



Security Council

Distr.: General
9 July 2026

Original: English

Implementation of Security Council resolution **1701 (2006)** during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2026

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report provides a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of Security Council resolution **1701 (2006)** since the previous report, dated 11 March (S/2026/160). Notwithstanding the ceasefires announced since 16 April, violations of the resolution persisted, as hostilities continued.

2. On 2 March, in the context of the military escalation in the Middle East, Hizbullah attacked Israel, precipitating a dramatic escalation in hostilities. Subsequently, the Israel Defense Forces, which had retained a presence and continued military activities north of the Blue Line since November 2024, intensified its operations in Lebanon, expanding its ground presence north of the Blue Line, unilaterally declaring a “forward defence line” several kilometres north of the Blue Line and advancing north of the Litani River. Hizbullah escalated its attacks on Israeli targets north and south of the Blue Line, while Israeli air strikes across southern Lebanon, the Bika‘ and Beirut caused thousands of fatalities, widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure and mass displacement. Seven peacekeepers were killed in the hostilities.

3. Since 14 April, Lebanon and Israel have engaged in direct talks under the auspices of the United States of America, with the United States Department of State stating that the objective is achieving “a comprehensive agreement that ensures lasting security, stability, and peace between the two countries”. Hostilities, however, have continued and domestic tensions in Lebanon have mounted, with Hizbullah rejecting the Government’s decisions to prohibit the group’s military activities and to engage in direct talks with Israel.

II. Implementation of resolution **1701 (2006)**

A. Cessation of hostilities

4. Early on 2 March, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) observed trajectories of projectiles fired from north to south of the Blue Line. Hizbullah, claiming its first attack on Israel since the 27 November 2024 cessation of hostilities arrangement, stated that it had launched rockets and drones at targets in northern Israel in “retaliation for the [killing] of ... Ayatollah Imam Sayyed Ali



al-Husseini al-Khamenei” and “in defense of Lebanon and its people”. The Israel Defense Forces, in response, intensified strikes against alleged Hizbullah targets in southern Lebanon and southern Beirut.

5. The President of Lebanon, Joseph Aoun, subsequently said that Hizbullah’s attack “targets all the efforts and endeavours exerted by the Lebanese state to keep Lebanon away from the dangerous military confrontations taking place in the region”. The Prime Minister of Lebanon, Nawaf Salam, said that “the launching of rockets from southern Lebanon ... provides Israel with pretexts to continue its attacks”.

6. On 3 March, the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, said that “the Lebanese government ... and the people of Lebanon must understand that Hizbullah is dragging them into a war that is not theirs ...”.

7. Preceding large-scale strikes and mass displacement, the Israel Defense Forces, on 4 March, issued evacuation orders for all “residents of southern Lebanon” to “head immediately north of the Litani River”, and, on 12 March, issued evacuation orders for all residents to move north of the Zahrani River. On 5 March, the Israel Defense Forces issued an “urgent warning” to all residents of southern Beirut. Hizbullah issued warnings on 5 and 17 March for Israeli communities located within 5 km of the Blue Line.

8. Until 20 June, Hizbullah claimed numerous operations targeting the Israel Defense Forces north and south of the Blue Line and communities in northern Israel. Concurrently, the Israel Defense Forces conducted extensive strikes on alleged Hizbullah targets across southern Lebanon, the Bika‘, central, eastern and southern Beirut and Mount Lebanon.

9. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of the Islamic Republic of Iran announced on 11 March its first joint operation with Hizbullah from Lebanese territory, targeting more than 50 sites in Israel. On 14 March, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps announced a second joint missile attack with Hizbullah against Israel. On 6 April, the Ansar Allah group in Yemen claimed that it had conducted a missile attack against Israel in coordination with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hizbullah.

10. Between 19 and 23 March, the Israel Defense Forces struck five bridges across the Litani River and destroyed key civilian crossing points, alleging that they had been used by Hizbullah “for both terrorist movement and to transfer thousands of weapons”. Another bridge was struck on 8 April but remained partly operational.

11. Following the 8 April announcement of a ceasefire between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Israel Defense Forces stated that it had “ceased fire in the operation against Iran”, but “in Lebanon, the [Israel Defense Forces] is continuing to conduct targeted ground operations against Hezbollah”. The Israel Defense Forces issued evacuation orders for all residents south of the Zahrani River and southern Beirut and subsequently conducted waves of simultaneous strikes in central and southern Beirut, Mount Lebanon, southern Lebanon and the Bika‘. The Israel Defense Forces claimed to have struck more than 100 alleged Hizbullah targets in 10 minutes. According to the Ministry of Public Health of Lebanon, 357 people were killed and more than 1,223 were injured in the strikes.

12. In identical letters dated 14 April addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2026/328), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations said that “densely populated residential neighbourhoods across vast areas of Lebanon were struck [on 8 April] during rush hour and without any prior warning that would have enabled civilians to take precautions or evacuate”.

13. Hizbullah stated that the “massacres [on 8 April] underscore our ... right to resist the occupation and respond to its aggression”. Among other attacks, Hizbullah claimed an attack on 10 April against the Israel Defense Forces naval base in Ashdod Port, some 150 km south of the Blue Line.

14. Representatives of the Governments of Lebanon and Israel met on 14 April in Washington, D.C., for direct talks under the auspices of the United States. On 16 April, the President of the United States, Donald J. Trump, announced a 10-day ceasefire, effective 12 a.m. local time on 17 April.

15. On 16 April, the United States Department of State stated that the ceasefire was “intended to enable good-faith negotiations toward a permanent security and peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon”. It added that the Government of Lebanon “will take meaningful steps to prevent Hezbollah and all other rogue non-state armed groups ... from carrying out any attacks, operations, or hostile activities against Israeli targets”, while “Israel shall preserve its right to take all necessary measures in self-defense”. Both sides had intensified attacks in the 24 hours preceding the ceasefire announcement.

16. On 18 April, the Secretary-General of Hizbullah, Naim Qassem, said that a “ceasefire means a complete cessation of all hostilities” and “must be mutual”, adding that Hizbullah would not wait “for diplomacy that has achieved nothing”.

17. Following a second round of talks in Washington, D.C., a three-week extension of the ceasefire was announced on 23 April. Mr. Trump said that the United States would “work with Lebanon in order to help it protect itself from Hezbollah”, adding that Israel “has the right to defend itself”, but must do so “carefully” and “surgically”. A third round of talks between Lebanon and Israel on 14 and 15 May in Washington, D.C., culminated in a 45-day extension of the ceasefire. Representatives of the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces convened for consultations on a security framework on 29 May at the United States Department of Defence.


18. Nevertheless, hostilities persisted. While no trajectories were detected from north to south from 17 to 20 April, on 21 April, Hizbullah resumed its attacks on the Israel Defense Forces north and south of the Blue Line and on civilian areas in northern Israel. From late April, Hizbullah increasingly used fibre-optic guided explosive drones, inflicting casualties among the Israel Defense Forces in southern Lebanon.

19. The Israel Defense Forces, meanwhile, continued to conduct strikes in the UNIFIL area of operations and north of the Litani River in the districts of Jazzin, Nabatiyah, Sidon and West Bika'. Extensive artillery shelling and large-scale demolitions in villages along the Blue Line also continued. Ahead of extensive strikes on Nabatiyah and Tyre Districts, the Israel Defense Forces on 27 May warned “all residents of southern Lebanon to evacuate north of the Zahrani River”, adding that “all areas south of the river are considered combat zones”. Southern Beirut was struck on 6 and 28 May. On 31 May, Mr. Netanyahu said that the Israel Defense Forces had eliminated 3,000 alleged Hizbullah operatives since 2 March. On 30 May, Mr. Salam said that “Israel must learn that, with its scorched-earth policy and collective punishment and razing of villages and towns, it will gain neither security nor stability”.

20. From 21 February to 20 June, UNIFIL radars detected 52,514 trajectories of projectiles from south to north of the Blue Line and 6,929 trajectories from north to south, many of which did not cross south of the Blue Line.¹ Separately, the mission observed 3,042 interceptions and observed or detected 2,418 airstrikes.


¹ Each trajectory may represent multiple projectiles. Almost all trajectories recorded were of rockets, mortar and artillery shells. UNIFIL radars cannot detect some types of projectiles, such as air-to-surface missiles, tank rounds, portable anti-tank missiles or those fired from light weapons.

Figure I
Trajectories of projectiles across the Blue Line detected by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, 21 February to 20 June 2026



Source: UNIFIL.

Figure II
Air strikes observed or detected by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, 21 February to 20 June 2026



Source: UNIFIL.

21. Following Mr. Netanyahu's statement on 1 June that he and the Minister of Defence of Israel, Israel Katz, had "instructed the [Israel Defense Forces] to strike terror targets in the Dahia Quarter of Beirut", the Embassy of Lebanon in Washington, D.C., announced that "Israeli strikes on Beirut's southern suburbs would cease in exchange for Hezbollah refraining from carrying out attacks against Israel". After a fourth round of talks in Washington, D.C., on 2 and 3 June, the United States

Department of State stated that “Israel and Lebanon [had] agreed to the implementation of a ceasefire ... contingent on a complete cessation of Hizballah fire and the evacuation of all Hizballah operatives from the South Litani Sector”. It added that “the two sides [had] agreed ... to swiftly advance the creation of pilot zones in which the Lebanese Armed Forces will take exclusive control of the territory to the exclusion of all non-state actors”.

22. On 4 June, Mr. Qassem said that any ceasefire “must be comprehensive” and include “Israel’s withdrawal”, adding that “Israeli settlements are not safe as long as Lebanese villages are under [Israeli Defense Forces] fire”. On 7 June, Mr. Netanyahu and Mr. Katz stated that “the [Israel Defense Forces] ... struck ... the Dahieh district of Beirut, in response to Hezbollah’s firing at Israeli territory”. Following strikes by the Islamic Republic of Iran on Israel in response to the attack on Beirut, Mr. Katz said on 8 June that “any Iranian attempt to link Lebanon and Iran and attack Israel will be met with great force, as happened yesterday”. On 14 June, Mr. Netanyahu and Mr. Katz stated that the Israel Defense Forces had again struck the “Dahieh quarter of Beirut ... in response to continued Hezbollah attacks on Israel’s territory”.

23. Following the announcement on 14 June of a memorandum of understanding between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran that also stipulated a cessation of hostilities on the Lebanese front, Mr. Netanyahu, on 15 June, said that “we will remain in the security zones for as long as it is required to defend our country”. On 15 June, Hizballah said that “there will be no return to the pre-March 2nd status quo” and called for a “return to a unified national stance ... to reassess the calculations and paths taken by the authorities”. On 17 June, Mr. Aoun said that “the Lebanese state is conducting the negotiations and is sovereign in its decisions; no one can act through us or at our expense”. A ceasefire between Hizballah and Israel came into effect on 19 June.

24. Until 20 June, however, both sides continued to trade fire and accusations of ceasefire violations. On 17 June, Mr. Qassem stated that Hizballah had carried out 3,185 operations since 2 March. The Israel Defense Forces on 19 June stated that “Hezbollah violated the ceasefire ... to prevent our forces from completing the destruction of its capabilities”, adding that “more than 100 Hezbollah targets” in the Bīqā’ and southern Lebanon had been struck overnight. On 19 June, Mr. Aoun condemned “the expansion of Israeli attacks and more killing and destruction”, and said that “the expansion of Israeli attacks ... targets all ongoing efforts to consolidate the ceasefire”. On 20 June, Hizballah stated that it would “not hesitate to confront any attempt by the enemy to seize land and expand its occupation”.

25. According to Ministry of Public Health of Lebanon, as at 20 June, at least 4,106 individuals, including 386 women and 252 children, had been killed and 12,153 others had been injured by Israeli military operations in Lebanon since 2 March, with 1,602 people, including 112 women and 75 children, killed and 4,609 others injured since 17 April. A total of 33 Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers have been killed and 77 injured, including 2 officers and a soldier who were killed in a strike on 6 June in Nabatiyah that the Israel Defense Forces said was “under review”. At least 3 Israeli civilians and 36 Israeli soldiers have been killed.

B. Respect for the Blue Line

26. On 2 March, UNIFIL observed Israel Defense Forces personnel crossing north of the Blue Line near Kafr Kila, Markaba and Udaysah (all Sector East), beyond the five positions and the two “buffer zones” maintained since February 2025 (S/2026/160, para. 18). On 3 March, Mr. Katz stated: “Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and I have authorized the [Israel Defense Forces] to advance and seize

additional controlling areas in Lebanon to prevent firing on Israeli border settlements.”

27. On 16 March, the Israel Defense Forces stated it had “begun limited and targeted ground operations against key Hezbollah strongholds in southern Lebanon, aimed at enhancing the forward defense area”. UNIFIL observed the Israel Defense Forces advancing north of the Blue Line along five main axes, towards Khiyam and Qantarah (both Sector East), Aytarun-Bint Jubayl, Dibil-Rashaf and along the coastal road through Naqurah to Bayyadah-Shama (all Sector West), amid clashes with Hizbullah.

28. On 22 March, Mr. Katz said that he and Mr. Netanyahu had ordered the Israel Defense Forces “to accelerate the destruction of Lebanese homes in the border villages in order to thwart threats to the Israeli settlements – in accordance with the Beit Hanoun and Rafah model in Gaza”. Two days later, he said that “Israel’s policy in Lebanon is clear: where there is terror and missiles, there are no homes and no residents”.

29. In identical letters dated 30 March addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2026/253](#)), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations called upon the United Nations and the Security Council to “compel Israel to cease its incursions and ... withdraw its forces to the internationally recognized borders ...”.

30. On 16 April, Mr. Netanyahu stated: “We are remaining in Lebanon in a reinforced security buffer zone. This is not the ‘five points’ that existed before This is a security buffer that starts at the sea and continues to Mount Dov [the Shab’a Farms] and the foothills of Mount Hermon [Jabal al-Shaykh], up to the Syrian border.”

31. On 19 April, the Israel Defense Forces published a map depicting what it claimed was “the Forward Defense Line and the area in which [Israel Defense Forces] soldiers are operating, following the ceasefire agreement”. The map depicted an area extending up to 10 km north of the Blue Line, including some territory north of the Litani River, within which some 55 Lebanese villages are located. The map also depicted a band of territory at sea, north of the agreed maritime border. On 18 June, the Israel Defense Forces published another map depicting its presence north of the Blue Line, including an expanded area north of the Litani River.

32. On 30 May, the Israel Defense Forces stated that it had “crossed the Litani River and expanded its operations against Hezbollah”. On 31 May, Mr. Netanyahu said that the Israel Defense Forces had “captured the Beaufort castle”, adding that he had “instructed the [Israel Defense Forces] to expand the incursion in Lebanon”. UNIFIL, in parallel, observed kinetic activity north of the Litani River near Beaufort Castle in Nabatiyah District. On 20 June, Hizbullah announced that it had repelled “an infiltration attempt toward the Ali al-Taher Heights” in Nabatiyah District, where the Israel Defense Forces, on 19 June, stated that it was destroying “strategic underground infrastructure ... Hezbollah [had] built in the Beaufort area”. Mr. Katz stated: “Israel has no intention of withdrawing from the Beaufort, which is an integral part of the security zone.”


33. On 9 June, the Israel Defense Forces stated that it had killed “a terrorist ... near the border fence with Lebanon ... shortly after he crossed into Israeli territory”. On several occasions, the Israel Defense Forces announced the capture of Hizbullah operatives. On 7 March, following heavy Israeli air strikes, the Israel Defense Forces landed a helicopter in the Biqa’ to search for the remains of an Israeli soldier who had been abducted in Lebanon in 1986. The operation resulted in 41 killed, including 3 Lebanese soldiers.

34. The Israel Defense Forces continued to occupy northern Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line in violation of resolution 1701 (2006). While the Government of Lebanon has welcomed the UNIFIL proposal of 2011 for the facilitation of the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the occupied area, the Government of Israel has yet to respond.

35. During the reporting period, UNIFIL detected 9,993 violations of Lebanese airspace, with a total overflight time of 12,677 hours. Fighter aircraft accounted for 56 per cent of the violations, drones 39 per cent and helicopters and unidentified aircraft 4 per cent.

Figure III

Violations of Lebanese airspace detected by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, 21 February to 20 June 2026



Source: UNIFIL.

C. Lebanese Armed Forces deployment

36. After 2 March, UNIFIL observed the destruction by the Israel Defense Forces of Lebanese Armed Forces checkpoints and other infrastructure, including at the ports of Naqurah and Tyre. On 4 March, the Lebanese Armed Forces announced that it was “carrying out repositioning of certain border points ... given the limited available resources”. On 1 April, the Lebanese Army announced that it had repositioned and redeployed certain units “as a result of the escalation of Israeli aggression against Lebanon, particularly in areas witnessing enemy incursions”.

37. UNIFIL continued to coordinate closely with the Lebanese Armed Forces, including to conduct reconnaissance of bridges spanning the Litani River, and to provide temporary shelter for army personnel during heightened hostilities.

38. The Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy maintained responsibility for maritime interdiction operations, hailing 1,716 vessels, of which 378 were inspected and cleared.

39. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force undertook 108 training exercises with the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy. Training activities were reduced during March and April as the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy temporarily withdrew from the three southernmost coastal radar stations of Lebanon.

40. Efforts continued to enhance the capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces, including through the Military Technical Committee for Lebanon, which met on 19 March. On 1 March, the Office of the President of the French Republic announced the postponement of the international conference in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces and security forces that had been scheduled to be held in Paris on 5 March (see annex III).*

D. Disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, including the presence of unauthorized personnel, assets and weapons south of the Litani River

41. Since 2 March, Hizbullah has claimed responsibility for near-daily attacks on Israel Defense Forces personnel and sites in Israel and in Lebanon, using rockets, missiles, artillery, explosive devices and, increasingly, fibre-optic guided explosive drones. Hizbullah has also repeatedly attacked civilian areas south of the Blue Line.

42. Following an emergency meeting on 2 March, the Cabinet of Lebanon declared “its absolute rejection ... of any military or security actions launched from Lebanese territory outside the framework of its legitimate institutions and affirms that the decision of war and peace rests exclusively with the State. This requires the immediate prohibition of all Hezbollah security and military activities, as they are unlawful, and requires it to surrender its weapons to the Lebanese State and to confine its activity to the political sphere”. In addition, the Cabinet “[requested] all military and security agencies to take immediate measures to ... prevent any military operation or the launch of any rockets or drones from Lebanese territory, and to apprehend violators ...”.

43. On 9 March, Mr. Aoun said that “what happened was a trap set for Lebanon ... to force Lebanon into ... either entering into a direct confrontation with Israeli aggression ... the collapse of the Lebanese state from the outside. Or ... the collapse of the Lebanese state from within”.

44. Tensions between the Government and Hizbullah mounted, with Mr. Qassem stating on 4 March that, “as long as occupation exists, resistance and its weapons are a legitimate right”. On 25 March, he called for “reversing the [Government] decision to criminalize [the] resistance”. On 12 May, Mr. Qassem stated that Hizbullah’s weapons were “an internal matter [that is] not part of negotiations with the enemy”. On 24 May, he said that “disarmament means annihilation ... The idea of [an] ‘arms monopoly’ ... is aimed at targeting the resistance We will defend ourselves until one of two outcomes: victory or martyrdom”. On 17 June, Mr. Qassem stated that any “[agreement] built on the condition of disarmament will not pass ... There are no pilot zones and no special security zones for Israel”.

45. On 9 April, the Cabinet of Lebanon stated that “the army and security forces are requested to immediately reinforce the state’s full control over the Beirut Governorate, and confine weapons therein to the legitimate forces alone”.

46. On 4 June, Mr. Salam said that “the requirement that south of Litani be free of weapons and armed groups ... is what Lebanon pledged to the world when it accepted resolution 1701 in 2006”. He added that “we have long delayed implementing what was stipulated in the Taif Agreement ... We must not squander this opportunity now ...”.

47. In identical letters dated 25 March addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2026/225), the Permanent Representative of

* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing in line with current liquidity management measures.

Israel to the United Nations transmitted a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, Gideon Sa'ar, who stated: "Although Lebanon claimed in January it had gained 'operational control' south of the Litani River, a significant portion of the attacks against Israel originated from that area ... The initial barrage of rockets launched on 2 March 2026 originated from a location that had been repeatedly reported to the [Lebanese Armed Forces] but was not addressed." On 10 May, Mr. Netanyahu proposed that Israel and Lebanon could "[work] together politically and militarily, possibly by splitting up the work, to get rid of Hizbullah".

48. The Israel Defense Forces claimed multiple strikes on infrastructure belonging to and individuals allegedly affiliated with non-State armed groups in Lebanon other than Hizbullah, including the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), Islamic Jihad, Jama'ah al-Islamiyah and the Lebanese Resistance Brigades. Alleged Hamas officials were targeted in the Beddawi camp in Tripoli on 5 March, in the Ein El Hilweh and Mieh Mieh camps in Sidon on 8 and 24 March, respectively, and on the outskirts of El Buss camp in Tyre on 28 May. On 25 May, alleged Hamas infrastructure on the periphery of Rashidieh camp near Tyre was struck. Other camps, including near Tyre and in southern Beirut, were subjected to evacuation orders and sustained damage as a result of nearby strikes.

49. Disarmament efforts in the Palestine refugee camps stalled, with implementation of an agreement regarding the status of weapons belonging to other factions, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad, still outstanding ([S/2025/460](#), para. 33). The security situation in the camps remained volatile, with repeated armed clashes in Burj Barajneh and Shatila camps in southern Beirut and in Burj Shemali, Ein El Hilweh and Rashidieh camps.

E. Arms embargo and border control

50. On 5 March, the Cabinet of Lebanon called "on the relevant ministries and agencies ... to ascertain if members of the [Islamic] Revolutionary Guard Corps are present in Lebanon; to intervene decisively and immediately to prevent any security or military activity or operation they might carry out from Lebanese territory ... and detain them ... until they can be deported". The Cabinet also reinstated entry visa requirements for Iranian nationals. On 22 March, Mr. Salam stated that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is "present and managing the military operations of [Hizbullah] in Lebanon".

51. In identical letters dated 21 April addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2026/343](#)), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations said that "the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ... joint operations with Hizbullah from Lebanese territory ... constitutes ... blatant defiance of the decisions of the Government of Lebanon".

52. After the Syrian Armed Forces accused Hizbullah of firing artillery shells from Lebanon into the Syrian Arab Republic, Mr. Aoun and the President of the Syrian Arab Republic, Ahmad al-Sharaa, agreed on 10 March on "the need to control the borders and prevent any security breaches" (see annex II).

53. The Israel Defense Forces repeatedly struck infrastructure allegedly used by Hizbullah for smuggling or financing its operations and infrastructure and individuals allegedly linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, giving "Iranian regime representatives" a 24-hour ultimatum on 3 March to leave Lebanon. In that connection, hotels in central and eastern Beirut were struck on 8 and 23 March, respectively. On 1 April, the Israel Defense Forces stated that it had targeted money exchange companies in Beirut that allegedly financed Hizbullah. The Israel Defense

Forces also struck branches of the Hizbullah-affiliated Al-Qard Al-Hassan financial association and alleged Hizbullah-affiliated petrol stations. On 29 March, the Israel Defense Forces announced an operation from the Syrian side of Mount Hermon [Jabal al-Shaykh] into the Shab'a Farms "in response to ongoing attempts by terrorist organizations to entrench themselves in the border area". On 4 April, the Israel Defense Forces called for the evacuation of the Masna' crossing, the main official border transit point between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, accusing Hizbullah of using the crossing for "military purposes and for smuggling weapons". On 7 April, Mr. Aoun said that he was "obtaining guarantees that the Masnaa border crossing ... will not be targeted". The crossing reopened on 8 April.

54. Lebanese security forces conducted at least 19 counter-trafficking operations across the country, including in southern Beirut, seizing weapons, ammunition and narcotics.

F. Landmines and cluster bombs

55. The Lebanese Armed Forces conducted at least 17 operations south of the Litani River and 19 operations north of the Litani River to detonate unexploded ordnance.

56. On 1 May, Lebanon deposited its instrument of accession to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, which enters into force on 1 November 2026.

57. Between 21 February and 20 June, UNIFIL discovered 46 units of unexploded ordnance in its area of operations, although the overall level of contamination is assessed to be significantly higher. UNIFIL experienced three incidents related to improvised explosive devices, including the fatal incident at Bani Hayyan (Sector East) on 30 March (see para. 76). UNIFIL observed the apparent use of white phosphorous by the Israel Defense Forces on at least 30 occasions.

58. UNIFIL delivered one explosive ordnance risk awareness sessions benefiting 16 peacekeepers and supported the Lebanon Mine Action Centre in delivering two explosive ordnance risk education activities, benefiting 235 students from affected communities.

III. Extension of State authority and institutional stability

59. On 8 April, Mr. Aoun, welcoming "the American-Iranian announcement of a ceasefire for a period of 15 days", said that he "affirmed the continuation of the Lebanese state's efforts to include Lebanon in regional peace in a fixed and permanent manner ... with regard to the full sovereignty of their state over all its territories and its liberation from any occupying presence, ... and the monopoly of the right to war and peace and the use of legitimate force in the hands of its constitutional institutions and none other". Mr. Salam affirmed that "no one negotiates on behalf of Lebanon except the Lebanese state".

60. On 30 March, Mr. Aoun emphasized that "no one in Lebanon wants a civil war and anyone seeking to exploit the current situation will not succeed". Following protests by Hizbullah and Amal Movement supporters from 10 to 12 April against the planned direct talks with Israel (see para. 14), Mr. Salam, in remarks "on the eve of the anniversary of the outbreak of Lebanon's civil war on 13 April 1975", underscored the Government's support for "negotiations to stop the war and enable the state's legitimate institutions to fully play their role in protecting Lebanon and the Lebanese".

61. Amid the escalation in hostilities, on 9 March, the Parliament of Lebanon extended its term for two years, effectively postponing parliamentary elections until May 2028. On 8 April, the Constitutional Council rejected three appeals contesting the extension, while recommending that the extension be terminated once conditions permitted. On 25 February, the Constitutional Council annulled the “law on the organization of the judiciary”, which was adopted in December 2025 (S/2026/160, para. 52), on procedural grounds, citing the failure of Parliament to consult the High Judicial Council.

62. On 30 March, judge Tarek Bitar, the judge leading the investigation into the 4 August 2020 Beirut Port explosion, concluded his investigation and referred the findings to the Public Prosecutor for his non-binding opinion, prior to the issuance of indictments and referral of the case to the High Judicial Council for trial proceedings.

63. On 30 April, the Cabinet approved a second national action plan (2026–2030) on the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security. The Cabinet also adopted amendments to the bank resolution law, adopted in July 2025 (S/2025/738, para. 49), in order to align it with international standards.

64. Since 2 March, at least 1,049,328 people, including more than 350,000 children, have been internally displaced in Lebanon, some multiple times. The presence of the Israel Defense Forces north of the Blue Line, in combination with kinetic activity, blanket evacuation orders, destruction of civilian infrastructure and the presence of unexploded ordnance, have impeded returns.

65. On 13 March, during the Secretary-General’s visit to Lebanon, Mr. Salam and the Secretary-General jointly launched the 2026 Lebanon flash appeal, calling for \$308.3 million to provide life-saving assistance and protection for up to 1.4 million people until the end of May 2026. On 5 June, an additional \$331.5 million was requested to fund the appeal, which was extended until the end of August. As at 20 June, 36.1 per cent (\$231 million) of the requested \$639.9 million funding had been received, jeopardizing the continuity of critical humanitarian interventions. As at 31 May, some 680,000 people, including 135,000 women, 179,000 girls, 169,000 boys, 125,000 men, 37,000 elderly women and 34,000 elderly men, had received assistance under the flash appeal.

66. Damage to critical infrastructure, combined with electricity, fuel and telecommunications disruptions, affected the provision of essential services. Healthcare services remain under significant strain owing to high casualty numbers, shortages of medical supplies and fuel and direct impacts on healthcare facilities. According to the World Health Organization, 133 healthcare workers were killed and 403 injured in 208 attacks on the healthcare sector. An estimated 1.24 million people are projected to face crisis-level food insecurity by August 2026. School closures and the use of educational facilities as collective shelters disrupted access to education for thousands of students. On 21 May, the Minister of Finance of Lebanon, Yassine Jaber, said that the economy was expected to contract by at least 7 per cent because of the hostilities.

67. Since 2 March, 190 Syrian refugees have been killed and 162 others injured owing to Israeli strikes in Lebanon. Some 280,000 Syrian refugees reside in areas affected by the escalation, of whom 100,000 remain displaced. Many displaced persons were unable to access collective shelters, while more than 1,000 refugees were unable to evacuate conflict-affected areas. The Syrian authorities estimate that, since 2 March, 641,542 individuals, including 512,023 Syrians, have entered the Syrian Arab Republic through official crossing points.

68. On 1 April, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) launched a return due to force majeure programme to support the provision

of basic services for those returning because of adverse conditions in Lebanon. More than 15,000 Syrian refugees have returned under the programme.

69. As at 31 May, 486,190 refugees and asylum-seekers were registered with UNHCR, including 474,888 registered Syrians out of an estimated 1.12 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon. A total of 11,302 refugees and asylum-seekers of other nationalities were also registered with UNHCR. The number of Syrians registered with UNHCR has decreased by more than 10 per cent (some 57,500 individuals) since December 2025, mainly as the result of returns to the Syrian Arab Republic. During the reporting period, 203 deportation incidents, involving 16,459 Syrian refugees, were recorded following raids and arrests at checkpoints.

70. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) opened two collective shelters in Sidon and north Lebanon. UNRWA continued to provide basic essential services in camps located south of the Litani River, where an estimated 28,000 Palestine refugees in three camps near Tyre had been joined by displaced Lebanese. Other camps, including in north Lebanon and the Bika', also hosted displaced persons.

71. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization reported damage to several cultural properties in southern Lebanon, including Sham' Citadel, Beaufort Castle and the archaeological sites of Tyre, that are provisionally inscribed on the International List of Cultural Property under Enhanced Protection under the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.

IV. United Nations presence


A. United Nations Interim Force deployment and adaptation

72. As at 20 June, UNIFIL consisted of 8,005 military personnel from 47 contributing countries, including 606 women (7.57 per cent). UNIFIL had 612 civilian staff, comprising 198 international and 414 national personnel, including 216 women (35.3 per cent). Alternative working arrangements are in place for 120 international and 279 national staff. The Maritime Task Force operated with two vessels, comprising 287 military personnel, including 17 women (5.92 per cent). There were 41 military observers, including 7 women (17 per cent), from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization serving with the Observer Group Lebanon under the operational command and control of UNIFIL. The highest-ranking military women hold the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, while the most senior civilian women serve at the D-1 level.

73. As at 20 June, UNIFIL remained present at all positions, albeit with a reduced footprint at the most exposed positions close to the Blue Line.

74. UNIFIL conducted an average of 581 operational activities and 344 logistical activities a month. Amid intensified kinetic activity, UNIFIL reduced movements, prioritizing force protection, sustaining critical operational and logistical functions, supporting humanitarian access and protection of civilians. After 16 April, UNIFIL increased its operational activities, facilitated community support activities, strengthened physical force protection measures and resupplied isolated positions. UNIFIL experienced numerous restrictions of its freedom of movement and four fatal incidents (see annex I). UNIFIL continued to address misinformation and disinformation campaigns.

Figure IV
Operational and logistical activities by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, 21 February to 20 June 2026



Source: UNIFIL.

75. In line with requirements to reduce expenditures by 15 per cent, UNIFIL handed over one position to the Lebanese Armed Forces. The handover of another six positions remains pending owing to continued kinetic activity.

B. Safety and security

76. Seven peacekeepers were killed in the line of duty on 29 March near Adshit al-Qusyar (Sector East), on 30 March near Bani Hayyan (Sector East), on 18 April near Ghanduriyah (Sector West) and on 3 June near Marji'yun. A total of 25 peacekeepers were injured and another 7 were severely injured in incidents near Qawzah on 6 March, Adshit al-Qusyar on 30 March and Udaysah on 3 April (see annex I for details).

77. In the UNIFIL area of operations, the use of armoured vehicles, full personal protection equipment and 48 hours' notice were required for the movement of civilian personnel. Following an increase in incidents involving roadside explosive devices in late March, all movements were accompanied by engineering expertise to dispose of such devices. UNIFIL also enhanced its force protection measures, including anti-drone netting and alerts, with respect to fibre-optic guided explosive drones.

78. Since 3 March, security measures for United Nations civilian personnel have included restrictions on the presence of eligible dependants of internationally recruited personnel, the voluntary relocation of locally recruited personnel and their eligible dependants from south to north of the Litani River, the relocation of internationally recruited non-essential personnel outside Lebanon and the suspension of all non-critical United Nations external missions to Lebanon.

C. Conduct and discipline

79. UNIFIL recorded two allegations of possible unsatisfactory conduct. No allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation were reported in UNIFIL or the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon. Training on United Nations standards of conduct was provided to 861 military personnel, including 57 women.

D. Accountability for attacks on peacekeepers

80. UNIFIL opened 16 technical investigations into violations of resolution 1701 (2006) and concluded 6 others. Findings from the UNIFIL investigations into three of the four fatal incidents and the incident that occurred near Qawzah on 6 March were shared with the affected troop-contributing countries and the parties on 22 May. The investigation into the fatal incident of 3 June is ongoing.

81. The Lebanese authorities confirmed that they had opened investigations into the fatal incidents of 30 March, 18 April and 3 June (see para. 76). The Israeli authorities have yet to confirm the opening of an investigation into the fatal incident of 29 March (see para. 76).

82. UNIFIL continued to monitor proceedings in Lebanese military courts against individuals suspected of planning or perpetrating serious attacks against peacekeepers. The military court has set 25 September 2026 as the date of the next hearing related to the 14 February 2025 attack on a UNIFIL convoy (S/2025/153, para. 56, and S/2026/160, para. 69).

83. The prosecutorial appeal challenging the acquittal of one individual and the conviction of five individuals in the fatal attack against UNIFIL near Aqibiyah on 14 December 2022 (see S/2023/184 and S/2025/738) remains pending.

V. Liaison and progress towards sustainable solutions

84. The United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon exercised her good offices in Lebanon and Israel, and in the region and beyond, to support de-escalation efforts. The Special Coordinator also urged the parties to seize the opportunity provided by direct talks to reach lasting solutions on the implementation of long-stalled provisions of resolution 1701 (2006).

85. The Head of Mission and Force Commander of UNIFIL, in close coordination with the Special Coordinator, continued with outreach to the parties. On 18 March, the Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Mechanism (S/2025/153, para. 28) informed UNIFIL that meetings had been suspended until further notice.

86. Since 2 March, 246 out of 383 notified humanitarian movements were successfully facilitated through an expanded humanitarian notification system managed by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The Lebanese Armed Forces, in close coordination with UNIFIL, facilitated humanitarian convoys to hard-to-reach areas and supported the movement of humanitarian personnel and supplies through checkpoints to ensure timely assistance to affected communities. Kinetic activity, unexploded ordnance and extensive damage to infrastructure constrained humanitarian access, with villages near the Blue Line largely inaccessible. Large swaths of southern Lebanon, the Bika' and southern Beirut were difficult to reach.

87. The liaison and coordination mechanisms of UNIFIL issued 8,441 notifications, including 372 notifications of civilian and humanitarian movements, to the Israel Defense Forces. Separately, UNIFIL issued seven force protection requests on behalf of the Lebanese Armed Forces and 2,315 notifications on behalf of the Lebanese Red Cross and the Lebanese Civil Defence.

88. Since 2 March, 10 people sought temporary protection in UNIFIL compounds. UNIFIL also increased its patrols at the request of communities in villages where civilians have remained.

89. The Syrian Arab Republic and Israel have yet to respond to the provisional definition of the Shab'a Farms area proposed in my report of 30 October 2007 on the implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) (S/2007/641, annex).

VI. Observations

90. The reporting period was marked by a dramatic escalation of hostilities with the 2 March attack and subsequent attacks by Hizbullah across the Blue Line, followed by the large-scale Israeli attacks across Lebanon and the expansion by Israel of its presence in Lebanese territory. This escalation has profoundly affected civilians on both sides of the Blue Line. Hostile acts by Hizbullah and the Israel Defense Forces are violations of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), which I strongly condemn.

91. I am deeply alarmed at the staggering loss of civilian life, massive displacement and large-scale devastation across Lebanon, including the systematic destruction of villages north of the Blue Line by the Israel Defense Forces. I reiterate my condemnation of all attacks affecting civilians on both sides of the Blue Line. International law, including international humanitarian law, must be respected by all actors without exception and accountability must be pursued. All parties to the conflict must ensure the protection of civilians, including healthcare personnel and journalists, and civilian infrastructure. All parties must also facilitate safe and unhindered access for humanitarian actors to reach civilians in need.

92. There is no military solution to this conflict. Continued escalation will only deepen instability, sow resentment and inflict further suffering on civilians on both sides of the Blue Line. I reiterate my call upon all parties to support de-escalation efforts and create space for diplomacy and dialogue in order to pave the way towards the full implementation of Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). In this respect, I welcome the efforts of the United States to help the parties agree upon arrangements to end decades of conflict and make progress towards lasting stability. The United Nations stands ready to support the parties towards this end.

93. In this context, in complement to the role of the Office of the Special Coordinator in promoting a political solution to the conflict and pursuant to the request that the Security Council made in its resolution [2790 \(2025\)](#), on 1 June, I conveyed to the Council options for a continued, impartial and effective United Nations uniformed presence along the Blue Line following the end of the mandate of UNIFIL (see [S/2026/453](#)).

94. I welcome the decisions by the Government of Lebanon to assert the State's sovereignty and monopoly on arms and the use of force. I call upon Hizbullah and other non-State armed groups to cooperate with the authorities in this regard. I also call upon the national authorities of Lebanon to advance their efforts to implement these decisions. Acknowledging the indispensability of the Lebanese Armed Forces to the extension of the State's authority, I call upon Member States to bolster tailored material and financial support for the Lebanese Armed Forces.

95. The unilateral declaration by the Israel Defense Forces of a "forward defence line" north of the Blue Line is in direct violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon and resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). The Blue Line, delineated in 2000 pursuant to Security Council resolutions [425 \(1978\)](#) and [426 \(1978\)](#), remains the applicable line of withdrawal. The presence and activities of the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanese territory constrain the efforts of the Government of Lebanon to extend its authority and thus also hinder efforts to bring an end to the conflict. I urge the Israeli authorities to fulfil their obligations under resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) to withdraw

from all areas north of the Blue Line and to cease air and ground violations of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

96. The deaths of seven peacekeepers are tragic reminders of the dangerous conditions in which UNIFIL is operating. I condemn in the strongest terms the deadly attacks against UNIFIL peacekeepers and extend my condolences to the families, friends and governments of the peacekeepers who made the ultimate sacrifice in the service of peace. I wish those who were injured a full recovery. Attacks against peacekeepers are completely unacceptable and must stop. They are in breach of international law and may constitute war crimes. I urge that the perpetrators of all attacks on United Nations personnel be held accountable.

97. Kinetic activity and the positioning of the Israel Defense Forces and Hizbullah in proximity to UNIFIL personnel and premises place Force personnel and premises at risk. Exposing United Nations peacekeepers and premises to such risks and impeding them from carrying out their mandated tasks constitute violations of resolution 1701 (2006) and international law. The freedom of movement of UNIFIL is essential for the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). All actors must comply with their obligations under international law to ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel and the inviolability of United Nations premises and property. I urge the parties to fully utilize available liaison and coordination channels to that end.

98. The pre-existing fragility of Lebanon, coupled with the current escalation of hostilities, has led to rapidly increasing humanitarian needs among a significant proportion of the Lebanese population. I am also concerned that many Syrian and Palestine refugees in Lebanon have been displaced yet again by the hostilities. I appeal to donors for timely and predictable funding in response to the flash appeal to sustain life-saving assistance, protection activities and recovery support for both displaced and returning civilians.

99. I encourage Government and Parliament of Lebanon to accelerate the implementation of outstanding reforms and take proactive measures, including the adoption of a medium-term fiscal framework, to lay the economic foundations of a strong State. I also urge Parliament to adopt amendments to the bank resolution law.

100. Taking note of the postponement of parliamentary elections, I encourage Parliament to use this additional time to pursue necessary electoral reforms.

101. Palestine refugee camps are already experiencing considerable hardship and volatility. Increased donor support to UNRWA remains vital to ensure the continuity of essential services for Palestine refugees in Lebanon and safeguard stability in the camps.

102. I express my sincere gratitude to all countries contributing military personnel and equipment to UNIFIL and the Observer Group Lebanon. I thank the outgoing Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, for her leadership over the past two challenging years for Lebanon, and the Head of Mission and Force Commander of UNIFIL, Major General Diodato Abagnara. I also thank the troop-contributing countries, whose forces continue to be vital to supporting the parties to uphold their obligations under resolution 1701 (2006), and all members of the United Nations country team for their continued dedication to stability in Lebanon.

Annex I


Incidents of aggressive behaviour and restrictions of the freedom of access and movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon from 21 February to 20 June 2026

1. In paragraph 15 of its resolution [2695 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council urged the parties to ensure that the freedom of movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in all its operations, including access to all parts of the Blue Line, was fully respected and unimpeded.

2. Kinetic activity, unexploded ordnance and other remnants of war continued to pose a threat to the safety and security of personnel and to impede UNIFIL's operations and freedom of movement. UNIFIL experienced numerous incidents, including explosions and direct impacts in and near its personnel and positions. During the reporting period, the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander protested repeatedly to both parties the presence of combatants in proximity to UN positions, which has the potential to undermine the perception of the Mission's impartiality and places its personnel and premises at risk. To mitigate the risk to United Nations personnel, UNIFIL also provided the Israel Defense Forces with the coordinates of all its positions and facilities on 6 and 22 March.

Figure V

Incidents of restrictions of freedom of movement, aggressive behaviour, and other incidents endangering UNIFIL personnel 21 February to 20 June 2026



Source: UNIFIL

Peacekeeping casualties

3. During the reporting period, UNIFIL experienced four incidents in which a total of seven peacekeepers were killed (see para. 74). UNIFIL's investigations assessed that the Israel Defense Forces was responsible for the deaths of two peacekeepers in one incident, with non-state actors, presumably Hizbullah, responsible for two of the fatal incidents, resulting in the death of four peacekeepers. The Mission has not determined responsibility for the other incident. UNIFIL also experienced 15 incidents in which a total of 32 peacekeepers were injured, 7 of them severely.

4. On 6 March, UN position 5-66 near Qawzah (Sector West) was caught in heavy fire resulting in five peacekeepers injured, including one severely who was evacuated by air to St. George Hospital in Beirut. As of 20 June, the peacekeeper is being treated at UNIFIL's hospital in Naqurah. UNIFIL launched an investigation into the incident and shared the findings with the parties on 22 May. Based on the fragments of the munition located at the gate it is assessed that the projectile used was tank round type M339 HE-MP-T. In a letter to the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander, the Israel Defense Forces claimed that Hizbullah had launched an attack against them from proximity to the UN position and that the Israel Defense Forces had fired in "response to ongoing fire from Hizbullah". The Israel Defense Forces stated that due to an operational error, the UN position was misidentified during the tank's response.
5. On 13 March, fire by the Israel Defense Forces hit an accommodation building and an observation tower at UN position 8-30, near Mays al Jabal (Sector East), causing a fire and minor injuries to one peacekeeper. UNIFIL has launched an investigation into the incident.
6. On 18 March, the observation tower of UN position 8-36, near Blida (Sector East), came under fire from the east, causing a minor injury to a peacekeeper. UNIFIL has launched an investigation into the incident.
7. On 29 March, an explosion occurred near a UNIFIL convoy in the vicinity of Bint Jubayl, injuring one peacekeeper and causing major damage to a vehicle. The injured peacekeeper was initially moved to the hospital at UN Position 2-45, near Tibnin (Sector West) before being evacuated to Hamoud Hospital in Saida for further medical assessment. The peacekeeper was released from hospital on 3 April and repatriated on 14 April. UNIFIL launched an investigation into the incident: an initial assessment, based on the available evidence, indicates that the explosion was caused by an improvised explosive device.
8. On 29 March, an explosion inside UN position 7-1 near Adshit al-Qusyar (Sector East) resulted in the death of one peacekeeper and left three others injured, one severely. The severely injured peacekeeper, who was evacuated by air to St. George Hospital in Beirut, succumbed to his injuries in Beirut on 24 April. UNIFIL has launched an investigation into the incident, with the findings shared with the parties on 22 May. Based on the available evidence, including analysis of the impact site and the fragments of the projectile discovered in United Nations position 7-1, UNIFIL found that the projectile was a 120 mm tank main armament round, type ME 339 HE-MP-T, fired by an Israel Defense Forces tank from the east, in the direction of Taybah (Sector East).. UNIFIL sent a letter to the Israel Defense Forces, protesting the attack and requesting an investigation by the competent authorities to bring the perpetrators to justice and ensure criminal accountability.
9. On 30 March, during a logistical movement from UN position 7-3 northeast of Marj'yun (Sector East) to UN position 7-1, the lead vehicle of the convoy was struck by an explosion. The incident resulted in the death of two peacekeepers, severe injuries to two peacekeeper and injuries to another two peacekeeper and the destruction of the vehicle. The two injured peacekeepers were subsequently evacuated by air to a medical facility at Saint George University of Beirut and are currently in stable condition. UNIFIL launched an investigation and shared its findings with the parties on 22 May. The investigations, based on the analysis of the site of the explosion, the impacted vehicle, and a second improvised explosive device discovered nearby as part of the recovery operation the same day, found that the explosion was caused by a victim-activated (tripwire) improvised explosive device. These findings suggest that, given the location of the incident, the nature of the explosion, and the current context, the improvised explosive device was most likely placed by Hizbullah. UNIFIL sent a note verbale to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

of Lebanon protesting the attack and requesting an investigation by the competent authorities to bring the perpetrators to justice and ensure criminal accountability.

10. On 2 April, a small arm round (likely ricochetting) caused a minor injury to a UNIFIL peacekeeper inside UN position 8-30, amid clashes between the Israel Defense Forces and Hizbullah. The point of origin could not be determined. UNIFIL has launched an investigation into the incident.

11. On 3 April, a projectile impacted a container and a building inside UN position 9-63, south of Udaysah (Sector East), severely injuring two peacekeepers. They were evacuated to Marj'yun hospital for treatment and repatriated on 25 April. UNIFIL has launched an investigation into the incident.

12. On 7 April, a UNIFIL reconnaissance patrol observed the launch of a rocket in its immediate vicinity near At Tiri (Sector West). Shortly thereafter, Israel Defense Forces counter-battery fire impacted within 20 metres from the UNIFIL patrol, while the peacekeepers observed two civilian vehicles in the vicinity. The engagement resulted in facial injuries to one peacekeeper and hearing injuries to five peacekeepers, as well as damage to UN vehicles.

13. On 7 April, a shell of unknown origin impacted 20 metres from a UNIFIL patrol near Dibil resulting in minor injuries.

14. On 16 April, an artillery shell landed approximately 700 metres from UN position 6-41 in the vicinity of At Tiri (Sector West), causing a shrapnel wound to a peacekeeper.

15. On 18 April, four Israel Defense Forces artillery rounds impacted 100 metres from a UNIFIL patrol in the vicinity of At Tiri (Sector West) resulting in one peacekeeper injured and vehicles damaged.

16. On 18 April, a UNIFIL patrol in Ghanduriyah (Sector West) came under small-arms fire resulting in one peacekeeper killed and three others injured, including two seriously. One of the critically wounded peacekeepers succumbed to his injuries on 22 April, following repatriation to France. UNIFIL launched an investigation and shared its findings with the parties on 22 May. An initial assessment indicates the fire came from non-state actors, presumably Hizbullah. In a statement the same day, Hizbullah denied any involvement in the incident and called for "caution in assigning blame and responsibility". UNIFIL sent a note verbale to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lebanon protesting the attack and requesting an investigation by the competent authorities to bring the perpetrators to justice and ensure criminal accountability.

17. On 3 June, an explosion occurred inside UN position 7-2, near Marj'yun, amidst indirect fire in the area. Three trajectories from north of the Litani river were detected by UNIFIL radars and impacted in the vicinity of the position, resulting in three peacekeepers injured, one severely. The severely injured peacekeeper was evacuated by air to St George Hospital in Beirut, where he subsequently succumbed to his injuries. The two other injured peacekeepers were treated at the position's medical facility and remain in a stable condition. UNIFIL has launched an investigation into the incident.

18. On 11 June, an air strike close to a UNIFIL resupply convoy near Hariss (Sector West) resulted in minor injuries to two peacekeepers, who were evacuated to UN position 6-40 near Hariss for medical triage. The strike damaged several UNIFIL assets. UNIFIL has launched an investigation into the incident.

Restrictions of UNIFIL's freedom of movement by the Israel Defense Forces

19. The presence of the Israel Defense Forces in the UNIFIL area of operations constitutes a major impediment to UNIFIL movements. During the reporting period, UNIFIL submitted 5,273 requests for deconfliction of movements, with the Israel

Defense Forces responding to 2,925 (55.47 per cent) of the requests. UNIFIL completed 3,919 (74.32 per cent) of its planned movements, with 1,354 (25.68 per cent) were cancelled or postponed due to the lack of deconfliction.

20. The Israel Defense Forces stopped UNIFIL patrols and convoys on the coastal road connecting Tyre with Naqurah (both Sector West) on 30 occasions, resulting in cancellation or postponement of 9 movements. Weapons, including machine guns and tank turrets, were directed at troops on 16 occasions. On 28 March, the Israel Defense Forces fired six shots impacting the side of a UNIFIL vehicle. The same day, a shell exploded 15 metres from a UNIFIL vehicle on the coastal road, resulting in a flat tire. On 14 May, an Israel Defense Forces tank pointed its main gun toward peacekeepers escorting the Lebanese Red Cross southwest of Bayadah (Sector West). While Lebanese Red Cross personnel worked to recover a body under debris, Israel Defense Forces soldiers repeatedly instructed UNIFIL to interrupt the work and leave the area.

21. Israel Defense Forces personnel also restricted UNIFIL's movement on the road connecting Shama with the coastal road on 39 occasions, with 12 of the incidents resulting in the movement cancelled or postponed. Weapons were directed towards peacekeepers in connection with these incidents on 17 occasions. The Israel Defense Forces fired shots towards UNIFIL convoys on the road on 6, 8 and 11 April. During the incident on 8 April, bursts fired within metres of the convoy ricocheted, damaging a vehicle. On 4 and 7 April, an Israel Defense Forces tank fired rounds in proximity of peacekeepers while advancing toward the convoy. On 12 April, an Israel Defense Forces tank rammed the lead vehicle of a UNIFIL convoy, while a second tank pointed its armament at the convoy.

22. Israel Defense Forces personnel also restricted UNIFIL's movements near Taybah. On 6 April, Israel Defense Forces personnel searched a UNIFIL vehicle at a roadblock southeast of Taybah and seized two UNIFIL radios. On 7 April, the Israel Defense Forces detained a UNIFIL peacekeeper after forcefully blocking a logistics convoy near Taybah. Following contact by the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander and UNIFIL Liaison Branch, the peacekeeper was released within an hour of detention, with all personal items intact. On 18 April, Israel Defense Forces soldiers threw stones at peacekeepers disembarking their vehicles at a roadblock in Taybah. As the patrol left the area Israel Defense Forces soldiers fired small arms rounds into the ground in proximity of the peacekeepers.

23. The Israel Defense Forces blocked UNIFIL movements near Naqurah on several occasions. On 6 May, the Israel Defense Forces personnel attempted to open the rear door of a UNIFIL patrol vehicle. On 15 May, Israel Defense Forces personnel stopped and searched a UNIFIL ambulance. On 28 May, Israel Defense Forces personnel stopped a UNIFIL medical evacuation convoy, carrying a patient, on two occasions near Naqurah.

24. In addition, UNIFIL encountered numerous roadblocks installed by the Israel Defense Forces in the Mission's area of operations.

Kinetic activity by the Israel Defense Forces

25. Kinetic activity continued to threaten the safety and security of UNIFIL civilian and military personnel. During the reporting period UNIFIL experienced at least 60 incidents of kinetic activity by the Israel Defense Forces, included the fatal incident on 29 March, in Adshit al-Qusayr. The number also includes 1 impact in and 21 impacts near UNIFIL positions. There were also 25 instances of small arms fire near UN positions. Incidents not resulting in injury or death are noted below.

26. Prior to the relocation of civilian staff and following "urgent warnings" issued by the Israel Defense Forces on 2 March, the Israel Defense Forces struck two buildings in central Tyre (Sector West). A total of 60 UNIFIL civilian personnel

resided within one kilometre of the locations of impact. On 4 March, the Israel Defense Forces struck another building in central Tyre, in an area with 45 staff members having their residences within one kilometre of the impact site. No warning was issued prior to the strike.

27. On 19 March, Israel Defense Forces airstrikes impacted 60, 70 and 100 metres from a UNIFIL patrol in Burj al-Shamali (Sector West). On 23 March, an impact, assessed as an airstrike, impacted 500 metres from a UNIFIL patrol near Shama (Sector West). On 24 April, an Israel Defense Forces drone dropped a stun grenade, which detonated approximately five metres from UNIFIL peacekeepers conducting road clearance operations southeast of At Tiri. On 5 June, two drones dropped grenades near a stationary UNIFIL convoy near Bayt Yahun (Sector West). Peacekeepers shot down one of the drones using assault rifles. On 1 March, an object identified as a drone was shot down near Ghajjar (Sector East), prompting peacekeepers to take cover in bunkers as a safety precaution.

28. On 4 March, Israel Defense Forces personnel fired a shot in an apparent effort to deter UNIFIL peacekeepers northwest of Ayta al-Sha'b, from returning to its position. On 29 March, the Israel Defense Forces opened fire toward UNIFIL patrol stopping at a roadblock west of Zalloutiye (Sector West). On 10 and 17 June, Israel Defense Forces tanks directed their turrets towards UNIFIL patrols near Tayr Harfa and At Tiri (Sector West), respectively.

29. On 19 March, one artillery shell hit the perimeter T-wall near the main gate of UN position 8-30. On 25 March, heavy machine gun fire impacted one accommodation inside the same position.

30. UNIFIL also experienced impacts by Israel Defense Forces airstrikes within 500 metres of its positions. This included airstrikes near UN position 7-1 (Sector East), twice on 7 March, once on 11 March, and once on 18 March, UN position 9-1 near Burj Qallawiyah (Sector East) on 11 March and 9 April, UN position 1-26, near Bayadah (Sector West) on 3, 5 and 11 April, UN position 2-3 near Shama (Sector West) on 6 April, and UN position 6-40 on 11 May. Also on 6 April, an airstrike some 100 metres from UN position 2-45 caused structural damage and damage to a UNIFIL armoured vehicle.

31. The Israel Defense Forces fired tank rounds impacting within 100 metres from UN position 9-15, west of Kfar Kila (Sector East) on 7 March and UN position 5-66 on 2 April. Israel Defense Forces tanks also fired tank rounds over UN position 4-31, near Halta (Sector East) on 12 March and UN position 7-1 on 10 April. On 16 March, Israel Defense Forces fired three tank rounds across the Blue Line in the vicinity of UN position 8-32, southeast of Hula (Sector East). On 16 April, a mortar shell landed approximately 50 metres from UN position 6-41. On 29 April, Israel Defense Forces artillery impacted approximately 600 metres from the same position, causing shrapnel damage inside the position. On 3 April, three Israel Defense Forces tanks fired from a position next to the perimeter of UN position 2-3, exposing the UN position to possible return fire. On 6 May, Israel Defense Forces impacts caused damage to the outer walls of UNP 1-26.

32. Small arms or machinegun fire across the Blue Line by the Israel Defense Forces impacted near at least 10 UN positions. On 17 March, small arms fire from an Israel Defense Forces north of the Blue Line impacted within 100 metres of UN position 6-52 near Aytarun (Sector West) on 17 March and UN position 5-66 near Bayt Lif (Sector West) on 2 April. On 13 April and 1 May, Israel Defense Forces soldiers fired a warning shot over UN position 2-45.

33. Debris from Israel Defense Forces interceptions landed in UN position 4-28 and UN position 2-1, near Yanuh (Sector West) on 2 March, and at UNIFIL headquarters

in Naqurah on 8, 11 and 17 March. On 1 May, debris from Israel Defense Forces countermeasures fell inside UN position 2-3. On 5 May shell fragments and debris were observed inside UNP 9-1, following Israel Defense Forces artillery shelling close to the position.

34. The Israel Defense Forces conducted controlled demolitions within 800 metres of UNIFIL headquarters in Naqurah, on 1, 2, 4 and 8 April, causing damage to UN premises, including windows inside the base. On 18 April, a controlled demolition 150 metres from UN position 1-26 caused damage to the position.

35. The Israel Defense Forces destroyed UNIFIL security cameras mounted at the outside perimeter of UNIFIL headquarters on 3 April and 18 May, and UN position 1-32A, both near Naqurah on 3 April, observation point Marwahin (Sector West) and UN position 1-21 both near Marwahin and UN position 1-31 near Labuneh on 3 March and 5 April, UN position 6-52 near Aytarun (Sector West) on 6 and 11 April and on UN position 6-40 on 18 May. On 7 March, the Israel Defense Forces destroyed the perimeter lights at the UN observation post in Markaba (Sector East). On 23 May, the UNIFIL head of Mission and Force Commander sent a letter to the Israel Defense Forces stating that the cameras were installed for force protection purposes and were in accordance with the parties obligations to ensure the safety and security of peacekeeper and that the deliberate and systematic incapacitating and theft of UNIFIL property is unacceptable.

Kinetic activity by nonstate actors

36. During the reporting period UNIFIL experienced at least 22 incidents of kinetic activity by non-state actors, including at least two fatal incidents as detailed above. Incidents not resulting in injury or death are noted below.

37. In late March, UNIFIL experienced an increase in incidents involving explosive devices. In addition to the incidents on 29 March, near Bint Jubayl, and 30 March northeast of Marj'yun, an explosion likely caused by a landmine occurred on 22 March close to a UNIFIL convoy in Mays al-Jabal with shrapnel damaging three vehicles. The increase in this type of incidents prompted the mission to increase security elements for logistical movements to resupply UN positions, with related tasks appropriately integrated. All convoys are preceded by an engineering team, with explosive ordnance disposal capacity, capable of identifying and disposing of devices, supported by a reconnaissance element, assessing access routes. The limited number of engineering teams with the required expertise, in combination with the need to ensure that all movement are accompanied, were the main constraints preventing UNIFIL from increasing its operational and logistic activities.

38. Hizbullah's use of operated fibre-optic drones constituted a serious threat to the safety and security of peacekeepers. A fibre-optic drone, carrying a warhead suspected to be a rocket propelled grenade round, crashed inside UN position 5-10, east of Hanniyah (Sector West) on 5 May without exploding, and inside UNIFIL headquarters on 10 and 12 May; on the latter occasion damaging some buildings. On 7 May, peacekeepers cut the fibre optic cable of two weaponised drones approaching UN position 9-10 near Ghanduriyah (Sector West). On 11 May, UNIFIL observed three drones carrying munitions impacting locations where the Israel Defense Forces were present, in proximity to UNIFIL headquarters at Naqurah, with one impact within 100 metres. UNIFIL consequently adapted its force protection measures with respect to fibre-optic explosive drones.

39. Non-state armed actors opened fire towards UNIFIL patrols near Burj Qallawiyah on 15, 20 and 23 March. During the incident on 20 March, peacekeepers were forced to return fire in support of disengagement. On 30 March, after

peacekeepers discovered an active rocket launcher near Burj Qallawiyah, non-state armed actors, suspected to be Hizbullah, opened fire on peacekeepers, who returned fire in self-defense. Non-state armed actors also opened fire toward UNIFIL patrols near Yatar and Dayr Kifa (Sector West) on 15 March, with at least one bullet impacting one of the UNIFIL vehicles during the incident in Yatar. During both incidents, peacekeepers returned fire in self-defense to support disengagement. On 30 March, a non-state armed actor fired pistol rounds towards peacekeepers in Dayr Qanun (Sector West), followed by an unidentified explosion, prompting the peacekeepers to return fire in self-defense, while leaving the area.

40. On 26 March, a 155mm shell impacted UN position 7-1, causing structural damage to the mosque and living quarters of the position. On 7 May, a rocket impacted inside UN position 2-3, near Sham'a (Sector West), resulting in a punctured vehicle tire.

Kinetic activity, undetermined attribution

41. During the reporting period UNIFIL experienced three incidents of kinetic activity in proximity to peacekeeping patrols or logistic movements which the Mission was unable to attribute with certainty to any party.

42. Unknown individual(s) opened small arms fire towards UNIFIL peacekeepers near Mays al-Jabal on 28 March, with bullets impacting the vehicle. On 17 March, shell fragments landed 40 metres from a UNIFIL logistic movement near Hinnayah (Sector West), damaging a patrol vehicle. On 22 March, an explosion followed by small arms fire near a UNIFIL logistic convoy near Mays al-Jabal, resulted in three vehicles sustaining damage. The point of origin of the explosion and small arms fire could not be determined.

43. UNIFIL experienced at least 22 impacts in and at least 5 impacts near its positions from unknown origin. At least 10 rounds of small arms fire was also reported to have impacted UN positions.

44. Mortar shells of an unknown origin impacted UN position 9-63 on 9 and 25 March and UN position 5-66 on 25 and 27 March causing structural damage to the two positions. Projectiles of unknown origin struck the mess inside UN position 8-30 on 26 March and UN position 7-1 [date] without causing damage. UN position 7-3 was impacted on 2 June. On 3 June a munition ricochet caused a power outage at the same position. Explosions of unknown origin took place inside UN position 2-3 on 2 April and UN position 9-63, near Udaysah (Sector East) on 3 April, destroying a container. An unexploded mortar shell of unknown origin was also discovered inside UN position 2-3 on 1 April. Artillery also impacted UN position 2-31 on 1 April.

45. Fragments of impacts of an unknown origin impacted UNIFIL positions. On 5 March, shelling fragments from indirect fire damaged a window at UN position 1-21, southeast of Marwahin (Sector West). On 29 March, multiple fragments fell inside UN position 2-3, including one mortar or artillery shell that pierced the roof of a bunker. On 29 March, large shrapnel fragments fell into the premises of UN position 1-26, shattering the glass at the main entrance. On 17 April, two UNIFIL vehicles sustained splinter damage while parked inside the same position. On 24 April, a defensive position inside UN position 1-21 was damaged by a projectile. On 6 June, multiple pieces of shrapnel were discovered inside UN position 9-1, following at least 13 nearby impacts.

46. UNIFIL also experienced impacts of unknown origin near its positions. On 16 March, one shell impacted 30 metres from the entrance of UN position 9-64, near Sarda (Sector East). On 23 March, multiple artillery rounds impacted approximately 100 metres from UN position 5-66 [and 3-400 meters from a UNIFIL checkpoint near

[,,] on 9 June]. Rockets impacted just outside UN position 9-63 on 25 March and about 400 metres from UN position 2-45 [date]. On 30 March two projectiles landed 400 metres from UN position 7-1.

47. Impacts of undetermined origin and type took place inside UN position 5-66 on 5 and 28 March and 3 April, UN position 2-3 on 18 March, UN position 9-66 near Kfar Kila (Sector East) on 19 March, UN position 1-26 on 28 March, 15 May and 12 June, UN position 8-30 on 10 and 11 April, and UN position 2-1 near Yanuh (Sector West) on 27 May. Structural damage was sustained on several occasions.

48. Explosions of unknown origin also took place within 100 metres of UN position 7-2 on 3 March and 21 April, UN position 8-30 on 11 March and 21 April, UN position 8-34 on 9 April and UN position 8-36 on 29 April. On 13 March, an explosion northwest of Tayr Falsay (Sector West) caused a power outage and damaged the windowpanes. On 3 June an explosion of unknown origin near UN position 7-2 caused damage to buildings at the position.

49. On 5 April, an unarmed small reconnaissance quadcopter drone crashed inside UN position 2-3 near Shama (Sector West).

50. With clashes between the Israel Defense Forces and Hizbullah taking place in proximity of UNIFIL headquarters in Naqurah, small arms fire impacted UNIFIL headquarters on 20, 21, 22, 23 and 26 March. The total number of impacts in the camp is yet to be determined. On 21 March, stray bullets impacted one vehicle as well as buildings, including the UNIFIL headquarters hospital. On 22 March, one impact inside the camp damaged windows in buildings along the western perimeter. Rounds of small arms fire also struck the hospital. On 23 March, several points of impact resulted in damage to the office complex, vehicles, roads near the Force Commander's building and the UNIFIL hospital in Naqurah. UNIFIL has launched an investigation into the impacts on 23 March. Small arms fire of unknown origin impacted UN position 7-2 on 6 March, UN position 8-34 on 28 March, and UN position 8-30 on 17 June. Heavy machine gun rounds impacted UN position 7-2 on 15 and 16 April.

51. UNIFIL experienced electronic interference of unknown origin while at sea on 21 February and near Bayt Lif on 21 February, Markaba on 21 February, Kfar Kila on 22 February, Marun al Ra's on 28 February, Dayr Mimas on 1 March and near Bayadah on 15 March.

Annex II

Implementation of the arms embargo

1. Paragraph 15 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) states that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using flag vessels or aircraft, the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to any entity or individual in Lebanon other than those authorized by the Government of Lebanon or the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The United Nations continued to engage with Member States regarding allegations of weapons transfers and efforts to address such violations of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).

2. During the reporting period, the Syrian Arab Republic's national security institutions announced on multiple occasions having thwarted Hizbullah-related military activities on its territory. On 19 March, the Ministry of Defense of the Syrian Arab Republic announced that its border guard forces had thwarted an arms smuggling attempt along the Syria-Lebanon border, resulting in the arrest of four individuals, including two Lebanese nationals, and the seizure of weapons and ammunition. On 29 March, the Ministry of Defense of the Syrian Arab Republic announced the discovery and closure of two tunnels connecting Syria and Lebanon "used for smuggling by Lebanese militias". On 3 April, Syrian border guard forces confirmed the closure of two tunnels along the Syrian Lebanese border near the Homs countryside which had been used "for smuggling operations and illegal trade, including the transport of weapons and other unlawful activities".

3. In identical letters dated 25 March addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2026/225](#)), the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations conveyed a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel, Gideon Sa'ar, stating that "The Iranian regime continues to invest heavily in strengthening its regional terror proxy network, providing Hezbollah with substantial funding and advanced weaponry, including precision-guided munitions and suicide uncrewed aerial vehicles [...] Iran has transferred to Hezbollah an estimated amount of approximately \$1.2 billion since the [2024] ceasefire. It also plays a direct role in training militants and guiding senior leadership". In identical letters dated 23 April addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2026/358](#)), the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations rejected the allegations from the "Israeli regime", which it stated "resorts to fabricating baseless allegations in a desperate attempt to justify its unlawful occupation of Lebanese territory as well as its continued, systematic violations of Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity".

4. The United Nations remains committed to supporting overall compliance by the parties with resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) in all its provisions and to advancing its implementation. This applies to the implementation of the arms embargo under paragraph 15 of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and any decision that would be adopted by the Security Council in this regard. I look forward to continued dialogue with the Council and its members on furthering our joint goal of the full implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).

Annex III

Mobilization of international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces

1. In paragraph 11 of its resolution [2790 \(2025\)](#), the Security Council urged “the international community to intensify its support, including equipment, material and finance, to the LAF in order to ensure their effective and sustainable deployment south of the Litani River and to enhance their capacities to implement resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) ... [and requested] ... the Secretary-General to continue adapting UNIFIL’s activities, within its mandate, to support the Lebanese Armed Forces in the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL”.

2. During the reporting period, the Lebanese leadership continued to advocate for enhanced international support to the Lebanese Armed Forces. Myriad statements released by international leaders urging an end to the hostilities in Lebanon included messages of support for the Lebanese Armed Forces.

3. Prior to the postponement of the “International Conference in Support of the Lebanese Armed Forces and security forces” which was originally planned for 5 March under the auspices of French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris (see para. 40), a meeting was held in Cairo on 24 February in preparation for the Conference. The meeting was hosted by Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Ahmed Mohamed Abdelatty, with participation from the Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, General Rodolph Haykal; the Director-General of Lebanon’s Internal Security Forces, General Raed Abdullah; Qatari Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mohammed bin Abdulaziz Al-Khulaifi; French Presidential Envoy Jean-Yves Le Drian; and Saudi Envoy to Lebanon Prince Yazid bin Farhan, alongside officials from the Arab League, the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Special Coordinator for Lebanon also attended, alongside the Deputy Force Commander of UNIFIL. According to a statement released by the Egyptian Government, participants expressed their “full support for the efforts of the Lebanese Army and Internal Security Forces under current circumstances, committing to mobilize the necessary international financial and technical resources to enable Lebanon to extend its exclusive sovereignty over its entire territory”. A statement released by the Lebanese Armed Forces noted that Commander Haykal had used the meeting to present a “detailed briefing on the needs of the military institution and the steps taken to implement the Army’s plan aimed at extending the authority of the Lebanese state over its entire territory”, while expressing gratitude to participating countries for “standing by the Army and Lebanon amid the current challenges”. However, on 1 March 2026, a statement was released by the French presidency announcing that a decision had been made by President Macron and his Lebanese counterpart, President Aoun, to postpone the Paris conference given that “conditions were not in place to hold the meeting”. The statement underscored the commitment of France, Lebanon and their “Quintet partners” to continue to support the Lebanese Armed Forces.

4. As part of its efforts to enhance the capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces, the Military Technical Committee for Lebanon met on 19 March. Originally set to take place in Paris, the meeting was convened in a hybrid format, with some participants joining from Beirut and others participating online, to prioritize the continuity of international support to the Lebanese army, even amid escalating hostilities. The meeting addressed overarching capability needs of the Lebanese Armed Forces, with urgent needs identified in the areas of mobility, surveillance and monitoring, force protection, and border security equipment and infrastructure. According to a statement released in Lebanese state-run media: “The Committee reaffirmed its full and ongoing

commitment to its partnership with the LAF, recognizing the institution's strength, professionalism, and high level of competence."

5. A communiqué by the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom, and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, published on 1 April, expressed commitment to the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces, noting an intention to "actively" participate in the international support conference "to be held as soon as conditions permit". The statement added: "With a view to enabling the Lebanese security forces to become the sole independent guarantors of Lebanon's sovereignty in the long term, we also call on the Lebanese authorities to continue to adopt the necessary financial and economic reforms, in line with IMF requirements."

6. President Macron, in a joint press conference with Prime Minister Salam during the latter's official trip to Paris on 21 April, noted France's commitment to supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces. He stated: "A monopoly on arms control will not happen overnight; it will be part of a comprehensive political strategy, but efforts in this direction must be renewed. We will be ready to provide concrete support with our regional and international partners by rescheduling the conference in support of the armed forces and security forces." In a statement on 18 June, Prime Minister Salam noted that, during a discussion with President Macron in Paris, the two had "agreed on the necessity of working to secure the appropriate conditions for holding the conferences to support the army and security forces and for reconstruction".

7. Bilateral defense support continued during the reporting period, in many cases bolstered by coordination from the Military Technical Committee for Lebanon. Equipment and other materials were provided by Canada, France, the Netherlands and Spain, as well as the European Union, with spare parts, equipment upgrades and repairs undertaken by the United Kingdom. Several countries mobilized to meet the needs of displaced Lebanese Armed Forces personnel and their families, including Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, with welfare support provided by France.

8. On 31 March, France confirmed that it had delivered 39 armoured personnel carriers to Lebanon for use by the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Netherlands announced a new contribution of 13.5 million euros to Lebanon in April, of which 7 million will be used to support the Lebanese Armed Forces. On 12 May, Germany announced that it had signed a new agreement to provide medical equipment and assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces navy. Germany also inaugurated the Naval Base Kitchen in Beirut on 8 May, which, the German Embassy stated, reflected the ongoing German-Lebanese Armed Forces partnership. The European Council approved, on 28 May, the allocation of 100 million euros to the Lebanese Armed Forces for 2026 through the European Peace Facility.

9. During an official visit to Lebanon, on 13 April, Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani noted: "As part of our military and training support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, I offered President Aoun Italy's assistance in combating illicit financing of terrorism and in preventing further attacks by Hezbollah."

10. On 7 May, Lebanese Armed Force Commander Haykal met with Turkish Defense Minister Yaşar Güler and Chief of the General Staff General Selçuk Bayraktaroğlu on the margins of a defense exhibition in Istanbul. Minister Güler affirmed, according to a Lebanese statement, Türkiye's continued support for the Lebanese Armed Forces in "confronting challenges" and expressed commitment to strengthened cooperation, while General Bayraktaroğlu conveyed to his Lebanese counterpart Türkiye's commitment to provide support to the Lebanese Armed Forces across "all fields".

11. Commander Haykal travelled to Pakistan from 6 to 9 June on an official visit following an invitation from his Pakistani counterpart, Field Marshal Syed Asim

Munir. According to a statement issued by the Lebanese Armed Forces, the visit included a discussion on enhancing military cooperation between Lebanon and Pakistan, including training.

12. Although several training initiatives were disrupted or delayed due to the deterioration of the security situation in the reporting period, training was delivered either in Lebanon or abroad to the Lebanese Armed Forces by France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, the United States and the United Kingdom. Italy also contributed to the training of 52 new Lebanese Armed Forces recruits.

13. The Military Technical Committee developed, in partnership with the Lebanese Armed Forces, an overview of urgent needs of the army covering the areas of mobility, domain awareness, welfare, force protection and communications. A series of technical workshops were arranged to refine requirements to optimize sustainable capabilities across the areas of infrastructure, equipment, training and other related materials. The Beirut Executive Committee, which habitually convenes defense attaché representatives of Military Technical Committee nations in Beirut, increased the frequency of its meetings to ensure oversight of emerging needs during the escalation.

14. During the reporting period, UNIFIL gifted information technology equipment, vehicles and related spare parts, which had reached their life expectancy, to the Lebanese Armed Forces.

15. Efforts to enhance the integration and complementarity of funding mobilized through the United Nations in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces continued during the reporting period. Of \$47.8 million in donor funding, including pledges, received by United Nations agencies, funds and programmes from Canada, Denmark, the European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Spain, and the United States, \$37 million is being channelled through the “Livelihood Ecosystem” project (see [S/2025/460](#), annex III, para. 9) in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

16. Under a broader United Nations framework of support to the security sector, seven United Nations agencies, funds and programmes are supporting the implementation of 21 projects in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces, in line with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, including in support of capacity enhancement as well as Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), border control, maritime security and capacity development in the areas of migrant protection, human rights, mediation, and women, peace and security, as well as into the “Livelihood Ecosystem” to respond to basic needs and the socio-economic well-being of Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers and their dependents. Funding totalling \$3 million from the European Union, Japan and the Netherlands is being directed to the Lebanese Mine Action Centre. The Lebanese Armed Forces also strengthened gender mainstreaming through a memorandum of understanding with UN Women, which delivered training for Army senior and mid-level officers on its anti-sexual harassment and domestic violence policy, as well as on issues related to women, peace and security, and gender-based violence.

17. Programming in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces implemented by the United Nations was impacted by the escalation of hostilities. Several projects in southern Lebanon were halted indefinitely, including the procurement of infrastructure for the Lebanese Armed Forces and civil-military coordination initiatives. Procurement activities continued where feasible, with some equipment being redirected to other Lebanese Armed Forces locations as operationally necessary. In coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces’ Disaster, Crisis and Risk Management Authority, and through new and reprogrammed donor funding, the United Nations supported the Lebanese Armed Forces to meet the needs of displaced soldiers and their families, including through the provision of food and hygiene items, in addition to psychosocial support.