its service delivery to the community and;

- e) assist CNP and Local police to develop short-, medium- and long-term Strategic Development Plans to ensure sustainable improvement of its human and physical capacity and facilitate infrastructure and facilities development of the CNP and Local police.

7. Operational Directions for UNPOL

7.1 UNAC Police will be required to:

- a) lead the protection of UN personnel and property planning, procedures and execution
- b) support and contribute in all human rights aspects the Political component incl. monitoring violations and coordination of Human Rights training as well as gender aspects in police issues
- c) support and contribute Protection of civilian's aspects the Political component incl. contribution to protect IDPRE camps, public services and Critical Information Infrastructures Security (CRITIS)
- d) increase efficiency of UNPOL operations in the POC sites by refocusing on emerging risk areas, while dedicating more resources in activities to create conducive conditions for voluntary return of IDPs.
- e) restructuring and deployment adjustment of current and newly deployed UNPOL officers in key areas of staffing and field assignments consistent with enhancements of current POC-related tasks and engaging with Carana Police Service within the technical assistance and advise strategy.
- f) provide support and train, advise, assist (TAA) to the Carana Police Service through identified support within technical assistance and advice strategy and agreed mechanisms supported by the Mission.
- g) maintain basic safety and security within UNAC POC sites.
- h) Coordinate, conduct and assist in the protection of UN personnel, property and the delivery of humanitarian assistance within UNAC POC sites.

7.2 Specifically in terms of the Elections, UNAC Police will:

- a) Support Carana Police Service with FPU to protect polling stations, high rank candidates and election rallies and BPT counter escalating demonstrations in front and after election day on order
- b) Monitor, TAA and Partner Carana Police Service with IPOs in order to (IOT) ensure a protected, free and democratic election without violations from or against the police and/or civilians
- c) Enhance capabilities of host state Police to meet the security challenges during the different phases of the elections by imparting specialized training and developing advising and mentoring roles, including specialised training of 5.000 personnel in election security, basic training of new entrants, refresher training of personnel trained in FPU duties, training of

trainers, communication and emergency response training

- d) Maintain close coordination with host state Police in planning, conducting and monitoring joint training programs for security and elections
- e) Assist the electoral process through close coordination and cooperation with United Nations Integrated Referendum and Elections Division (UNIRED)
- f) Consistent with national laws and in consultation with UNIRED, provide advice to the host state Police about election security aspects at all levels in order to assist a professional law enforcement approach to security, meeting basic international requirements
- g) Assist host state police in the development of organisation structures, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and guidelines and reporting mechanism up to county level
- h) Facilitate development of a comprehensive strategic security plan (including contingencies) for UNPOL, in conjunction with UN Military and Local Stakeholders, and
- i) Closely engage with United Nations Development Program (UNDP), bilateral donors and other actors for support for other required and identified activities

7.3 Monitoring & Evaluation of UNPOL Mandate implementation

- a) Impact of UNAC Police training, mentoring and advising of the CNP and local police, will continue to be evaluated through periodic compilation of Strategic Evaluation Reports and evaluation of CNP and local police performance.
- b) UNAC Police component will support and contribute in election aspects the Political component incl. protection of polling stations, high rank candidate's election rallies and possible support in countering hostile demonstrations
- c) UNAC Police component will support and contribute SSR aspects the Political component incl. TAA, partnering and capacity building with the Carana Police Service Forces

7.4 National DDR Program

UNAC support activities of the National DDR Program should be integrated and coordinated within UNAC to

- a) Support and monitor Carana Police Service in executing disarmament and demobilization in POC sites.
- b) Observe DDR Process to be permanently in a position to generate a complete picture of the situation and to be able to derive appropriate reactions or to be able to intervene immediately should mandate provisions and agreements be violated.
- c) Advice and assist Carana Police Service in Reintegration Program to meet the integration of the conflicting parties with the inclusion of ethnic distribution, equality also under gender aspects and to promote and advance the growth of the police forces at the same time.
- d) support and contribute DDR aspects the Development component incl. the assistance in

Carana police development.

e) support and contribute in Demining aspects the Development component.

8. Execution

8.1 Organization of the UNPOL Component

UNAC Police is foreseen to have a strength of 1,885 Police officers, including 6 Formed Police Units. For operational efficiency and effectiveness, a lean and flat command structure will be maintained in order to provide dynamic leadership and management and ensure maximum deployment of officers in team sites to fulfil operational commitments. Based on the tasks of UN Police, a comprehensive training curriculum has been designed for Training of the host state police personnel. The curriculum includes inputs on all aspects of policing including community policing.

Special emphasis has been laid on sensitizing the Police on human rights, gender and juvenile issues. Specific needs of the police in developing skills in computers, forensics, riot control, special operations, narcotics control etc. are being met through special training and co-location of UN Police experts with the concerned Units.

The Special Representative of Secretary General (SRSG), as appointed by the SG, will be responsible for implementing the mission's mandate and leads and directs all the mission components and ensures unity of effort and coherence among entities in the mission area.

The UNAC Police is headed by the Police Commissioner based in Galasi. Specialist units at Mission HQs and a Deputy Police Commissioner, who oversees UNPOL functioning in their respective regions, support it. The Formed Police Units (FPUs) with a planned strength of 160 personnel each are to be deployed to Galasi (2), Amsan, Folsa; Maldosa and Alur (in three Sectors)

The UNAC Police component is organized and structured to function in partnership and harmony with other mission components. It is designed to ensure that managerial and administrative functions are lean but pragmatic and meet the requirements of the concerned region. It envisages deployment/co-location of maximum officers in the field to ensure effective mandate implementation throughout the Mission area.

Gender and Child and Vulnerable Person's Protection Officers have been appointed at all levels to deal with the issues related to gender aspects of security and the special needs of children and vulnerable persons. Gender mainstreaming is being ensured through incorporation of gender aspects in selection and deployment of human resources, development of job descriptions, directives, policies, standard operating procedures training curriculum development and investigations of sexual and gender-based violence.

A Gender Coordinator is placed in the office of the R&R Coordinator in MHQ to keep the Police Commissioner apprised on UNAC Police gender main streaming efforts and all activities related to gender issues with the host Police services.

Foreseen Strength of components:

• Police HQ	50 Police Officers
• Police Sector HQ	30 Police Officers each
• Liaison Team in Galasi	10 Police Officers
• UNPOL in Carana Police Academy	20 Police Officers
• FPU	160 Police Officers each
• Team in Combined Team sites or Police Station	5 to 10 Police Officers

UN Police Deployment details are attached as Annex A.

9.1 Scheme of Deployment

The Police Component will deploy in:

Phase 1

- a) UN Police assist Carana Police Forces to reorganize, stabilize and expand police structures by monitoring, training, advising and partnering.
- b) UN Police assist Carana Police Forces in reestablishing internal security in Galasi and sector north and the protection of IDP camps in regard to the rule of law, protection of civilians, gender-based violence and human rights.
- c) UN Police ensure the protection of UN Personnel and facilities in the area of operation in close coordination with Carana Police Forces.

Benchmarks

- Police presence in Galasi.
- Police training facility in Galasi is established and operational capable.

Phase 2

- a) UN Police continue to assist Carana Police Forces in reestablishing internal security also in sector central and south and additionally the protection of IDPRE camps in regard to the rule of law, protection of civilians, gender-based violence and human rights.
- b) UN Police continue their effort in protection of UN personnel and facilities.

Benchmarks

- Formed Police Units operational in the vicinity of IDPRE camps.
- Police training facilities in Folsa and Corma are established and operational.

Phase 3

- a) UN Police continue their effort in assisting Carana Police and protection of UN personnel and facilities.
- b) UN Police assist Carana Police Force reinforcement.

Benchmarks

- Police training facility in Alur established and operational.
- 40% of Carana Police Forces successfully participated in human rights and rule of law training activities.
- Carana Police presence >50% in sector west.

Phase 4

UN Police continue their effort in assisting Carana Police and protection of UN personnel and facilities.

Benchmarks

- +95% of Carana Police Forces successfully participated in human rights and rule of law training.
- Carana Police presence in +95% of Carana and rule of law is accepted.
- Buildup process of Carana Police Forces completed by 75%.

10. Logistics & Support

All Police HQs are co-located to UNAC HQs in Sectors and capitol.

The UNAC logistics support concept is based on the integration of UN provided and contingent-owned resources. Administrative and logistics support to the mission is provided by Mission Support Division, under the leadership of the Director of Mission Support. The DMS is responsible for issuing the UNAC Mission Support Plan which is the authoritative document for the planning, coordination and management of all administrative.

11. Command and Control

The UNAC Police Command Structure is attached as Annex D.

The UNAC Police comprise up to 1,885 police officers consisting of 6 FPU's with currently planned 960 personnel in total and 925 IPO.

The UNAC Police component is headed by a Police Commissioner (at a D-2 level) based at the Mission HQ in GALASI and supported by three Deputy Police Commissioner (at s D-1 level). He shall be part of the Mission Senior Leadership Team.

The Police commissioner is responsible for technical reporting on the implementation of police and law enforcement-specific strategies and activities to the Police Adviser in the UN HQ IOT

receive strategic and operational guidance and support.


Exit strategy: The UNAC Police component shall base its transition on Security Council mandates and exit once credible host-state police and other law enforcement services have been established throughout the territory and/or the authorities of Carana no longer require the services of the UNAC Police component.

Annexes

- A. Deployment timeline und phases UNPOL
- B. Component Tasks UNPOL
- C. Deployment Map UNPOL
- D. C2-structure UNPOL


Annex A

UNPOL Deployment timeline und phases




Annex B

Component Tasks UNPOL




Annex C

Deployment Map UNPOL



Annex D
C2-structure UNPOL



Mission Support Concept of Operations



MISSION SUPPORT CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

FOR UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN CARANA (UNAC)

25 September 2021

REFERENCES:

- A. Kalari Peace Agreement dated 11 August 2021.
- B. Security Council Resolution 1544 dated 10 September 2021 (S/RES/1544 (2021)).
- C. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations on the situation in Carana 4711 (2021). S/2021/4711, dated 27 July 2021.
- D. Strategic Guidance from USG DPO, dated 02 June 2021.
- E. UNAC Mission Concept, dated 25 September 2021.
- F. Strategic Assessment Report, dated 22 February 2021.
- G. Military Concept of Operations (CONOPS), dated 25 September 2021.
- H. Police Concept of Operations (CONOPS), dated 25 September 2021.
- I. UN/DPO/DOS Policy - Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping, dated 25 October 2019.
- J. UN/DPO/DPPA/DOS/DSS Policy – Casualty Evacuation in the Field, effective 01.03.2020

REVIEW

The CONOPS should be reviewed when there is major change in a mandate or Mission Concept.

INTRODUCTION

The aim of the paper is to describe the current logistical situation and to outline the logistical approach within UNAC.

1. SITUATION

Mission Support Concept is based on the integration of UN-owned, military, police and contracted logistics resources, employed and tasked through the Director Mission Support (DMS) based on mission priorities established through discussion with the component, commanders and the SRSG.

Rapid but phased development of mission support capability is required to establish basic operational presence.

During initial deployment, support capability will be rudimentary using based on UN owned, military and contracted resources. Over time, this will be replaced by a more semi-permanent or permanent support infrastructure as the UN owned assets become available in the theatre. The military enabling capability will be reduced as more semi-permanent or permanent support is developed.

Formed military and police units will be fully self-sustaining for all applicable categories except field defence stores.

Coordination of mission support services and resources with the United Nations Mission Support Centre (MSC) will be ensured by establishing a liaison mechanism.

2. Support and Infrastructure Situation

a. Roads

CARANA has a network of paved and capable roads, which mostly connect the major cities and is predominantly running in east-westerly direction. In the West and the North, the communication to neighbouring countries is ensured via these paved roads. The roads need to be maintained to withhold constant heavy traffic. Due to fighting and lack of maintenance limitations to movement and transportation in certain areas, e.g. HANNO and LEPPKO, may occur.

The majority of roads in CARANA are unpaved gravel roads or simple sand trails which are vulnerable to meteorological influence and deteriorate fast if not maintained. The availability of the unpaved roads during the rainy season and the weeks after can be assessed as unlikely (approx. 50% of the time)

Bridges along paved roads are generally steel and concrete constructions, able to withhold heavy vehicles. The bridges along the unpaved roads are mostly wooden constructions which need to be assessed individually. An overall road map depicting the availability especially of the unpaved roads including the bridges has not been produced yet.

b. Railways

There are two railway lines in CARANA. The northern line is running between GALASI and AKKABAR, the southern line between MALDOSA and MIA. Both lines are in bad shape and in need of maintenance, but operational. The northern line ends in MARONI due to a bridge collapse in 2020. Nearly all stations along both lines are sufficiently equipped for loading and unloading containers and vehicles, only MIA station does not contain container facilities.

c. Harbours

CARANA has three larger harbours capable of loading and unloading deep-water ships. These are located in GALASI, CERENI and MALDOSA. GALASI harbour is the only one with Roll-on/Roll-off (RoRo) capability. MALDOSA harbour is specialized in copper transportation and is lacking significant storage containers.

d. Rivers

The rivers in CARANA are navigable for transportation vessels.

e. Airports

CARANA has two major airports capable of handling heavy goods, meeting international standards concerning air traffic. The larger one is located in GALASI, suitable for deployment of personnel and equipment. Storage space is limited. The smaller one is located in CORMA. It is comparable to GALASI airport but is limited in handling of heavy goods. CORMA airport is located outside the city and therefore provides large storage capabilities.

There are a number of smaller airports, but due to uncertain fuel supply, unpaved aprons and short runways these are not suitable for the use as APODS.

f. Electricity

CARANA hosts three power plants, the KILU and the SALOBO dam as well as a coal power plant in GALASI. The SALOBO dam is not operational, and due to a rebellion in the HANNO coal mining area fuel supply for the GALASI power plant is limited. Power outages in the GALASI area happen on a regular basis.

The overall electricity net is not centralized and does not feature redundancies; therefore, the loss of a main supply line might lead to a cut-off of entire regions.

The majority of the country is generally without regular power supply and relies heavily on generators.

g. Water and Sanitation

Drinking water is mostly available throughout the country, but varies in quality depending from which region it is originated. Purification is basically always needed for consuming non- bottled groundwater. The contamination of the water appears to be one of the main sources for various health issues throughout the country.

h. Food

The deterioration of the economy resulted in widespread poverty. The amount of usable agricultural areas has significantly decreased due to fighting and / or placement of landmines. The accessibility of food is therefore limited in certain areas.

i. Medical Services

The medical service provided by the Host Nation inside the major cities is assessed initially as sufficient for minor treatment. The areas around the three identified possible SPODS are Meningitis distribution areas. In the north and north-eastern areas several pockets with cholera cases had been reported.

j. Fuel and aviation fuel

Aviation fuel supplies only available in GALASI and CORMA.

k. Local labour

A workforce qualified for basic tasks is available, first and second level educated people with sufficient language abilities in English are quite rare.

l. Banking

A full operational banking system exists only in GALASI, CERENI and MALDOSA. International transactions or funding is available in four banking institutes. All four do have branches in GALASI, only the Bank of CARANA is active in the other major cities. Electronic cash transfer inside the rural areas is not possible.

m. Climatic Conditions

In the West Monsoon from August to October mild temperatures. In the North mild climate and in the East and South hot and dry.

3. Assessment of the Support Situation

The overall logistical situation in CARANA is challenging. Two of three SPODs provide a rapid deployment of own forces. Two of five APODs provide strategic airlift capacities. The capital GALASI offers the best logistical support options regarding A- and SPOD. The road network offers limited paved and capable roads, predominantly running in east-westerly direction.

Due to overall bad infrastructure engineer support has to be considered. Supply goods (food, fuel) are mainly available in the eastern big cities. The western part of CARANA is logistically in a poor condition.

4. Core Assumptions

1. Sufficient access to Carana seaports and airports to enable deployment and sustainment is ensured
2. Freedom of movement is ensured
3. UN LogBase BRINDISI provides necessary personnel, equipment and logistic C2 for initial entry
4. All TCC provide logistic forces as envisaged in initial Force Sensing
5. All TCC are capable of providing forces with wet lease equipment.
6. Strategic transport means for deployment via sea and air are available

7. The international community supports the payment of salary to civil servants
8. Area of Operations is limited to Carana.

5. MISSION

Intent

My intent is to establish a logistic footprint so that a rapid initial presence will be enabled support for an extending presence throughout Carana and the entire mission will be provided.

In the first and second phase our main effort is the support of deployment and the activation of the logistic network. Within Phase 1 and until logistic contingents will be made available, mission support is based on contributions by UN Log Base Brindisi, ITA and local and global contracts. After reinforcement by contingent logistic forces UN Log Base ITA can be redeployed step by step.

Within means and capabilities, we support other organisation in order to contribute to mission success.

MSC Component


- plans, coordinates and maintains the administration and logistics structures to deploy and to operate and sustain the UN PKM in Carana,
- be able to support other UN entities in the field if required and
- within capabilities, plan, coordinate and manage the Mission Budget.

6. EXECUTION

6.1 Deployment

1. The deployment consists of mainly three phases. The initial deployment begins with M-Day and ends at M+60 to cover the Mission HQ, Section HQs and initial enabling Forces. From M+60 up to M+120 further Enabling Forces and initial PKM Forces will be deployed. Phase three focusses mainly the deployment PKM Forces and mission FOC will be NLT M+130.
2. Ports of Entry. Galasi in the North and Maldosa in the South
3. Air Point of Entry. Galasi: Troops will be deployed direct into the deployment locations through HQ air charters. The details will be worked out once FGS finalizes the troop generation plan for Carana.
4. Main Deployment Routes. The main deployment routes are as follows:
 - Galasi - Sureen.
 - Maldosa – Muka – Faron - Alur.
5. Main Supply Routes. As per deployment routes. Priority for Opening Routes.
 - Priority 1. Galasi - Sureen
 - Priority 2. Maldosa – Muka – Faron - Alur.

6. Branch-Plan for complete loss or loss of capacities of SPOD GALASI: Activate SPOD CERENI and APOD AMSAN by UN LogBase Brindisi within 30 days.



UNAC Mission Support Capabilities

6.2 Support Concept

		UNOE ¹	COE ²	leased	Contracted
Transport		UN LogBase ITA for land transports and MOVCON during initial phase	Mil Transport Units for land transports after initial phase		Contracts for sea and land transports
Aviation		UN LogBase ITA during initial phase	Mil Aviation Units for tactical air transports after initial phase		Contracts for strategic and tactical airlift
Supply	Food	UN LogBase ITA Water purification facilities	Provision of 50% of food and water supplies		Local and global Contracts for 50 % of food and water supplies
	Spare Parts		Wet lease by TCC		
	Fuel	Interim storage at and transport by Mission Support Units	Interim storage at and transport by Mission Support Units		Contracts for fuel supply for LogBase Galasi
	Ammunition		Provided and logistically handled by TCC		
	Electricity	UN LogBase ITA power generators	Wet lease power generators		Contracts for fuel supply
Medical Support			In addition to Role 1 within military Forces, Role 2/3 provided by TCC		
Engineering		UN LogBase ITA during initial phase		Construction machines iaw demand of mil engineer units	Local and global contracts for Construction of HQs and field camps
CITS		UN LogBase ITA during initial phase	Mil Signal Units for extending demand after initial phase	IT equipment for cross-section use in HQ and offices	Contracts for Land lines and SAT use for communications

UN owned equipment

Contingency owned equipment

6.3 Support Organization

1. Director of Mission Support (DMS). The office of the DMS and its key support functions will be located with the mission HQ at Galasi.
2. Operations and Recourses Management. The Chief Operations and Recourses Management, who leads Personnel, Finance, Field Technology and the Mission Support Centre (MSC), will be located at Galasi with the Mission HQ.
3. Service Delivery Management (SDM). The Chief Service Delivery, with his sections is responsible for providing in mission logistics support to all the mission components, incl. transport services, aviation services, medical services, engineering services and life support. All sections of the SDM will be jointly manned by civilians, military and police personnel. The SDM will be located at the Mission HQ in Galasi. The Chief SDM will be assisted by a Deputy Chief SDM (DCSDM) who will be the senior military logistician. DCSDM will report to the Chief SDM on all matters concerning mission support.
4. Supply Chain Management (SCM). The Chief Supply Chain Management, with his sections (acquisition, procurement, warehousing, and movement control and performance management) will be located at Mission HQ in Galasi.
5. Mission Support Centre. MSC though part of the SDM, will be located at Galasi for better coordination of logistics support with other mission components; however, it will continue to function under the Chief SDM.
6. Mission Logistics Base. The mission logistics bases will be located at Galasi and Maldosa. Seven (7) days of mission reserve of all UN supplies will be held at the mission logistics base. Each section listed above will be suitably represented at the mission logistics base.
7. Sector Logistics Bases. There will be a smaller logistics base in each sector location with similar facilities at a smaller scale as the mission logistics base. 30 days of operational reserve will be held at each sector logistics base. Each section listed above will be suitably represented at the sector logistics bases.
8. An overview of the mission support structure is provided with Annex A.

7. COE and Self-sustainment

7.1 Self-sustainment

1. All military / police units will remain fully self-sustained in all applicable categories throughout the duration of their deployment.
2. Contingents are required to deploy to the Mission area with sufficient stocks of supply items, including spare parts and consumables to last them for a period of 90 days.
3. Arrangements for the re-supply of self-sustained items will be made by the Contingent Commander with the appropriate national authority. MOVCON may assist the contingents for the movement of these items from the POE/POD to unit locations.

7.2 Contingent Owned Equipment

1. The COE brought by contingents should be capable of operating in tropical climate of extreme heat and humidity.
2. Troop and police contributors will be responsible for maintenance of all COE under wet lease in accordance with the COE Manual. Under the wet lease agreement, contingents are required to deploy into the Mission with sufficient spares for maintenance of their major and minor equipment for a period of 90 days. Re-supply of the spares and maintenance stores after this period is the contingent responsibility; however, MOVCON may assist the contingents in moving these stores from the POE or APOE to the unit locations.
3. COE handling parties will be deployed by TCCs/PCCs to assist in unloading/loading of the vehicles (APCs etc.) accompanying the sea transport or by commercial air travel to the mission area prior to arrival of the COE.
4. Troop and police contributors will deploy adequate logistics vehicles and MHE to operate and maintain the equipment it is deploying.

7.3 Accommodation

1. Subject to the availability of resources, overall mission priorities and operational requirements the UN will provide UN standard accommodation to contingents as soon as possible. Should the UN not be able provide UN standard accommodation the TCC will be entitled, after 6 months under tentage, to dual reimbursement of the tentage and accommodation rate.
2. In accordance with the COE Manual, TCC providing tentage self-sustained services must be capable of providing temporary office/workspace in tentage.
3. For living accommodation, all staff officers (police and military) at Galasi will be responsible for making their own arrangements. All staff officers and UNMOs, in the sectors are normally responsible for making their own arrangements. However, based on the availability on the ground or the prevailing security situation they will have an option to be accommodated in the UN provided accommodation – costs to be taken from the Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA). In all UN installations UN will be provided catering facilities. Meals and services are to be paid by the individuals.

8. Rations and Fuel

1. **Rations.** All units will deploy self-sufficient with dry rations for a period of 60 after which UN will provide all rations. In addition, mission will hold 7 days MRE at mission level and 14 days MRE at sector level for all UN staff. However, a push supply system for rations and bottled water be imposed with rations expected to be available in the mission by M+14. Composite Reserve Rations (COMPO rations) will likely to be delivered by M+15. COMPO rations will be stored and distributed by the Ration Contractor from their warehouses. The contractor will have their warehouses in each sector HQ. The contractor will also deliver food rations to all TCC Team Sites.
2. **Fuel.** UN will provide diesel fuel for vehicles and generators and Jet A1 for the aircraft. Up to M+60, UN will provide fuel at all locations using local bridging contracts or UN owned resources.

After M+60, a mission wide bridging contract will be operational for a period of 9-18 months. This will be followed by a longer-term turnkey contract.

3. No gas or petrol will be available. All equipment and vehicles must be diesel operated.

9. Water

1. **Contingent movement from TCC to designated deployment site.** Contingents will need to deploy with a minimum of 14 days bottled drinking water. This water is to be consigned as air cargo during initial deployment.

2. **Raw water.** The UN will provide raw water to contingents. In cases where raw water is not initially available, the UN will provide treated water.

3. **Water treatment.** Contingents will need to become self-sufficient in treating raw water as soon as practicable on reaching Carana. Accordingly, advance parties of each contingent are encouraged to include fully operational self-sufficiency capabilities for water. Advance parties should have treatment plants operational in time for the arrival of the contingent main body. TCC/PCC need to include in its contingents sufficient skilled operators for water equipment. Contingents will need to deploy with all water treatment chemicals. The UN will not provide any consumables for TCC wet lease provided water treatment plants.

10. Transport

1. Military Staff Officers, Military Liaison Officers and UNMOs will be provided transport according to the Mission's Vehicle Establishment Committee (VEC) determinations.

2. Troop and police contributors will deploy vehicles operating on diesel only.

3. Military vehicles should be equipped with the following:

- a. Elevated air intake snorkels
- b. HF and VHF communications
- c. GPS navigation system (preferable)
- d. Larger fuel tanks
- e. Additional tanks for water
- f. Roof racks
- g. Elaborate medical kit
- h. Self-recovery kits like winches, shovels and picks
- i. Jump leads, hydraulic jacks with wooden blocks.

11. Communications and IT Facilities.

1. UN will provide communications (HF, VHF and Telephone) and IT facilities down to the team sites. VTC facilities will be established at Mission HQ, Force HQ, and all Sector HQs. The UN will

provide all communication equipment and basic training modules for radio operators once they are deployed.

2. Formed military and police units, including force protection companies, at the team sites will be on self-sustained for their internal communications. HF communications need to be provided as agreed upon at the MOU.
3. Private communications will be made available down to team site level on cost recovery basis, as and when available. Provision of welfare communications (Internet) is the responsibility of the TCC/PCC.

12. Medical

1. **Medical.** Medical services in the mission will be integrated and available to all members of the mission irrespective of their status and available to contractors and UN staff members (not part of UNMIC) for emergency services on cost recovery basis. Deployment of medical resources will be as follows:
 2. **Level IV Medical Facilities.** Level IV medical care will be provided through private hospitals located at Coalinga (outside Carana). Medical Section/LSD will take suitable action to negotiate a contract with the hospitals at Coalinga.
 3. **Level III Military Hospital.** Galasi. The hospital will serve as Level II capability for Sector Central.
 4. **Level II Military Hospitals (Including a Level I Facility).** To be collocated with Sector HQs at Corma and Alur.
 5. **Level I Medical Facilities.** At all team sites. The level I facility will be deployed by the battalion providing the force protection at each team site. Each unit (company level or above) need to deploy with a level I capability. Each Infantry Battalion should include two level I medical facilities – to be able to deploy medical teams' at all independent company size locations.
 6. **UN Medical Clinics.** UN medical clinic will be deployed at Galasi.
 7. Chief Service Delivery Management is empowered to authorize medical evacuations in the mission in consultation with the Chief Medical Officer (CMO). This authority may be delegated as follows:
 - a. **Tactical MEDEVAC/CASEVAC.** If tactical MEDEVAC/CASEVAC is required within the Mission area to Level II or Level III hospitals, the medical staff at the Sector level can authorize use of the evacuation transport assets.
 - b. Authority for the financial aspects of medical evacuations of UN personnel from within the mission area to the Level II/III hospital may be delegated to the Force Medical Officer; however, Chief SDM and CMO should be apprised at the earliest opportunity of any such evacuations.
 - c. **Strategic Medivacs.** Chief Service Delivery Management will authorize strategic medical evacuation outside the country with advice from the CMO.

13. Air Operations

1. Main Aviation Bases.

- a. Transport Aircraft. Galasi
- b. Passenger Aircraft. Galasi.

2. Sector Aviation Bases.

- a. Planned locations of aviation bases are Galasi, Corma and Alur.
- b. Temporary landing sites need to be determined and cleared by DMS, in cooperation with the Force Commander and Police Commissioner.

5. **Deployment of Aircraft.** Final deployment number of contracted aircraft and helicopters will be decided by the Technical Preparatory Team.

6. **Air Operations Centre.** An Air Operations Centre will be established. Tasking of all aircraft in the mission area will be coordinated through the MSC.

14. Supporting Tasks for cross-cutting issues

1. Providing facilities, supply and transport for UN personnel for SSR activities.
2. Providing support for logistic handling of disarmament within capacities for DDR activities.
3. Providing additional EOD capacities for demining taking limitations in terms of mine clearance due to focus of protection of facilities into consideration.
4. Providing constructional/physical protection for protection of UN personnel (for protection of civilians within capacities) and providing threat assessment and protection demands.

15. Logistics & Support

1. The units must be adequately equipped and self-sustained for, but not limited to, the four different sections, with integral support and maintenance elements, for operations in permanent and temporary deployment locations.
2. The units must be able to logistically support any permanent or mobile detachments. Beyond the self-sustainment requirements of the mobile detachment, all deployed detachments are also required to receive full support from the respective host unit.
3. All containers, including but not limited to, general storage refrigeration, ammunition, medical and workshops, are to no larger than the ISO standard twenty-foot container and valid container safety certificate. Gross weight not to exceed 10 tons.
4. All minor equipment, spare parts and consumables are supplied by the TCC under wet lease arrangement.
5. All vehicles, plants and equipment will be subject to inspection and payload confirmation testing by UN officials prior to deployment from home country locations to ensure mission compatibility and operability.

6. The UN attempts to provide waste and sewage removal services through local contractors. However, contingents may be asked during MOU negotiations to deploy one sewage truck per base camp with trained service personnel to operate the equipment.
7. Ammunition Levels. Unit ammunition levels must meet the requirements. The level for this mission is set at 60 bullets per soldier. TCCs are to provide an ammunition list with details including batch number, quantity, date of manufacture and the self-life as provided by the manufacturer. The ammunition prepared for deployment must have at least 50% of its shelf life on the expected date of deployment.
8. The TCC is encouraged to deploy equipment, which supports efforts to reduce the environmental footprint of its operations including more energy efficient generators, renewable energy power generation and environmental enhancements to accommodate and conduct themselves in an environmentally conscious manner.

16. Command and Control


1. UN military units and personnel are under Operational Control (OPCON) of the Force Commander/ Head of mission. The Force Commander will deploy units as operationally required and designated command and control status.
2. The contributing Member State retains administrative control (ADMINCON) over non-operational administrative issues for deployed uniformed contingent personnel and units.
3. ADMINCON over uniformed contingents and units is exercised by a senior national officer of a TCC deployed within mission area. This authority is limited to administrative matters such as personnel management, supply and services and must not adversely influence the management and conduct of UN operations within the mission area. Military personnel assigned to serve under UN OPCON shall not act on national caveats, direction or instructions that result in actions contrary to UN policies, non-compliance with any orders or instructions, or adversely affect implementation of the missions' mandate.

Annexes:

- A. Mission Set-Up and Log Basis
- B. Organization Mission Support Component within Mission HQ


Annex A

Mission Set-Up and Log Basis



Annex B

Organization Mission Support Component within Mission HQ



**RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)
FOR
THE MILITARY COMPONENT
OF THE
UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN CARANA
(UNAC)**



**DEPARTMENT OF PEACE OPERATIONS
OFFICE OF MILITARY AFFAIRS
MILITARY PLANNING SERVICE**

25 SEPTEMBER 2021

INTRODUCTION

This document, including all of its Annexes (A–D), constitutes the entire Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC).

This document provides authority for the use of force and explains policy, principles, procedures and responsibilities relating to the use of force.

These ROEs are directions to operational commanders, which delineate the parameters within which military personnel of national contingents assigned to UNAC's military component may use force in the Carana. They are founded on Security Council resolution. Where issued as prohibitions, they are orders not to take specific actions. Where issued as permissions, they are the authority for commanders to take certain specific actions if they are judged necessary to achieve the aim of the Mission.

While remaining predominantly defensive in nature, the ROE also allows for proactive action in order to ensure the implementation of the tasks assigned to UNAC's military component.

In addition to the main document, the key elements are attached as follows:

- a. Annex A Authorised Numbered ROE for UNAC.
- b. Annex B Definitions.
- c. Annex C Supporting directions and procedures, including those for challenging, warning shots, search and apprehension.
- d. Annex D Aide-Mémoire.

AUTHORITY

The powers and authority of UNAC derive from Security Council resolution on UNAC S/RES/1544/2021, dated 10 September 2021. They must be exercised in a manner consistent with UNAC's Mandate.

MISSION

Relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions that set out the circumstances in which force may be used by UNAC to implement its mandate are set out in Annex A – “Authorised Numbered ROE for UNAC.”

EXECUTION OF ROE

Principles

a. General

- (1) The conduct of military operations is controlled by the provisions of international law.
- (2) UNAC military personnel must operate within the framework of this document, which has been formulated in accordance with the parameters set out in Security Council resolution.
- (3) UNAC ROE provide direction to commanders at all levels, governing the use of force within the Mission Area. They define the degree of force that may be used and the

manner in which it may be applied. They are designed to ensure that the application of force is controlled and legal. The ROE informs commanders of the constraints imposed and the degrees of freedom they have in the course of carrying out their mission.

- (4) The ROE are to be translated in a clear and concise way into the language(s) of each participating nationality. Throughout the conduct of military operations, where force is to be used, UNAC military personnel must comply with the international legal principles of proportionality, the minimum use of force and the requirement to avoid, and in any to event minimize, collateral damage.
- (5) While the ROE may restrict the manoeuvre and operation of specific weapons systems, they do not:
 - a. Describe specific doctrine, tactics and procedures.
 - b. Address safety-related restrictions.

b. International Law, including Law of Armed Conflict.

UNAC military personnel are required to comply with International Law, including the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), and to apply the ROE in accordance with those laws, as and when applicable. Fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law applicable to United Nations forces that are actively engaged as combatants in situations of armed conflict are contained in Secretary-General's Bulletin "Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law" (ST/SGB/1999/13).

c. Self-Defence

- (1) Nothing in these ROEs negates a Commander's right and obligation to take all necessary and appropriate action for self-defence. All personnel may exercise the inherent right of self-defence.
- (2) Pre-emptive self-defence against an anticipated attack must be supported by credible evidence or information that justifies a reasonable belief that hostile units or persons are about to attack.
- (3) Self-defence against a hostile force(s) may be exercised by individuals or by individual units that are under attack or about to be attacked, as well as by other UN forces that are able to assist those individuals or individual units.

d. Military Necessity.

The principle of military necessity authorizes the use of only that force which is required to accomplish the authorized objective. Military necessity does not and cannot authorize acts that are otherwise prohibited under international law, including the law of armed conflict.

e. Alternatives to the Use of Force.

Whenever the operational situation permits, every reasonable effort must be made to resolve a potentially hostile confrontation by means other than the use of force (e.g. through negotiations or assistance from the local authorities). This principle does not apply where UNAC armed units are engaged in offensive operations in accordance with these ROEs.

f. Duty to Challenge and Warn.

Before resorting to the use of force, every reasonable step must be taken to deter a party(s) or person from committing a hostile act. The procedure required by the UN to challenge and warn is given in Annex C. This does not apply where UNAC armed units are engaged in offensive operations in accordance with these ROEs.

g. Duty to Identify Target - Observe Fire.

Positive identification of hostile forces prior to engagement is required. Unobserved indirect fire is prohibited. Firing procedures are given in Annex C.

h. Duty to Use Minimum and Proportional Force.

- (1) Any force used must be limited, in its intensity and duration, to that which is necessary to achieve the authorized objective. In some circumstances, the immediate use of deadly force may be necessary for this purpose.
- (2) The use of force must be commensurate with the level of the threat. However, the level of force that is used may have to be higher than the level of the threat in order to avoid or minimise UN or civilian casualties or, in the case of offensive operations, to ensure that the authorised objective is achieved.
- (3) Commanders should, where appropriate, consider the use of alternatives to the use of physical force, such as deception, psychological methods, negotiation and other non-lethal means, including the deployment or manoeuvre of larger forces in order to demonstrate resolve.

i. Avoidance of Collateral Damage.

When force is used, all feasible precautions are to be taken with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, collateral damage. The use of force shall cease if it becomes apparent that further use of force may be expected to cause collateral damage which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

j. Duty to Report.

Each and every confrontation resulting in a detention, or involving the use of deadly force, is to be reported through the chain of command as soon as possible, whether it results in casualties or not. More details are contained in Annex C.

k. Right to Maintain Position.

UNAC military personnel may maintain their position and equipment when confronted with a hostile act or intent. In such circumstances, they may also use necessary force, as authorised in these ROEs.

l. Use of Force beyond Self-Defence.

- (1) The use of force beyond self-defence may be applied in the circumstances set out in Annex A – “Rule 1 Use of Force” of these ROE and is subject to the conditions set out in these ROEs.
- (2) The Force Commander, or the commander to whom the authorisation has been delegated, retains direct control over the use of force in these circumstances.

Applicability

The ROE set out in this document apply to all military personnel of national contingents assigned to the military component of UNAC, as authorised by the Security Council.

Responsibility of Force Commander and Subordinate Commanders

- a. The implementation of these ROE is a command responsibility. These ROEs are addressed to the Force Commander, who is then responsible for issuing them to all subordinate commanders.
- b. The Force Commander and his/her subordinate commanders are not permitted to exceed these ROE, but may, when and as appropriate, authorise more restrictive limits on the actions of assigned forces, subject to United Nations Headquarters (UNHQ) approval. A commander may issue these ROE as received from UNHQ, may add additional guidance or amplification consistent with their terms, or may incorporate them into appropriate orders or instructions.
- c. All commanders have an obligation to seek clarification if these ROEs are considered to be unclear or inappropriate for the military situation.
- d. It is the responsibility of the commanders of all National Contingents to ensure that all those under their command understand these ROE. To assist in this process, they must issue a ROE Aide-Mémoire (Blue Card), translated into the language(s) appropriate for their own contingent, to each individual under their command. This must be done before the contingent can be considered to be effective.
- e. Training in the application of these ROE is the responsibility of commanders at all levels. ROE training sessions should be conducted on a regular basis and, at a minimum, once per month and whenever UNAC military personnel, including individual replacements or reinforcements as authorised by the Security Council, are deployed into the Mission Area.

ROE Contravention.

The following procedures apply in dealing with ROE contravention:

- a. Any ROE contravention is to be reported to DPO at United Nations Headquarters (UNHQ) through the UN chain of command, by the quickest possible means.
- b. Flanking and subordinate commands should be informed, if the consequences are likely to affect them.
- c. Remedial measures, including training, should be taken in order to avoid reoccurrence.
- d. Any contravention must be subject to a formal investigation. The Force Commander is to convene a board of inquiry (BOI), which is to forward its findings to the Under-Secretary-General of Peace Operations as soon as possible.

Security Classification.

These ROEs are an exercise document for training purposes and are classified as **OPEN**.

ROE Changes.

These ROEs can only be amended or changed by or with the authority of the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations.

**Under-Secretary-General
for Peace Operations**

Annexes

- Annex A Authorised Numbered ROE for UNAC
- Annex B Definitions and Amplifications
- Annex C Supporting Directions and Procedures
- Annex D Aide-Mémoire

Annex A

Authorized Numbered ROE for UNAC

**AUTHORIZED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
FOR UNAC**

Security Council Resolution

1. The Security Council, by its Resolution 1544 (2021) decided to establish a United Nations Assistance Mission Carana (UNAC). The successful completion of the UNAC mission will result in Carana achieving peace and security.

2. The Security Council thereupon decided to establish by its Resolution 1544 (2021), a United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC) which is mandated to establish UNAC, for a period of 12 months. It further decides that UNAC will consist of up to 13,315 United Nations military unit personnel, up to 185 military observers, 40 liaison officers and 300 military staff officers, up to 1,885 civilian police officers including formed units, and the appropriate civilian component to assist Carana in the implementation of the Kalari Peace Agreement.

3. The UN Security Council by its Resolution 1544 (2021) approved the appointment by the Secretary-General of his Special Representative for Carana to direct the operations of UNAC and coordinate all United Nations activities in Carana.

UNAC Mandate

4. Under the provisions of Security Council Resolution 1544 (2021), the UNAC mandate consists of the following elements:

- a. Support for Implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and peace process,
- b. Support for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
- c. Protection of civilians and United Nations Personnel, Facilities and Civilians,
- d. Promotion and protection of human rights,
- e. Support for Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance.
- f. Support for Security reform.

5. Support for Implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and peace process

- (1) to observe and monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and investigate violations of the ceasefire; and to establish and maintain continuous liaison with the field headquarters of all parties' military forces;
- (2) to assist the new transitional Government in conjunction with other international partners to re-establish national authority throughout the country, including the establishment of a functioning administrative structure at both the national and local levels;
- (3) to assist the new transitional Government in restoring proper administration of natural resources, in preparing for national elections to be held no later than mid-2023; and in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal

framework and judicial and correctional institutions.

6. Support for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

- (1) to assist in the development and implementation of a voluntary national disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programme for all armed parties, and to collect, store or destroy weapons and ammunition as part of an organized DDR programme as in cooperation with relevant international organizations and donor nations;
- (2) to support the reintegration and rehabilitation of former combatants with particular regard to the needs of child soldiers, women, and addressing the inclusion of non-Carana combatants; and to assist and carry out voluntary disarmament and to collect and destroy weapons and ammunition as part of an organized DDR programme.

7. Protection of civilians and United Nations Personnel, Facilities and Civilians

- (1) to protect without prejudice to the efforts of the government, civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, as well as UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel;
- (2) to provide specific protection for women and children affected by armed conflict, and address the needs of victims of sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict.

8. Support for Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance:

- (1) to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, including by helping to establish the necessary security conditions; through an adequate human rights presence, capacity and expertise within UNAC to carry out human rights promotion, protection, and monitoring activities;
- (2) to monitor the human rights situation, to contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Carana, with particular attention to vulnerable groups including refugees, returning refugees and internally displaced persons, abductees, women, children and demobilized child soldiers, as well as provide human rights technical assistance as needed in close cooperation with other United Nations agencies, related organizations, government organizations and non-governmental organizations;
- (3) to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, including by helping to establish the necessary security conditions to protect refugees and internally displaced persons; in accordance with humanitarian principles, and the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees.

9. Support for Security Sector reform:

- (1) to assist the new Carana government in monitoring and restructuring of the police force of Carana, consistent with democratic policing and international standards, to develop a civilian police training programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police in cooperation with interested organizations and interested States;
- (2) to assist the new Carana government in the formation of a new and restructured Carana military in cooperation with international organizations and interested States;

10. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council, by its

Resolution 1544 (2021), authorized UNAC, for the duration of its mandate, to fulfil its tasks, and decided to review this issue and all other aspects of UNAC'S mandate after 12 months.

SPECIFIC RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR UNAC

The following ROE have been authorized for use by UN Military Force in UNAC:

Rule 1 — Use of Force

- Rule No 1.1 Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to defend oneself and other UN personnel against a hostile act or a hostile intent, is authorized.
- Rule No 1.2 Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to defend other international personnel against a hostile act or a hostile intent, is authorized.
- Rule No 1.3 Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to resist armed attempts to abduct or detain oneself and other UN personnel, is authorized.
- Rule No 1.4 Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to resist armed attempts to abduct or detain other international personnel is authorized.
- Rule No 1.5 Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to protect United Nations installations, areas or goods designated by the SRSG in consultation with the Force Commander, against a hostile act, is authorized.
- Rule No 1.6 Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to protect key installations, areas or goods designated by the SRSG in consultation with the Force Commander, against a hostile act is authorized.
- Rule No 1.8 Use of force up to and including deadly force, in order to protect civilians under immediate threat of physical violence, is authorized.
- Rule No 1.9 Use of force (not including the use of deadly force) to prevent the escape of any apprehended or detained person, pending hand-over to appropriate civilian authorities, is authorized. In case of necessity to act in self-defence, use of force, up to and including deadly force, is authorized.
- Rule No 1.10 Use of force, up to and including deadly force is authorized:
- a. In order to protect the security of UNAC personnel; and
 - b. Against any individual and/or group, who limits or intends to limit the freedom of movement of UNAC personnel.
- Rule No 1.11 Use of force up to and including deadly force, to resist armed/forceful attempts to prevent UNAC personnel from discharging their duties is authorized.

Rule 2 — Use of Weapon Systems

- Rule No 2.1 Use of explosives in order to destroy weapons, ammunition, mines and unexploded ordnance, in the course of the disarmament exercise, is authorized.
- Rule No 2.2 Indiscriminate pointing of weapons in the direction of any person is prohibited.
- Rule No 2.3 Firing of weapons other than for organized training and as authorized in these ROE, is prohibited.
- Rule No 2.4 Firing of warning shots is authorized.
- Rule No 2.5 Use of riot control equipment and agents is authorized.
- Rule No 2.6 Use of lasers for survey, range finding and targeting is authorized.
- Rule No 2.7 Use of Grenades and Grenade 40 mm HE is authorized only when necessary for immediate self-defence or the immediate defence of others authorized to be defended under these ROE against a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent.

Rule 3 — Authority to Carry Weapons

- Rule No 3.1 Carriage of loaded personal weapons is authorized.
- Rule No 3.2 Overt carriage by individuals of hand-held support weapons such as machine guns, light mortars and handheld anti-tank weapons, is authorized.
- Rule No 3.3 Deployment and carriage of weapons on or in vehicles, aircraft and vessels is authorized.

Rule 4 — Authority to Detain, Search and Disarm

- Rule No 4.1 Detention of individuals or groups who commit a hostile act or demonstrate a hostile intent against oneself, one's unit or UN personnel is authorized.
- Rule No 4.2 Detention of individuals or groups who commit a hostile act or demonstrate a hostile intent against other international personnel is authorized.
- Rule No 4.3 Detention of individuals or groups who commit a hostile act or demonstrate hostile intent against any civilian, or against installations and areas or goods designated by the SRSG in consultation with the Force Commander is authorized.
- Rule No 4.4 Searching of detained persons for weapons, ammunition and explosives, is authorized.
- Rule No 4.5 Disarming of armed individuals or groups, when so directed by the Force Commander, is authorized.

- Rule No 4.6 In the absence of police authority, warning and questioning of persons is authorized if those persons are known to be obstructing or otherwise interfering with the UNAC mission, or are believed, on reasonable grounds to be so doing.
- Rule No 4.7 In the absence of police authority, detention and search of persons is authorized if those persons are known to be obstructing or otherwise interfering with the UNAC mission or are believed on reasonable grounds to be so doing.

Rule 5 — Reaction to Civil Action or Unrest

- Rule No 5.1 In the absence of police authority, detention of any person who commits or threatens to commit a crime, is authorized.
- Rule No 5.2 In the absence of police authority, warning and questioning of suspicious person or persons obstructing or otherwise interfering with the UNAC mission are authorized.
- Rule No 5.3 In the absence of police authority, detention and search of suspicious person or persons obstructing or otherwise interfering with the UNAC mission are authorized.
- Rule No 5.4 In the absence of police authority, security operations such as roadblocks, barriers, cordon and search and prohibition of entry, which may disrupt the normal pattern of civilian life, are permitted to the extent necessary for mission accomplishment.

Annex B

Definitions and Amplifications

DEFINITIONS

1. **Civil unrest.** The commission, perpetration or instigation of acts of violence, which affect public peace and order.
2. **Collateral Damage.** Incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian property not part of an authorized target.
3. **Cordon.** A deployment of UNAC personnel around an object or location with the intent to isolate an area and restrict and/or control both access and exit.
4. **Detainee:** A detainee or detained person means any person deprived of personal liberty except as a result of conviction of an offence.
5. **Force.** The use of, or threat to use, physical means to impose one's will. Such means are used by formed, armed and disciplined bodies of UNAC and generally imply the potential to use appropriate and authorized levels of violence.
 - a. **Armed Force.** The use of weapons, including firearms and bayonets. Note: Such weapons are generally designed to inflict deadly force, but can also be used in a non-deadly manner.
 - b. **Deadly Force.** The level of force which is intended, or is likely to cause, death regardless of whether death actually results. This is the ultimate degree of force.
 - c. **Non-deadly Force:** The level of force which is neither intended nor likely to cause death, regardless of whether death actually results.
 - d. **Minimum Force.** The minimum degree of authorized force which is necessary and reasonable in the circumstances, to achieve the objective. The minimum degree of force is applicable whenever force is used. Minimum force can be deadly force if appropriate.
 - e. **Unarmed Force.** The use of physical force, short of the use of "armed force".

NOTE: Riot control equipment and other 'non-lethal weapons' may be used as a means of unarmed force as they are designed and intended to be used so as not to inflict deadly force.
6. **Hostile Act.** An action where the intent is to cause death, serious bodily harm or destruction of designated property.
7. **Hostile Intent.** The threat of imminent and direct use of force, which is demonstrated through an action which appears to be preparatory to a hostile act. Only a reasonable belief in the hostile intent is required, before the use of force is authorized. Whether or not hostile intent is being demonstrated must be judged by the on-scene commander, on the basis of one or a combination of the following factors:

- a. The capability and preparedness of the threat.
 - b. The available evidence which indicates an intention to attack.
 - c. Historical precedent within the Mission's Area of Operations (AO).
8. **Hostile operations.** The firing or use, without the consent of the Government of Carana, of any type of weapon by members of an illegal armed group against the members, weapons systems, installations or facilities of, or positions occupied by, members of another illegal armed group, the FDC, the MPC, the CISC, or UNAC.
 9. **Illegal Armed Group.** An armed group, which does not form part of the armed forces of the parties to the Kalari Peace Agreement and which has been established, and continues to operate, in contravention of the national laws of Carana. The SRSG, in consultation with Force Commander, will prepare and maintain a list of illegal armed groups and make that list available to operational commanders through the Force Commander.
 10. **Loaded Weapon.** A weapon that has ammunition attached to it but none of the ammunition has been placed into the chamber.
 11. **Positive Identification.** Assured identification by a specific means. This can be achieved by any of the following methods: visual, electronic support measures, flight plan correlation, thermal imaging, passive acoustic analysis or Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) procedures.
 12. **Proportionality.** The amount of force which is reasonable in intensity, duration and magnitude, based on all facts known to the commander at the time, to decisively counter a hostile act or hostile intent, or to achieve an authorized objective.
 13. **Reasonable Belief.** Reasonable belief is when the Commander, or individual, logically and sensibly concludes, based on the conditions and circumstances in which he or she finds him or herself that a hostile threat exists.
 14. **Self-Defence.** Self-Defence is the use of such necessary and reasonable force, including deadly force, by an individual or unit in order to protect oneself, one's unit and all UN personnel against a hostile act or hostile intent.
 15. **Pre-emptive Self-Defence.** Action taken to pre-empt an imminent hostile act, where there is clear indication that an attack is about to be made against oneself, one's unit and UN personnel.
 16. **UN Personnel.** All members of UNAC (including locally recruited personnel whilst on duty), UN officials and experts on mission on official visits.
 17. **Other International Personnel.** Personnel belonging to international agencies associated with UNAC in the fulfilment of its mandate, and other individuals or groups formally and specifically designated by the SRSG in consultation with UN HQ, including:
 - a. Members of organisations operating with the authority of the UN Security Council (SC) or General Assembly (GA);

- b. Members of authorized charitable, humanitarian or monitoring organisations;
- c. Other individuals or groups specifically designated by the SRSG; but excluding foreign nationals such as businessmen and journalists.

Warning Shots. A warning shot is a signal demonstrating resolve, or a capability to convince persons to stop threatening actions, or as a warning and potential precursor to the actual use of deadly force. A warning shot is a shot fired at a safe point of aim with no intent to cause death, injury or severe damage.

AMPLIFICATIONS

1. **General Amplification to Rule No 1:** Rule No 1 generally allows the use of force up to and including deadly force in given circumstances. Any use of force must be graduated where possible and only the minimum force necessary to meet the threat must be used. This does not prevent the immediate use of deadly force if the threat to life is imminent and there is no alternative but to use deadly force immediately to remove that threat.
2. **Amplification to Rule No 1.5 and Rule No 1.6:** The minimum force necessary, NOT including deadly force, may be used to protect your property and property (including buildings and installations) it is your duty to protect. Deadly force, including opening fire, may ONLY be used against an individual or group who:
 - a. Attempts to damage or destroy property whose damage or destruction is likely to endanger the life of, or cause serious injury to, yourself or any other person; or
 - b. Attempts to destroy property that has been declared 'designated property' by the Force Commander; and
 - c. There is no other reasonable way to prevent the individual or group from so acting.
3. For the purposes of both **Rule No 1.5 and Rule No 1.6**, the following property has been designated by the SRSG and declared 'designated property' by the Force Commander:
 - a. UNAC aircraft and vessels, including any aircraft and vessels of Troops Contributing Countries (TCC) that are deployed to the UNAC AO for the purpose of assisting v to fulfil the mandate (whether occupied or not);
 - b. Occupied v vehicles, premises and compounds (including police stations, courts, and other central and district administration buildings);
 - c. Occupied vehicles, premises and compounds of organizations and agencies who are assisting UNAC in the fulfilment of its humanitarian mandate, including United Nations specialized agencies, other international organizations, foreign government agencies and non-governmental organizations;
 - d. Carana community power stations and water reticulation and purification plants (whether occupied or not);
 - e. UNAC arming and refuelling points (whether occupied or not); and UNAC and civil communication facilities essential for UNAC command and control between battalions,

units and higher headquarters (whether occupied or not).

4. **Amplification to Rule No 1.9:** Deadly force may only be used (as part of a graduated response where possible) where the attempt to restrict movement if successful would likely result in the loss of life or serious injury to any person.
5. **Amplification to Rule No 1.10:** Deadly force may only be used (as part of a graduated response where possible) where the attempt to prevent UNAC personnel from discharging their duty if successful would likely result in the loss of life or serious injury to any person. This does not prevent you from using non-deadly force to resist the individual or groups attempt to prevent you from discharging your duties. If in so doing the response from that individual or group threatens yours or any other person's life, or is likely to cause serious injury, then deadly force may be used.
6. **General Amplification to Rule No. 5:** Action taken by UNAC in relation to persons who are involved in civil actions or unrest shall only occur in the following circumstances:
 - a. while performing routine activities UNAC observe serious criminal activity; Force/Mission protection;
 - b. providing assistance to Carana Security Agencies in accordance with agreed procedures; and
 - c. while operating in the vicinity of the tactical coordination line/ border until border normalization is achieved.

Persons who are detained are to be treated in compliance with Annex C and the Force Commander's Detention and Disarmament policy issued separately.

7. **Amplification to Hostile Intent.** Hostile intent will always be determined on a case-by-case basis and will be heavily dependent upon local conditions. Hostile intent can be demonstrated by:
 - a. persons that carry out armed attacks against UN personnel and other international personnel or against those falling under the protection of UNAC;
 - b. members of any military or paramilitary group or organization carrying personal weapons or manning weapon systems, whether or not they are engaged in attacks against UN personnel, other international personnel and/or those falling under the protection of UNAC;
 - c. civilians that spontaneously take up arms against UN personnel, other international personnel or those falling under the protection of UNAC.
8. In the case of Militia or suspected Militia, at all times the determination of hostile intent shall require weapons being carried in a manner deemed ready for immediate use. When UNAC Security Force units are confronted by Militia or suspected Militia who are:
 - a. Positively recognized, and
 - b. Carrying firearms and/or grenades, and
- c. Operating in a tactical manner, then such Militia or suspected Militia may be engaged on the basis that they are demonstrating hostile intent. In such circumstances the requirement to provide a warning in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex C is not mandatory.

NOTE: 'Positively recognized' means that a person is observed and is understood to be Militia or suspected Militia.

9. **'Operating in a tactical manner'** shall be determined on a case-by-case basis. The following examples would normally constitute operating in a tactical manner:
- a. Militia or suspected Militia patrolling in a tactical manner or military formation;
 - b. Militia or suspected Militia in an ambush position;
 - c. Militia or suspected Militia deployed or deploying at a road block(s)
 - d. Militia or suspected Militia deployed or assessed as deploying as an armed sentry, or sentries to their position.

Annex C

Supporting Directives and Procedures

GENERAL

1. **Identification.** Assured identification (positive identification) of hostile forces (groups and persons) prior to engagement is required. Unobserved indirect fire is prohibited.
2. **Civil Action.** UNAC military personnel should avoid any action which would result in the disruption of legitimate civil activities in the mission area.
3. **Prohibitions.** The following prohibitions are to be observed, even when authorized ROE are being used:
 - a. Use of certain weapons and methods of combat under the relevant instruments of international humanitarian law, including, in particular, the prohibition on the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and biological methods of warfare; bullets which explode, expand or flatten easily in the human body; and certain explosive projectiles. The use of certain conventional weapons, such as non-detectable fragments, anti-personnel mines, booby traps and incendiary weapons is prohibited.
 - b. Use of weapons or methods of warfare which may cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, or which are intended, or may be expected to cause, widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.
 - c. Use of weapons or methods of combat of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering.
 - d. Attacks on monuments of art, architecture or history, archaeological sites, works of art, places of worship and museums and libraries which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples. In its area of operation, UNAC shall not use such cultural property or their immediate surroundings for purposes which might expose them to destruction or damage. Theft, pillage, misappropriation and any act of vandalism directed against cultural property are strictly prohibited.
 - e. Use of methods of warfare to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuff, crops, livestock and drinking water installations and supplies.
 - f. Making installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dikes and nuclear electrical generating stations, the object of military operations if such operations may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.
 - g. Engaging in reprisals against objects and installations protected under this paragraph above.
 - h. Engaging in punitive use of force and retaliation.
4. **Cordon Principles.** Cordons may only be conducted if the Force Commander determines that the situation warrants isolation of the area and that such action is consistent with the mandate of UNAC.

WARNING PROCEDURES

5. **General.** The use of armed force is normally a measure of last resort, in response to a hostile act or hostile intent. If a confrontation threatens the UNAC military personnel on the scene, the UN aim must be to dissuade the parties concerned from carrying on.
6. **Graduation.** The following graduated procedures are to be observed:
 - a. **Verbal Negotiation and/or Visual Demonstration.** Every effort must be made to warn any potential or actual aggressor before UNAC military personnel respond with force. The aim is to stop hostile activity.
 - b. **Unarmed Force.** If the preceding step is unsuccessful, where possible, minimum unarmed force may be employed. If riot control equipment or other non-lethal weapons are possessed by UNAC personnel trained to use those weapons, and where they would be an effective means to bring the threat to an end before having to resort to deadly force, then they may be used if authorized by the on-scene commander.
 - c. **Charge Weapons.** An attempt should be made to make use of the visual and audible effect of charging weapons to convince any aggressor that failure to stop the aggressive activity may result in the use of deadly force.
 - d. **Warning Shots.** If the threat continues, and subject to the orders of the commander on the scene, warning shots should be fired at a safe point of aim, to avoid causing personal injury or collateral damage.
 - e. **Armed Force.** If all the preceding steps, including the use of unarmed force, are unsuccessful and there are no other choices available, the necessary armed force may be used. The decision to open fire will be made only on the order and under the control of the on-scene Commander, unless there is insufficient time. Before opening fire, a final warning is to be given as follows:
 - i. The warning may be given verbally (in English and in the local language and / or visually by a sign or by illumination (e.g. hand-held red flares, searchlights, etc.).
 - ii. You are to challenge in English:
“UNITED NATIONS, HALT OR I SHOOT”.
 - iii. This challenge will be repeated in French as follows:
“NATIONS UNIES HALTE OU JE TIRE”.
 - iv. The verbal or visual warning should be repeated as many (and at least three) times as necessary to ensure understanding or compliance.

FIRING PROCEDURES

7. **Opening Fire without Warning.** The only circumstance, under which it is permitted to open fire without attempting to follow the warning sequence, would be if an attack by an aggressor comes so unexpectedly that, even a moment's delay could lead to death of, or grievous injury to oneself, UN personnel and those who are under the protection of UNAC as specified in this ROE.
8. **Procedures during Firing.** The use of firearms must be controlled, and there should be no indiscriminate firing. Automatic fire should only be used as a last resort. The following points must be kept in mind during fire:
 - a. Fire must be aimed.
 - b. Minimum rounds are to be fired to achieve the authorized objective.
 - c. All necessary precautions are to be taken to avoid collateral damage.
9. **Procedures After firing.** After any weapon firing, the following actions are to be taken:
 - a. **Medical Assistance.** All injured persons should be given first aid as soon as possible, when such aid can be given without endangering lives.
 - b. **Recording.** Details of the incident are to be recorded, including:
 - (1) Date, time and place of firing;
 - (2) Unit and personnel involved;
 - (3) The events leading up to firing;
 - (4) Why UNAC personnel opened fire;
 - (5) Who or what was fired on;
 - (6) The weapons fired and the number of rounds discharged;
 - (7) The apparent results of the firing; and
 - (8) A diagram of the incident scene.
10. **Reporting.** Following an immediate report that firing has taken place, the above information and the current situation are to be reported through the UN chain of command, to the Force Commander and UN HQ (DPO), as rapidly as possible.

SEARCH AND APPREHENSION PROCEDURES

See the Force Commander's Detention and Disarmament Policy issued separately.

Annex D

AIDE-MEMOIRE

General Rules for Use of Force

1. The principles of minimum force and proportionality apply at all times. However, the level of force that is used may have to be higher than the level of the threat in order to avoid or minimize UN or civilian casualties or, in the case of offensive operations, to ensure that the authorized objective is achieved.

2. Except where engaged in offensive operations, you must make every reasonable effort, wherever possible, to control a situation through measures short of force. Your response should, if possible, be graduated and include personal contact and negotiation, voice and visual signals, radio or other electronic means of communication, manoeuvres, charging of weapons and warning shots. You may use force, unarmed or armed, only if all other means to control the situation have failed, or such means do not hold out any promise of achieving your authorized objective, for example, to protect civilians from violence.

3. You may open fire only on the order and under the control of the on-scene commander, unless there is insufficient time or opportunity for you to obtain an order from him/her.

4. Before opening fire, you must give a final warning, at least three times, in the French, local or English, language as follows:

“NATIONS UNIES, HALTE OU JE TIRE” or

“UNITED NATIONS, HALT OR I WILL FIRE”

5. You may open fire without warning only when (i) an attack is so unexpected that a moment's delay could lead to the death or serious injury of yourself, your fellow soldiers, civilians or other persons under the protection of UNAC 's military component, or (ii) if giving such a warning does not hold any promise of achieving your immediate authorized objective or (iii) you are engaged in offensive operations.

6. If you have to open fire:

- a. Fire must be aimed and controlled. Indiscriminate fire is not permitted.
- b. Automatic fire should only be used as a last resort, except (i) in the case of weapons that can fire in automatic mode only or (ii) where you are engaged in offensive operations.
- c. Take all feasible precautions to avoid, and in any event minimize, collateral damage.
- d. Except where you are engaged in offensive operations, fire no more rounds than necessary.

7. After firing:

- a. Render medical assistance.
- b. Record the details of the incident, whether or not casualties have occurred.
- c. Report those details through the chain of command without delay.

8. When in doubt, and time permits, always seek clarification from higher command.

Specific Rules for Use of Force

9. You are authorized to use force, up to and including deadly force

- a. to defend (i) yourself, (ii) other UN personnel, (iii) members of the FDC, MPC or CISC that your unit has been assigned to assist or support, (iv) individuals designated by the SRSG against (a) a hostile act or a hostile intent or (b) to resist an attempt to abduct or detain them;
- b. to protect civilians, including humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders, under threat of physical violence from (i) members of illegal armed groups (ii) members of the FDC, MPC or CISC;*
- c. to protect designated facilities, installations, equipment, areas or goods against a hostile act or hostile intent that involves a grave threat to life or of serious bodily injury;
- d. against any individual or group that, through the use or threat of the use of armed force, limits or intends to limit the freedom of movement of (i) yourself, (ii) other UNAC personnel, (iii) members of the FDC, MPC or CISC that your unit has been assigned to assist or support;*
- e. to prevent or put a stop to the commission by (i) members of an illegal armed group or (ii) members of the FDC, MPC or CISC of a serious crime that involves a grave threat to life or of serious bodily injury to civilians;
- f. to prevent the supply of weapons, related materiel, military advice and training and other supplies and logistic support to illegal armed groups;*
- g. to prevent or suppress hostile activities or operations by illegal armed groups;*
- h. to degrade or eliminate the fighting or other operational capabilities of elements of illegal armed groups that have not agreed to disband and lay down their arms;**
- i. to prevent forcible passage by individuals or groups through a roadblock, checkpoint or cordon whose establishment has been authorized by the Sector Commander, if there is a grave threat to life or of serious bodily injury;
- j. against any person or group that, through the use or threat of the use of armed force, is preventing or demonstrating intent to prevent you or your unit carrying out lawful orders issued by a superior commander.

* When and where possible, seek permission from your immediate superior commander.

** These authorizations apply to you only if and when your unit is tasked with offensive operations.

UNITED NATIONS

Department of Peace Operations (DPO)



**DIRECTIVE ON DETENTION, SEARCHES AND USE OF FORCE FOR
INDIVIDUAL POLICE OFFICERS ON ASSIGNMENT WITH UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN CARANA (UNAC)**

**DEPARTMENT OF PEACE OPERATIONS
POLICE DIVISION**

25 September 2021

**DIRECTIVE ON DETENTION, SEARCHES AND USE OF FORCE FOR INDIVIDUAL POLICE OFFICERS (IPOs)
ON ASSIGNMENT WITH
UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN CARANA (UNAC)**

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Authority and mandate

1. This Directive, including its Annexes, constitutes the “Directive on detention, searches and use of force for all individual police officers on assignment with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC)” (hereinafter “Directive”).
2. This Directive provides the authority for the detention, searches and use of force by individual police officers (IPOs) on assignment with UNAC while carrying out their mandated tasks without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the Carana law enforcement agencies for the maintenance of law and order.
3. The Directive is issued by the USG-DPKO and sets forth the principles, parameters and conditions under which UNAC IPOs are authorized to detain, search and use non-lethal force in carrying out their mandated tasks in accordance with applicable Security Council resolutions. The specific tasks and responsibilities assigned to IPOs are stipulated in the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the police component in UNAC.

Command responsibility

4. Implementation of this Directive is a command responsibility. In accordance with:
 - a. DPKO/DFS Directive for Heads of Police Components of Peacekeeping Operations (Ref. 2006/00122, dated 21 November 2006);
 - b. DPKO/DFS Policy for United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions (Ref. 2014.01, dated 1 February 2014),
 - c. DPKO/DFS Policy on Justice Support in United Nations Peace Operations (Ref. 2016.22, dated 01 August 2016)
 - d. DPKO/DFS Guidelines on the Role of United Nations police in protection of civilians (Ref. 2017.12, dated 1 August 2017)
 - e. DPKO/DFS Manual on Community-Oriented Policing in United Nations Peace Operations (Ref. 2018.04, dated 2018)
 - f. Guidelines on Combined Military and Police coordination (Ref DPO 2019.16, dated 1 September 2019)
 - g. DPO/DOS Policy on Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Ref. 2019.23, dated 25v October 2019)
 - h. DPO/DOS Guidelines on Specialized Police Teams on Assignment with United Nations Peace Operations (Ref. 2019.34, dated 1 September 2019)
 - i. DPO/DPPA/DSS Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on Handling of Detention in UN Peacekeeping and Special Political Missions (Ref.2013, dated 1 January 2021),

Primary and overall command is vested in the Police Commissioner.

5. The Police Commissioner and those to whom he/she delegates command and control functions shall ensure that all IPOs under their respective command understand and comply with this Directive, as well as any further directives issued by the Police Commissioner.

Principles of the use of force

6. At all times, use of force by UNAC IPOs shall be consistent with the principles of necessity, proportionality/minimum use of force, legality and accountability as set forth in this Directive, and consistent with the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms, the United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, the United Nations Centre for Human Rights International Human Rights Standards for Law Enforcement.

Police Equipment

7. IPOs may only carry and use police equipment as listed in Annex A of this Directive.
8. It is the personal responsibility of every IPO to keep his/her police equipment secure. He/she must be able to account for the whereabouts and condition of his/her police equipment at all times. The Police Commissioner will issue detailed directives regarding the carriage, care and storage of these item(s) of police equipment.

Training and qualifications

9. Every IPO must be fully familiar with this Directive and understand the rules that it contains. To this end, he/she must receive a full briefing on this Directive as part of his/her induction training package and refresher briefings on a regular basis thereafter.
10. Every IPO must have received current and proper training on the care and use of the particular police equipment he/she carries. The Police Commissioner will issue detailed directives regarding the required training and the documentation that must be submitted to prove that the specific training has been satisfactorily completed.
11. An IPO may only carry police equipment if the Police Commissioner has certified that he/she has received and meets the required briefing and training expertise stipulated in the above directives.
12. IPOs while on duty, who carry police equipment are required to carry in their breast pocket an Aide-Mémoire (Blue Card) attached as Annex D of this Directive, which summarizes the rules contained in this Directive.

AUTHORITY TO STOP, DETAIN AND SEARCH

Authority to stop and detain

13. IPOs are authorized to stop, search and detain individuals in their areas of deployment, in all situations where use of force is authorized as set out in paragraph 21 of this Directive. They shall not deprive anyone of his/her liberty except on this basis, and in accordance with the procedures as prescribed in this Directive. IPOs do not have any lawful authority to arrest persons whom they stop and detain and may only hand over those individuals who are detained to the national authorities (or release them) in accordance with the ISOP.
14. In stopping or detaining persons, IPOs must act in accordance with the principles and procedures set forth in the Note of Guidance for UNAC: Security of the IDP population in the Protection of Civilians (POC) sites of 3 April 2014 (Note of Guidance) and those in

DPO/DPPA/DSS Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on Handling of Detention in UN Peacekeeping and Special Political Missions, dated 1 January 2021. Every IPO must have received current and effective training on implementation of the ISOP and the Note of Guidance.

Authority to search and seize

15. IPOs are authorized to search persons stopped or detained under paragraph 14 for illegal and prohibited items identified and to seize such items as may be used to cause harm, as well as any item found in the person's possession or control which may evidence a hostile act or intent to cause harm, including arms, ammunition, weapons and explosives, as well as illegal substances or other illegal items. IPOs may not confiscate other items that they may find in the possession of the detained person.
16. The following principles must be observed during any stop and search:
 - a) Stop and searches are not to humiliate or embarrass persons being searched;
 - b) Search procedures must take into account gender, and be sensitive to other factors such as race, religion and cultural practices;
 - c) The purpose of the search must be clearly stated to the person who is to be searched before he/she is searched;
 - d) The search must be conducted in the presence of another IPO/FPU member.
17. Weapons and other dangerous goods found/recovered during searches will be documented, inventoried and stored according to the Mission's established procedures. Necessary coordination shall occur between IPOs and the Mission's other components for the inventory and safekeeping of the found/recovered items.

Use of Non-Lethal Force or Items of Police Equipment

18. IPOs are authorized to use force solely for the reasons or purposes and in the circumstances specified in paragraph 20.
19. In using force, IPOs must AT ALL TIMES, act in accordance with international Human Rights norms and standards, including the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms, the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and this Directive.
20. As recalled in paragraph 6, the principles of legality, proportionality and necessity are to be observed at all times in the use of force. If force is required, it must be graduated and the minimum required to achieve a legitimate objective. The use of force is the last resort and all possible steps must be taken to avoid the need to resort to force, including in the preparation phase of an operation. There must always be accountability in respect of any use of force.

Use of Force, excluding deadly force

21. IPOs are authorized to use force, excluding lethal force, or items of police equipment as per Annex A:
 - a) To protect, deter or defend themselves against a hostile act or a hostile intent;
 - b) To protect other United Nations and associated personnel against a hostile act or a hostile intent;

- c) To prevent and stop any person or group, who intends to limit, or limits, their freedom of movement or the freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel.

Gradation of force

- 22. IPOs shall, as far as possible, use dialogue and mediation and other non-violent means before resorting to the use of physical force with or without police equipment. They may use non-lethal force with or without authorized police equipment only if other means remain ineffective for the purpose of achieving an authorized objective, as specified in paragraph 21 of this Directive.
- 23. If there is no practical alternative to the use of force, with or without police equipment in order to achieve objectives specified in paragraph 21 of this Directive, IPOs must, whenever the operational circumstances permit, observe the following graduated procedures:
 - a) Identify themselves in English and in the language(s) spoken in the location to which the IPOs are deployed as members of the UNAC Police component;
 - b) Give a clear warning of their intent to use force or police equipment;
 - c) The following warning shall be used in English and the primary languages spoken in the region:
«UNITED NATIONS, STOP OR I WILL USE FORCE»
 - d) Following such warning, IPOs intending to use force, with or without police equipment shall give reasonable time for that warning to be obeyed, unless doing so would,
 - i. unduly place themselves at a risk of death or bodily harm;
 - ii. create a risk of death or serious bodily harm to other persons; or
 - iii. clearly be inappropriate or pointless in the circumstances
- 24. The Police Commissioner has a duty to ensure that IPOs know the warning to be given verbally in English and the primary languages spoken in the region to which the IPOs are deployed.
- 25. Whenever the use of force, with or without any police equipment, is determined to be required under paragraph 20 of this Directive, IPOs shall understand and follow the following principles:
 - a) Non-violent means are to be attempted first;
 - b) Act with restraint and only use the minimum degree of force that is proportional to the seriousness of the threat and necessary to achieve the authorized objectives;
 - c) Respect and preserve life and cause minimum injury to persons;
 - d) Cause minimum damage to property;
 - e) First Aid should be provided as soon as possible to anyone who is hurt.
- 26. IPOs shall not use police equipment other than in the circumstances and to achieve the objectives set out in paragraph 20 of this Directive.
- 27. Handcuffs and restraints may only be used in accordance with the ISOP by IPOs who have satisfactorily completed the necessary training as stipulated in para 9-12 of this Directive.
- 28. No IPOs shall use force or police equipment against women with obvious signs of pregnancy, elderly persons, or persons with signs of severe disability, and minors, except in cases where

there is a hostile intent or hostile act that involves a grave threat to life or of serious bodily injury to United Nations or associated personnel.

Reports and Investigations

29. Immediately upon any incident involving the detention of any person pursuant to paragraph 13 of this Directive, the Police Commissioner shall be notified of such detention. Within twelve (12) hours the IPO who carried out the detention must submit through the chain of command to the Police Commissioner a detention details form (Annex B). The copy of the duly completed forms in Annex B of the ISOP will be submitted to the Police Commissioner upon detained person(s) detention, release or hand over, as appropriate.
30. Immediately after any incident involving the use of force, with or without police equipment, the IPO concerned must inform the Police Commissioner through the chain of command. The IPO must submit a written report within twelve (12) hours of the time of the occurrence of any such incident through the chain of command to the Police Commissioner with the following information:
 - a) The date, time, location and circumstances which led to the use of force with or without the police equipment;
 - b) The name(s) of the IPOs or other UNAC personnel involved including those who used force with or without the police equipment;
 - c) The name(s) of person(s) against whom the force/equipment was used;
 - d) The name(s) of witnesses, if any;
 - e) Injuries and/or damage of property caused by use of force with or without police equipment;
 - f) The events leading up to the use of force with or without police equipment;
 - g) The reason(s) for the use of force with or without police equipment;
 - h) The results of the use of force with or without police equipment;
 - i) A diagram of the incident scene where appropriate;
 - j) Any corrective actions taken to reduce the possibility of a similar incident.
 - k) Type of force used by IPO.

Violations

31. IPOs are advised that obedience to supervisor's orders shall not preclude a violation of this Directive or of the rules that it contains from being considered an act of serious misconduct if the IPO concerned knew that an order to use non-lethal force with or without item(s) of police equipment resulting in the injury of a person or damage to property was manifestly in violation of this Directive and the rules contained herein and he/she had a reasonable opportunity to refuse to follow it. In any case, responsibility also rests on the superiors who gave an order in violation of this Directive and the rules contained herein and shall be considered as serious misconduct.
32. Any violation of this Directive, as well as of the rules contained herein, shall be considered as an act of serious misconduct under the Directive for Disciplinary Matters Involving Civilian Police

Officers and Military Observers and other applicable directives and will be investigated in accordance with the SOP for the UNAC Police component.

Related Documents

33. The following references (policies and normative), although not exhaustive, are relevant.
- a. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials adopted by General Assembly resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979.
 - b. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990.
 - c. OHCHR/DPKO/DPA/DFS Policy on Human Rights in UN Peace Operations and Political Missions, 01 September 2011, Ref. 2011.20.
 - d. Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN Support to non-UN security forces (HRDDP) (A/67/775-S/2013/110).
 - e. DPKO/DFS Policy on Internal Evaluations and Inspections of United Nations Police, 01 October 2012, Ref. 2012.13.
 - f. DPKO/DFS Policy: United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions, Ref. 2014.01 of 1 February 2014.
 - g. Note of Guidance for UNAC: Security of the IDP population in the Protection of Civilians (POC) sites of 3 April 2014.
 - h. Implementation of the Note of Guidance to UNAC on Security of the IDP population in the POC sites of 24 April 2014.
 - i. DPKO/DFS Policy on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping, Ref. 2015.07 of 1 April 2015.
 - j. UN Standing Order on the integrated response to security incidents in and around UN POC sites of 18 March 2015.
 - k. UNAC Protection of Civilians (POC) Strategy, Ref. 2014/PoC/1 of 15 March 2015.
 - l. ISOP Review Report. November 2016.
 - m. SOP for UNAC Police component of 04 November 2016.
 - n. SOP on the Management of UNAC Holding Facilities of 5 April 2016.
 - o. SOP on Weapons Free Zones of 29 November 2016.
 - p. DPKO/DFS Policy on Justice Support in United Nations Peace Operations (Ref. 2016.22, dated 01 August 2016)
 - q. DPKO/DFS Guidelines on the Role of United Nations police in Protection of Civilians (Ref. 2017.12, dated 1 August 2017)
 - r. DPKO/DFS Manual on Community-Oriented Policing in United Nations Peace Operations (Ref. 2018.04, dated 2018)
 - s. Guidelines on Combined Military and Police coordination (Ref DPO 2019.16, dated 1 September 2019)

- t. DPO/DOS Policy on Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Ref. 2019.23, dated 25v October 2019)
- u. DPO/DOS Guidelines on Specialized Police Teams on Assignment with United Nations Peace Operations (Ref. 2019.34, dated 1 September 2019)
- v. DPO/DPPA/DSS Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on Handling of Detention in UN Peacekeeping and Special Political Missions (Ref.2013, dated 1 January 2021)
- w. Ground rules for UNAC POC sites.

Definitions

34. The definitions in Annex C of this Directive shall form an integral part of this Directive.

Monitoring and Compliance

35. The SRSG shall monitor compliance with this document.

Entry into Force

36. This Directive is adopted without prejudice to the Directive on Detention, Searches and Use of Force for Formed Police Units on Assignment with UNAC or the Rules of Engagement for the Military Component of UNAC.
37. This Directive enters into effect immediately upon approval. It may only be abrogated or amended in writing by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

Annexes:

- A. Authorized Items of police equipment for IPOs on assignment with UNAC**
- B. Detention details**
- C. Definitions**
- D. Blue Card**

Annex A

AUTHORISED ITEMS OF POLICE EQUIPMENT FOR IPOs ON ASSIGNMENT WITH UNAC

1. Pepper sprays
2. Police Shield
3. Helmets with face shield
4. Gloves (abrasion and puncture resistant)
5. Stab/cut/ puncture resistant Vest 6. Vest Trauma Plates
6. Safety Glasses/UV protective
7. Duty Belts (with proper holstering for approved equipment)
8. Hand cuffs
9. Metal Scanners
10. Headlamps
11. Flexcuffs

The carriage and/or use of any firearms, ammunition or related items of police equipment that does not appear on this list is strictly prohibited.

Annex B

DETENTION DETAILS

DETAINED PERSON'S DETAILS

FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME, MAIDEN NAME, ALIAS AND LAST NAME

.....

ADDRESS

.....

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH

.....

GENDER

.....

COUNTRY OF CITIZENSHIP

.....

NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION NUMBER

.....

DATE, TIME AND PLACE DETAINED:

.....

REASON FOR DETENTION

.....

.....

.....

WITNESS DETAILS

(NAME, SURNAME AND ADDRESS)

.....

DID THE DETAINED PERSON MAKE A STATEMENT?

.....

(If so, attach a copy of that statement)

WAS THE DETAINED PERSON SEARCHED?

IF SO, WHY?

.....

.....

WERE ANY ITEMS CONFISCATED OR SEIZED FROM THE DETAINED PERSON?

IF SO, PROVIDE A COMPLETE INVENTORY

.....

.....

.....

PHYSICAL CONDITION OF THE DETAINED PERSON, INCLUDING ANY VISIBLE OR ALLEGED INJURIES

.....

.....

(Including pictures, if so agreed by detained person)

WAS MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS

.....

.....

OFFICER DETAILS:

Name and Surname

United Nations Identification Number

Contingent:

Signature

Date and Time

Annex C

DEFINITIONS

1. Use of Force. The use or threat of the use, of physical means to achieve an objective authorized in this Directive.
2. Hostile Act. An attack where the intent is to cause death, bodily harm or destruction of designated property.
3. Hostile Intent. The threat of imminent force, which is demonstrated through an action which appears to be preparatory to a hostile act. Only a reasonable belief in the presence of hostile intent is required before detention or the use of force is authorized.
4. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). Protective clothing, helmet, goggles, or other equipment designed to protect the wearer's body from injury.
5. United Nations. The United Nations, including its offices programmes and funds.
6. United Nations personnel. Members of UNAC (including locally recruited personnel whilst on duty), officials of the United Nations and experts on mission for the United Nations.
7. Stop and detain. To hold a person so that he/she cannot leave.
8. Carana police and law enforcement agencies. All duly recognized police and other law enforcement agencies operating in Carana including the National Police.

Annex D

BLUE CARD

USE OF FORCE OR OTHER ITEMS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT EQUIPMENT Members of IPOs are authorized to use force or other items of police equipment to protect or defend themselves, other United Nations personnel against a hostile act or a hostile intent that involves serious bodily injury or to prevent or stop incidents that jeopardise public safety within UNAC premises. Gradation of Force Members of IPOs shall, as far as possible, apply non-violent means before resorting to the use either of physical force or other items of police equipment. They may use force or other items of police equipment only if other means remain ineffective for the purpose of achieving an authorized objective. If there is no practical alternative to the use of force, or other items of police equipment in order to achieve an authorized objective, members of IPOs must, whenever the operational circumstances permit, observe the following graduated procedures: A. Non-lethal force must be used, if at all possible; B. If non-lethal incapacitating weapons or tear gas are possessed by members of a IPOs who are trained to use those equipment, and where they would be an effective means to bring a threat to an end, then they must be used, if so allowed by the on-scene authorized commander; C. If the preceding measures remain ineffective or are without any promise of achieving an authorized objective, an attempt should be made, if possible, to make use of the visual and audible effect of preparing for use of force; D. If the preceding measures remain ineffective or are without any promise of achieving an authorized objective, force can be used in manner that avoids causing of personal injury or collateral damage to property; E. If the preceding measures remain ineffective or have no real likelihood of achieving the authorized objective, escalation of the incident to the next level will be necessary.	If members of IPOs intend to use force against other persons, they must first: A. Identify themselves in the language(s) spoken in the location to which the IPO is posted as members of the UNAC Police component; and B. Give a clear warning of their intent to use force. If members of IPO intend to use force, the following warning shall be used in English: « UNITED NATIONS, STOP OR I WILL USE FORCE » A. Give enough time for that warning to be obeyed, B. Unless to do so would: C. Unduly place themselves at risk of death or serious bodily harm; D. Create a risk of death or serious bodily harm to other persons; or E. Clearly be inappropriate or pointless in the circumstances. Principles of Use of Force At all times, use of force shall be consistent with the principles of gradation and last resort, minimum necessary and proportionate use of force as well as legality, and accountability in accordance with the United Nations Police in Peacekeeping operations and Special Political Mission, and Basic Principles of the use of Force. Use of Force, excluding Lethal Force Members of IPOs are authorized to use force or items of police equipment, excluding lethal force: A. To protect, deter or defend themselves against hostile act or intent ; B. To protect other United nations and associated personnel; C. To prevent or stop the commission of a crime that does not involve a grave threat to life or serious bodily injury; D. Against any person or group who limits or intends to limit the freedom of movement of the IPO or its members, or the freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel, or the freedom of movement of humanitarian workers.

United Nations
Department of Peace Operations (DPO)



**DIRECTIVE ON DETENTION, SEARCHES AND USE OF FORCE FOR FORMED
POLICE UNITS ON ASSIGNMENT WITH UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE
MISSION IN CARANA (UNAC)**

**DEPARTMENT OF PEACE OPERATIONS
POLICE DIVISION**

25 September 2021

DIRECTIVE ON DETENTION, SEARCHES AND USE OF FORCE FOR FORMED POLICE UNITS ON ASSIGNMENT WITH UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN CARANA (UNAC)

GENERAL

Authority and Mandate

1. This Directive, including its Annexes A-B, constitutes the "Directive on detention, searches and use of force for all members of Formed Police Units (FPU) in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC)" (hereinafter "Directive").
2. This Directive provides the authority for the detention, searches and use of force by members of FPU in their areas of deployment in UNAC.
3. This Directive is issued by the USG-DPKO and sets out the principles, parameters, and conditions under which detention, searches and use of force may be used by members of FPU in UNAC while executing their mandated activities within the limits of their capacities and areas of operation, in accordance with Security Council resolution (S/RES/1544/2021) of 10 September 2021. The Police Commissioner may issue more detailed directives to his commanding staff and the FPU commanders.

Command Responsibility

4. Implementation of this Directive is a command responsibility. In accordance with the DPKO/DFS Policy for Formed Police Units, dated 01 January 2017 ("FPU Policy"), which forms an integral part of this Directive, primary and overall command of the FPU is vested in the Police Commissioner who can delegate his/her command functions to the Deputy Chief of Operations/FPU Coordinator, responsible for all matters related to FPU.
5. Each FPU Commander is responsible for the effective command and control of the Unit under his/her command, and shall ensure that all the FPU members under his/her command understand and comply with this Directive as well as with any directives issued by the Police Commissioner.

Principles of Use of Force

6. At all times, use of force shall be consistent with the principles of gradation and last resort, minimum necessary and proportionate use of force as well as legality, and accountability in accordance with the FPU Policy.

Training and Qualifications for the Use of Force

7. Every member of a FPU who carries a firearm or other item(s) of law enforcement equipment must be fully familiar with this Directive and understand the rules it contains. He/she must have received current and proper training on the care and use of the particular weapon or item(s) of law enforcement equipment assigned to him/her.
8. The Police Commissioner will issue detailed directives regarding induction training and briefings on this Directive, including the documentation that must be submitted to prove that they have been received. A member of a FPU can only carry a firearm or other item(s) of law enforcement equipment if the Police Commissioner has certified that he/she has received the required briefings stipulated in the aforementioned directives.

9. Members of FPU who carry firearms or other item(s) of law enforcement equipment are required at all times while on duty to carry in their breast pocket an Aide-Memoire (Blue Card) provided by UNAC, which summarizes the rules contained in this Directive.

Equipment and Weapons

10. Members of FPU may only carry and use the firearms and other items of law enforcement for the exercise of their functions during the time of their mission listed in Annex A of this Directive. Detailed directives regarding the precise specifications of such items listed in that Annex A are contained in the UNAC Force Requirement for FPU. Members of FPU may only carry and use firearms and other items of law enforcement that conform to the specifications in the UNAC Force Requirement for FPU.
11. It is the personal responsibility of every member of a FPU to keep his/her firearm, ammunition and other item(s) of law enforcement equipment secure. He/she must be able to account for their whereabouts and condition at all times. The Police Commissioner will issue detailed directives regarding the carriage, care and storage of firearms, ammunition and other item(s) of law enforcement equipment.

Definitions

12. The definitions in Annex B of this Directive shall form an integral part of this Directive.

Use of Force, Firearms or items of Law Enforcement

13. Members of FPU are authorized to use force or firearms or other items of law enforcement equipment to protect or defend themselves, other United Nations and associated personnel, civilians including humanitarian workers, and key sites, equipment or goods designated by the SRSG, in consultation with the Police Commissioner, against a hostile act or a hostile intent that involves a grave threat to life or of serious bodily injury.

Gradation of Force

14. Members of FPU shall, as far as possible, apply de-escalation/non-violent means before resorting to the use either of physical force, firearms or other items of law enforcement equipment. They may use force, firearms or other items of law enforcement equipment only if other means remain ineffective for the purpose of achieving an authorized objective specified in paragraphs 6 to 13 of this Directive, or are without any promise of achieving such an authorized objective. Section D.2.2 of the FPU Policy, governing Gradation of Force, shall apply at all times.
15. If there is no practical alternative to the use of force, firearms or other items of law enforcement equipment in order to achieve an authorised objective specified in paragraphs 6 to 13 of this Directive, members of FPU must, whenever the operational circumstances permit, observe the following graduated procedures:
 - a. unarmed force must be used, if at all possible;
 - b. if non-lethal incapacitating weapons or tear gas are possessed by members of a FPU who are trained to use those weapons, and where they would be an effective means to bring a threat to an end, then they must be used, if so allowed by the on-scene authorized commander;

- c. if the preceding measures remain ineffective or are without any promise of achieving an authorized objective, an attempt should be made, if possible, to make use of the visual and audible effect of preparing a firearm for use;
 - d. if the preceding measures remain ineffective or are without any promise of achieving an authorized objective, warning shots should, if circumstances allow, be fired at a safe point of aim that avoids the causing of personal injury or collateral damage to property;
 - e. if the preceding measures remain ineffective or have no real likelihood of achieving the authorized objective, the use of armed force against persons is authorized.
16. If members of FPU intend to use force or firearms against other persons, they must first:
- a. identify themselves in the language(s) spoken in the location to which the FPU is posted as members of the UNAC Police component; and
 - b. give a clear warning of their intent to use force or firearms.
 - c. If members of FPU intend to use force, the following warning shall be used in English:
« UNITED NATIONS, STOP OR I WILL USE FORCE »
; and
 - d. If members of FPU intend to use firearms, the following warning shall be used in English:
« UNITED NATIONS, STOP OR I WILL SHOOT »
;and
 - e. give enough time for that warning to be obeyed, unless to do so would:
 - i. unduly place themselves at risk of death or serious bodily harm;
 - ii. create a risk of death or serious bodily harm to other persons; or
 - iii. clearly be inappropriate or pointless in the circumstances.
17. The Commander of each FPU has a duty to ensure that his officers know the warning to be given verbally in English and the primary language(s) spoken in the region to which the FPU is deployed.
18. Whenever the use of force or firearms or any other item of law enforcement equipment is determined to be required under paragraph 11 or 12 of this Directive, members of FPUs shall:
- a. act with restraint and only use the minimum degree of force that is proportional to the seriousness of the threat and necessary to achieve the authorized objective;
 - b. respect and preserve human life and cause the minimum of injury to people;
 - c. cause the minimum of damage to property;
 - d. as soon as practicable, help anyone who is hurt and ensure that medical aid is rendered if needed; and
 - e. as soon as practicable, ensure that relatives or friends of people injured or affected by the incident are notified.
19. No member of a FPU shall point a firearm or a non-lethal incapacitating weapon in the direction of any person other than in the circumstances and to achieve the objectives set out in paragraphs 11 and 12 of this Directive.

Reporting and Investigation

20. Immediately after any incident involving the use of force or firearms or other item of law enforcement equipment and regardless of whether or not such use resulted in death or injury to people or damage to property, the member of the FPU concerned must verbally inform the Office of Police Commissioner and record the details of the incident, including:
 - a. the date, time and place of the incident;
 - b. the name(s) of the UNAC personnel involved;
 - c. the name(s) of any members of the Caran law enforcement agencies involved;
 - d. the events leading up to the use of force, firearms or other item(s) of law enforcement equipment;
 - e. the reasons why he/she used force, firearms or other item(s) of law enforcement equipment;
 - f. who was subjected to the use of force, firearms or other item(s) of law enforcement equipment;
 - g. the apparent results of the use of force, firearms or other item(s) of law enforcement equipment; and
 - h. a diagram of the incident scene, where appropriate.
21. He/she must submit a written report with those details within twelve (12) hours of the time of the incident through the chain of command to the Police Commissioner. The Police Commissioner will, without delay, investigate the incident and present a report on it to the SRSG who will transmit that report to United Nations Headquarters. All members of FPUs are required to cooperate fully and actively with any such investigation.

Contravention

22. Members of FPUs are advised that obedience to superior orders shall not preclude a violation of this Directive or of the rules that it contains from being considered an act of serious misconduct if the member of a FPU concerned knew that an order to use force, firearms or other item(s) of law enforcement equipment resulting in the death, injury of a person or damage to property was manifestly in violation of this Directive and the rules contained herein and he/she had a reasonable opportunity to refuse to follow it. Responsibility shall, in any case also rest on the superior(s) who gave an order in violation of this Directive and the rules contained herein, and shall be considered as a serious misconduct under paragraph 21.
23. Any contravention of this Directive, as well as of the rules contained herein, shall be considered as an act of serious misconduct under the Directive for Disciplinary Matters Involving Civilian Police Officers and Military Observers.

RELATED DOCUMENTS

24. The following references (policies and normative), although not exhaustive, are relevant.
 - a. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials adopted by General Assembly resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979.
 - b. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August to 7 September 1990.

- c. OHCHR/DPKO/DPA/DFS Policy on Human Rights in UN Peace Operations and Political Missions, 01 September 2011, Ref. 2011.20.
- d. Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on UN Support to non-UN security forces (HRDDP) (A/67/775-S/2013/110).
- e. DPKO/DFS Policy: United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions, Ref. 2014.01 of 1 February 2014.
- f. Note of Guidance for UNAC: Security of the IDP population in the Protection of Civilians (POC) sites of 3 April 2014.
- g. Implementation of the Note of Guidance to UNAC on Security of the IDP population in the POC sites of 24 April 2014.
- h. DPKO/DFS Policy on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping, Ref. 2015.07 of 1 April 2015.
- i. UN Standing Order on the integrated response to security incidents in and around UN POC sites of 18 March 2015.
- j. ISOP Review Report. November 2016.
- k. UN Protection of Civilians (POC) Strategy, Ref. 2014/PoC/1 of 15 March 2015.
- l. SOP for UN Police component of 04 November 2016.
- m. SOP on the Management of UN Holding Facilities of 5 April 2016.
- n. SOP on Weapons Free Zones of 29 November 2016.
- o. DPKO/DFS Policy on Justice Support in United Nations Peace Operations (Ref. 2016.22, dated 01 August 2016)
- p. DPKO/DFS Guidelines on the Role of United Nations police in Protection of Civilians (Ref. 2017.12, dated 1 August 2017)
- q. DPKO/DFS Manual on Community-Oriented Policing in United Nations Peace Operations (Ref. 2018.04, dated 2018)
- r. Guidelines on Combined Military and Police coordination (Ref DPO 2019.16, dated 1 September 2019)
- s. DPO/DOS Policy on Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Ref. 2019.23, dated 25v October 2019)
- t. DPO/DOS Guidelines on Specialized Police Teams on Assignment with United Nations Peace Operations (Ref. 2019.34, dated 1 September 2019)
- u. UN DPO Ref. 2019.11 SOP -Assessment and Evaluation of Formed Police Unit Performance.
- v. DPO/DPPA/DSS Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on Handling of Detention in UN Peacekeeping and Special Political Missions (Ref.2013, dated 1 January 2021)
- w. Ground rules for UN POC sites.

ENTRY INTO FORCE

- 25. This Directive is adopted without prejudice to the rules of engagement for the military component of UNAC
- 26. This Directive shall enter into force on 25 September 2021.

ANNEXES:

- A. List of law enforcement equipment related to the use of force.
- B. Definitions

Annex A

**LIST OF LAW ENFORCEMENT EQUIPMENT RELATED TO THE USE OF FORCE, INCLUDING LETHAL FORCE
AUTHORIZED FOR MEMBERS OF FORMED POLICE UNITS (FPU_s) ON ASSIGNMENT WITH UNAC**

1. Police Armoured Protected Vehicles APVs / APCs Infantry Carriers
2. Water cannon
3. Crowd control vehicles
4. Rifles and ammunition
5. Side arms and ammunition
6. Machine guns and ammunition (up to 15 mm)
7. Electric baton / Taser (advanced pistol)
8. Launcher for tear gas grenades (single/multiple barrel)
9. Tear gas/smoke hand grenades
10. Tear gas/smoke grenades/canisters (37 mm and above)
11. Flash-bang / stun grenades
12. Smoke grenades (coloured)
13. Soft-Kinetic Projectiles (SKPs) as per UN specifications
14. Illumination flares
15. Signal pistol
16. Pepper spray canisters (OC Mace)
17. Spike strip /Traffic spikes
18. Police baton / Tonfa
19. Rigid handcuffs
20. Disposable restraints

The carriage and/or use of any firearms, ammunition or related items of law enforcement that does not appear on this list is strictly prohibited

Annex B

DEFINITIONS

1. Armed Force. The use of weapons, including firearms, non-lethal incapacitating weapons and tear gas.
2. Civil unrest. The commission, perpetration or instigation of acts of violence which affect public peace or order.
3. Force. The use, or threat of the use, of physical means to achieve an objective authorized in this Directive.
4. Hostile Act. An action where the intent is to cause death, bodily harm or destruction of designated property.
5. Hostile Intent. The threat of imminent use of force, which is demonstrated through an action or behaviour which appears to be preparatory to a hostile act. Only a reasonable belief in the presence of hostile intent is required before detention or the use of force is authorized. Whether or not hostile intent is being demonstrated must be judged by the on-scene commander, on the basis of one or a combination of the following factors:
 - a. The capability and preparedness of the threat.
 - b. The available evidence which indicates an intention to attack
 - c. Historical precedent within the Mission's Area of Responsibility (AOR)
6. Caran Police and other law enforcement agencies. All duly recognized law enforcement agencies operating in Carana.
7. Prevent. To take action for the purpose of ensuring that an event or activity which one has a reasonable belief, supported by credible evidence or information, will soon occur does not in fact take place.
8. Reasonable belief. A belief which a reasonable person would sensibly hold on the basis of facts as they are known to the commander or individual officer at the time.
9. Unarmed Force. The use of physical force, short of the use of "Armed Force".
10. United Nations. The United Nations, including its offices, programmes, funds.
 - a. United Nations and Associated Personnel. The following persons are considered "United Nations and Associated Personnel" for the purpose of this Directive:
Members of UNAC (including locally recruited personnel while on duty);
 - b. Officials of the United Nations and of its specialized agencies and related organizations;
 - c. Experts on Mission for the United Nations and for its specialized agencies and related organizations;
 - d. United Nations Volunteers (UNVs) on assignment or mission in Carana;
 - e. Other personnel designated by the SRSG in consultation with the United Nations headquarters (UNHQ), including:

- i. Persons engaged by the Secretary-General or by one of the specialized agencies or related organizations of the United Nations to perform functions on behalf of UNAC or the United Nations;
- ii. Persons assigned by a Government or an intergovernmental organization operating with the authority of the Security Council or General Assembly to carry out activities in support of the fulfilment of the mandate of UNAC or of programmes of the United Nations, including programmes of its offices, agencies, funds, and programmes;
- iii. Persons deployed by authorized humanitarian non-governmental organizations or agencies under an agreement with the Secretary-General or with a specialized agency or related organization of the United Nations to carry out activities in support of the fulfilment of the mandate of UNAC or of programmes of the United Nations, including programmes of its offices, agencies, funds, and programmes.

11. Stop and detain. To hold a person so that he/she cannot leave.

UNAC Military OPORD



OPORD 01/2021: UNAC OP ORDER

(UN Confidential)

Copy No 01 of 40

FWD HQ UNAC

GALASI, CARANA

151030C OCT 2021

OP O 01/2021

References:

- A. Kalari Peace Agreement dated 11 August 2021.
- B. Security Council Resolution 1544 dated 10 September 2021 (S/RES/1544 (2021)).
- C. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations on the situation in Carana 4711 (2021). S/2021/4711, dated 27 July 2021.
- D. Strategic Guidance from USG DPO, dated 02 June 2021.
- E. UNAC Mission Concept, dated 25 September 2021.
- F. UNAC Military concept of Operations (CONOPS), dated 25 September 2021
- G. Strategic Assessment Report, dated 22 February 2021.
- H. UNAC Rules of Engagement, dated 25 September 2021.

Time Z: CHARLIE

Task Organization: See Annex A

1. PURPOSE:

- a. This Operation Order (OpO) provides the overarching operational and tactical direction and guidance to UNAC Force headquarters and units for a period of 12 to 16 months, starting on 01 November 2021. OpO 001/2021 development and release follow the adoption of a UNSCR 1544 (2021) for UNAC (Reference B), the UNAC Mission Concept and of the development of the overall situation in Carana. It focuses on Phase 1 and 2 (Initial and full deployment) and Phase 3 (Consolidation) of the UNAC mission.
- b. The overarching tasks and objectives outlined in this Operation Order will be supplemented periodically by Force Commander's Quarterly Guidance which will continue to guide subordinates towards the Military Objectives of the Force and Mission.
- c. This OPO will be reviewed and amended if there are any significant changes in the UNAC mandate or priorities, if the UNAC Force mission is modified, if Phase 3 of the mission is achieved, or through the achievement of all objectives. Annexes to this OpO will be subject to refinement, given the expected changes in Force structure and laydown throughout the lifespan of the Order.

2. SITUATION

- a. General. CARANA has experienced internal conflict for over ten years. Due to the lack of political and economic development as well as an increasing discrimination of Kori and Tatsi members the opposition against the government under President Ogavo grew and led to the formation of rebel groups engaging the government in armed conflict. The Mouvement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) defeated the Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC) in local battles and leading to the FDC loss of control in the western Carana. Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC) established itself in Southern Carana and engaged the FDC in the South. The conflict led to the displacement and violence against local population leading to a serious humanitarian crisis with about 700,000 iDPs needing assistance.
- b. Sustained efforts by The Fasia Union and the United Nations finally resulted in the KALARI Peace Agreement reached between the Government of Carana, MPC and the CISC. This created the conditions to form a Transitional Government, to develop a new constitution for Carana, to hold general election within 12 months of the adoption of the constitution and to establish a new CARANA National Defence and Security Forces consisting of Government forces and combatants of the Armed Political Parties and Movements.
- c. The Carana Defence Forces (CDF) and the armed components of the MPC and CISC are currently respecting the overall peace agreement. The new transitional government has been formed and plans are underway for presidential and national elections to be held in 2023. While the cease-fire is generally holding, tensions between the factions remain high and there is a great deal of suspicion from all sides that the election might not be free or fair.

- d. Ongoing operation to neutralize El Hasar in Katasi may push the terrorist group towards western Carana. The capabilities of FRAFOR are not sufficient to both maintain the security in Katasi and neutralize El Hasar in and across the border areas to Carana.
- e. Relations with Rimosa are strained due to disputes over islands of their shared coast and oil exploitation in these territories as well as the Ellassi Liberation Front (ELF) is reported crossing the border into Carana conducting armed attacks and raids on local villages along the Carana-Rimosa border.
- f. Despite some International Community Humanitarian relief attempts, the overall situation in CARANA is critical. 6.3 million are currently in need of humanitarian assistance, and living conditions are most dramatic for the approx. 1.1 million IDPs, 700,000 of which currently live in provisional camps in central Carana. Another unquantified refugee and IDP population, estimated at approx. 30,000 refugees and 300,000 IDPs, is currently based along the borders to Katasi and Rimosa. There is an urgent need to act.
- g. Political Situation. The international community has asked the United Nations to intervene with a military force. In view of this situation, the UNSC has adopted a Resolution 1544 (2021) establishing the United Nations Assistance Mission in CARANA (UNAC) for a period of 6 months and further defined that UNAC will consist of up to an authorised strength of up 13,315 United Nations military unit personnel, up to 185 military observers, 40 liaison officers and 300 military staff officers to address the situation.
- h. Belligerent Forces. The belligerent organisations and capabilities are defined in Annex F INTSUM 01/20 200900C Oct 2021 to this OPO. There are two major belligerent groups, the FDC and the MPC. Neither side has the military strength to dominate the country to any extent. These two belligerent groups remain deployed in defensive positions but are capable of limited local offensive actions. A third armed group, the CISC, is an unstructured formation of rebels. Their capabilities are very limited and generally consist of conducting terrorist-like actions against the FDC in the **LEPPKO Province** and harassing the local population.
 - (1) FDC. The FDC has a strength of approximately 20,000 all ranks. It consists of four “area commands”, all less than brigade strength, and a small air force. The FDC is considered the official armed forces of CARANA. Its equipment has suffered from previous years of fighting and is in a poor state of maintenance.
 - (2) MPC. The MPC comprises approximately 10,000 personnel of whom approximately half have returned home and, although they have retained their weapons, are currently inactive. The remainder are organized in groups of 750 men and deployed in camps of approximately 250. They are equipped with assault rifles, light mortars and anti-tank weapons. Most of their vehicles are in a poor state of repair with shortages of spares and fuel restricting operations.
 - (3) CISC. The CISC consists of approximately 3,000 to 5,000 fighters with diverging backgrounds. Some members are deserters from the FDC, while others are form fighters

from the civil war in Rimosa. The discipline and internal cohesion of this rebel group are low, as is the standard of training. They are notably brutal in combat and show no regard for the rights of non-combatants.

i. Friendly Forces.

- (1) UNSC's Intent. The UNSC intent is to create a secure, stable, democratic and economically sound CARANA thus promoting peace, prosperity and security throughout the region.
- (2) SRSG's Intent. The SRSG wants to
 - (a) support of the transnational government of Carana in the implementation of the peace process and the creation of a DDR and SSR concept quickly and efficiently already with the initial deployment,
 - (b) ensure that early, visible and robust monitoring and observing posture is established especially in those areas, where the parties to the conflict have not been withdrawn,
 - (c) coordinate all UNAC efforts and humanitarian/development activities with the transitional government, the parties to the conflict and other organizations for mandate implementation, and
 - (d) conduct an information campaign in close coordination with the transitional government and all parties to the conflict in regard to the objectives of the UN Peacekeeping
 - (e) and allow the development of the conditions for the rebuilding of the country, including a general election.
- (3) SRSG's Concept of Operations. In order to implement the UNSC Resolution 1544, and acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, UNAC is to carry out peacekeeping operations within CARANA. It is to ensure that while doing so it remains an impartial force and is perceived as such by all belligerent parties. It is to do all it can to fulfil its mandate through negotiation and mediation, having gained the consent, trust and cooperation of all the belligerent factions at all levels. Where negotiation has failed, UNAC may take the necessary action, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the Government of the Republic of CARANA.
- (4) UN Components in Theatre. The UNAC is organized into five components: Political, Development/Humanitarian, Military, Police and Mission Support Components. The UNAC military force is one of the components available to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General/ Head of Mission (SRSG/HoM) in CARANA to achieve the objectives set in the UNSC Resolution. It is a vital component as it provides overall

security and adequate stability for other UN and UN components to complete their role.

(5) UNHCR will also be present in CARANA. They are the lead agency for the refugee camps outside CARANA and so outside the UNAC mandate.

(6) The UNAC military forces will operate with UN-related organizations, Regional and civilian organizations, International Organizations (IO) and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs). These organizations' efforts are coordinated by the Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In addition, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the World Food Program (WFO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations International Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF) are present in CARANA.

j. Attachments and Detachments. See UNAC Task Organization Table (Annex A) for all military forces in UNAC.

3. **MISSION.**

UNAC will implement UNSC Resolution 1544 (2021) with a view to creating conditions for a more secure and stable environment in CARANA.

4. **EXECUTION.**

a. UNAC Force Commander's intent. The Force Commander's intent is to capitalise on the continued commitment of the belligerents to adhere to the KALARI peace agreement and to ensure that their military components do not attempt to delay its implementation. He wishes to quickly establish contacts with all parties and factions involved and develop Sector and local-level cooperation based on consensus. The quick UNAC Forces entry and deployment in CARANA and the implementation of control measures will create the conditions for the provision of Humanitarian relief and allow all the UN and UN organisations to achieve their mission and democratise the Country. At the same time, our success in providing benefits to the citizens of CARANA will secure their support to us.

b. UNAC End State. A secure and stable environment throughout CARANA.

c. UNAC CoG. The legitimacy of the mission is evidenced by international support and the Mandate authorised by the UN Security Council.

d. UNAC Concept of Op. UNAC will conduct its operations along five major lines of operations. Decisive points (DP) for each line of operations are detailed in Annex C.

- (1) Stabilize the Country.
- (2) Secure the Country.
- (3) Coordination with all parties involved.
- (4) Establish viable new CARANA Armed Forces.
- (5) Obtain the support of the citizens of CARANA.

- e. To secure and stabilise the Country UNAC Forces will be deployed quickly and deal swiftly with any breach of the agreement from the signing parties. During **Phase 1**, UNAC Forces will adopt a very cooperative approach with all military factions and at the same time be ready to revert to a more aggressive posture. Special efforts will be required with those that do not follow the content of the KALARI Peace Agreement. Of particular importance during this phase, all conditions for the delivery of Humanitarian assistance must be established and maintained. This will be followed by direct and indirect military support actions aimed at securing further the environment.

The activities such as DDR will be initiated in **Phase 2** and fully supported during **Phase 3**. This will create added security and in turn facilitate the safe return of refugees and deportees. Once the desired level of security and stability are achieved, UNAC Forces will switch its main effort in support of the democratization process including the conduct of a general election and the rebuilding of the CARANA Armed Forces and Police Force.

Throughout the Mission, UNAC forces will ensure the protection of all UN components, related organisations and CARANA civilians by coordinating their actions, monitoring all faction's activities and maintaining a 24/7 capability to take appropriate actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as necessary. Flexibility will be ensured by a strong and very mobile Quick Reaction Force.

- (1) Phase 1 Initial Deployment. UNAC will see the deployment of its HQ, main logistic Base, Aviation Forces, and 3 Sector HQs with the first assigned contingents, through sea and airport points of entry at GALASI, CERENI, MALDOSA and CORMA. Other organisations will also be deployed and the Joint Commission for the Ceasefire (JCC) will establish Joint Liaison Teams (JLT) down to the provincial level throughout the Country. Each UNAC sector will deploy all assigned forces to monitor the cease-fire within the boundary, establish Humanitarian corridors and establish liaison with all parties and related agencies. Force security will be maintained throughout by securing permanent locations and maintaining Quick Reaction Forces at the Mission and Sector levels. An active public information campaign will be implemented down to the contingent level during this phase.
- (2) Phase 2 Full Deployment. During the second phase, UNAC will finalize the deployment of assigned contingents in order to maintain the established secure and stable environment and conduct operations in direct and indirect support to:
 - (a) Return of refugees and deportees
 - (b) Establish cantonments and conduct DDR activities
 - (c) Security operations in support of the electoral process
 - (d) Facilitate the creation of the Country's Legal structure

(3) Phase 3 Consolidation. In Phase3, UNAC will maintain the established secure and stable environment and conduct operations focusing on:

- (a) the conduct of elections
- (b) the formation of the National Army and, as required, the National Police force
- (c) contingent rotations
- (d) monitor and report HR violations

(4) Phase 4 Capacity Building (omitted)

f. Grouping and tasks

(1) Grouping as per Annex A

(2) Phase 1 Tasks – SECTOR 1:

- (a) Deploy in the city of **GALASI**
- (b) Ensure the security of all UNAC elements deployed within Boundaries
- (c) Provide quick reaction forces of Coy size (QRF) at 12 hours' notice to move
- (d) Participate in the Mission Information Campaign

(3) Phase 1 Tasks - SECTORS 2 and 3:

- (a) Deploy contingents assigned to Sector once entering AO
- (b) Protect sea and airport points of entry within boundaries
- (c) Protect all Airport/Airfield within boundaries
- (d) Monitor the withdrawal of FDC, MPC and CISC from confrontation lines in cantonment areas and establish Zones of Separation (ZOS) in areas of tension
- (e) Promote and ensure freedom of movement
- (f) Secure the delivery of humanitarian aid and the relief of suffering
- (g) Contact other non-signing armed factions, if any within AO, and develop local consensus to conform to the intent of the KALARI Agreement.

(4) Phase 2 and 3 Tasks - SECTOR 1:

- (a) Ensure the security of all UNAC elements deployed within Boundaries
- (b) Promote and ensure freedom of movement within boundaries
- (c) Provide protection and support to the Electoral Division personnel
- (d) Provide a quick reaction force of Coy size (QRF) at 12 hours' notice to move
- (e) Assist the Rule of Law division with escort protection as required
- (f) Participate in the Mission Information Campaign

(5) Phase 2 and 3 Tasks - SECTORS 2 and 3:

- (a) Maintain AO secured 24/7
- (b) Maintain freedom of movement throughout AO
- (c) Protect sea and airport points of entry within boundaries
- (d) Protect all Airport/Airfield within boundaries
- (e) Provide escort protection to Electoral Division personnel when needed
- (f) Establish Assembly Zones (AZ) and Cantonment Area (CA) for former fighters of the MPC, CISC and other armed group, if any within AO, in preparation of demobilisation
- (g) Monitor the demobilisation and disarmament of members of the MPC, CISC and other factions
- (h) Be at 72 hours' notice to move to conduct cordon and search operations in support of DDR and Human Rights activities
- (i) Assist Rule of Law division with escort protection as required
- (j) Participate in the Mission Information Campaign

(6) Phase 4 Tasks - SECTOR 1:

- (a) Ensure security of all UNAC elements deployed within Boundaries
- (b) Promote and ensure freedom of movement within boundaries
- (c) Provide protection and support to the Electoral Division personnel
- (d) Protect electoral material delivery, collect and storage throughout the electoral process while in the city of GALASI
- (e) Monitor and assist in the training of the new CARANA Armed Forces and assist UN CIVPOL in training the new CARANA Police Force
- (f) Provide a quick reaction force of Coy size (QRF) at 24 hours' notice to move
- (g) Participate in the Mission Information Campaign
- (h) Assist Rule of Law division with escort protection as required
- (i) Monitor and assist as necessary and as per capability the demobilisation and disarmament of members of the FDC, MPC, CISC and other factions
- (j) Be ready for additional protection tasks in support of electoral process.

(7) Phase 4 Tasks - SECTORS 2 and 3:

- (a) Maintain AO secured 24/7
- (b) Maintain freedom of movement throughout

- (c) Protect sea and airport points of entry within boundaries
- (d) Protect all Airport/Airfield within boundaries
- (e) Protect electoral material delivery, collect and storage throughout the electoral process
- (f) Monitor and assist in the training of the new CARANA Armed Forces and assist UN CIVPOL in training the new CARANA Police Force
- (g) Be at 48 hours' notice to move to conduct cordon and search operations in support Human Rights activities
- (h) Monitor overall Humanitarian situation and report all HR violations
- (i) Participate in the Mission Information Campaign

g. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Timings.

- (a) Phase 1 to be completed as soon as possible
- (b) Phases 2 and 3 will be initiated by this HQ
- (c) DDR process to begin Aug 21 – New CARANA Armed Forces capabilities to be ready at the latest by Dec 23
- (d) Election scheduled for July 2023

(2) Boundaries. Sector AOs are assigned as per Annexes A and B

(3) Movement. All contingents' movement in and out of the Theatre will be this HQ's responsibility. Once within Sector Boundary, Sectors HQ are responsible for all UNAC troop's movement.

(4) CIMIC. All contingents CIMIC initiative will be coordinated through the CIMIC Sub-Committee of the JCC

(5) AVN SP Req. Request for Aviation Support to be forwarded 72 hours in advance to this HQ.

(6) Liaison. Sectors are to exchange LO with neighbouring formations. All liaisons with neighbouring countries will be initiated by this HQ.

(7) Coordination.

- (a) Daily Bde/Sector Report to be submitted by 16:00 to this HQ
- (b) UNAC morning coord. UNAC morning coord conference will be held at 0930hrs
- (c) DDR. Sector/Bde HQs to coordinate DDR support activities with the CARANA DDR Commission

- (d) Coordination points between Sectors/Bde as per SOP. Info this HQ when coord points are manned.
 - (e) All UNAC armed forces support to Police training will be coordinated through UN CIVPOL
 - (f) Direct liaison with all other components of UNAC is authorized at the Bde/Sector level
- (8) Visits. All visits within Theatre will be coordinated by this HQ

5. **SERVICE SUPPORT**

- a. Administrative Orders. Mission Administrative Order will be published as Annex I (**omitted**) to the OP Order. UNAC DMS will provide effective administrative, engineering, logistic and technical support for the operation of all components of UNAC and act as a financial 'watchdog'. Sector 1 will be supported directly from the Central admin base and Sector Regional Admin Offices will provide support in assigned AO.
- b. Each contingent support will be as per MOUs developed between UN and the contributing countries.
- c. Defensive stores. Def stores are a Mission control item. All requests are to be forwarded to this HQ. Allocation to each sector in addition to the basic load carried in theatre by contributing countries will be authorized by this HQ.
- d. All direct costs for military support to IDP and refugees will be captured and forwarded to this HQ through RAO.
- e. Medical. Formation's Med support facilities will ensure first and second-line care and first-line evacuation. The mission will provide all CASEVAC including emergency evacuation to Field Hospital, second-line care and stabilization before further evacuation. CASEVAC will be requested through the Op channel. Evacuation to the home country remains each contributing nation's responsibility.

6. **COMMAND AND SIGNALS**

- a. Command
 - (1) UNAC HQs:
 - (a) Phase 1: HQ in GALASI
 - (b) Phase 2 and 3: Main HQ and Alternate in GALASI
- b. Communication. Code words, nicknames, passwords and Emergency Control measures as per Annex F (omitted)

7. **Ack Instruction: ACK**

Kinobe M.S.

Major General

Force Commander UNAC

Annexes:

Annex A: UNAC Task Organization Table by Sector

Annex B: Deployment Map

Annex C: Military Lines of Operations and Decisive Conditions

Annex D: Military Observers/Liaison Officers Deployment Map

Annex E: Known deployment locations of Belligerent Groups

Annex F: Belligerent Organizations and Capabilities

Annex G: Foreign Military Groups/Military Forces

Annex H: UNAC Communications and Electronics Emission Measures **(omitted)**

Annex I: Mission Administrative Order **(omitted)**

DISTR:**Copy No.**

UNAC HQ	1-9
SECTOR 1	10-11
SECTOR 2	12-13
SECTOR 3	14-15
NIGERIA HQ UNIT; ING UNIT	16-17
INDIAN SIGNAL UNIT, Level III HOSPITAL; INF BTL, TRANSPORT UNIT	18 - 21
NEPAL INF BTL/QRF	22
CAMBODIA DEMINING UNIT	23
EGYPTIAN MP UNIT, TRANSPORT UNITS	24 -26
NAMIBIA INF BTL/QRF	27
ETHIOPIA INF BTL	28
BANGLADESH INF BTL, AVN UNIT	29 – 30
CHINA ENG UNIT; LOG UNIT	31 – 33
UGANDA INF BTL	34
RWANDA INF BTL, Level II HOSPITAL	35 - 36
KENYA INF BTL	37
SOUTH AFRICAN INF BTL, ENG UNIT	38 – 39
PAKISTAN INF BTL, ENG UNIT, LEVEL II Hospital, SIG UNIT	40 - 43
GERMANY ISR UNIT, LOG UNIT	44 – 45
GHANA INF BTLs	46 – 47
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PSOD	53 -58
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
Annex A to OP O 01/2021HQ UNAC15 OCT 2021UNAC Task Organization Table by Sector

Force HQ		Sector I		Sector II		Sector III	
	Galasi		Galasi		Alur		Corma
	Galasi QRF		Galasi		Alur		Corma
	Galasi Level 3		Galasi		Alur		Corma
	Galasi		Galasi		Alur		Corma
	Galasi		Galasi		Alur		Corma
	Galasi		Galasi		Alur		Corma
	Galasi		Galasi		Alur		Corma
			Galasi		Alur		Corma
			Maroni		Alur		Corma
			Folsa		Alur		Corma
					Alur		Corma
					Alur		Corma
					Alur		Lora
					Faron		Muka
					Sereen		Kika

Annex B to OP O 01/2021

HQ UNAC


15 OCT 2021

Deployment Map

Annex C to OP O 01/2021

HQ UNAC


15 OCT 2021

Military Lines of Operations and Decisive Conditions

Annex E to OP O 01/2021

HQ UNAC

15 OCT 2021

Known deployment locations of Belligerent Groups

Annex F to OP O 01/2021HQ UNAC15 OCT 2021**Belligerent Organizations and Capabilities**

1. **Introduction.** Carana is a Presidential Republic in line with the first Carana constitution adopted by a referendum in 1987. Jackson Ogavo, leader of the PDC, became the first elected president of CARANA. Initially the government was reasonably representative of the ethnic balance of the country, although still dominated by the Falin, and it followed democratic principles that were later enshrined in the 1991 constitution. During the early years some economic and social reforms were realized but over time, Ogavo's focus changed, and he became preoccupied with quietly suppressing all opposition groups and enhancing his own power base. Beginning in 2008, he expanded the influence of the central government on all economic and social activities by laws and administrative rules. The 1996 replacement of all key Kori and Tatsi government ministers with members of Ogavo's Falin tribe was followed by an increasingly repressive regime, administrative and economic inefficiency, and corruption. As in the government, the Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC) are dominated by the Falin and have become the de facto military arm of the party.

2. **Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC).**

The FDC consists of approximately 20,000 personnel in 4 'area commands' and an air force, equipped with mostly a mixture of former French and Russian weapons and vehicles and a small Navy. The majority of equipment is in a poor state of repair. The most effective and best-equipped brigade, with some M3 APCs and AMX 13 tanks, is the Northern Area. The least effective and worst equipped is the Central Area. With a small number of coastal and river patrol boats, the Navy plays a specialized but insignificant role in the Defence Force. The Air Force, equipped with a squadron of armed helicopters, transport helicopters and a few light bombers has a limited striking capacity. This limited capacity allowed the government to project its power over the entire country during the conflict. However, this limited capacity was not sufficient to deliver decisive strikes against the various rebel groups. Currently, the six Alpha Jets can be assessed as non-operational. The FDC headquarters is collocated with PDC headquarters in GALASI.

For further information on the FDC, refer to the "Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) report.

3. **Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC).**

With an eye on future elections, the leadership of MPC is currently developing its political platform and preparing for a long-term political role. Given the precedent set during the fighting in terms of its ability to coordinate activities against the government, it has the potential to become an effective political force. It enjoys broad public support in the west as it is seen

to have the ability to address the concerns and needs of the people when the government had failed. In some areas the MPC have taken over government and basic administrative functions. The MPC operates a harsh public order regime but have repeatedly indicated that they respect human rights, especially the rights of the child. As a result of broad public support, and dissatisfaction with the government, the new administrative role of the MPC is increasingly accepted by the population in the west – other elements remain compliant out of fear for the MPC.

The original assessment of The MPC strength was somewhat conservative and has been adjusted from a total of 6,000 to approximately 10,000. The MPC is assessed with a total strength of 10,000 fighters and 10,000 to 20,000 supporters. Approximately 5,000 MPC returned home last month but most have kept their weapons and remain ready to return to their formations if necessary.

The MPC is structured into groups of 750 men. Each of these groups is led by a field commander and has a local network of supporters. The groups have no internally defined military structure, but a system of sub-commanders with different numbers of fighters. The loyalty to the commanders is high and discipline is very good. The deployed elements of the MPC have established camps of up to approximately 250 from where they conduct patrols west of the separation line; while this is not in contravention of the Kalari Treaty it has the potential to act as a trigger for other action whether by mistake or by design.

The MPC is lightly armed but AK47 assault rifles, RPG7 anti-tank weapons and a variety of medium and heavy machine guns. They do not have any armoured vehicles but are extremely mobile using "technical" - light trucks mounting machine guns or recoilless rifles.

The official HQ of MPC is in ALUR but this is more a symbolic HQ than an operational one. After the end of the fighting, the official HQ in ALUR increased in importance and became a basic administrative centre of the region. Some leaders of MPC are permanently in ALUR.

For further information on the MPC, refer to the "Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) report".

4. **Independent Combatants du Sud Carana (CISC).**

The CISC is an unstructured formation of rebels with diverging backgrounds. Some members are deserters from the FDC, while others are from the civil war in RIMOSA. The movement has also been successful in recruiting young men from the local population. This is mostly due to recent rebel successes along with the poor economic situation. The discipline and internal cohesion of this rebel group is low, as is the standard of training.

The CISC currently lacks the structure or organisation that would enable it to develop into an effective political body. It owes its following to frustration over poor living conditions, general dissatisfaction with the Ogavo administration and longstanding ethnic hostilities with the Falin minority in LEPPKO province.

Unlike the MPC, the ICSC has not tried to establish administrative functions and exercises control in the region only by the rule of the force. It has never made an attempt to capitalize

on its potential and has probably missed the opportunity to do so in that it has never articulated any clear political objectives. It may become increasingly frustrated when it sees itself marginalised.

The public support for CISC is based mainly in the Tatsi dominated Southern region because of many acts of violence against the population. During the fighting, CISC fighters operated primarily from their villages without deploying in camps or permanent positions. After the fighting stopped, it can be assumed that most CISC rebels were living in their home villages and group only occasionally. The loose structure of CISC makes it very difficult to assess their strength and positions precisely. It can be assumed that the number of active fighters has not changed and remains in the region of 3.000 – 5.000. They are equipped with assault rifles, light machine guns and anti-tank weapons. They are notably brutal in combat and show no regard for the rights of non-combatants.

Even though CISC did not until now attack FDC positions it has relied upon the strong anti-government feelings in the south for most of its support, however there have been a number recent reports of several acts of violence against ethnic minorities in the south of the area adjacent to the border with RIMOSA. It remains to be seen whether these have involved members of the CISC, in which case it would be in violation of the Kalari Peace Agreement, or whether they are the responsibility of other groups who are not signatories. Reports indicate the former although this has not been corroborated.

5. Militia / warlords

Several smaller armed groups are operating in the Northern Leppko Region mainly for economic reasons (theft, illegal exploitation of resources, ransom). The aims and loyalties of these groups are very uncertain, assumed to be loyal to their leaders (warlords) and the boundary from local militias to armed bandits is fluent.

Current information indicates that these groups consist of 300 up to 1,000 fighters with light weapons. None of these groups is signatory to the KPA.

Annex G to OP O 01/2021HQ UNAC15 OCT 2021**Foreign Military Groups/Military Forces****1. El_Hasar**

The El Hasar group was formed in the neighbouring country of Katasi and turned into a “terror organisation” requesting their own state and engaging in guerrilla type terror operations against the Katasi government. Anti-terror operations conducted by the Government of Katasi supported by the French Forces, led to El Hasar fighters/elements frequently crossing the border into Carana in the area North and South along the Kalesi River into the direction of Terpil and Herai villages in the North and towards Pukka and Maki in the South of the River, however avoiding direct engagement / confrontation with the MPC.

Local communities report of armed attacks and raids on villages, including violence against civilians such as rape, torture and other casualties.

2. Elasi Liberation Front (ELF)

The ELF was formed in the neighbouring country of Rimosa and is conducting insurgency operations against the Rimosa government. They mainly operate south of the Carana border in Rimosa, but began to challenge CISC in southern Carana and collaborate with some CISC splinter groups.

Carana communities along the border and along the road from Eres to Kika continue report of armed attacks and raids on villages, including violence against civilians like rape, torture and other casualties.

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