



## 09.

### International Funding in Fragile Contexts

# Why We Do This

**Fragility, conflict and violence** massively disrupt development. But in response, too often we focus on the urgent, not the important. One essential building block for stability is to foster functioning, accountable national security sector institutions that are sustainably financed. The United Nations, in partnership with the World Bank, has commissioned a cadre of experts and research institutions to develop nine policy briefs on the role of security sector reform and governance (SSR&G) in preventing conflict and sustaining peace. Together, these briefs offer a timely analysis of the risks of weakened, dysfunctional security institutions, of the exorbitant cost of predatory behaviour by security providers, and of poor public financial management of security expenditures. They explore new SSR&G solutions in which the UN and the World Bank may cooperate to help countries build more affordable, accountable, and inclusive institutions that support them to transition out of fragility and create safer environments conducive to sustainable development and well-being.

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**09. International Funding in Fragile Contexts**

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Good Governance in National Security –  
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that Deliver Genuine Security to All –  
09. International funding in fragile contexts

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The United Nations supports nationally led security sector reform. Our goal is to help states and societies develop effective, inclusive, and accountable security institutions that contribute to national and international security and sustainable development.

**Integrity. Accountability. Genuine security.**

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# Executive Summary

## Policy challenges for security sector support

**Security-development strategies that cohesively integrate various donors and partners are notably absent in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, undermining conflict prevention and limiting the effectiveness of peace and development initiatives.** A significant growth in the number of actors addressing security sector issues in these contexts has not been accompanied by increased opportunities for structured dialogue and exchange between security and development actors at global and national levels. This prevents security institutions from most effectively complementing the design, function, and delivery of development objectives and initiatives.

**It is in fragile contexts that the need for security sector reform and governance (SSR/G), and security sector assistance (SSA), is greatest.**

In 2022, fragile contexts were home to 1.9 billion people, representing one-quarter (24 per cent) of the global population but three-quarters (73 per cent) of the extreme poor, burdened with the world's highest rate of conflict. Over the decade beginning in 2010, the number of active violent conflicts in fragile contexts increased by 150 per cent, so that by 2020, 81 per cent of all active violent conflicts worldwide were located in fragile contexts. On top of this, an analysis of 54 fragile contexts from January 2018 to December 2019 found that incidents of non-conflict-related violence against civilians rose by 50 per cent over that two-year period.

**Fragility is not only driving violent conflict but also other forms of political violence, such as civil unrest and military coups.** In fragile contexts, all these forms of violence increased in 2020 and 2021. However, in 2021, 51 of 60 fragile contexts were not in a state of war, which illustrates the nuanced nature of the relationship between fragility and conflict. Even in non-conflict conditions, the weak legal, judicial, and policing frameworks of fragile contexts can erode the basis for human security, raising risks across security dimensions while absent the capacity to cope with these risks.

**There is a need to mitigate the policy and operational dissonance between security sector reform and governance (SSR/G) and security sector assistance (SSA).** The delivery of SSA without or with insufficient support for SSR/G can lead to unintended consequences, for example by increasing military capacity in

the absence of enhanced security sector governance, leading to unconstitutional changes of government. The desire to deliver SSA should not come at a cost to the objectives of sustainable peace and development, and this can be mitigated by better aligning the funding and operations of SSA and SSR/G activities in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

**Approaches to fostering ownership of SSR/G must also evolve, to address the political, operational, and financial realities.** Frequently, efforts to build local ownership of peace and development policies and reforms fall short, hampered by concerns about donor risk and partner accountability, weak political will, and competing priorities. These initiatives must take into account that the political economy associated with violence distorts and obstructs support for sustainable peace and inclusive development, the very bases for which are already undermined by the fact that fragile contexts are both vulnerable to violence and feature limited state capacity, weakening the integrity of their economic and security systems.

## **Smarter funding for security and development**

**Funding for SSR/G has been on a steady decline; but by better understanding the connections between security and development in fragile contexts, funding streams and operational alignment can both be improved.** Since 2015, funding for SSR/G in fragile contexts has trended downward. In 2022, the US\$152 million in official development assistance (ODA) allocated by OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members to “security system management and reform” in fragile contexts amounted to 3.1 per cent of the peace assistance funded by these countries, which comprised a mere 0.3 per cent of their total ODA. This was the lowest share since 2007. A similar trend can be seen in the funding provided for SSR/G in fragile contexts by official donors, which equalled only 2.2 per cent of their total peace assistance in 2022. And, while a broader analysis of “security-related” ODA in fragile contexts – including outflows from multilateral organizations and official contributions from non-DAC donors – suggests that these donors allotted 3.1 per cent of total ODA to conflict, peace, and security in 2022, this was still down significantly from 2019, when nearly 6 per cent of assistance went to these activities.

**A failure to recognize and operationalize connections between security and development in fragile and conflict-affected contexts is compromising partnerships, effectiveness, and the ability to meet objectives.** This blind spot can be attributed to a variety of factors: diverse and fragmented funding

approaches by donors; a failure to address the intersections between security and development issues; insufficient state capacity to manage funding; disconnected political processes; and disagreements and confusion over the strategic purposes of SSR/G, SSA, and development. By refining the analytical framework so that SSR/G can be applied alongside SSA, these processes can be linked and aligned with development priorities to reduce inefficiencies and improve effectiveness.

**Importantly, security sector priorities figure prominently in the national development plans of fragile and conflict-affected contexts but must be sufficiently supported.** Of the 15 extremely fragile contexts identified by the OECD's fragility framework in 2022, all but Afghanistan have articulated a national development or development recovery plan that includes references to peace, justice, and security. Yet, gaps between the objectives of national development plans and security sector reform strategies, and those set by donor priorities, can lead to a deprioritizing of SSR/G, undermining a key pillar for sustainable peace and development.

**Fundamentally, sustainable and predictable funding for SSR/G in fragile and conflict-affected contexts enables sustainable development.** To ensure the sustainability and predictability of funding, a balance must be struck between donor priorities, funding cycles, and funding shortfalls, on one side; and the expectations of partners, as well as sustainable financing pathways developed to meet the needs of their security sectors, on the other. This means knowing (as far as possible) what funding falls outside the ODA envelope, including aid to non-state actors, and what this implies as far as the decision-making of partner states on SSR/G and SSA. Despite potential political and operational issues, the case for a global fund for SSR or the adaptation of existing funding mechanisms to enable sustainable, community-owned, and effective programming for security and justice tasks deserves closer consideration. As a first step, a global dialogue on more effective support to SSR/G and SSA could be facilitated through enhanced communication and alignment across funding mechanisms, including international financial institutions (IFIs), using a networked approach. This would start to address some of the fragmentation in the system.

**Integrating international financial institutions (IFIs) can help build expertise, embed competence, and foster sustainability for SSR/G and SSA.** In fragile and conflict-affected contexts, national funding arrangements for the security sector can often benefit from closer examination and better management frameworks. Yet, SSR/G programming frequently fails to adequately address public finance issues and the importance of effective financial management to the delivery of

security. Using initiatives such as the United Nations-World Bank Humanitarian – Development – Peacebuilding and Partnership Facility (HDPP) as a starting point, multilateral actors such as the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) can foster a broader dialogue on the comparative advantages of IFIs, based on evidence on impact and outcomes.

**Investments in the collection, management, and analysis of data from security sectors in fragile and conflict-affected contexts is essential to better decision-making across the security-development nexus.** This should be facilitated through a global architecture that enables regular dialogue and exchange on security and justice issues, and better aligns funding for security and development – which would help build confidence and trust among donors and partners. Development actors should also be more systematic about integrating security sectors into their diagnostic assessments, to ensure they capture the most comprehensive understanding of sources of risk.

## **Building understanding, dialogue, and momentum for effective support to SSR/G**

**To mitigate risks and build on comparative advantages in fragile contexts, security and development actors must engage in more regular, structured dialogue.** Full implementation of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) Nexus fundamentally requires a mutual awareness and knowledge exchange among security and development actors. The DAC, supported by its subsidiary, the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), currently gathers peace, security, and development experts and leaders to share learning, analysis, and objectives. In the future, such dialogue could be extended to develop a shared sense of risk thresholds, reflecting the input of various actors that support SSR/G and SSA. Exchanges at the policy and operational levels, between the staff of IFIs, UN peacekeeping missions, and other security providers (e.g. the OSCE) should also be intensified. This may present an opportunity for representatives of countries receiving or providing SSR/G or SSA support to offer their views on its scope, application, and impact.

Though the potential of SSR/G and SSA as instruments of conflict prevention is significant, they have not been optimally aligned to harness their maximum preventative value. Investments in justice, rule of law, and SSR/G are a means of addressing the perceptions of exclusion and the grievances that underlie violent conflict. Moreover, better aligned SSR/G and SSA can help strengthen the links

between conflict prevention and resilience building, and between institutional reform and capacity building. Security sector support frameworks designed for fragile contexts must therefore place a greater emphasis on the causes of fragility, political settlements, and how support is distributed across the security-development nexus. Many bilateral actors have already sought to improve alignment across their security and development activities in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, for example by linking diplomatic, defence, and development activities to promote reforms of security and justice institutions.

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# Abbreviations

|              |                                                                               |
|--------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>ADB</b>   | Asian Development Bank                                                        |
| <b>AfDB</b>  | African Development Bank                                                      |
| <b>CFSP</b>  | Common Foreign Security Policy of the EU                                      |
| <b>CRS</b>   | Creditor Reporting System of the OECD                                         |
| <b>CSDP</b>  | Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU                                  |
| <b>DAC</b>   | Development Assistance Committee of the OECD                                  |
| <b>EPF</b>   | European Peace Facility                                                       |
| <b>EU</b>    | European Union                                                                |
| <b>GFS</b>   | Global Fragility Strategy                                                     |
| <b>HDPP</b>  | Humanitarian – Development – Peacebuilding and Partnership Facility           |
| <b>IDA</b>   | International Development Association                                         |
| <b>IFI</b>   | International Financial Institution                                           |
| <b>INCAF</b> | International Network on Conflict and Fragility                               |
| <b>NDICI</b> | Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument of the EU |
| <b>ODA</b>   | Official development assistance                                               |
| <b>OECD</b>  | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development                        |
| <b>OSCE</b>  | Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe                          |
| <b>PER</b>   | Public Expenditure Review                                                     |
| <b>PBF</b>   | United Nations Peacebuilding Fund                                             |
| <b>PFM</b>   | Public Financial Management                                                   |
| <b>PRA</b>   | Prevention and Resilience Allocation instrument of the IDA                    |
| <b>SSA</b>   | Security sector assistance                                                    |
| <b>SSG</b>   | Security sector governance                                                    |
| <b>SSR</b>   | Security sector reform                                                        |
| <b>SSR/G</b> | Security sector reform and governance                                         |
| <b>UN</b>    | United Nations                                                                |
| <b>WB</b>    | World Bank                                                                    |
| <b>WBG</b>   | World Bank Group                                                              |

# 1. Policy challenges for security sector reform and governance (SSR/G) and security sector assistance (SSA)

This joint United Nations-OECD policy brief analyses the main challenges affecting the delivery, funding, and development of security sector reform and governance (SSR/G) and security sector assistance (SSA) in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. It presents a case for enhanced dialogue between security and development actors, as well as greater operational and financial alignment of SSR/G and SSA, based on shared principles of engagement.

## Challenges for security sector support in fragile and conflict-affected contexts

**“Sustainable development cannot be realized without peace and security; and peace and security will be at risk without sustainable development.”**

The delivery of security as a regional and global public good depends on well-functioning security sectors capable of supporting economic development, social cohesion, and political settlement by creating space for renewal and investment across the socioeconomic spectrum. Yet, the recognition that the prospect for sustained outcomes is increased by aligning development and security objectives has not led to changes in international norms and policies related to SSR/G, which in most cases remain connected to post-conflict state-building, recovery, and reconstruction agendas. In other words, the potential value of SSR/G to conflict prevention, economic development, and resilience building has not yet been fully realized.

Simply put, development and security are inextricably linked. Within the development space and in the context of development cooperation, security institutions can play an important role in complementing the design, function, and delivery of development objectives and initiatives, across government and in the private sector. However, cohesive security-development solutions are notably absent in fragile and conflict-affected states, where security actors and their development counterparts are rarely in the same room. This is because it is difficult to build consensus on the economic, governance, and security needs of a state when external and internal interests converge, and tactical objectives prevail.

## Moving beyond the post-conflict framing of security sector engagement

There is a tendency for the security-development nexus to be thought of in linear terms, wherein security is a necessary precursor for development. Indeed, this is how former World Bank President Robert Zoellick described it, when he advocated *“bringing security and development together first to smooth the transition from conflict to peace and then to embed stability so that development can take hold long enough to break the cycle of fragility and violence.”* While this is a fair assessment of some benefits of the security-development nexus, the value of this nexus is not accounted for in two important ways by Zoellick.

First, progress made in development – from increased tax revenues to the provision of education and health-care – plays an important role in facilitating sustainable, effective, efficient, and accountable security sectors in which SSR/G can take hold and become institutionalized. Second, the merits of linking security and development are as relevant for conflict prevention and resilience building as they are for post-conflict transitions.

Broadly speaking, security sector support can be grouped into three types: security sector reform (SSR), security sector governance (SSG), and security sector assistance (SSA). All three approaches are highly political but often in different ways and at different levels (see Box 1, below). While support for SSR and SSG is frequently implemented as part of an intentional effort to embed reforms in sustainable governance institutions and structures, this is not the case for SSA. In fact, SSA is often delivered in the absence of reform or governance agendas, for short-term tactical, political, or geopolitical gain.

### Box 1. Security sector lexicon

There are no universally agreed definitions of these terms, but for the purposes of this paper, the following definitions should be assumed to apply:

**Security sector** – The structures, institutions, and personnel responsible for the management, provision, and oversight of security in a State. A security sector is generally thought to include defence, law enforcement, corrections, and intelligence agencies, as well as the institutions responsible for border management, customs, and civil emergencies. Judicial actors responsible for the adjudication of criminal cases are, in many instances, also considered part of the security sector. Where non-State actors provide security, they may be considered elements of a security sector as well. This includes customary or informal authorities and private security services. Additionally, any actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies, and civil society groups, may be viewed as security sector actors.

**Security Sector Reform (SSR)** – A process of assessment, review, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation that is led by national authorities

with the goal of enhancing security in a State and making it more effective for and accountable to its people, without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law.

**Security Sector Governance (SSG)** – The process by which security institutions are subordinated to mechanisms of civilian oversight and democratic control, and by which the principles of good governance (including public financial management) are applied to security provision. This means ensuring that security sector actors are accountable, transparent, fiscally sustainable, inclusive, and responsive to the security needs of all people regardless of sex, ethnicity, religion, age, or income. In Security Council resolution 2553 (2020), the United Nations stressed how important it is “to adequately consider initiatives that address strategic security sector governance, management and oversight aspects in order to ensure the long-term sustainability of the security sector based on the particular needs and conditions of the country in question.” The United Nations also underlined five fundamental areas of focus in the process of establishing democratic governance in the security sector: the strengthening of the national legal framework; the role and capacity of civil society; institutions; a management system; and internal oversight.

**Security Sector Assistance (SSA)** – Bilateral transfers of military materiel, tactical combat training, joint exercises, military education, defence institution building, and other types of security cooperation.

**Security-Development Nexus** – Because security is fundamental to people’s livelihoods, to reducing poverty, and to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), contemporary understandings of security encompass not only classic military conceptions but also what is widely referred to as “human security.” The priorities this elevates intersect with development priorities related to sustainable growth, reduced poverty and inequalities, and greater social resilience. In this way, support for the security sector can enhance development outcomes while support for development activities can help strengthen the security sector.

# The need for SSR, SSG, and SSA is greatest in fragile and conflict-affected contexts

The dynamic interplay of fragility, conflict, and violence demands a response that balances support across the humanitarian, development, and peace (HDP) and security spheres. The goal is to build capacity for conflict prevention. Ideally, in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, this capacity building is focused on the most vulnerable populations.


While violent conflict and fragility are not the same, they tend to be closely linked; and more than ever before, violent conflict and its consequences are concentrated in fragile contexts. From 2010 to 2020, the number of active violent conflicts in fragile contexts rose by 150 per cent, and between 2020 and 2021 alone, the number of fatalities from armed conflict in fragile contexts doubled. In 2021, the share of global casualties from fragile contexts also peaked at 91 per cent, though this rate dropped

rather rapidly to 64 per cent in 2022 and 41 per cent in 2023 (largely due to the Russian aggression in Ukraine).

Trends observed in fragile contexts must be placed in a wider frame. Around the world, violence and risk have intensified, with deaths from organized violence increasing between 2022 and 2023, driven by the conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, and Sudan. By 2023, peacefulness had declined globally for the ninth consecutive year. And from 2021 through 2023, 15 of the 20 deadliest State conflicts occurred in fragile contexts. Fragile contexts also continue to see record rates of both State and non-State conflict fatalities. Notably, however, political violence is rising in all contexts globally, and most quickly in developed States.

The recent character of conflict in fragile contexts is notable for the prevalence of non-State actors and organized armed groups, alongside other regional, transnational, and global actors, who combine and compete

**Figure 1. Fatalities from violent conflict in fragile contexts, by type, 2000–2023**



Source: The categories used here, of State, non-State, and one-sided violent conflict, are derived from Therése Pettersson and Magnus Öberg, “Organized violence, 1989–2019,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 57, No. 4 (2020), pp. 597–613.

in a variety of ways in pursuit of diverse interests. Parties to conflict are often driven by the fragility they experience, such as water scarcity, weak governance, unemployment, or inequality. These actors may also seek to exploit fragility, using physical and psychological trauma to expose and target the fragility in people, communities, institutions, and States they oppose. This kind of exploitation of fragility for the violent pursuit of political objectives devalues human security and distorts local and regional politics, undermining the capacity for compromise and peace.

There has been an unprecedented rise in civilian deaths in conflict, with civilians dying as a direct result of 12 of the world's deadliest conflicts at a rate that jumped by 53 per cent from 2021 to 2022. This was reflected in increases across the globe, from a 23 per cent growth in conflict-related casualties in sub-Saharan Africa to higher numbers of deadly incidents against civilians in other parts of the world, in many cases perpetrated either by security actors or because those actors were ineffective. Beyond violent conflict, recent data on non-conflict-related violence also highlights the need for SSR/G in many countries to address justice and policing issues. For example, some 409,000 people were the victims of intentional homicides in 2018, far outpacing the number (105,000) killed as a direct result of conflict. And in 2021, when global homicides hit a 20-year high amid escalating gang and sociopolitical violence, intentional homicides caused more deaths around the world than conflict and terrorism combined. That year, the number of intentional homicides reached approximately 458,000 – the highest number in two decades. To put this in perspective, the global burden of homicide in 2021 was twice the number of conflict deaths.

Additionally, from 2015 to 2021, an estimated 3.1 million people were killed in intentional homicides, dwarfing the estimated 700,000 lost in armed conflicts during the same period. And though roughly four out of five homicide victims are men, homicidal violence has terrifying implications for women, who die by homicide for predominantly gender-based reasons. In fragile contexts, where weak legal, judicial, and policing frameworks undermine the basis for human security, women are especially at risk. In 2020, for instance, 281 million women and girls in fragile contexts had no legal protections against domestic violence, and 315 million had no legal protections against gender-based discrimination in employment.

These trends impact humanitarian, development, and peace (HDP) initiatives in fragile contexts for many reasons, four of which are highlighted here:

**First, an absent or weak security sector impedes humanitarian assistance and limits the value of investments in infrastructure.** Attacks on healthcare facilities have been a notable feature of many recent conflicts and offer a useful illustration of this point, as these attacks have clear implications for humanitarian access. In 2023 alone, the Aid Worker Security Database documented 280 fatalities among humanitarian workers, more than any previous year on record; and 91 per cent of these (248 incidents) occurred in fragile contexts. Meanwhile, survey data collected in 2020 from conflict-affected Afghanistan, Central African Republic, and northeast Nigeria showed that many civilians in these contexts were unable to access humanitarian aid.

**Second, conflict curtails the impact and infrastructure of development.** It is common for development capacity to be targeted directly during conflict; but attacks on sites considered to have strategic military value (including airports, seaports, desalination facilities, and more) also reduce the capacity of the State and the population to cope, eroding development gains. This deters investment and compounds economic and societal risks. In fragile contexts, violence also shrinks the space for implementing development projects, as development agencies contend with ever growing security threats.

**Third, the political economy associated with conflict and violence distorts the environment into which sustainable peace and inclusive development must be implemented and institutionalized.** The economic and security sectors of fragile States are vulnerable to all forms of violence, which can easily undermine their integrity, particularly when coupled with limited State capacity. This erodes the basis for peace and development and can present in a variety of ways. For instance, if citizens do not feel protected by the State, they may seek the protection of non-State actors, from militias to private security companies. In rural Somalia, this was the case for some women, who found that Al-Shabaab's rule offered them a "degree of predictability and opportunities for justice that are often absent in areas administered by the federal government", including roles in facilitating taxation, extortion, money laundering and smuggling. Or, security sector actors who are poorly paid or go without pay for protracted periods may seek

to leverage their position to secure alternative streams of income. This is sometimes where official State actors come together with non-State and criminal organizations in relationships of convenience. And when the economy is poor and jobs are lacking, individuals who have engaged in political violence amidst wars or domestic instability are more likely to be involved in organized crime during peacetime, including racketeering and illicit trafficking. Political transitions, even towards democracy, can provoke more violence, as competition heightens over who sits at the table, who gets what, and who controls access to funding, in new political settlements.

**Fourth, the economic impact of conflict and violence is global.** In 2017, OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members spent US\$5.1 trillion on measures to contain worldwide violence – from investments in internal security to national defence expenditures to peacekeeping and peacebuilding – constituting 86 per cent of the economic impact of violence on these countries. At the same time, two-thirds of the economic impact of violence in fragile contexts was due to direct or interpersonal violence (see Figure 2, below). These figures underscore that the costs of violence are interconnected and increasingly global, and that DAC members have shouldered a disproportionate share of the expense of containing it. Funding solutions in fragile contexts must meaningfully support sustainable peace, to reduce this global burden and its drag on development.


That said, DAC members and non-DAC members alike have a stake in preventing violence and conflict in fragile contexts, meaning that it is in all their interests to support an international architecture for prevention, including through effective SSR/G and SSA.

## Mitigating the dissonance between SSR/G and SSA

The motivations for funding SSR/G and SSA vary greatly according to the political-security priorities of donors and partners. Often, train-and-equip tasks associated with SSA are seen as tactical enablers intended to achieve a military-political effect.<sup>40</sup> In certain contexts, this is a legitimate and practical means of enabling local security actors to address issues like terrorism, insurgency, or border incursions. However, in the absence of effective SSG or SSR, unintended consequences can arise from SSA when increased military capacity is not balanced by enhanced governance.<sup>41</sup> For example, a study carried out in Mali in 2020 found that the absence of a locally-defined strategic framework, along with weak security governance, meant that SSA was largely “supply-driven and therefore foreign-owned,” contributing to financial, sustainability, and operational challenges.<sup>42</sup>

Enhancing the funding and operational alignment of SSA and SSR/G in fragile and conflict-affected contexts can

**Figure 2. Economic impact of violence by type, in fragile contexts and DAC member States, 2017<sup>39</sup>**



Source: Mohib Iqbal, Harrison Bardwell, and David Hammond, “Estimating the Global Economic Cost of Violence: Methodology Improvements and Estimate Updates,” *Defence and Peace Economics*, Vol. 32, no. 4 (2019) pp. 403–426.

serve to mitigate the risk of unintended outcomes in the security-development space. And even where this is not possible – such as where regimes in power refuse to engage with SSR/G – the principles of SSR/G can still be applied to bring awareness to the medium- and long-term impacts of SSA.<sup>43</sup> This, on its own, should serve to mitigate at least some of the risk associated with delivering assistance. Annually, direct military assistance through SSA runs into the billions of US dollars.<sup>44</sup> Hence, it can have a significant bearing on short- to medium-term political and security dynamics, as has been the case with the funding and delivery of SSA in tandem with “stabilization” missions (see Box 2, below).

While it is difficult to establish an overall figure for non-ODA expenditures in fragile contexts, data from individual States demonstrates the scale of commitment. According to research by the Security Assistance Monitor, for instance, in 2021, the United States spent some US\$20 billion on SSA. And based on estimates from the US Treasury, in 2018, US security assistance to Afghanistan amounted to 5 times the level of ODA it received that year. Given this, as well as the overlapping importance of SSR/G, SSA, and development cooperation in fragile and conflict-affected States, there is a strong value-for-money argument for addressing strategic, programmatic, and funding alignment across the security-development nexus, for better outcomes.<sup>45</sup>

## Building the case for better alignment between SSR/G and SSA

**When SSA is poorly conceived, aligned, or delivered, it can undermine and compromise SSR/G.** There are different funding and operational dynamics at play depending on whether SSA is delivered as a part of peacebuilding, peacekeeping, or stabilization activities, but frequently, SSA is not sufficiently informed by a long-term vision of how the security sector should function within an enduring political settlement. In regions like the Sahel, or in Afghanistan – where stabilization missions and substantial funding frequently go hand-in-hand with counterinsurgency (COIN) operations – the focus of SSA tends towards more immediate military-political objectives, intended to bring conflict to an end. Yet, the funding and delivery of these activities has largely neglected or avoided the matter of governance of the security sector, raising questions about the legitimacy and durability of newly operationalized local forces.<sup>46</sup> This has been

exemplified by the collapse of the security sector in Afghanistan with the end of the international military assistance mission.<sup>47</sup>

To tackle these inconsistencies and oversights, the political sensitivities that shape and influence governance in fragile and conflict-affected contexts must be understood and addressed; and the design and delivery of security and development activities must take into account external and internal political dynamics, histories, and aspirations.<sup>48</sup> The return of Taliban governance in Afghanistan has been a cautionary tale, and it is critically important that lessons from that context are identified and integrated into SSA for its future application in other contexts (see Box 2, below). A recent meta-analysis of the effectiveness of aid to Afghanistan found that interventions associated with security and justice had been less effective than development activities over a 20-year period, and stabilization projects had been “mostly ineffective.”<sup>49</sup> To build knowledge among donors and partners alike, expertise on SSR/G must be better integrated.<sup>50</sup> In fact, this is essential to addressing the relationship between SSA and SSR/G,<sup>51</sup> and between both of these areas and development, and therefore to creating new “global norms for effective security sector assistance.”<sup>52</sup>

### Box 2. Learning from funding pathways in Afghanistan, 2002–2019

Afghanistan has relied heavily on foreign assistance. In 2018, aid grants financed close to 80 per cent of the country’s national budget, especially in critical sectors such as health and education; and in 2019, the ODA Afghanistan received (US\$3.4 billion) amounted to almost 150 times the total of foreign direct investments (US\$23.4 million) and 4 times remittances (US\$845 million). This underscores the significance of ODA to the Afghan economy, relative to other financial streams.

When it comes to the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus, donors have prioritized the funding of development and peace activities over humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan, for example allotting 54 and 36 per cent of total spending in 2019 to development and peace, respectively, and only 10 per cent to humanitarian assistance. These priorities have been replicated

in the distribution of ODA (see Figure 3, below).<sup>53</sup> What this reflects is a dependency – developed over decades and recognized as early as 2005 in an analysis by the Afghan Ministry of Finance – on donor funding for the Afghan security sector, the cost of which overwhelmingly exceeds domestic revenues.<sup>54</sup>

Thus, with the end of international military assistance to Afghanistan, it is important to evaluate the effectiveness of stabilization operations there, and to question why some lessons identified did not become lessons learned. For instance, why did initiatives like NATO's Development Directorate – a component part of its counterinsurgency plan for Afghanistan – incorporate very limited input from development actors?<sup>55</sup> And why was there such an imbalance in funding for SSA and SSR/G? An estimated US\$87 billion in funding was allocated to SSA (e.g. training and equipping police and military forces) through 2019,<sup>56</sup> whereas a relatively meagre \$6.2 billion in funding had flowed to the UNDP Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), which addressed SSR objectives, through 2020.<sup>57</sup> Moreover, most of the funding that went to LOTFA supported its primary purpose of paying the salaries of the Afghan National Army, even though it started to expand its operations in 2015 to increase its support for core institutional development.

In 2017, an independent review prompted the adoption of a new, pooled-fund model intended to facilitate support for the entire Afghan justice chain (police, courts, and corrections) and thereby all security and justice institutions, with a focus on anti-corruption. The same review determined that: insufficient resources had historically been allocated to reform; LOTFA's ability to exert influence beyond the central ministry and police command was "extremely limited"; and "the lack of focus on police reform was very much a legacy of the largely militarized response to Afghanistan's security challenges with counterinsurgency continually trumping community-focussed policing."<sup>58</sup>


These dynamics are not unique to Afghanistan, however, and the prioritization of stabilization initiatives over other interventions and support

leaves local actors in contexts across the globe with very valid questions regarding the substance of their input, the quality of international approaches to coordination and governance, and the extent to which external actors can be held accountable for their actions.<sup>59</sup> In fact, considerable evidence has long pointed not only to the operational and strategic flaws associated with implementing stabilization but also to the strategic dissonance between conceptualizations of security and development, in Afghanistan and in other contexts (like Iraq).<sup>60</sup> Evaluations of the effectiveness of SSA, and of stabilization more broadly, are incomplete if they fail to examine why political and institutional leadership did not act on this evidence, increasingly available over the course of twenty years.

Importantly, **SSA can enable and build momentum for SSR/G.** For example, despite some of the difficulties associated with the train-and-equip support associated with SSA, this is often an essential component in fulfilling the objectives of SSR/G. By carefully synchronizing SSA and SSR/G processes, some of the risk of standalone SSA can be offset, as the capabilities gained through this assistance are not allowed to compound unaddressed problems in security governance structures. When harnessed to SSR/G, the visibility of train-and-equip initiatives can actually build momentum for reform, foster trust among civilians that domestic leaders and institutions will deliver on that reform and strengthen the belief of security actors in their own ability to provide services in new and more effective ways.

**Though many SSA activities are not ODA-eligible peace and security expenditures, they clearly contribute to and influence development objectives.** The funding for SSA is typically more substantial than that for SSR, and ODA funding to SSR/G can have a sustained multiplier effect when the larger sums of SSA are aligned with SSR; such as by linking train-and-equip activities to sustainable governance and oversight structures. In contexts where almost all the major donors to SSA are members of the OECD DAC, there is an especially strong argument for an alignment of principles, even for interventions that lie beyond ODA classification. This would be consistent with the principles behind the OECD DAC Recommendation on the HDP Nexus and its emphasis on whole-of-government

**Figure 3. ODA across the HDP nexus in Afghanistan, 2002–2019**



Source: OECD States of Fragility platform

approaches and stakeholder engagement in and for fragile and conflict-affected contexts.<sup>61</sup>

**SSA has political and security utility on its own and can be delivered without SSR/G, but this often brings longer-term implications and challenges.** As commitments to SSR/G have grown and relevant activities have become more diversified, “hardware” versus “software” gaps identified by Keane and Ommundsen in 2015 remain, due in part to the separation of SSA’s train, equip, and build functions from the governance and accountability associated with SSR/G.<sup>62</sup> This suggests that isolating these processes limits their impact in the long term, particularly where SSA is delivered under weak or misaligned governance structures. Indeed, a growing body of evidence from the Sahel, Afghanistan, Somalia, and elsewhere indicates that SSA is failing to achieve desired outcomes in the absence of SSR/G.<sup>63</sup> While it should be noted that in some cases, the decision to prioritize short-term security (i.e. stabilization and counterinsurgency) over SSR/G and development has been a local one (as in the Sahel);<sup>64</sup> in many contexts, SSR/G has been vulnerable to failure when early expectations are not matched by financial and political resources.

**Enhancing the effectiveness of SSA will therefore require informed political decision-making to guide its design and implementation, with a view beyond short-term narratives and agendas.** In keeping with SDG 16 and the conflict sensitivity that underpins the *do no harm* concept, there is a strong argument for aligning SSA and SSR/G where possible. And where approaches to peacekeeping in fragile contexts are fragmented (such as in the Central African Republic), it is important that SSA delivered to one actor does not compromise the SSR/G objectives of another. By enhancing monitoring and oversight of SSA among donors and partners, any friction between SSA and SSR/G can be minimized.

To that end, **funding mechanisms must adjust to meet the requirements presented by fragile and conflict-affected contexts.** This means adapting to the activities associated with stabilization, peacekeeping, peace transitions, and conflict prevention, and working to ensure that SSA is focused on sustainable strategic objectives that do no harm rather than on tactical expediency. It also means increasing long-term support to SSR/G, which is rare despite the knowledge that predictable funding for the reform of security institutions is a fundamental precursor and enabler of sustainable development in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.<sup>65</sup> There are a number

of reasons for this: the diversity and fragmentation of funding approaches by donors; a failure to address the intersections between security and development; insufficient State capacity to manage funding; and detachment from (particularly by political elites), or disagreement and confusion over, SSR/G and SSA processes. Stakeholders may be able to address anomalies and work towards more integrated approaches if policy and results-based financing, as well as assessments by international financial institutions (IFIs), are directed at informing, incentivizing, and regulating SSA and SSR/G assistance.<sup>66</sup> Supporting the tracking and evaluation of expenditures on SSA can also help to mitigate the risk of inflated defence budgets alongside weak governance and public financial management of the security sector, which can undermine both the goals of SSA and the integrity of SSR/G.<sup>67</sup> As Bisca has noted, development banks and IFIs can provide the technical know-how to assess defence and security expenditures with public finance tools, to help align reform objectives with the realities of budgetary constraints.<sup>68</sup>

## The challenge of shallow ownership

It is broadly accepted that the best way to achieve effective and inclusive peace, security, and development is by promoting local ownership of these processes. Yet, the *quality* of local ownership can vary significantly and has proven difficult to assess in practice. Often, external actors that support SSR/G and SSA find it challenging to identify national stakeholders, and local participation can be inconsistent. On top of this, the activities associated with these processes can themselves become a source of tension, as external and local actors compete to address the needs and political aspirations of stakeholder communities.<sup>69</sup>

Understanding the motives of external actors can thus be an important consideration in the design and delivery of successful SSR/G and SSA. Analysis has shown that crucial local input and knowledge are often absent at the planning and design stages, resulting in what Collins and Thiessen have described as “shallow ownership” – wherein local actors are encouraged to “buy into externally designed reform strategies” over more inclusive, self-determined approaches.<sup>70</sup> Similarly, when activities intended to implement reform and assistance strategies

are funded and organized by donor agencies parallel to State institutions, this feeds local concerns about what drives domestic political will (see Box 3, below).

### Box 3. Domestic capacity and security sector support in the Central African Republic

In many fragile contexts, the domestic security sector simply lacks the capacity to uphold the rule of law and ensure national sovereignty. The Central African Republic (CAR), for example, allocates less than 1 per cent of its total security budget to domestic military expenditures,<sup>71</sup> and was also among the worst performers when it came to armed security officer and police officer indicators in the OECD Fragility Framework in 2022. This environment is such that local views on incentives for reform have evolved in a range of ways, including by adapting to contrasting or competing visions of donor engagement.

The CAR government receives capacity-building support that is integrated into the MINUSCA mandate (2019), and the EU has also deployed a dedicated capacity-building operation in the country – the Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM RCA). In both cases, the aim is to strengthen domestic security capacity to facilitate an eventual transfer of responsibilities from international security actors to the domestic sector. But the CAR also receives security assistance from the Russian-based Wagner Group, which provides instructors to CAR military and police forces; and the political motivations behind this support stand in contrast to the efforts of the UN and EU, adding significant complexity to an already volatile situation.<sup>72</sup>

Political will is imperative in sustaining any commitment to and momentum for reform. In fact, a study of parliamentary oversight of security sectors in West Africa identified political will as the single most important condition for ensuring that legislatures perform their civilian oversight function effectively.<sup>73</sup> The challenge vis-à-vis SSR/G and SSA is that political will, and thus political decision-making, is determined by a broad range of factors,

including: group motivations (i.e. of political and security elites), the comparative attractiveness of incentives, the salience of proposed reforms to the interests of political actors, the relative balance of power among stakeholders, and cultural and identity aspects of the political landscape.<sup>74</sup> Hence, the implementation of SSR/G processes is influenced by the short- and long-term calculations of national political and institutional leaders, in intended and unintended ways.

In some contexts, security sectors and other State institutions have struggled to move beyond paradigms that privilege elites. For instance, in Ghana, environmental concerns related to illegal mining led to a militarized response by the government, which established an ongoing joint military-police operation known as Operation Vanguard in 2017, to combat the practice.<sup>75</sup> This has raised questions about “the boundaries of military involvement in domestic security,” and a “militarisation of security in the country.”<sup>76</sup> There are other contexts, however, in which political will has aligned more closely to public sentiment, or where the choice to become a Troop Contributing Country (TCC) to other UN peacekeeping operations has provided “a powerful incentive, and funds, to maintain skills and equipment.”<sup>77</sup>

Developing, maintaining, and reinforcing political dialogue among donors, partners, and other national stakeholders is essential to the success of SSR processes.<sup>78</sup> Yet, due in part to the scale, complexity, and sensitivity of the challenges associated with fostering and sustaining political support for reform, there has been a tendency to prioritize its technical aspects at the expense of engagement with political stakeholders.<sup>79</sup> Implementation of Security Council resolution 2553 (2020) – which emphasizes SSR as a key element of political processes in States recovering from conflict – can serve as a starting point for the adoption of better approaches to cultivating political will for SSR/G in fragile contexts.

## Addressing data gaps and sensitivities

The politically sensitive nature of many security sector activities has led to the reasonable norm that national security institutions protect the details of their financial and operational decision-making through layers of classification. This can make it difficult to gain a clear view of the financial flows into and out of security sectors, leaving policymakers with the challenge of piecing together any information that is available to inform their decision-making across the security-development nexus. For donors (and in many cases, partners), this presents a series of potential problems, related to financial transparency, the effectiveness and efficiency of systems, and the quality of oversight. One way to identify existing knowledge gaps is to develop an understanding of the true footprint of a security sector across both government and the socioeconomic spectrum.

In 2019, a pilot study “on the treatment of peace and security expenditures” in the OECD’s Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD) framework demonstrated that security and development dichotomies can be addressed without compromising core principles, through dedicated investments in the collection, management, and analysis of data.<sup>80</sup> The framework “aims to provide a comprehensive picture of external official support for sustainable development flows mobilised through official interventions, thereby facilitating a common international reporting standard for all providers of development co-operation, including emerging economies.”<sup>81</sup> Linking this to a global architecture that facilitates regular dialogue and exchange, and better aligned funding for security and justice initiatives, would help build confidence and trust among donors and partners.<sup>82</sup>

## 2. Focus on Funding

### Better security-development connections mean better funding solutions

The interdependency of security and development activities across the HDP nexus is acknowledged in many development policies. Even so, this has been a challenge to translate coherently into programmatic design, as there is still much to learn about how to facilitate effective economic reform and mobilize financing in fragile contexts in a way that is conflict-sensitive, supports peace and resilience, and takes into account the many constraints to governance, capacity, and physical and human capital.<sup>83</sup> It is therefore promising that a meta-analysis of OECD Peer Reviews found the development policies of all DAC members align to some extent with the Recommendation on the HDP Nexus, especially in terms of their internal coherence between humanitarian, development, and peace interventions.


These policies have had a clear impact on funding strategies. Sweden, Denmark, and the UK have demonstrated a readiness to make funding mechanisms more adaptable

and predictable through their use of resilience funds, flexible mid-year allocations, and long-term framework agreements. Canada provides quick and flexible funding to conflict prevention, dialogue, stabilization, and peacebuilding by way of its Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOP). And through its Minka Fund, France deploys conflict prevention and peacebuilding assistance to crisis areas, working with local governance institutions and the private sector on interventions related to early economic recovery and job creation.<sup>84</sup> To forge the kind of dialogue that is necessary to sustain and embed SSR/G alongside and in concert with national development priorities, security sectors in transition must demonstrate the impact and value of these investments even to stakeholders focused on other dimensions of fragility.

### Analysing official development assistance (ODA) to the security sector<sup>85</sup>


Despite the proven importance of the security sector to sustainable development and peace, members of the OECD DAC have dedicated only a small share of their

**Figure 4. ODA allocated to SSR/G in fragile contexts by DAC members, 2012–2022**



Source: OECD (2023), OECD Data Explorer, Creditor Reporting System (flows) database, accessed 28 March 2023

**Figure 5. ODA allocated to SSR/G in extremely fragile, other fragile, and other developing contexts by DAC members, 2012–2022**




Source: OECD (2023), OECD Data Explorer, Creditor Reporting System (flows) database, accessed 28 March 2023

bilateral official development assistance (ODA) towards strengthening the security sector in fragile contexts – where funding for SSR/G has trended downward since 2015 (see Figure 4, below). In 2022, DAC members allocated US\$152 million in ODA to SSR/G in fragile contexts.<sup>86</sup> For these countries, this amounted to just 3.1 per cent of ODA directed at peace, which constituted only 0.3 per cent of their total ODA, the lowest share since 2007.

In extremely fragile contexts, ODA for SSR/G peaked in 2019, when it was funded at a significantly higher rate than similar ODA delivered to other fragile and developing contexts (see Figure 5, below).<sup>87</sup> However, as of 2020, the pattern of aid allocations for SSR/G by DAC members shifted, with ODA to other developing contexts doubling. As a consequence, extremely fragile contexts are now receiving less than half the ODA delivered to other developing contexts.

**Figure 6. Proportion of ODA for SSR in fragile contexts, by donor group, 2022**



Source: OECD (2023), OECD Data Explorer, Creditor Reporting System (flows) database, accessed 28 March 2023

The bilateral assistance of DAC members accounts for the lion's share of ODA directed towards SSR/G in fragile contexts (see Figure 6, below). Multilateral donors (excluding the EU) have steadily increased their funding of this objective but remain a relatively small channel for this kind of ODA, allocating US\$14.4 million for SSR/G in fragile contexts in 2022 (8 per cent of all such funding); similarly, non-DAC donors allocated US\$18.2 million for this purpose in 2022 (10 per cent of funding). That said, there were two multilateral actors within the top ten official donors for SSR/G in fragile contexts in 2022: the Inter-American Development Bank and the UN Peacebuilding Fund, which together, accounted for 6 per cent of all funding allocated by official donors that year.

It is worth looking at just one of the OECD purpose codes for ODA, the category of Conflict, Peace and Security (code 152). This is where primary peacebuilding activities are tracked, some of which influence the functioning and governance of the security sector or have clear implications for SSR/G. The data shows US\$1.5 billion in allocations by DAC members to this purpose in 2022, totalling only 3.2 per cent of the total ODA delivered by these countries in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

Perhaps this low rate reflects a lack of prioritization of this issue by donors, or the limited scope of peace and security expenditures that are eligible for classification as ODA. Or perhaps, the Conflict, Peace and Security purpose code does not, on its own, reflect the true extent of activities that impact SSR/G (see Box 4, below). If a wider selection of codes is used, broadening the analytical framework, the picture is more nuanced.<sup>88</sup> For this reason, an additional thirteen purpose codes assigned to security-related activities associated with SSR/G and SSA were analysed for this paper to assess real spending on these processes in fragile and conflict-affected contexts (see Annex A). These codes capture activities related to justice (legal and judicial development), human rights, and violence against women and girls, among others, all of which have clear implications for SSR/G and highlight the importance of the complementarity of financing across the security-development nexus. This broader analysis discovered that funding for SSR/G and SSA in fragile contexts totalled US\$5.3 billion in 2022, of which DAC members provided US\$3.1 billion, or approximately 6.6 per cent of their total ODA.

#### Box 4. The categorization of funding to security sector activities


The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) serves as a forum to discuss issues surrounding aid, development, and poverty reduction in developing countries, and brings together the world's major donor countries. ODA spending by DAC members on SSR/G is categorized by the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) under purpose code 15210 (Security systems management and reform), within the larger purpose code set of Conflict, Peace and Security.<sup>89</sup> Though SSA activities can be aligned with SSR/G processes, SSA is not eligible for ODA, and it is extremely difficult to obtain data on global SSA funding. Still, as the Afghanistan example demonstrates (see Box 2, above), data from individual countries can offer valuable insight. Hence, it is important to acknowledge that funding directed to many other areas of development can be critical to SSR/G.

For instance, reforms to the judiciary, to pensions, or to prisons are not categorized as Conflict, Peace and Security spending by the OECD CRS, but can all be instrumental to SSR, depending on the context. The point here is not to discuss the logic and merits of ODA classification,<sup>90</sup> but to recognize that ODA delivered for activities that do not fall under purpose code 15210, or even under the Conflict, Peace and Security umbrella, can still have a significant influence on the functioning of SSR/G in a given context. Progress on peace and development can be hindered or compromised by failures to acknowledge and consider these connections.

#### Funding pathways for security-related activities

**ODA for security-related activities has long been associated with three donors – the United States, Germany, and EU institutions.** In 2012, they accounted for 58 per cent of the ODA disbursed for these activities globally, with the United States underwriting nearly 40 per cent of this by itself. Ten years later, these three remained the largest donors in this category, though the distribution of their

Figure 7. Top 10 donors of ODA to security-related activities globally, 2022




Source: OECD (2023), OECD Data Explorer, Creditor Reporting System (flows) database, accessed 28 March 2023

funding had shifted (see Figure 7, below). In 2022, EU institutions accounted for 16.3 per cent (US\$1.9 billion) of funding for security-related activities, with Germany contributing 13.2 per cent (US\$1.54 billion) and the United States contributing 12.3 per cent (US\$1.43 billion).

While Figure 7 shows total volume of funding, another way to assess the extent to which DAC members prioritize support to SSR/G is by identifying which States

allocate the largest *proportion* of their ODA to activities categorized under purpose code 15210 (Security systems management and reform). In 2022, Lithuania led this list (at 42 per cent), followed by Portugal (34 per cent), Greece (27 per cent), and Slovenia (13 per cent). It is also useful to track the total number of donors providing development assistance towards security-related activities. This number has fluctuated somewhat in recent years but has trended steadily upward, rising from 59 in 2015 to

Figure 8. Number of donors funding security-related activities, 2015–2022



Source: OECD (2023), OECD Data Explorer, Creditor Reporting System (flows) database, accessed 28 March 2023

76 in 2022 (see Figure 8, below), indicating a persistence from donors that suggests there are more opportunities yet for sustainable funding for SSR/G.

Many donors contribute only small amounts of funding, but as the number of official providers of ODA to peace and security progressively grows and the marketplace becomes more crowded, more pathways to sustainable funding for peacebuilding will emerge. The need to ensure the quality of this increasingly diversified funding reinforces how important it is that donors pursue coherent and complementary means of delivering it, according to the comparative advantages of each donor and the needs of partner countries as articulated in their national development and SSR/G strategies. This approach should target broader, cohesive policy change instead of relying on small impact projects to meet fragmented goals.


**Historically, public sector institutions and multilateral organizations have been the main channels through which ODA is directed towards security-related activities in fragile contexts (see Figure 9, below), with over two-thirds of all ODA delivered through these channels in 2022.** And, while most of the security-related ODA that flows into fragile contexts through multilateral organizations continues to be delivered by UN entities,

IFIs provided some US\$20 million in security-related assistance alone to fragile contexts in 2022.<sup>91</sup> More than three-quarters (77 per cent) of this assistance was focused on public financial management, but the remainder was aimed at objectives that included strengthening human rights (13 per cent of funding) and ending gendered violence (5 per cent of funding). These are objectives with clear links to the security sector, underlining the potential for IFIs to contribute their expertise to peace and security. Innovations such as the use of Public Expenditure Reviews (PERs) for the security and justice sectors in countries such as Liberia and Somalia, or ideas about how to “rightsize” security sectors with a greater emphasis on sound fiscal management and cross-government coherence, have prompted fresh thinking on sustainable SSR processes, especially among IFIs.

### SSA funding and data blind spots

To gain a full appreciation of the security-development funding landscape in any context, it is necessary to know, as much as possible, what financial flows fall outside the ODA envelope, including those directed to non-State actors, and what this means for partner States in the midst of SSR/G processes. As was noted earlier, for

**Figure 9. Channels for security-related ODA from official donors to fragile contexts, 2012–2022**



Source: OECD (2023), OECD Data Explorer, Creditor Reporting System (flows) database, accessed 28 March 2023

example, direct military assistance delivered as a component of SSA runs into several billions of US dollars and can have a significant bearing on short to medium-term political and security dynamics. At the same time, the international and local management of SSA funding can strongly shape the political economy of fragile and conflict-affected contexts.<sup>92</sup> Often, this is reflected in complex institutional arrangements (with donor countries) that separate development, foreign, and security functions, creating an artificial competition between national security, foreign policy, and development considerations. In this way, the dynamics created by SSA for State and non-State actors in partner countries can complicate the scope of SSR/G and attempts to manage funding solutions, as the political intentions of donors and partners may be fixed on shorter-term objectives.<sup>93</sup>

## National development plans and security sector strategies

Security sector priorities figure prominently in the national development plans of fragile and conflict-affected States. Of the 15 extremely fragile contexts identified by the OECD's fragility framework in 2022, all except Afghanistan have national development or development recovery plans that include references to peace, justice, and security; 4 countries (Central African Republic, Haiti, Iraq and Somalia) have concurrent SSR/G processes while Chad, Yemen, DRC and Burundi reference security sector reform objectives. However, when the funding demands of national development plans and security sector reform strategies do not match donor priorities, SSR/G can end up being sidelined, undermining a key pillar for sustainable peace and development.

In fact, an analysis of extremely fragile contexts and other fragile contexts found that gaps between national development plans or security sector reform strategies and the priorities of donors can mean certain SSR/G activities fall through the cracks in terms of funding. On the part of donors, this may be due to narrow interpretations of mandates supporting peace and security activities, constraints set regarding the purpose of SSA, or an unwillingness to support SSR/G. But in any case, this selectivity feeds into the common complaint by States attempting to implement SSR/G programming, that funding is unpredictable.

The Gambia and Niger are both illustrative, as fragile States that have placed SSR/G at the centre of their national development plans but have had different levels of success in implementing reform. In The Gambia, SSR has struggled to gain momentum due to delays in drafting separate national security and SSR strategies. Political tensions have further complicated efforts to rightsize the armed forces and reform the financial management of the security sector. In contrast, Niger has taken a more integrated approach by intentionally aligning security governance with development policies to promote peace and stability. This convergence of "security (external and internal) and development policies" aims to prevent multidimensional crises that could undermine national economic and social development."<sup>94</sup> This highlights the benefit of emphasizing human security alongside security sector reform.

## Supporting financial management in SSR/G

Financial management is essential to building the donor confidence required for the provision of sustained funding that underlies effective SSR/G. Yet, reform strategies frequently fail to give sufficient consideration to public finance issues.<sup>95</sup> Debates among donors and partners on this topic, particularly related to the concept of rightsizing security institutions through reform strategies, have highlighted the potential role of IFIs (and others) in providing budgetary support and capacity to SSR/G processes. For instance, the application of Public Financial Management (PFM) approaches can help build transparency and awareness across government (particularly between finance, security, and justice ministries), bridge gaps between sustainable budgets and operational realities, and embed institutional and political accountability in State institutions.<sup>96</sup> This is important in situations where political and institutional leaders are detached from donor-driven reform processes because it can create the space for these leaders to take a more accountable role in financial decision-making vis-à-vis the security sector. Moreover, depending on the political sensitivities at play, developing financial governance frameworks can address institutional and procedural deficits in funding for security sector activities. Supporting these initiatives creates opportunities for the economic and technical expertise of IFIs to influence financial management practices in the security sector.<sup>97</sup>

## Integrating the comparative advantage of IFIs

Through initiatives of the UN and IFIs, questions of funding and sustainable financial management for SSR/G and SSA have increasingly come to the fore, but more needs to be done to ensure these processes are financially informed. This means exploring the links between fragility, fiscal policy, and conflict; and also building on evidence suggesting that countercyclical fiscal policies in response to economic shocks can lower the risk of armed conflict, by helping populations deal with those shocks and reducing acute competition for resources.<sup>98</sup>

Effective financial management is also a critical part of SSR/G and SSA in times of transition, such as during the withdrawal of peacekeepers, because sustained progress in fragile contexts requires a collective effort to prevent instability rather than simply respond to crises when they are out of control. Formulating and prioritizing practical approaches to raising and managing public money in a way that helps strengthen the social contract and generate revenue could form a key pillar of a conflict prevention strategy that blends development priorities with SSR/G and SSA objectives. A proposal of the African Development Bank (AfDB) for security-indexed investment bonds (see Box 5, below) is just one example of how IFIs have begun exploring innovative ways of paying for security, which may enhance the potential for local accountability, leadership, and ownership.

Successive World Development Reports have correlated a lack of attention on conflict prevention to factors such as the impact of fragility, conflict, and violence on aid (i.e. volatility and uneven distribution), and have recommended support for credible governance structures and examinations of power sharing and resource distribution to reduce exclusion and mitigate incentives to violence.<sup>100</sup> The importance of aligning security and development objectives was thus established as a norm by the UN and the World Bank in 2017, in the *Pathways for Peace* report.<sup>101</sup> Since then, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) have further developed this emphasis on security and justice in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.<sup>102</sup> The AfDB and IMF have also adopted fragility strategies to orient their alignment with global agendas such as the SDGs and regional agendas such as the African Union's Agenda 2063, as well as with the objectives of partners concerning justice and security reform or the fiscal impact of security provision.

### Box 5. International Financial Institutions (IFIs) as security sector innovators

In 2021, addressing the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, and prompted by the collapse of development projects in Mozambique due to deteriorating security, President of the African Development Bank Akinwumi A. Adesina called for a stronger linkage between security and investment, growth, and development.<sup>99</sup> Adesina outlined a proposal for the development of security-indexed investment bonds that take advantage of low, long-term interest rates, allowing African States to leverage resources on the global capital markets to reinforce their security sectors. He suggested that revenue streams from these bonds could be used to:

- strengthen the security architecture of African countries and support dual-purpose infrastructure to enhance national and regional peacekeeping and security capacities.
- rebuild destroyed or damaged infrastructure in conflict-affected areas and finance new investment projects to relaunch economic activities and create jobs in areas prone to security challenges; and
- build social infrastructure, especially for water, sanitation, schools, healthcare, roads, ICT, and agriculture, to improve access to basic services and support community livelihoods in fragile contexts.

The value and potential that IFIs can bring to fragile and conflict-affected contexts aspiring to build sustainable security sectors has been evident in the application of frameworks like PFM and tools like PERs.<sup>103</sup> It is important that these are embedded and developed further across the security-development nexus. Initiatives such as the UN-World Bank Humanitarian – Development – Peacebuilding and Partnership Facility (HDPP) offer a platform for more inclusive and more nuanced dialogue on the comparative advantages of IFIs, based on impacts and outcomes.

## Building predictability for and with partner States

In contexts where external support is essential to internal security and development, the predictability of funding is as important as its management; and external actors continue to represent the main security actors in some fragile (especially extremely fragile) States, such as in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Mali, and South Sudan, where the security sectors remain highly dependent on international support through peace operations.<sup>104</sup> This question of predictability is where the thinking on aid effectiveness can align with SSR/G and SSA for better outcomes. According to the OECD, aid is considered predictable when partner countries can be confident about the amounts and timing of aid disbursements, within a process that supports transparency and reliability.<sup>105</sup>

In some cases, unpredictable financing for reform can be attributed in part to strategic ambiguity. For example, over two decades, SSR/G in Afghanistan struggled for aid amidst short-term political and security priorities that tended to draw support for SSA, epitomized by the observation of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction that the international approach there had amounted to “20 one-year reconstruction efforts, rather than one 20-year effort.”<sup>106</sup> Afghanistan may have been a testing ground for various security sector activities, but almost always in the absence of any coherent strategy.<sup>107</sup> And, as the country’s 2017 National Peace and Development Framework conceded, its dependency on donors to fund its security sector was an obstacle to sustainable development.<sup>108</sup> Yet, due to political or technical failings, initiatives to strengthen security sector governance (including financial management capacity) have been unable to address these dependencies. The objective laid out by the government in 2017 – to increase domestic revenue collection and improve efficiency by “preventing corruption, misuse of funds and strict spending monitoring mechanisms in the security sector”<sup>109</sup> – has simply been unattainable within the context of wider failures to address governance and institutional capacity issues.<sup>110</sup>

Whether it is the result of ambiguous or competing objectives among partners, inflexible funding cycles, or insufficient administrative or governance capacities among and between partners, **unpredictable support for the security sector leads to three types of problems.** First, it disrupts

**the continuity of activities**, such as peace operations, SSA, and SSR/G, which has economic, employment, and security implications. Second, **it can generate dissonance regarding the objectives of a reform or assistance process**, often with political repercussions. This is because external support conditioned on adherence to donor priorities (including strategic preferences for supporting SSR/G and/or SSA) or to funding cycles that are arbitrarily time-limited can directly impact the level of political will for these processes, and therefore local ownership of them.<sup>111</sup> Third, unpredictable support may increase reliance on external funding over time, as **it can impact the sustainability of a transition to domestic revenue streams.** Indeed, one of the benefits of using PERs in security sectors is that they have demonstrated the critical importance of building financially sustainable sectors and have highlighted the necessity that predictable funding pathways are developed in fragile contexts to support and sustain security sectors, independent of development aid.

Acknowledging the complexity of current policy, funding, and operational modalities, there is a strong case for adapting existing mechanisms to facilitate predictable financing for SSR/G in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. This can help to alleviate issues like expenditure deviations, and the pressure of balancing support to crises and contingency operations with standing security commitments.<sup>112</sup> Where mechanisms such as the Prevention and Resilience Allocation (PRA) instrument of the International Development Association (IDA) are used to fund prevention strategies, ensuring appropriate allocations for related security and non-security programming could help mitigate unintended outcomes arising from gaps in funding priorities. This may require the review or adaptation of existing mandates, as well as better dialogue among security institutions.

The 2021 updated World Bank policy on Development Cooperation and Fragility, Conflict, and Violence highlights the potential for greater complementarity to support the prevention of conflict and violence by strengthening national systems, core State functions, and institutional resilience.<sup>113</sup> The support of the European Union to the African Peace Fund is instructive in this regard, as it has helped underwrite responses to conflicts in Africa while concurrently building the institutional capacities of the African Union to manage peace operations.<sup>114</sup> The “financial weight... long-term perspective and predictability” of the EU in this partnership has complemented the

legitimacy of the African Peace and Security Architecture, supporting its ability to deploy operations quickly and develop channels for dialogue between partners at the political and technical levels.<sup>115</sup> In the future, adherence to the DAC Recommendation on the HDP Nexus could provide a convening framework for the alignment of efforts by diverse actors in similar partnerships.

### **Box 6. The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund and SSR/G**

Between 2020 and 2024, the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) has supported security-related projects in 38 countries, constituting some US\$1.24 billion, or approximately 57.5% of its total expenditures. Of this, approximately 57.5% was allocated to infrastructure, operations support, and equipment; 24.2% to training and internal disciplinary policy; and 6.5% to governance and oversight. As Figure 10 (below) shows, PBF funding has been dispersed to a greater number of projects in recent years, but the proportion of security-related projects receiving support has decreased.

That said, supporting SSR is one of many functions of the PBF – which focuses on providing short-term funding to help guard against risks that might otherwise have a disruptive impact on peacebuilding interventions, including SSR/G activities. The intent of the Fund is to produce catalytic effects across projects and ensure coordination throughout the donor community. To this end, it operates a committee to consider issues related to the HDP nexus, and the 2020–2024 Strategy for the PBF emphasizes reforms meant to improve “UN engagement on the ground by driving more integrated approaches across the peace and security, development, and human rights pillars.”<sup>116</sup> The PBF could potentially be adapted to ensure a greater stream of dedicated funding flows to SSR/G in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, to help sustain and inspire support for reform.


## **Considering the case for a global fund**

Given the evidence, particularly as it relates to stabilization and peacekeeping, a global fund for security and justice could clearly serve as a focal point for more effective and more predictable allocations across the security-development nexus. Following the example of the Global Fund (for HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria), a similar strategy could be proposed to support SSR/G, enabling effective, sustainable, and community-owned programming with a multiplier effect on many levels.<sup>118</sup> Supporting demand-driven rather than supply-driven programming would empower local implementers to apply for funding in alignment with national strategies and budgeting cycles. And, by integrating the principles of good SSR/G, potentially alongside principles for the effectiveness of SSA, national ownership could be strengthened by incentivizing local communities and governments to “define their own objectives, establish their own implementation units, build their own capacity, and be responsible for the results.”<sup>119</sup> Global or vertical funding arrangements can also facilitate the collective management of donor risk, through a greater emphasis on data, results, learning, and innovation.<sup>120</sup>

Access to a global fund for SSR could support the development of more sustainable governance structures as well, particularly in States transitioning from conflict, where the predictability of funding can diminish as donor focus wanes over time.<sup>121</sup> Such a fund could ensure that initial gains were perpetuated by fostering local capacity building, facilitating financing for small projects, and bringing together donors and technical partners to enable and embed SSR processes. Expenditures from the fund allocated to country-level strategies could be synergistic with the existing funding approaches of the US Global Fragility Strategy, the European Peace Facility, the African Union’s Peace Fund, or World Bank investments targeting demobilization and transitional justice support. In some cases, it would make sense for the fund to complement bilateral arrangements, such as Germany’s security and development policy for the Sahel, the Netherlands’ Central Stability Fund, or France’s Minka Fund.<sup>122</sup>

However, in contemplating a global fund for security and justice, there are a range of challenges that must be considered, beyond the technicalities of how this fund might work in practice. For one, the prevailing funding landscape for SSR/G and SSA has evolved for very

**Figure 10. The number of security-related projects supported by the PBF as a proportion of all projects, 2017–2023<sup>117</sup>**



Source: Reports of the Secretary-General on the Peacebuilding Fund for the years 2023, 2021, and 2019 (A/78/779, A/76/687, A/74/688).

specific reasons that reflect diverging and often politically sensitive views on how security sector activities should be financed. Further analysis is required to determine the extent to which these sensitivities can be addressed in the design of a global fund that can operate at scale and has the financial and political capacity to capitalize on an ongoing basis. Recent reviews of the global and vertical funds that have emerged over the past two decades in other sectors have found that performance is strongly correlated to design. Funds with participatory governance structures, more independence, greater beneficiary involvement, and clear performance-based metrics have proven to be the most agile and effective.<sup>123</sup> As a precondition for success, a global fund for SSR/G should also be designed to work within, and not on top of, any country-level strategy, and must be aligned to other priorities across the HDP nexus.

Representatives of donor institutions who were interviewed for this paper raised concerns about the appetite among donors for yet another vertical fund. Some

expressed a preference for adapting existing funding options, for instance by further developing PBF support to SSR/G (see Box 6, above). This could facilitate sustained and catalytic support for reform initiatives in fragile and conflict-affected contexts; which, where possible, should be aligned with non-ODA but security-related activities such as SAA. If convergence on funding is not feasible, enhanced communication and alignment across funding mechanisms, including IFIs, should be an objective, through a networked approach. As a first step, facilitating dialogue across such a network could stimulate more effective support for SSR/G and SSA globally, alleviating some of the fragmentation in the system. In the short term, this kind of principle-based, networked approach to funding for SSR/G and SSA can stand on its own merits while also offering a stepping stone to more ambitious initiatives.

# 3. Next generation security sector support: Establishing dialogue and norms

## Structured dialogue for security and development

Stronger dialogue is necessary to increase awareness of the role and potential of SSR/G and SSA in fragile contexts, mitigate risks, and build on comparative advantages. Reform, governance, and assistance will all be delivered more effectively if analysis and planning between security and development actors is more coordinated, and to realize this, regular structured dialogue between these actors must be facilitated. Given the wide range of issues and actors within the development and peace nexus (see Annex B), this dialogue should be encouraged from multiple entry points, through multilateral and bilateral frameworks. The United Nations and OECD could lead this effort; as effective UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and implementation of the DAC Recommendation on the HDP Nexus, require that security and development actors engage in knowledge sharing and awareness raising.<sup>124</sup>

The continued development of the UN-World Bank partnership in crisis settings has significant potential to add clarity and direction to this effort. Similarly, given the commitment of DAC members to both SSR/G and SSA globally, the convening power of the DAC, supported by its subsidiary the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), could be used to organize security and development expertise and leadership for the exchange of learning, analysis, and objectives.<sup>125</sup> This could also present an opportunity for representatives from contexts receiving SSR/G or SSA support (perhaps through bodies such as the g7+) to share their views on the scope, application, and impact of interventions.

## Building consensus on principles and norms for supporting SSR/G and SSA

The overlaps, gaps, challenges, and opportunities identified in this text make a strong case for a better global architecture for SSR/G and SSA, built on or aligned with principles of aid effectiveness adapted from development financing.<sup>126</sup> While it is important to note that ODA funding classified under the OECD's "Security systems management and reform" purpose code (15210) is subject to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (see Box 7, below), the potential exists to apply complementary measures for SSA and SSR/G more broadly.<sup>127</sup> In fact, the adoption of a Paris Declaration-style framework focused on the complementarity of SSR/G and SSA for conflict prevention and development could provide a stimulus for policies and interventions that "intensify efforts to mobilise domestic resources, strengthen fiscal sustainability and create an enabling environment for public and private investments."<sup>128</sup> In fragile and conflict-affected contexts, SSR/G requires robust and consistent funding in order to unlock the potential of sustainable development through reform of the security sector. Aligning security assistance with existing mechanisms for development would help stabilize fragile States, prevent violence, and increase the value of dollars spent by multilateral and bilateral donors alike.

There would be several advantages to establishing shared principles for SSA and SSR/G. First, aligning approaches to risk, conflict prevention, and resilience, especially in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, would facilitate the integration of a fragility analysis for security-development awareness and would help identify entry points for conflict prevention. Such an alignment could also foster greater understanding and cohesion with the local priorities driving accountability and ownership.<sup>130</sup> Additionally, in contexts affected by insurgencies and terrorism, it could allow for the development of approaches that are informed (not driven) by counterinsurgency thinking.

## Box 7. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness

The Paris Declaration (2005) is a practical, action-oriented roadmap to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development. It provides a series of specific implementation measures, and it establishes a monitoring system to assess progress and ensure that donors and recipients hold each other accountable. The Declaration outlines five fundamental principles for making aid more effective:

- *Ownership*: Developing countries set their own strategies to reduce poverty, improve their institutions, and tackle corruption.
- *Alignment*: Donor countries align behind these objectives and use local systems.
- *Harmonization*: Donor countries coordinate, simplify procedures, and share information to avoid duplication.
- *Results*: Developing countries and donors shift together towards a results-oriented approach, based on reporting and assessment mechanisms.
- *Mutual accountability*: Developing countries and donors are accountable for development results and must take certain steps to implement agreed commitments.<sup>129</sup>

Second, though different funding arrangements for SSR/G and SSA have emerged for very specific reasons, the process of coming together to establish shared principles across different funding networks could enable important strategic dialogue and oversight. There would be practical advantages to such a process as well, including the opportunity for information sharing on funding and the discussion of security-development frameworks for incentivizing local will and effective ownership of SSR/G initiatives. This could also serve as a platform for an exchange of insights on affordability.<sup>131</sup>

Finally, shared principles could facilitate inclusive and multilevel partnerships at the strategic and operational levels. The complementarity reflected in the DAC

Recommendation on the HDP Nexus could be useful in guiding the direction of security-development awareness and cooperation, and encouraging greater transparency and accountability regarding SSR/G funding.<sup>132</sup> Opportunities for complementarity bring multiplier effects, and an international consensus that security assistance should be aligned with existing development mechanisms would harmonize effective action to prevent conflict and violence and build more sustainable security sectors.

## Aligning SSR/G and SSA for effective transitions and conflict prevention

Part of the challenge of effectively delivering SSR/G and SSA is that these processes must be adapted to function within or alongside political frameworks that are informed and influenced by a range of political, social, cultural, and economic incentives.<sup>133</sup> At the time of publication, there are nine UN peace operations and special political missions with a mandate to undertake SSR activities.<sup>134</sup> Others, like UNIFIL, also incorporate assistance and support activities that resemble components of SSR/G and SSA. In contrast to the evidence on stabilization noted earlier, the alignment of peacekeeping with SSR/G and SSA produces more positive outcomes. For example, SSA was found to significantly reduce political violence when conducted in conjunction with peacekeeping operations that featured many components of an SSR-informed approach: “regular, intensive contact between international advisers and the partner nation’s security personnel; a relatively long-term commitment; close oversight of the performance of security forces; and integration of train-and-equip efforts into an overall political strategy.”<sup>135</sup>

In this way, **SSR/G and SSA can be vital to enabling sustainable transitions towards a post-peacekeeping context.** Linking sustainable development and sustainable security reform, “the successful transition and draw-down of peace operations are largely dependent on the ability of the host government to assume responsibility for the provision of security and other public goods while sustaining service delivery in the absence of large-scale international support.”<sup>136</sup> While many challenges remain in transitions from conflict to peace after peacekeeping

missions, there is increasing evidence that the effective application of SSR/G in a way that is mindful of the local political economy can help align funding for security and development initiatives while also opening new avenues for improved cross-government dialogue on the implications of SSR/G for the wider government agenda.<sup>137</sup> There are no easy solutions for States transitioning from conflict, and thereafter from peacekeeping missions, which is why governments and donors often pursue a combination of interventions to address political, operational, and financial necessities.<sup>138</sup> But research conducted by Scott found that, even where significant risks have been identified, the design and delivery of critical infrastructure projects should begin as soon as there is some confidence in ongoing security.<sup>139</sup> The ability to maintain that confidence will increasingly depend on the quality of SSR/G.

Hence, **SSR/G and SSA both hold significant potential as instruments of conflict prevention.**<sup>140</sup> But generally, they have not been aligned to harness the preventative value of investments in justice, rule of law, and SSR as a combined means of addressing perceptions of exclusion and the grievances that lead to violent conflict.<sup>141</sup> In fact, between 2018 and 2022, DAC donors cut their justice-related support in fragile contexts by more than two-thirds, directing less than 1 per cent of their total ODA in these contexts to justice actors, including police; a twenty-year low. These cuts occurred even though rule of law and access to civil and criminal justice declined in most countries in the same period.<sup>142</sup>

A robust evidence base is emerging to suggest that earlier and more integrated approaches to peacebuilding and conflict prevention should be prioritized. The social and economic costs of responding to violent conflict are rising, with global military expenditures reaching a record high US\$24.4 trillion in 2023.<sup>143</sup> DAC members continue to spend significantly on multilateral operations worldwide, including through troop contributions.<sup>144</sup> And the economic cost of violence often amounts to a considerable portion of the GDP in fragile contexts.

The business case for investing in conflict prevention has also been affirmed and reaffirmed over the past decade.<sup>145</sup> There is a clear return on investment when it comes to conflict prevention, as noted in various sources, among them the *Pathways for Peace* report – which estimated a 16:1 yield for every US dollar invested in prevention.<sup>146</sup> More recent estimates suggest an even greater

rate of return, closer to 22:1.<sup>147</sup> And with the growing use of impact evaluations, decision-making about which strategies may be most effective in preventing violence and restoring stability following conflict can be better informed.<sup>148</sup> A review published by the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation identified 195 completed and 47 ongoing impact evaluations of peacebuilding interventions (broadly defined), and found a 150 per cent increase in the use of these evaluations since 2015.<sup>149</sup> Given the high levels of need, it is important and appropriate that donors are directing resources towards crisis response. However, the benefit of investing in prevention is becoming harder to ignore, as it reduces the humanitarian burden and allows savings to be redirected towards sustainable development and peace, as outlined in the DAC Recommendation on the HDP Nexus.<sup>150</sup> For donors, prevention provides value for money and improves impact.<sup>151</sup> Thus, by embracing the potential and scope of the DAC Recommendation, donors may be incentivized to similarly embrace conflict prevention strategies as well as new frameworks or coalitions for prevention that are capable of harnessing the diplomatic and mediation expertise of entities such as the Peace Building Commission, along with the regional and technical expertise of IFIs. Recurring violence can destroy the infrastructure and systems that donors have supported, and development investments are less likely to be sustained in situations of insecurity. A better alignment of SSR/G and SSA, with a focus on effectiveness and complementarity, will strengthen and reinforce connections between conflict prevention activities and the resilience-building priorities of development actors.

## Building on bilateral approaches and strategies

In many cases, bilateral actors have already sought to improve the alignment of their security and development activities. For instance, the United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability (i.e. the Global Fragility Strategy, or GFS) seeks to better align the operations of diplomatic, defence, and development agencies to promote reforms of security and justice sector institutions in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.<sup>152</sup> The importance it places on conflict prevention and addressing violent extremism alongside SSR/G and SSA diversifies the options for engagement in fragile contexts, to include a greater scope of peacekeeping and peacebuilding

approaches.<sup>153</sup> Given the significant funding promised under the Global Fragility Act, the potential for this cooperation across the development-peace nexus is significant and could contribute significantly to better capacity building and institutional reform.

The EU's European Peace Facility (EPF) reflects an ambitious approach to advancing security-related policies and programming. EU engagement in this domain is primarily delivered through three key mechanisms. First, the Partnership Instrument (PI) for cooperation with third countries, designed to promote EU interests abroad while addressing major global challenges. Second, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which includes a range of SSR-related activities, such as the monitoring and implementation of peace and security processes. Finally, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which provides the most visible EU contributions to SSR through initiatives like the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Somalia, aimed at establishing best practices for integrating Security Sector Assistance (SSA) and Security Sector Reform and Governance (SSR/G). The EU also engages through Union Trust Funds, the European Development Fund, the Capacity Building in Support of Security and Development (CBSD) initiative and the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI),<sup>154</sup> and various instruments of the Commission. Through the NDICI and the EPF, the EU is expanding its scope beyond a traditional focus on non-military soft power and adapting itself to the changing political, strategic, and operational demands of an increasingly unpredictable geopolitical environment. The evolution of the Team Europe approach, adapted from the response of Member States to COVID-19, has also provided welcome impetus for improved cooperation across EU institutions.

There are also alternative bilateral approaches to delivering security in fragile contexts, including the use of private military security companies for SSA. Often, these initiatives have very specific and very counterproductive mandates.<sup>155</sup> Examples of reform driven by regional political priorities agreed between States include the Rwanda-Mozambique security forces operations in Cabo Delgado under a Southern African Development Community (SADC) mandate,<sup>156</sup> and the ECOMIG (ECOWAS Mission in The Gambia) force, which includes elements of SSA in its mandate but has been criticized for its lack of alignment with the SSR process in The Gambia.<sup>157</sup>

## Broadening the analytical base for security sector analysis

In fragile contexts, support for SSR/G and SSA must adapt to an increasingly complex operating space in which non-State actors and organized armed groups operate alongside other regional, transnational, and global actors, who combine and compete in myriad ways in pursuit of their own interests. In 2019, when Africa experienced 25 active State-based armed conflicts, this was the highest number on the continent since 1946; but this rose to 30 in 2020 and sat at 28 by 2023, nearly double the 15 active conflicts counted in 2013. While groups affiliated with the Islamic State have been responsible for quite a bit of violence targeting civilians, the engagement of these groups in conflict has dropped in recent years, so that they were fighting actively in just 12 African countries in 2023, down from 18 in 2019.<sup>158</sup>

In several countries, including Somalia, Burkina Faso, and Cameroon, complex dynamics emerged in recent years as new or reignited clashes involving extremist groups have erupted alongside existing armed conflicts.<sup>159</sup> The unconstitutional coups in both Burkina Faso and Niger were in fact the consequence of increased risk combined with a decreasing capacity for coping. And in 2020, an upward trend in fatalities from State-based conflict was "mainly driven by escalating violence in three wars... over government power in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Yemen."<sup>160</sup> Designing security sector support to operate effectively in fragile contexts will thus require a greater emphasis on causes of fragility, political settlements, and the balance of support across the security-development nexus.

Fragility analysis can be helpful in identifying windows of opportunity for effective conflict prevention, especially given that violent conflict and its consequences are more concentrated in fragile contexts than ever before.<sup>161</sup> While the potential for conflict varies in these contexts, serious deteriorations in fragility frequently correlate with rising violence, as events in Nicaragua have demonstrated, leading to a surge of ODA directed to the country by multilateral actors in recent years.<sup>162</sup> This risk exists in some states that are not currently analysed as part of the fragility framework but are exhibiting significant signs of fragility, such as Lebanon, which "has been grappling with compounding crises."<sup>163</sup> To ensure prevention is effective,

it is therefore prudent to consider the security implications of the causes of fragility.

It is also essential that the political components of SSR/G and SSA strategies are properly resourced with people possessing the skills and knowledge to navigate the complexity of these processes and enhance effectiveness. Thinking and working politically in fragile and conflict-affected contexts involves influencing the behaviour of political actors to develop arrangements that are inclusive and flexible enough to allow for the non-violent resolution of conflict.<sup>164</sup> For this reason, political settlement analysis moves beyond an examination of the distribution of power within a particular system, which is the focus of political economy analysis, and interrogates the institutional rules of the game that form or preserve a tacit settlement in a fragile context.<sup>165</sup> This focus on politics is crucial to effective SSR/G, and such an analysis may help donors evolve from prescribing interventions that reflect their interpretation of best practices, towards more awareness and contemplation of the role their interventions play in influencing or maintaining a political settlement.<sup>166</sup> By taking this approach, it becomes clear that investments in justice, rule of law, and SSR/G are needed as a means of addressing the perceptions of exclusion and the grievances that lead to violent conflict; as is the role played by diplomats in fragile contexts (See Annex C).

The evidence for more balanced support across the security-development nexus is accumulating. Increasingly, members of the OECD DAC are acknowledging this in their strategies for conflict and crisis prevention and citing the importance of justice and security to sustaining peace. Such is the case in Germany's thematic, interministerial strategies on transitional justice, rule of law, and security sector reform, which form part of the government's guidelines on Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, and Building Peace.<sup>167</sup> This trend points to the potential for better alignment between conflict prevention and security sector strategies. Building on this momentum within the framework of the DAC Recommendation on the HDP Nexus and exploring the potential for future dialogue on peace, security, and development can help ensure that support for security sectors in fragile and conflict-affected contexts adapts to address the issues most central to sustaining peace.

# Annex A: ODA expenditures by DAC members

## A more detailed look at ODA funding to SSR/G in fragile contexts

As outlined in Chapter 2, assessments of the volume of official development assistance (ODA) directed to SSR/G vary depending on the nature and type of activities that are classified as security related. For example, this paper includes an analysis of this assistance that applies an expansive definition integrating the activities captured in 13 purpose codes of the OECD's Creditor Reporting System (CRS).<sup>168</sup> This provides insight into funding for a wider range of activities that should be considered for incorporation into security and development processes, as argued throughout this text. And by applying this expansive definition, it was determined that US\$4.7 billion was allocated by DAC members to security-related activities in 2019, equalling 6 per cent of their total spending on ODA and 13.5 times what was spent on SSR/G using the strictest definition.

Still, if we apply the strictest definition of SSR/G, confining our analysis to disbursements associated only with CRS purpose code 15210 (Security system management and reform), the ODA assigned to this purpose code and delivered by DAC members to fragile contexts amounted to US\$152 million in 2022. This was a mere 0.3 per cent of the total ODA of these countries and represented the lowest share of ODA for this purpose code since 2007. DAC ODA to a broader set of conflict, peace, and security interventions in fragile contexts in 2022 amounted to US\$1.5 billion, or 3.1 per cent of their total ODA in these contexts.

The range of these estimates underscores the degree of variance that can inform assessments of SSR/G and SSR/G-related activities, and the funding that flows to these interventions. The table below offers more detailed descriptions of the 13 CRS purpose codes that capture security-related activities, as per the expanded definition used for analysis in this paper.

**Table A1. Purpose codes of the DAC CRS for security-related activities**

| Code  | Name                                           | Description                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
|-------|------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 15111 | Public finance management (PFM)                | Fiscal policy and planning; support to ministries of finance; strengthening financial and managerial accountability; public expenditure management; improving financial management systems; budget drafting; inter-governmental fiscal relations, public audit, public debt.                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 15113 | Anti-corruption organisations and institutions | Specialised organisations, institutions and frameworks for the prevention of and combat against corruption, bribery, money-laundering and other aspects of organised crime, with or without law enforcement powers, e.g. anti-corruption commissions and monitoring bodies, special investigation services, institutions and initiatives of integrity and ethics oversight, specialised NGOs, other civil society and citizens' organisations directly concerned with corruption. |

| Code  | Name                                    | Description                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
|-------|-----------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 15130 | Legal and judicial development          | Support to institutions, systems and procedures of the justice sector, both formal and informal; support to ministries of justice, the interior and home affairs; judges and courts; legal drafting services; bar and lawyers associations; professional legal education; maintenance of law and order and public safety; border management; law enforcement agencies, police, prisons and their supervision; ombudsmen; alternative dispute resolution, arbitration and mediation; legal aid and counsel; traditional, indigenous and paralegal practices that fall outside the formal legal system. Measures that support the improvement of legal frameworks, constitutions, laws and regulations; legislative and constitutional drafting and review; legal reform; integration of formal and informal systems of law. Public legal education; dissemination of information on entitlements and remedies for injustice; awareness campaigns.                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 15160 | Human rights                            | Measures to support specialised official human rights institutions and mechanisms at universal, regional, national and local levels in their statutory roles to promote and protect civil and political, economic, social and cultural rights as defined in international conventions and covenants; translation of international human rights commitments into national legislation; reporting and follow-up; human rights dialogue. Human rights defenders and human rights NGOs; human rights advocacy, activism, mobilisation; awareness raising and public human rights education. Human rights programming targeting specific groups, e.g. children, persons with disabilities, migrants, ethnic, religious, linguistic and sexual minorities, indigenous people and those suffering from caste discrimination, victims of trafficking, victims of torture.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 15180 | Ending violence against women and girls | Support to programmes designed to prevent and eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls/gender-based violence. This encompasses a broad range of forms of physical, sexual and psychological violence including but not limited to: intimate partner violence (domestic violence); sexual violence; female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C); child, early and forced marriage; acid throwing; honour killings; and trafficking of women and girls. Prevention activities may include efforts to empower women and girls; change attitudes, norms and behaviour; adopt and enact legal reforms; and strengthen implementation of laws and policies on ending violence against women and girls, including through strengthening institutional capacity. Interventions to respond to violence against women and girls/gender-based violence may include expanding access to services including legal assistance, psychosocial counselling and health care; training personnel to respond more effectively to the needs of survivors; and ensuring investigation, prosecution and punishment of perpetrators of violence. |

| Code  | Name                                                                          | Description                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|-------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 15190 | Facilitation of orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility | <p>Assistance to developing countries that facilitates the orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through capacity building in migration and mobility policy, analysis, planning and management. This includes support to facilitate safe and regular migration and address irregular migration, engagement with diaspora and programmes enhancing the development impact of remittances and/or their use for developmental projects in developing countries. • Measures to improve migrant labour recruitment systems in developing countries. • Capacity building for strategy and policy development as well as legal and judicial development (including border management) in developing countries. This includes support to address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration, and strengthen the transnational response to smuggling of migrants and preventing and combating trafficking in human beings. Support to effective strategies to ensure international protection and the right to asylum. • Support to effective strategies to ensure access to justice and assistance for displaced persons. Assistance to migrants for their safe, dignified, informed and voluntary return to their country of origin (covers only returns from another developing country; assistance to forced returns is excluded from ODA). • Assistance to migrants for their sustainable reintegration in their country of origin (use code 93010 for pre-departure assistance provided in donor countries in the context of voluntary returns).</p> |
| 15210 | Security system management and reform                                         | <p>Technical co-operation provided to parliament, government ministries, law enforcement agencies and the judiciary to assist review and reform of the security system to improve democratic governance and civilian control; technical co-operation provided to government to improve civilian oversight and democratic control of budgeting, management, accountability and auditing of security expenditure, including military budgets, as part of a public expenditure management programme; assistance to civil society to enhance its competence and capacity to scrutinise the security system so that it is managed in accordance with democratic norms and principles of accountability, transparency and good governance.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| 15220 | Civilian peace-building conflict prevention and resolution                    | <p>Support for civilian activities related to peace building, conflict prevention and resolution, including capacity building, monitoring, dialogue and information exchange. Bilateral participation in international civilian peace missions such as those conducted by the UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) or the European Union (European Security and Defence Policy), and contributions to civilian peace funds or commissions (e.g. Peacebuilding Commission, Peacebuilding thematic window of the MDG achievement fund etc.). The contributions can take the form of financing or provision of equipment or civilian or military personnel (e.g. for training civilians).</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |

| Code  | Name                                                   | Description                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
|-------|--------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 15230 | Participation in international peacekeeping operations | Bilateral participation in peacekeeping operations mandated or authorised by the United Nations (UN) through Security Council resolutions, and conducted by international organisations, e.g. UN, NATO, the European Union (Security and Defence Policy security-related operations), or regional groupings of developing countries. Direct contributions to the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) budget are excluded from bilateral ODA (they are reportable in part as multilateral ODA). The activities that can be reported as bilateral ODA under this code are limited to: human rights and election monitoring; reintegration of demobilised soldiers; rehabilitation of basic national infrastructure; monitoring or retraining of civil administrators and police forces; security sector reform and other rule of law-related activities; training in customs and border control procedures; advice or training in fiscal or macroeconomic stabilisation policy; repatriation and demobilisation of armed factions, and disposal of their weapons; explosive mine removal. The enforcement aspects of international peacekeeping operations are not reportable as ODA. ODA-eligible bilateral participation in peacekeeping operations can take the form of financing or provision of equipment or military or civilian personnel (e.g. police officers). The reportable cost is calculated as the excess over what the personnel and equipment would have cost to maintain had they not been assigned to take part in a peace operation. Costs for military contingents participating in UNDPKO peacekeeping operations are not reportable as ODA. International peacekeeping operations may include humanitarian-type activities (contributions to the form of equipment or personnel), as described in codes 7xxxx. |
| 15240 | Reintegration and SALW control                         | Reintegration of demobilised military personnel into the economy; conversion of production facilities from military to civilian outputs; technical co-operation to control, prevent and/or reduce the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) – see para. 80 of the Directives for definition of SALW activities covered.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| 15250 | Removal of land mines and explosive remnants of war    | All activities related to land mines and explosive remnants of war which have benefits to developing countries as their main objective, including removal of land mines and explosive remnants of war, and stockpile destruction for developmental purposes [other than in the context of an international peacekeeping operation (15230)]; risk education and awareness raising; rehabilitation, reintegration and assistance to victims, and research and development on demining and clearance. Only activities for civilian purposes are ODA-eligible.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| 15261 | Child soldiers (prevention and demobilization)         | Technical co-operation provided to government – and assistance to civil society organisations – to support and apply legislation designed to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers, and to demobilise, disarm, reintegrate, repatriate and resettle (DDR) child soldiers.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
| 16063 | Narcotics control                                      | In-country and customs controls including training of the police; educational programmes and awareness campaigns to restrict narcotics traffic and in-country distribution. ODA recording of narcotics control expenditures is limited to activities that focus on economic development and welfare including alternative development programmes and crop substitution.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |

## Further analysis of ODA expenditures directed to security-related activities

In 2022, donors disbursed US\$5.3 billion in ODA to security-related activities in fragile contexts. This was the third-highest amount historically (behind US\$6.1 billion in 2020 and US\$5.8 billion in 2010) but constituted a lower share of ODA than that directed to traditional social sectors such as education, health, and humanitarian assistance. Moreover, though this ODA supported SSR/G-related objectives, in many cases it was not integrated into an existing SSR process in the recipient country. This underscores the inefficiency with which ODA is targeted to SSR and speaks to the need for consistent funding to security sectors in fragile contexts as a means of better ensuring the quality of support they receive.


A majority of the ODA allocated to security-related activities that year (58 per cent) was concentrated under three purpose codes: public financial management (15111), accounting for US\$2.8 billion (or 24 per cent) of the total; civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution (15220), which received US\$2.7 billion (23 per cent of the total); and human rights (15160), comprising US\$1.2 billion (11 per cent). Interventions aimed at legal and

judicial development, ending violence against women and girls, and SSR/G all received under 10 per cent of security-related ODA. The fact that so much security-related ODA was directed towards peacebuilding and human rights highlights the political nature of interventions in fragile contexts and the need to ensure that engagement is politically informed.

The broad approach used here to define security-related activities suggests a broader perspective should also be considered for use among donors. At the same time, it underscores the need for a coherent and focused, but adaptable, framework that prioritizes the specific needs of a given security sector in the context of national security and development processes. However, such a framework must also have the flexibility to be applied beyond single country contexts, as more than one-quarter (29 per cent) of the ODA disbursed to security-related activities in 2022 was global or multi-country in scope.

Fragile contexts were the recipients of approximately 45 per cent of ODA allocated to security-related activities worldwide in 2022. Nicaragua topped this list, receiving US\$544 million, or 14 per cent of the total ODA expenditures to fragile contexts, largely due to funding directed

**Figure A1. Top 20 recipients in fragile contexts of DAC ODA to security-related activities, 2022**



Source: OECD (2023), OECD Data Explorer, Creditor Reporting System (flows) database, accessed 28 March 2023

towards the PFM purpose code. As Figure A1 (below) shows, Nicaragua was followed by Nigeria (US\$356 million), the Democratic Republic of Congo (US\$349 million), and Iraq (US\$287 million). Altogether, these four countries received 39 per cent of total ODA to security-related activities in fragile contexts that year. Notably, the top 20 recipients of this assistance in fragile contexts were distributed broadly across regions and income levels (see Figure A1).

Identifying existing gaps depends on analyses like this one to help develop our understanding of the true footprint of a security sector, which can be difficult to gain a clear view of, as the financial flows into and out of security sectors are largely veiled. The OECD's Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD) framework, first published in 2019, offers ways to address contradictions between security and development, in part by ensuring dedicated investments in data collection, management, and analysis.<sup>169</sup> The framework is intended to comprehensively track external official support for sustainable development, delivered through official interventions, and facilitate a common international reporting standard (see Box A1, below).<sup>170</sup> This could feasibly be linked to a global architecture that facilitates regular dialogue and exchange, and better alignment of funding for security and justice.<sup>171</sup>

### Box A1. Alternative approaches to tracking peace and security expenditures

Tracking peace and security expenditures in the TOSSD system, and thus providing more transparency on funding in this area, must be balanced with the risk of including activities in TOSSD that carry significant risks of undermining the SDGs. As the TOSSD Task Force considers how to approach this moving forward, findings from a 2019 pilot study are relevant to their deliberations.<sup>172</sup>

These include findings that:

- There is potential value in capturing external security assistance in TOSSD to address gaps resulting from off-budget security and justice expenditures and associated issues of transparency and data integrity.


- Some thought should be given to categorizing expenditures to peacekeeping operations (i.e. those following the basic principles UN peacekeeping, of consent of the parties, impartiality, non-use of force except in self-defence, and defence of the mandate) as disbursements to international/regional public goods (Pillar II), reflecting that these operations, even if located in individual contexts, address a threat to international peace and security and hence a global challenge.
- Disarmament is eligible for tracking in TOSSD, including activities conducted in the context of DDR, Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) control, removal of land mines and explosive remnants of war, and the reduction and elimination of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons.
- The eligibility of activities aimed at combating terrorism and organized crime for tracking in TOSSD should be guided by two international documents rooted in global consensus, with clear linkages to sustainable development, which identify specific areas of intervention – the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy (GCTS) and the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) with its three supplementary Protocols on Trafficking in Persons, Smuggling of Migrants, and Trafficking of Firearms.
- Despite limits on the types of military assistance covered in TOSSD, the inclusion of support to SSR that builds the capacity of armed forces to improve civilian oversight should be considered, as this contributes to sustainable development, which is eligible for tracking in TOSSD. On top of this, it is worth contemplating the inclusion of training provided to a partner countries' military in delivering any activity for the benefit of civilians that has a development impact, as well as support to the delivery of humanitarian assistance by a military.
- Principles and safeguards should set the context for reporting and classification.

# Annex B: The roles of external security actors

Security actors engage in a range of tasks vital to sustaining peace and development in fragile contexts, from support for elections and human rights monitoring, to SSR and DDR. These initiatives, which are often operationalized through joint efforts of international

actors (development, peacebuilding, and political) and local security actors, constitute key components of most peace agreements and are central to international support for peace.


**Figure B1. External security actors and security activities in fragile contexts**



Source: OECD (2023), States of Fragility online platform, accessed 05 April 2023.

# Annex C. Diplomacy, security, development

Figure C1. Diplomatic actors and diplomatic functions in fragile contexts



Note: This infographic, provides an overview of the different diplomatic functions and actors that matters for peace in fragile contexts, as well as how they relate to each other. It is not a comprehensive mapping of the global diplomatic system.

Source: OECD (2023), *States of Fragility* online platform, accessed 05 April 2023.

# Endnotes

- 1 This analysis includes 13 purpose codes from the OECD Creditor Reporting System. See Annex A.
- 2 These States are: Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. As of the time of publication, the Interim Taliban Administration has yet to issue a National Development Strategy.
- 3 Political declaration adopted at the high-level political forum on sustainable development convened under the auspices of the General Assembly (A/RES/78/1).
- 4 World Bank, *Violence without Borders: The Internationalization of Crime and Conflict* (Washington, D.C., 2020); and United Nations and World Bank, *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict* (Washington, D.C., 2018), p. 161.
- 5 OECD, *OECD DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform (SSR): Supporting Security and Justice* (2007), p. 3.
- 6 The security-development nexus should be seen as an important subset of the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus. As much as possible, the modalities used to advance policy and programmes for the security-development nexus should draw from and link to progress across broader HDP activities, avoiding duplication or the development of silos.
- 7 Robert B. Zoellick, President of the World Bank, “Securing Development,” speech delivered at the Passing of the Baton conference, United States Institute of Peace, 8 January 2009.
- 8 For more, see: OECD, *OECD DAC Handbook on Security Sector Reform (SSR)*, p. 13; Stephen Watts et al., *Building Security in Africa: An Evaluation of U.S. Security Sector Assistance in Africa from the Cold War to the Present* (RAND Corporation, 2018); and DCAF/ISSAT, *SSR In a Nutshell: Manual for Introductory Training on Security Sector Reform* (2016).
- 9 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, “Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform” (A/62/659–S/2008/39), 23 January 2008.
- 10 Ibid. It should be noted that SSR is a political and technical process aimed at improving state and human security by making security provision, management, and oversight more effective and more accountable; but it can also be an inclusive process involving all State and non-State actors engaged in security provision, management, and oversight, and emphasizing the interdependence of their roles, responsibilities, and actions.
- 11 United Nations SSR Task Force, *Security Sector Reform: Integrated Technical Guidance Notes* (2012).
- 12 What is Human Security? – The Human Security Unit
- 13 World Bank, *World Development Report 2014: Risk and Opportunity – Managing Risk for Development* (Washington, D.C., 2013).
- 14 United Nations and World Bank, *Pathways for Peace*.
- 15 World Bank, *World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law* (Washington, D.C., 2017).
- 16 OECD, *States of Fragility 2020* (Paris, 2020); and Therése Pettersson and Magnus Öberg, “Organized violence, 1989–2019,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 57, No. 4 (2020), pp. 597–613.
- 17 OECD, *States of Fragility 2022* (Paris, 2022).
- 18 OECD, *States of Fragility 2020*.
- 19 2023 data from the Global Peace Index.
- 20 Data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) on historical deaths from war (State) taking a three-year rolling average (highest per capita deaths to lowest above 1 for 100,000).
- 21 Clionadh Raleigh, “Global Conflict and Disorder Patterns: 2020,” paper presented at a 2020 Munich Security Conference side event hosted by ACLED and the GCSP, 14 February 2020.

- 22 World Bank, *Violence without Borders*.
- 23 Christine Cheng, Jonathan Goodhand, and Patrick Meehan, *Securing and Sustaining Elite Bargains that Reduce Violent Conflict*, Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project (UK Government Stabilisation Unit, 2018).
- 24 Héní Nsaibia, "State atrocities in the Sahel: The impetus for counterinsurgency results is fueling government attacks on civilians," ACLED, 20 May 2020, <https://acleddata.com/2020/05/20/state-atrocities-in-the-sahel-the-impetus-for-counter-insurgency-results-is-fueling-government-attacks-on-civilians/>.
- 25 Gergely Hideg and Anna Alvazzi del Frate, "Still Not There: Global Violent Deaths Scenarios, 2019–30," SANA Briefing Paper, February 2021.
- 26 United Nations, *The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2023* (New York, 2023), p. 44.
- 27 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Global Study on Homicide 2023* (New York, 2023), p. 19.
- 28 United Nations, *A New Agenda for Peace*, Our Common Agenda Policy Brief 9 (2023), p. 9.
- 29 Harsh Desai, *Justice and the rule of law in fragile contexts* (OECD, forthcoming).
- 30 See the database at: <https://aidworkersecurity.org> (accessed 15 November 2024). Also see: Humanitarian Outcomes, "Aid Worker Security Report: Figures at a glance," USAID, 2024.
- 31 Abby Stoddard et al., *Humanitarian Access SCORE Report: 2020 Global Synthesis* (Humanitarian Outcomes and USAID, 2021).
- 32 See: "Yemen rebels target Saudi desalination plant: coalition," *France 24*, 20 June 2019, <https://www.france24.com/en/20190620-yemen-rebels-target-saudi-desalination-plant-coalition>; and Jeannie Sowers and Erika Weinthal, "Humanitarian challenges and the targeting of civilian infrastructure in the Yemen war," *International Affairs* 97, no. 1 (2021), pp. 157–177.
- 33 Rebekka Grun, Mira Saidi, and Paul M. Bisca, "Adapting social safety net operations to insecurity in the Sahel," SASPP Policy Note Series No. 1, November 2020.
- 34 International Crisis Group, "Women and Al-Shabaab's Insurgency," Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 145, 27 June 2019.
- 35 Rachel Kleinfeld and Robert Muggah, "The State of War," *Foreign Policy*, 18 March 2019, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/18/the-state-of-war/>.
- 36 OECD, *States of Fragility 2016* (Paris, 2016).
- 37 DAC members include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the European Union Institutions, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
- 38 Mohib Iqbal, Harrison Bardwell, and David Hammond, "Estimating the Global Economic Cost of Violence: Methodology Improvements and Estimate Updates," *Defence and Peace Economics*, Vol. 32, no. 4 (2019) pp. 403–426; and Harsh Desai, *Conflict Prevention in Fragile Contexts*, OECD Development Co-operation Working Paper No. 78 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2020), p. 16. Also see: Olaf J. de Groot et al., "The Global Economic Burden of Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 59, no. 2 (2022), pp. 259–276.
- 39 Insecurity can disrupt economic activity through a number of channels. Fear resulting from violence can increase transport costs or postpone investments; there may be indirect effects such as the breakdown of political institutions and public services like health and education; and effects may spill over into other countries as well, such as in the case of a refugee crisis. Here, these economic impacts are categorized as a result of collective violence (costs associated with instrumental violence inflicted by groups such as States, militias, or terrorist organizations), interpersonal violence (costs due to violence between individuals such as homicide and assault), and violence containment (costs incurred due to a lack of peace and safety, and as a consequence of violence and civil unrest).

- 40 Michael Shurkin and Anelise Bernard, "Ten things the United States should do to combat terrorism in the Sahel," *War on the Rocks*, 30 August 2021, <https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/ten-things-the-united-states-should-do-to-combat-terrorism-in-the-sahel/>
- 41 Gordon Adams and Richard Sokolsky, "Governance and Security Sector Assistance: The Missing Link—Part II," *Lawfare*, 19 July 2015, <https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/governance-and-security-sector-assistance-missing-link%e2%80%94part-ii>; and Rachel Kleinfeld, "Fragility and Security Sector Reform," FSG Policy Brief No. 3, September 2016.
- 42 Denis M. Tull, "The European Union Training Mission and the struggle for a new model army in Mali," IRSEM Research Paper No. 89, 11 February 2020.
- 43 See: Stephen Watts, "The Problem of Security Sector Assistance in Africa," in *Identifying and Mitigating Risks in Security Sector Assistance for Africa's Fragile States* (RAND, 2015).
- 44 Bernard Harborne, William Dorotinsky, and Paul M. Bisca, eds., *Securing Development: Public Finance and the Security Sector* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2017), p. 7.
- 45 RAND, "Reforming Security Sector Assistance for Africa," Research Brief RB-10028-OSD/AFRICOM (2018).
- 46 Calin Trenkov-Wermuth and Paul M. Bisca, "Global Fragility Act: A Chance to Reshape International Security Assistance?" *United States Institute of Peace*, 19 January 2021, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/01/global-fragility-act-chance-reshape-international-security-assistance>.
- 47 As of January 2015, international forces were engaged in Afghanistan as part of Resolute Support Mission (RSM) – a train, advise, and assist mission to support Afghan security forces and institutions.
- 48 World Bank, *Violence without Borders*.
- 49 Christoph Zürcher, *Meta-Review of Evaluations of Development Assistance to Afghanistan, 2008–2018* (German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2020).
- 50 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, *Divided Responsibility: Lessons from U.S. Security Sector Assistance in Afghanistan* (Arlington, VA: SIGAR, 2019), p. 60.
- 51 Trenkov-Wermuth and Bisca, "Global Fragility Act."
- 52 Trenkov-Wermuth and Bisca, "Global Fragility Act."
- 53 OECD, *States of Fragility 2020*.
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